

12 ||| A Coup against King Bureaucracy?

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OFFICIALS at a state university, authorized to lease space for off-campus programs in a nearby city, find it is more cost-effective to purchase the site outright. They take the initiative and arrange for the purchase using funds set aside for the lease.

Administrators at a county hospital in California grow increasingly concerned with the lack of prenatal care available to needy local residents. They develop a program to provide comprehensive care through improved use of existing resources and mobilization of public and private resources, volunteers, and grants.

Faced with the need to encourage recycling, a Minnesota municipality develops a high-technology solution to the problem. Using hand-held computers to scan bar-code stickers on recycling bins, the town monitors residential use of recycling and adjusts trash collection bills accordingly—the more recycling, the lower the bill.

Iowa was having a problem finding a market for recyclable waste generated by local business. The solution was to establish a by-product and waste search service, through which state administrators play matchmaker between generators of recyclable waste and potential users.

These cases might be dismissed as mere isolated innovative actions by government administrators.¹ But stories like these pepper the specialized journals that focus on the work of state and local governments. Recent issues of *Governing* magazine, for example, have highlighted innovations in property acquisition and leasing, responding to community challenges to waste disposal plans, reducing paperwork burdens, lowering the costs of com-

puter maintenance contracts, increasing the power of local human service agencies, building facilities that turn waste into energy, and reclaiming abandoned industrial sites for productive uses. Competitive awards celebrating innovative excellence in state and local governments have not lacked for nominations, and university centers devoted to improving government productivity have been busy providing support to officials requesting help with new projects.

For American public administration, in short, necessity has become the spur of change and innovation. Stirred to action by budget cuts attributable to tax revolts and economic downturns, government administrators have responded with creative solutions that challenge the stereotypical image of the recalcitrant bureaucrat. Administrators have begun breaking free of the constraints that have characterized their jobs. Insofar as they have loosened those binds, they have engaged in deregulating government. In doing so, they have forged ahead of political leaders, academics, and the "good government" reformers who have traditionally led the charge for changes in public administration.

Recently, the nation has witnessed the conversion of this ad hoc process into a consolidated reform movement, a version of the so-called management revolution that spread throughout corporate America in the 1980s.² That revolution also began when managers broke through well-established organizational constraints and market barriers. It first came to the public's attention through Tom Peters and Robert Waterman's *In Search of Excellence*, a study built on observations of what successful companies were doing that made them stand out during a business decline.³ Even the jargon of that private sector movement, from *total quality management* and *entrepreneurialism* to *liberation management* and *learning organizations*, has become common wherever public officials meet to discuss reforming government.

The similarities do not end there, for just as a private sector revolution has generated a variety of managerial reforms, deregulating government is but one reform to emerge in response to what is taking place in the public sector. In what ways does this impulse resemble other reform efforts that have gained support in recent years? What are the prospects for significant and sustainable change under deregulation or its alternatives?

A New Movement toward Reform

Change in government has been promoted by rekindled public interest in administrative reform.⁴ The increase in innovative government actions has been one product of this renewed focus. Another has been the development of relevant administrative theories that—separately or together—might provide an intellectual framework for reform.

Theories of Reform

The question of whether government administrators' actions preceded administrative theories in the development of reform initiatives or vice versa might be important for historians, but for purposes here it is enough to think of the two as having emerged simultaneously. The conditions that launched the innovative actions in the United States and abroad—economic recession and stagflation, tight energy resources, awareness of environmental degradation, the failure of domestic social and economic policies—also stimulated rethinking about what government is and how it should work. Among the products of that rethinking were three theories of government administration:

- the minimal state theory, closely associated with the administrative strategies used by the Reagan administration;
- deregulating government, which has found favor among some academics and leaders in public administration, including members of the Volcker and Winter commissions; and
- reinventing government, which has received considerable attention in the news media and has attracted a following among public sector professionals and politicians.

The label of minimal statism can be applied to similar schools of thought that have roots in the work of Frederick A. Hayek and Milton Friedman and draw intellectual sustenance from the work of William A. Niskanen, Gordon Tullock, Nobel laureate James M. Buchanan, and other members of the "public choice" school.⁵ Robert Nozick, a leading advocate of the perspective, calls for a government with limited functions: "protecting all citizens against violence, theft, and fraud, and . . . [guaranteeing] the enforcement of contracts."⁶ To the extent that an administrative theory emerges

from this outlook (I shall call its adherents minimalists), it is anti-bureaucratic and focuses on adapting the practices of corporate management to the public sector. This managerialism involves forcing agency heads to contend with a competitive rather than merely administrative environment.

In a competitive situation, they had to meet prevailing expectations outside their control. They had to keep on their toes. They could not afford to relax; otherwise somebody else might steal a march on them. They could never feel completely secure. They had to keep running just to stay in the same place. To advance, they had to be better and do better. They had to keep up with improvements and, more importantly, they had to try to be first with improvements. They had every incentive to police themselves, improve their own functioning and adjust to changing conditions.⁷

During the Reagan administration, minimalism was implemented through various means that sought diminished expectations of government; budgetary restraints and centralized decisionmaking; a leaner and more responsive political establishment; and a focus on a few objectives of overriding national importance.⁸ Administration officials also used management techniques aimed at minimizing the number and importance of career federal administrators: "President Reagan's essentially negative view of government intervention included an equally negative view of the public service."⁹

In contrast to the minimalist position, the views reflected in this volume, especially in James Q. Wilson's call for deregulating government, contend that too many controls and constraints harry public servants.¹⁰ Addressing the need for better performance among federal agencies, the 1989 report of the National Commission on the Public Service (the Volcker commission) urges that

once presidential choices are made . . . the decisions should be implemented in the federal departments and agencies where the President's own appointees and government's top career managers must have both authority and responsibility. The jobs will be done well or poorly depending on their competence, morale, and commitment, not on the rules and reporting requirements im-

posed by the White House staff, Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and Office of Personnel Management (OPM).¹¹

Disentangling government agencies from overintrusive White House control is only one problem adherents of deregulation seek to redress. They have been equally critical of congressional micromanagement and judicial interference.¹² Wilson observes that among all advanced nations the United States seems to have the most rule-bound bureaucracies. This he attributes to the American character and public mores as well as to the distinctive institutional context within which U.S. government agencies must operate.¹³ Although no deregulator advocates a relaxation of all constraints, they all regard the elimination of some and loosening of others as critical to improving government performance.

The third theory, reinventing government, lacks the academic underpinnings of the others and in fact cites authors from the other approaches approvingly.¹⁴ But although they draw rationalizations from the advocates of minimal statism and deregulating government, the reinventors take their true inspiration from the experience of practitioners. From such a composite of theory and practice, a journalist, David Osborne, and a former city manager, Ted Gaebler, coauthored the bible of this approach, *Reinventing Government*. The popularity of this book and similar works was one of the most visible signs that this movement was widespread and had gained momentum.¹⁵ Given its dozens of case studies drawn from state and local governments, the work found a receptive audience among administrators at those levels. As Jonathan Walters reports, "lots of state and local officials are getting plenty done, [and] 'reinvention,' by whatever name is going on all over the country."¹⁶

Ideas posited by Osborne and Gaebler had the enthusiastic endorsement of Bill Clinton, and many appeared as major planks in his 1992 presidential platform. Clinton followed through on those platform promises by creating a National Performance Review task force headed by Vice President Al Gore. The theme of "reinventing" was preeminent in the work of the task force, and when the group's 168-page formal report was unveiled on September 7, 1993, the inside-the-beltway media attributed principal authorship to "reinventing government guru and NPR consultant David Osborne."¹⁷

Differences among the Theories

In many respects, these three theories of government reform would seem better described as ideological alternatives than as the basis for a single political movement. The minimalist position is clearly antigovernment. William A. Niskanen, the premier theorist of minimal bureaucracy and an important economic advisor to the Reagan and Bush administrations, portrayed this perspective best when presenting his "dream that Washington might once again be a quiet southern town with several major shrines and minor universities and where everyone, other than tourists, had the good sense to leave town in the summer."¹⁸ In contrast, the advocates of reinventing show no reluctance in touting the virtues of greater reliance on government, once it is reconfigured into reinvented forms. The deregulators tend to be more centrist, advocating the effective government where it can be most appropriately used.

Differences among the three are just as evident in the strategies each would employ to promote reform. In general terms they offer three distinct strategic options: push, release, and pull. The minimalists regard a forceful push into the abyss of budget and personnel cuts as the only effective means to bring needed changes. Bureaucrats, they contend, thrive in times of plenty, but in the face of significant budget cuts they would develop creative means of using whatever resources they have. The result will be a leaner government. For proof the minimalists point to startling innovations made by administrators at all levels of government under the budget limitations of the 1970s and 1980s.

The deregulators want to release administrators from increasingly binding constraints. Greater flexibility is their call to arms: let administrators do what they can do best is the underlying theme.¹⁹ And if, operating free of arbitrary binds, they do not deliver, the failure may signal that government should not be involved in a particular activity.²⁰

The reinventors are more traditional. Reform is to be accomplished by example and through political means. Their pull orientation provides the rationale for energizing a politically effective movement. To focus that energy, they call for revolutionizing how the nation thinks about government and the way things get done. Innovative actions of public officials represent "nothing less than a shift in the basic model of governance used in America."

This shift is under way all around us, but because we are not looking for it—because we assume that all governments have to be big, centralized, and bureaucratic—we seldom see it. We are blind to the new realities because they do not fit our preconceptions. . . . What we need most if this revolution is to succeed . . . is a new framework for understanding government, a new way of thinking about government.²¹

Thus what the reinventing government approach lacks in theoretical originality is made up for with a firm belief in the ability to institute comprehensive improvements through rethinking government and taking advantage of a political situation in which all the conditions for reform are present.²²

Strange Bedfellows, One Blanket

In spite of the ideological and strategic differences among the strands of the reform movement, there is a common theme: the urge to debureaucratize government administration. Debureaucratization is an idea neither new nor restricted to critics of American government. Frustration among political leaders and others at what they perceive as the more pernicious effects of big government has been endemic worldwide for decades.²³ In the British Commonwealth, administrative reforms such as the new public management have emerged in New Zealand, Australia, and the United Kingdom. Scandinavian nations have embarked on programs to renew their national administrative systems, and even the highly centralized French government adopted a plan that would endow the provinces with greater importance.²⁴

Nor would advocates of debureaucratization have to search far for the domestic roots of the impulse. Innovative public programs that have broken free of the constraints of bureaucratic procedures have been common. "America is constantly inventing itself," observed Bruce Smith a decade ago, "and the capacity to invent new ways of accomplishing the public's business has been a great strength."²⁵ The working technology of public action greatly expanded between the 1930s and 1960s.²⁶ Government contracting and other strategies were adopted at all levels of American government. The responses to the challenges of the times received little

attention,²⁷ but they established a practical legacy for the debureaucratization movement.

If the diverse debureaucratization approaches coalesce to form an effective political movement, it will not be the first time. The movement that created the administrative structure so vehemently challenged by the debureaucratizing coalition was itself the product of a coalition that developed after the Civil War when middle-class reformers sought to end political corruption and adopt more businesslike approaches to government administration. By the early 1900s the coalition had found common ground with both the Progressive movement and the scientific management school.²⁸ The resulting archetype for government, regarded at the time as a significant improvement, is now itself the target of reform common to the minimalist, deregulating, and reinventing focus.

The Bureaucratic Challenge

Unlike earlier reform movements in which the focus was the corruption of public officials and the inefficiencies of government, the advocates of debureaucratization are focused on the logic that has defined the work of the public sector and public administration for nearly half a century.²⁹ Each takes aim at the bureaucratized public sector. Although few would question the significant role played by the bureaucratized public sector in the development of the modern state, it has rarely lacked for critics. Bureaucratization is credited by both friends and foes with having redesigned the social world.³⁰ Thus when approaching the problems of bureaucratization, the new reformers address problems that go beyond the hierarchical forms of public organizations or the creation of bureaucratic personalities. Too much attention to structures, they contend, leads to mere tinkering rather than substantial change, and attacking the behavior of bureaucrats is akin to blaming the victim.³¹ Instead, they focus on the way bureaucratization distorts government and the way it operates.

Bureaucratization can accomplish three closely related tasks. It can reduce uncertainty; it can impose order; and, through appropriate designs, it can constrain and guide the very power its orderliness unleashes. These are desirable functions, but each also generates a challenge to effective governance. Reducing uncertainty means minimizing disruptive forces from outside (competition, for exam-

ple) and from within the organization (as with innovativeness). Orderliness, brought about primarily through hierarchical structures, has similar stifling consequences and can separate an organization from reality. These negative results have often been reinforced through restrictions that were mostly designed with other dangers in mind.

Redressing these results demands rethinking bureaucratic logic. For many of the new reformers, debureaucratizing requires transformation of ideas, a revolution that changes the model of governance.

For the minimalists, bureaucratization manifests itself in big, expanding government agencies administered (as opposed to managed) for the benefit of the agencies and those that support them. Beyond proselytizing for smaller government, minimalists want to push remaining agencies into more competitive, market-based circumstances. Under such conditions, they argue, the urge to survive will generate less bureaucratic behavior. But to accomplish this will require a radically different formulation in the logic that structures and operates government. Thus America must adopt a more democratic paradigm based on a theory of public goods: "When the central problem in public administration is viewed as the provision of public goods and services, alternative forms of organization may be available for the performance of [public service] . . . functions apart from an extension and perfection of bureaucratic structures."³²

Promoting debureaucratization through paradigmatic change is also the focus of those who advocate reinventing government. They scrutinize beliefs "embedded in the bureaucratic paradigm," including the definitive delegation of hierarchical authority, the uniform application of rules and procedures, the reliance on experts to carry out both line and staff functions, a narrow definition of primary responsibilities, and the efficiency of having the centralized staff exercise "unilateral control over line agencies' administrative actions."³³ Michael Barzelay provides a systematic articulation of the bureaucratic paradigm by elaborating a point-by-point comparison with an emerging postbureaucratic paradigm. The bureaucratic paradigm, he contends, focuses on

- the public interest as opposed to "results citizens value,"
- efficiency as opposed to "quality and value,"
- administration as opposed to "production,"

- control as opposed to “winning adherence to norms,”
- specifying functions, authority, and structure as opposed to stressing mission, services, customers, and outcomes,
- justifying costs as opposed to delivering value,
- enforcing responsibility as opposed to building accountability,
- following rules and procedures as opposed to a more norms-based, problem-solving approach, and
- operating administrative systems as opposed to organization strategies based on a continuous process of developing and strengthening appropriate norms and incentives.³⁴

Osborne and Gaebler's view of the bureaucratic paradigm is best captured in what governments would replace by adopting the principles of reinventing:

- bureaucratic commitment to deliver services (“rowing”) must be replaced by a commitment to ensure the provision of such services (“steering”);
- bureaucratic “ownership and control” of programs (“serving”) must be replaced by community-based ownership (“empowerment”);
- bureaucratic propensity for monopolization must be replaced by competition among potential service providers;
- bureaucratic rule-driven organizations must be replaced by mission-driven organizations;
- bureaucratic preoccupation with costs must be replaced by concern for results;
- bureaucratic self-interest and parochialism must be replaced by focus on meeting the needs of the consumer;
- bureaucratic stress on spending must be replaced by an emphasis on earning;
- bureaucratic urge to focus on cures must be replaced by a preventive orientation;
- bureaucratic hierarchicalism must be replaced by more participatory approaches; and
- bureaucratic aversion to the market must be replaced by an embrace of market principles.³⁵

The deregulators are much less likely to label what they are confronting bureaucracy; rather they focus on factors that cause otherwise well-intentioned and well-functioning bureaucracies to adopt pathological behaviors. The problem is not bureaucracy per se, but overbureaucratization, which renders the beneficial ele-

ments of agency operations dysfunctional and counterproductive.³⁶ The primary cause of overbureaucratization is the urge to take administrative control too far. Bureaucracies must balance the pressures to achieve goals with the constraints imposed by policymakers and a public fearful of waste, fraud, and abuse. “Talented, strongly motivated people usually will find ways of making rule-ridden systems work,” James Q. Wilson has commented, but not every agency is blessed with such personnel, and the result may be overbureaucratization that will start at the top of an agency and reach to the lowest levels.³⁷ More tempered reforms—ones that build on greater public trust of administrators—are required if America is to avoid the consequences of too much bureaucratization.

Obstacles to Reform

With debureaucratization as a common theme, the coalition of minimalists, deregulators, and reinventors seems to have the potential to amass the theoretical and strategic resources needed to launch a reform movement.³⁸ Launching a movement and succeeding, however, are not the same. To succeed, they must do three things: offer a viable agenda for reform, which means they must get their theory in order; establish the movement as a credible political force; and move cultural and institutional biases away from supporting the dominant bureaucratic paradigm.

Lack of a Consistent and Coherent Agenda

Exactly what do the members of the debureaucratization coalition want? To say that they seek a less bureaucratized government administration is not enough. Obviously, specific proposals are needed if they are going to get beyond rhetoric: an agenda to act on, one that can be explained to policymakers and the public and packaged as actions for legislators, executives, or managers. To create such an agenda, the three schools must develop a reasonably coherent theoretical structure for their alternative to the bureaucratic paradigm. This will not be easy.

First, the schools vary greatly in the sophistication of their theories, and this variation may prove disruptive if they turn out to be unredeemably incompatible. If they do not, the minimalists have a

clear advantage, for their roots are in the writings of neoclassical and public-choice scholars whose primary concern was building and articulating theory. In contrast the reinventors offer little theoretical underpinning, relying on anecdotal evidence and theory borrowed from others. The deregulators have a clear sense of theory, but it has yet to be formally explicated and instead must be culled from scattered statements made by its advocates.

A sophisticated theory, however, does not necessarily translate into a viable agenda for reform. Reform requires public understanding and support, and all too often it has been the more vacuous theories that have worked best before mass audiences. Furthermore, prescriptions engendered by a well-articulated theory might prove politically and technically infeasible. The objective should be a theory satisfactory to all three schools that can generate a realistic agenda.

The second difficulty with developing a theoretical base for debureaucratization is in the ideological and strategic differences among the three schools. These political differences can erupt at any time and counteract efforts to develop a synthesis of theory. A common enemy—the overly bureaucratized public sector—may not be enough to keep a theory-centered coalition together. To the extent it does, a viable theory might develop and will, in turn, complement the efforts to sustain a credible political effort. However, that intellectual common ground may not be enough, in which case the foundation for theory-building efforts might be provided by those leading the political charge.

The consequences of abandoning the effort to construct a theory and allowing the political agenda to proceed on its own was amply demonstrated by the steps taken early in the Clinton administration to launch its program for reforming government. Lacking a coherent theory, the reinventors had not presented a useful agenda for President Clinton to act on.³⁹ As a result the administration's initial steps, under the banner of reinventing government, were a hodgepodge of initiatives, many of them based on questionable assumptions.⁴⁰

What are the theoretical underpinnings of the debureaucratizing schools? For present purposes, I will compare the three along four dimensions: purpose, personnel, organization, and management procedures. These dimensions address the questions of why, who, what, and how public administration ought to be conducted.⁴¹ This

Figure 12-1. Characteristics of the Bureaucratic Paradigm and Three Reform Approaches

Characteristics	Bureaucratic paradigm	Minimal state	Reinventing government	Deregulating government
Purpose of government	Execution of the will of the state	Provision of public goods and services	Meet citizen expectations	Solve "public" problems
Nature of public servants	Neutrally competent	Rational, self-interested budget maximizers	Entrepreneurs	Public-regarding
Organization of work	Tightly structured hierarchy	Competitive, multiorganizational marketlike setting	"Appropriate" organizational form	Loosely structured hierarchy
Management approach	Close supervision, Standard Operating Procedures	Cost-minimizing, consumer-oriented management	Facilitative management; total quality management	Mediation management; balancing control and flexibility

summary is accomplished, of course, at the risk of oversimplification. Nevertheless, even a general overview can provide a sense of the potential for and content of a debureaucratizing agenda (see figure 12-1).

PURPOSE. What is the primary purpose of government administration? Frank J. Goodnow's "execution of the will of the state" stands as the classic expression of purpose for the bureaucratic paradigm.⁴² The phrase is often preceded with qualifiers—*efficient, effective, equitable*. Drawing the qualifiers together is the instrumental view of public administration implied in Goodnow's statement of purpose.⁴³

Minimalists adhere with considerable consistency to the vision of the minimal state: the purpose of government should be limited to the provision of public goods and services, that is, those goods and services with characteristics such that they cannot be produced or distributed through the private sector. Under the best of circumstances, all goods and services could be classified as either private or public. Most, according to the minimalists, could be produced and distributed through market mechanisms and must be so offered. Others would be provided by the public sector. For mixed goods and services—those that have some divisible and some indi-

visible characteristics—the minimalist bias would be against relying on the public sector because nonmarket mechanisms are, by definition, less efficient than market mechanisms. Where nonmarket means must be used, the minimalists would impose tight fiscal controls to keep costs and inefficiencies down.

For reinventors the primary function of government is to meet citizens' expectations by providing what they value.⁴⁴ The government is a consumer-driven organization. Osborne and Gaebler stress government as catalyst rather than provider of value, which adds another feature unique to the reinventors' theory. In this regard they cite New York Governor Mario Cuomo's statement that "it is not government's obligation to provide services . . . but to see that they're provided."⁴⁵

Deregulators emphasize still another view of the purpose of government: solving public problems. Unlike the minimalists, their definition of what is public is not a technical matter, but a political matter decided by the nation's policymakers. In this sense the deregulators take a traditional view of the purpose of public administration. But they strongly imply that the details should be left to the competent administrators of government programs. Greater freedom for line managers and workers is a constant theme: public and policymakers will be well served by allowing public sector workers to develop solutions to the problems they have been asked to deal with.

PERSONNEL. The bureaucratic paradigm regards the issue of who will best serve the public as a complicated problem reflecting the desire to guarantee that bureaucrats are both competent and non-partisan. Such criteria are the foundations for the merit system as originally designed. In contrast to this neutrally competent standard, the minimalists assume the type of person one actually finds in bureaucratic positions is a rational, self-interested budget maximizer.⁴⁶ The reinventors focus on the entrepreneurial personality within public sector workers. And the deregulators see submerged in overbureaucratized agencies public-regarding persons who act much differently when provided the right incentives.

ORGANIZATION. The bureaucratic paradigm tends to rely on tightly controlled, unified, and centralized hierarchies. The minimalists would create a multiorganizational situation in which market or marketlike interactions (that is, competition) could be maxi-

mized. The reinventors are even more relaxed, advocating the use of whatever structural arrangements would work to help meet citizen expectations. Finally, the deregulators remain committed to the traditional bureaucratic forms but with much looser structures, rules, and regulations.

MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES. In the bureaucratic paradigm the ideal form of management is based on close supervision of employees or at the least management through standard operating procedures and regulations. For the minimalists, those who manage public agencies in a competitive context will, by necessity, have to be cost conscious and more consumer oriented because their jobs depend on it. The reinventors are more facilitative, taking their ideas from the total quality management movement and the work of Tom Peters and his colleagues.⁴⁷ The deregulators regard managers as mediators who must balance the demands for control and guidance with the needs of those on the line trying to solve the public's problems.⁴⁸

AN AGENDA WITHOUT ASSUMPTIONS. Figure 12-1 provides an overview of these positions. There is no doubt that all three schools have an aversion to the traditional bureaucratic paradigm. But it is also striking how little they overlap in their assumptions about government and what it takes to improve it. Developing an agenda that will satisfy all three in detail does not seem feasible (or logically possible) given their differences. Thus two options seem open. The first is to develop a synthesis reflecting their common ground. The second is to adopt an agenda based on the most feasible of the three approaches.

A synthesis of the schools is not out of the question. For example, all three question the traditional assumption that the purpose of government is to serve some abstract entity (the state or the public interest), and all believe that government should deal with more technical ends (public goods and services) or empirical ends (citizen values, specific problems). To the extent that reinventors and deregulators can agree that public problems are defined by what citizens value and expect, there is hope for synthesis at least between those two schools.⁴⁹ Satisfying the minimalists is more difficult, however, for their reliance on the technical definition of what is or is not public does not leave much room for flexibility. But there have been attempts among minimalists to move beyond this view.

Charles Murray, for example, has argued that government should foster the pursuit of happiness for its citizenry; and although he maintains that this is best accomplished through very limited government, his approach might create some room for a useful synthesis on this very significant point.⁵⁰

A synthesis might also emerge on other points. The entrepreneurial public servant does form a bridge between the self-interested and public-regarding extremes, and the reinventors' pragmatic approach toward organizational forms offers an inviting basis for synthesis.⁵¹ The synthesis in the management approach is the idea of a results-oriented method of running government.

Once a general synthesis of theory is worked out, action can be more effectively organized. Although the synthesis might emerge on its own, a more timely elaboration is likely to require the energy generated by political activity.

An alternative approach to developing an agenda would be to take the route of least political and administrative resistance by building the movement around the reforms most likely to sell politically and generate the least opposition from those most directly affected. Questions of politics and implementation are extremely important. Historically, the American constitutional system has been more likely to favor gradual transformations than radical reforms. Thus although the Pendleton Act of 1883 was a watershed in the history of administrative reform, its initial effects were insignificant; not until forty years later could reformers claim that most of their agenda had been adopted.⁵²

Gradual reform will favor the agenda of the deregulators. Deregulating government does not pose a radical challenge to the status quo, which both the minimalists and the reinventors have promised in their statements. As described by the Volcker and Winter commissions, the agenda of the deregulators focuses on changes that many regard as both necessary and feasible. This is especially true for public personnel policy; people representing all shades of the political spectrum have urged greater flexibility in hiring and promotions. But taking this path has its costs, especially for purists who regard deregulators as tinkers whose ideas will not lead to the needed transformation of government administration. Still, the history of administrative reform in America is filled with examples of progress made through political expediency.

Need for a Politically Credible Force

What does it take for an administrative reform movement to be taken seriously in the American political arena? Despite the constant concern with administrative reform in contemporary American politics, successful movements can be counted on one hand. If the measure of a successful reform is defined as the establishment of a new administrative culture, then success has occurred only twice since 1787: the institutionalization of the spoils system (1820s–80s) and its replacement by the bureaucratic paradigm associated with the Progressive Era.⁵³ The two cases differ in indications of what constitutes credible politics for promoting a reform movement. The first was tied to a partisan political program; the second evolved over several decades, relying on a variety of organizational and political strategies.

But one can broaden the number of relevant models by considering other movements in American history. Neil J. Smelser provides such an analysis in his study of movements that seek to restore, protect, modify, or create social norms. The various cases have one characteristic distinguishing them from other forms of collective action: "mobilization to organize and push through a program [of norm-oriented reform] takes a long time—a longer time than is generally required for the mobilization phases of panics, crazes, and hostile outbursts. For this reason, the mobilization phase of a norm-oriented movement is likely to be very complicated; it has to adapt to the exigencies of maintaining an organization over long periods."⁵⁴

A crucial factor in a mobilization effort is leadership, and several roles can emerge during a movement. Leaders in developing the beliefs upon which the movement is based (Smelser calls these leaders "formulators") are important, as are those who mobilize members ("promoters"). To the extent that the movement has an organized component, it will need organizational leaders ("bureaucrats") who will be concerned with the stability, growth, and tactics of the group. Political leaders ("power seekers") will also arise within the movement to represent factions that might have strategical or ideological differences with other factions. Even "prestige seekers," leaders "engaged in maintaining the prestige of the organization or movement in the public eye," are needed.⁵⁵

As a political force, debureaucratization has not developed so far as to need a formal organization, although it has from time to time

and place to place been associated with other organizations (for instance, the minimalists' links with the Republican party under Reagan and Bush and the reinventors' links with the Democratic party under Clinton). There are leaders who can be labeled formulators, but their contribution has been limited to writing books and articles, giving speeches, and providing advice, formally or informally, to policymakers. What is missing is a mobilizing leader, someone who can bring the diverse elements of the movement together into some organizational form. For now, these leaders have met with limited success.

The problem faced by potential mobilizing leaders is that administrative reform does not have the appeal of other issues. This was brought out most clearly by what Clinton campaign officials called the "Speech He Never Gave."

It was the one on "reinventing government," or "entrepreneurial government," or the "New Paradigm," depending on the buzz phrase you choose to describe the theory. . . . It's not that Clinton wasn't itching to talk about the subject. . . . What held Clinton back was the fear of putting audiences to sleep with an arcane discussion of applying ideas of management gurus . . . to federal institutions. So he kept his discussions about the specifics of reinventing government private.⁵⁶

Without a mobilizing leader or some other force to get the agenda in front of the public, the debureaucratizing movement will remain in the "incipient phase" of its development. With effective leadership it would achieve "enthusiastic mobilization," which would then be followed by a "period of institutionalization and organization."⁵⁷

As the example of the Progressive reformers demonstrates, however, although mobilizing leaders like Theodore Roosevelt or Robert LaFollette are needed, a credible movement can still develop without a unified organizational base. For the Progressives there were various jurisdictions (local, state, and national) and institutional contexts (electoral systems, legislature, executive branch, and even judiciary) through which to affect reform. As Neil Smelser observes, "the history of any given movement—its ebbs and flows, its switches, its bursts of enthusiasm—can be written in large part as

a pattern of abandoning one method which appears to be losing effectiveness and adopting some new, more promising method."⁵⁸

Still, the political success of debureaucratization will depend heavily on the development of mobilizing leadership. This can be a role President Clinton or even a leader of the partisan opposition such as Jack Kemp might play. But tying the reform agenda to either party does not bode well for long-term success. It would be more fruitful if the leadership of both parties supported the movement, a cooperation that worked well for the Progressive reformers. Short of that, the support of the party in power will have to suffice. The minimalist reformers were in such a position during the Reagan-Bush years, but through most of the 1980s they stood alone. With Clinton in the White House, the advantage now is to the reinventors who can take the lead. Whether they will remains to be seen.⁵⁹

The deregulators have, consciously or not, taken a decidedly different approach. Deregulating government was the principle theme underlying the work of the Volcker and Winter commissions. The two chairpersons have provided energetic and articulate voices for the recommendations of their respective groups. The bipartisan and diverse membership of each group further enhances the value of having used national commissions. The main question is whether a collective form of mobilizing leadership can be effective and sustainable. If so, the advantage once again goes to the deregulators.

Problems of Dethroning King Bureaucracy

A viable agenda and political clout are necessary, but little reform will be achieved in the long run without addressing the dominance of the bureaucratic paradigm. There are other obstacles to be sidestepped or overcome, but the bureaucratic orthodoxy must be dethroned: "if the dogma survives," Robert Golembiewski has commented, "any successful innovative arrangements will be regarded as but exceptions to good practice."⁶⁰ Do the reformers possess enough intellectual and political power to unseat the orthodoxy? Perhaps, but the bureaucratic model is strong. It has intellectual roots that link it with the academic study of public administration, it has the ability to generate solutions to administrative problems that are feasible and workable, and it is compatible with the political culture and institutional context of contemporary government.

THE BIRTH OF A FIELD AND A PARADIGM. Part of the problem facing reformers is that the emergence of public administration as a field of study was closely linked to the efforts of Progressive reformers to establish the bureaucratic paradigm as the dominant model of governance for the United States. Most histories trace the academic roots to Woodrow Wilson's 1887 essay, "The Study of Administration," which urged systematic investigation of the business side of government.⁶¹ The goal was to discover principles that could be applied to promote efficient government operations. At the same time, Wilson implicitly outlined the bureaucratic paradigm. Besides the classic separation of administration from politics, a pervasive premise was his assumption that administration must be rooted in a centralized and unified authority. He also advocated creating "a corps of civil servants prepared by special schooling and drilled, after appointment, into a perfected organization, with appropriate hierarchy and characteristic discipline."⁶²

This association of theory and practice was reinforced throughout what is today termed the classical period in the study of American public administration. Before 1940 the discipline was dominated by four doctrines:

- the distinction between politics (as the expression of the public will) and administration (as the execution of the public will);

- the need for a scientific approach to the study of administration;

- the objective of using that approach to discover the principles of administration; and

- the goal of achieving economy and efficiency in government administration through the application of those principles.⁶³

Although the wisdom of these doctrines can be questioned, their intellectual impact cannot. The urge to establish firm principles of public administration and the widespread assumption that good administration had bureaucratic characteristics created a close association between paradigm and field.⁶⁴

Building upon the basic precepts in the Wilsonian paradigm, students of public administration gradually articulated several principles of administration. Such concepts as unity of command, span of control, chain of command, departmentalization by major functions, and direction by single heads of authority in subordinate units of administration are assumed to have univer-

sal applicability in the perfection of administrative arrangements. Strengthening of the government is viewed as the equivalent of increasing the authority and powers of the chief executive. General-authority agencies are preferred to limited-authority agencies. Large jurisdictions are preferred to small. Centralized solutions are preferred to the disaggregation of authority among diverse decision structures.⁶⁵

Significant challenges to the classical approach to the study of public administration emerged during the 1930s, and by the 1950s a logical-positivist model was well on its way to replacing the scientific search for principles.⁶⁶ Nevertheless, the bureaucratic paradigm had been set and has thrived as the conventional wisdom in public administration. "Though scholars stress [the principles'] limitations, no substitute body of normative ideas on how to organize a bureaucracy has taken their place. Consequently, consultants and committees charged with recommending large governmental reorganizations still regularly fall back upon them."⁶⁷

Those who have studied public administration know that it takes more than reasoned criticism, an alternative theory, or a research program demonstrating the need for (or viability of) an alternative to overcome the orthodoxy. All those weapons have been used. The paradigm remains resilient in the face of evidence generated against it by the very science created by those associated with establishing it.⁶⁸

THE RELEVANCE OF BUREAUCRATIC SOLUTIONS. One reason for its strength is that the bureaucratic paradigm continues to be a source of solutions to administrative problems. Academics may point out logical fallacies and contradictions in the model, but government administrators are more interested in what works. "The decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organization," observed Max Weber, "has always been its purely *technical* superiority over any other form of organization."⁶⁹ That superiority is found in the bureaucratic organization's ability to provide a stable and simplified environment for carrying out administrative tasks. The productive capacities of the organization comes from its ability to reshape or control difficult situations.

Those who challenge the orthodoxy acknowledge some continuing value of the bureaucratic approach but believe that value is severely limited in today's turbulent environment. Osborne and

Gaebler, for example, speak of bureaucracies as creatures of the past that worked superbly

in crisis, when goals were clear and widely shared, when tasks were relatively straightforward, and when virtually everyone was willing to pitch in for the cause. . . . Bureaucratic institutions still work in some circumstances. If the environment is stable, the task is relatively simple, every customer wants the same service, and the quality of performance is not critical, a traditional public bureaucracy can do the job.⁷⁰

But those preconditions, the authors contend, now exist for only a few public agencies (social security and public libraries, for example); "most government institutions perform increasingly complex tasks, in competitive, rapidly changing environments, with customers who want quality and choice."

These statements reflect a lack of appreciation for the popularity of bureaucratic solutions among public sector managers and the power of bureaucratic organizations to reconfigure their working environments (as well as themselves) in order to achieve the appropriate kind of environmental stability and uniformity. In contrast to the popular antibureaucraticism of the new reformers, Elliot Jaques comments,

[thirty-five] years of research have convinced me that the managerial hierarchy is the most efficient, the hardest, and in fact the most natural structure ever devised for large organizations. Properly structured, hierarchy can release energy and creativity, rationalize productivity, and actually improve morale. Moreover, I think most managers know this intuitively and have only lacked a workable structure and a decent intellectual justification for what they have always known could work and work well.⁷¹

Despite Osborne and Gaebler's statements, the use of bureaucratic methods continues to be widespread and is not limited to stable environments and simple tasks. What is perceived as a movement *away* from bureaucratic forms is more likely a movement *toward* bureaucratic forms that are compatible with the shifting demands of the public sector. Many and varied public sector species have been produced from the bureaucratic genus.⁷² As Lau-

rence E. Lynn, Jr. has noted, "while they are unquestionably bureaucracies, government agencies are not the archetypal bureaucracies described by Max Weber."⁷³ Many of these variations are the products of institutional contexts, others reflect the politics surrounding their establishment, and still others have been adaptations in the face of change.⁷⁴ Thus what Osborne and Gaebler mistake for the decline and growing irrelevance of bureaucracy is actually adaptation. The variants differ somewhat from the classical model, but they retain some of the primary characteristics that made bureaucratic methods such a potent force.⁷⁵

The bureaucratic paradigm continually demonstrates its superiority over alternative approaches by doing more than merely creating organizations that fit their environs; it transforms itself and its environment to render challenging situations more manageable. As an organizational methodology, bureaucracies can transform difficult conditions to more simple, placid states or can adapt their own organizational forms to environmental features conducive to bureaucratic stability.⁷⁶ Consider, for example, redundant bureaucracies, two agencies or programs that perform the same function. Although contrary to some of the most fundamental principles of the bureaucratic paradigm, redundancy is widely accepted in practice and theory as a potential bureaucratic solution to some situations. When appropriately designed (or allowed simply to grow) and applied, redundancy not only provides backup where service might be interrupted, but also may improve service delivery and reduce the risks of accidents.⁷⁷

Max Weber understood the power and implications of bureaucracies' transformational qualities: "Once fully established, bureaucracy is among those social structures which are the hardest to destroy."⁷⁸ The staying power of bureaucratic solutions is manifest in their ability to adopt widely varying responses to a shifting environment—from responses that build solutions using current organizations and programs to those that develop innovative solutions within the confines of the general bureaucratic paradigm.⁷⁹

The success of these adaptations may be the real story behind the cases cited by Osborne and Gaebler and others because the innovative and entrepreneurial actions taken by practitioners have often been fostered by the very same bureaucratic context that seemed so impenetrable and intransigent. Thus while some might regard the examples Osborne and Gaebler use as demonstrating the possibil-

ity of a nonbureaucratic paradigm, others see in them a reaffirmation of the bureaucratic capacity to adapt.

This more positive assessment marks an important distinction between James Q. Wilson's agenda for deregulating bureaucracy and the reinventing of Osborne and Gaebler and Barzelay. Wilson (and other deregulators) understands the problem-solving potential of government bureaucracies, particularly if they are freed of the constraints that reduce their ability to adapt. "To evaluate the efficiency of a government agency one first must judge the value of the constraints under which it operates; to improve its efficiency one must decide which constraints one is willing to sacrifice."⁸⁰

Yet Wilson also acknowledges a darker side to the paradigm that is fundamental to the hostile opinion many reformers have of bureaucratic methods. The capacities that make bureaucracy adapt so well can also render it incapable of productive long-term adjustments. Described as "self-reinforcing equilibrium" and "dynamic conservatism," it is an affliction manifest in many organizations.⁸¹ The very efforts made to solve problems have consequences that, unless addressed, will threaten those efforts. Rules established to bring about conformity in work force behavior generate resistance that in turn creates the need for more rules or other forms of control that have further adverse consequences, and so on. Although the immediate problem may be resolved, the organization "pays a price for its successful strategies, whose results may prevent the system from making adaptations essential to growth and vitality."⁸²

It is this propensity toward dynamic conservatism that most concerns Wilson.

All organizations seek the stability and comfort that comes from relying on standard operating procedures—'SOPs.' When results are unknown or equivocal, bureaus will have no incentive to alter those SOPs so as better to achieve their goals, only an incentive to modify them to conform to externally imposed constraints. The SOPs will represent an internally defined equilibrium that reconciles the situational imperatives, professional norms, bureaucratic ideologies, peer-group expectations, and . . . leadership demands unique to that agency.⁸³

If this was to occur, there would be little value in relying on bureaucratic methods—deregulated or regulated. The solution, Wilson

contends, is not to seek an alternative form of government operations, but to reduce reliance on government.

Despite the potential drawbacks to relying on bureaucratic methods, bureaucracies remain the primary means for dealing with administrative tasks. Turbulent environments have certainly challenged the capacities of the bureaucratic paradigm, but there is no indication that it has failed as an adaptable way of dealing with most of the challenges facing government administrators.

OPERATIONALITY AND FEASIBILITY OF SOLUTIONS. The impression that the bureaucratic paradigm is relevant to the challenges facing government administration is strengthened by its operationality and feasibility. These awkward terms reflect major criteria most practitioners apply to any suggestions for reform: can they be translated into realistic programs both technically and financially?

In a 1992 meeting of public officials and academics called to discuss the reinventing government agenda, a recurring criticism of Osborne and Gaebler's book was that it did not adequately describe "the process by which change occurs, offering instead such obfuscatory terms as 'paradigm shift' and such seemingly oversimplified notions as 'steering, not rowing.'"⁸⁴ It is one thing to talk about change, another to do something about it. Although practitioners might welcome an alternative to the bureaucratic orthodoxy, they are unlikely to accept one that does not provide some practical suggestions.

Feasibility raises different but related concerns. Unless conditions are ripe no reform program—no matter how detailed and well designed—will be taken seriously, and a large number of conditions come into play. One study of common barriers to productivity improvement listed three dozen potential obstacles to public sector innovations.⁸⁵ Some are rooted in general conditions and range from legal restrictions and political considerations to the short time horizons of the public and elected officials. Even more barriers—structures and behavioral norms—can block organizational changes from within.⁸⁶ And there are personal barriers, reflecting the fact that ultimately change must depend on the people who enact it. Considering all these potential obstructions, it seems a miracle that change occurs at all.

In both operationality and feasibility, the bureaucratic orthodoxy has a considerable advantage over any competing paradigm. The fact that bureaucratic reforms can take place within existing bureau-

cratized contexts is the principal advantage. Clearly, incremental or complementary innovations are likely to be easier than the radical ones that would be required for a shift to nonbureaucratic methods. For example, Osborne and Gaebler would replace "administrative mechanisms" with a combination of market mechanisms and community empowerment. Markets would bring efficiency and effectiveness, while empowered communities would provide the "warmth and caring" that markets lack.⁸⁷ But while offering examples to emulate, Osborne and Gaebler fail to elaborate on the means for achieving them.

Ironically, the reforms that would bring about such innovations would require that government create the right conditions—changing market rules, sharing private sector risks, shifting public investment policies, and so forth.⁸⁸ In other words, government would have to engage in a radical transformation to create or improve market mechanisms and community groups while terminating administered programs and probably dislocating people currently served. Implementing changes within existing programs that would sharpen bureaucrats' sensitivity to those they serve would seem more attractive. And there is no shortage of ideas for how to implement such changes. For example, reforms in teaching organizations how to learn have received the attention of theorists and practitioners alike and are even finding a place in the popular media.⁸⁹

A related advantage is historical: existing bureaucratic structures have established relationships that can act as media through which changes can be processed.⁹⁰ Organizational cultures and management strategies, if appropriately used, can reorient an agency.⁹¹ And this approach can be inexpensive, especially in contrast with more radical reforms that challenge the very existence of those organizations and the cultural milieu they help define.⁹²

One must also add to this advantage the growing knowledge about bureaucratic operations. It is one of the ironies of the bureaucratic paradigm that the author of its greatest critical challenge, Herbert A. Simon, laid the groundwork for administrative sciences, a cross-disciplinary field that continues to generate and test ideas relevant to organizational life. Mining the findings of administrative sciences, analysts have proposed various strategies to increase effectiveness and productivity within the current bureaucratic framework.⁹³ And other approaches to the study of bureaucracy based on principal-agent models shows promise as an even more fruitful

expansion of knowledge about public bureaucracies.⁹⁴ As this knowledge grows and is communicated to practitioners, prospects of bureaucratic reform increase and the value of debureaucratized alternatives declines.

It is not surprising, therefore, that there is a growing appreciation of changes that can be accomplished by working within the bureaucratized model of governance. What many public managers have discovered is that it is often easier to reengineer than to reinvent.⁹⁵

CULTURAL AND INSTITUTIONAL IMPERATIVES. The final obstacle to dethroning bureaucracy is more ominous than the rest, for it pits the advocates of debureaucratization against the power of America's cultural institutions. For all its problems, the bureaucratic paradigm remains compatible with America's institutional norms and the cultural values that undergird them.

Administrative reform is more than a political act. It is also an act of cultural change, reflecting and challenging basic social values. The public administration Alexis de Tocqueville observed during his travels in the United States was that in small autonomous communities where democratic culture placed greater emphasis on turnover than on recordkeeping: "After one brief moment of power, officials are lost again amid the everchanging crowd, and as a result, the proceedings of American society often leave fewer traces than do events in a private family."⁹⁶ The transition toward a new culture—one based on a national community having to face nationwide challenges—called for a transformation in administration as well. The triumph of the bureaucratic paradigm over the classicism and idealism of the post-Civil War period took several decades.⁹⁷ In establishing a new conceptual order, it also created an administrative state and corporate complex hardly imaginable at the turn of the century.⁹⁸ The cultural milieu fostering the new paradigm was, like all milieus, a compromise between values of the past and future. Thus while it promoted the adoption of more efficient bureaucratic methods in both public and private sectors, it maintained some biases from an agrarian past deeply suspicious of big business and government.

The result was a cultural dialectic that has both defined and plagued the public sector. The emergence of bureaucracy led to the complementary triumph of values conducive to hierarchical life. This hierarchical culture valued social relationships based on specialized roles for different people—an arrangement that would "en-

able people to live together more harmoniously than alternative arrangements."⁹⁹ But bureaucratization also created a reactionary response, an urge for individualism and life among friends in the small autonomous community of earlier times.¹⁰⁰

This seemingly self-contradictory setting has encouraged both facilitation and restraint of bureaucratic power. The vehicles for implementing that dualistic imperative have been four complex institutions that act as alternative accountability systems that provide the context of rules and options within which government administrators operate.¹⁰¹

—A *political* system that stresses the need for public agencies and administrators to be responsive, particularly to members of the legislature and agency constituents.

—A *legal* system focusing administrators' attention on the fact that theirs is a fiduciary relationship, filled with contractual and other legal obligations.

—A *hierarchical* system in which administrative positions are organized in superordinate-subordinate arrangement, with the top layers having the greatest responsibility and powers.

—A *professional* system through which qualified deference is given to specialists.¹⁰²

The four accountability systems represent four primary values of the administrative state: political responsiveness, the rule of law, efficiency, and deference to expertise.¹⁰³ Most have deep roots in U.S. constitutional traditions. Three of the four mirror the Founders' views that there are three forms of legitimate government authority: legislative, requiring political responsiveness; executive, associated with the desire for efficiency; and judicial, reflecting a commitment to the rule of law.¹⁰⁴ The four systems also represent a balance between those who believe bureaucratic institutions can control themselves (through hierarchical and professional mechanisms) and those who contend that external restrictions (political forces and legal requirements) are needed.¹⁰⁵ Furthermore, the systems can be separated into those that tend to specify what bureaucratic agencies can and cannot do (legal and hierarchical) and those that provide for greater discretion (professional and political).

The importance of these accountability systems in day-to-day operations of government agencies varies, but their impact is significant. They shape public administrators' efforts and assist them to manage diverse and often conflicting expectations. One or two will

be most important in a given period, but in times of crisis all four can come into play.

These accountability systems have remained stable, reinforced by the relatively unchanging public attitude toward government administrators. To be successful, major reforms of the public bureaucracy will have to contend with the established cultural milieu and institutional setting. This is perhaps the greatest obstacle to the success of the debureaucratization movement.

Among the major advocates of reform, only the deregulators seem aware of the obstacles. James Q. Wilson, for example, accepts the need for a trade-off between the popular desire for effective government and equally popular demand for controls and restraints on bureaucratic power. Because this trade-off is deeply rooted in the American constitutional regime, reforms that require fundamental changes might just be too costly.¹⁰⁶

CHANGING THE BUREAUCRATIC CULTURE. The debureaucratization movement has yet to get its agenda clear and is still in its incipient stage politically. The people committed to promoting it must spend most of their energies in dealing with those challenges. However, all their efforts will be for naught unless they confront the cultural and institutional power of the bureaucratic paradigm. Convinced of the inherent problems with bureaucracy and bureaucratic solutions, the reformers might ignore the realities that sustain it. Although bureaucratic government has few defenders, it remains an important and pervasive structure of our political, economic, social, and cultural lives. "The way in which a bureaucracy operates cannot be explained simply by knowing its tasks and the economic and political incentives that it confronts," James Q. Wilson has commented. "Culture makes a difference."¹⁰⁷

Can a powerful cultural force be successfully challenged? Yes, if one takes a sweeping view of history. Is such a powerful cultural force *easily* challenged? Perhaps not. Established cultures are more than value systems; they are ways of life. Once they are as firmly established as the bureaucratic culture is, they perpetuate themselves through adaptation, cooptation, and dozens of other strategies.¹⁰⁸

To deal with the cultural barriers, the new reformers will need to do two things. First, they will have to develop a strategy for cultural change that complements their political efforts. Cultural change is difficult but possible, particularly in times of turbulence.

That human perception is everywhere culturally biased does not mean that people can make the world come out any way they wish. Surprise—the discrepancy between the expected and the actual—is of central importance in dislodging individuals from their way of life. Change occurs when successive events intervene in such a manner as to prevent a way of life from delivering on the expectations it has generated, thereby prompting individuals to seek more promising alternatives.¹⁰⁹

Developing a strategy to take advantage of such discrepancies should be high on the movement's list.

Second, the new reformers must develop and continuously promote images to replace those that now support the bureaucratic paradigm. Regardless of their validity, images suggest stories and attitudes extracted from stories that tell people the way things are or the way they ought to be. They establish models for how people act or think they ought to act, and generate expectations that influence behavior and assessment of human actions.¹¹⁰

The bureaucratic culture is reflected in four popular images of public administration. The most common is that of the impersonal bureaucrat, an image so deeply ingrained that Americans freely associate *bureaucrat* with all public sector workers. The image comes close to the kafkaesque stereotype of the warders who arrest K in *The Trial*.¹¹¹ Another image is that of the agent, the public administrator as someone hired to perform certain tasks in certain ways. Here the stereotype comes from the world of crime and espionage, where public servants (although we rarely think of them as such) commit to completing a mission. A third image is that of the public administrator as the politician, someone whose job is to satisfy his or her constituency by representing their interests and making decisions on their behalf. Finally, there is the public administrator as the expert hired for his or her knowledge and skills who is expected to apply them in a professional manner to the problems of government.

Most discussions of public administration refer to these myths, but it is the image of the bureaucrat that dominates, reflecting the dominance of the bureaucratic paradigm and the public's suspicious view of public servants. Replacing that image, or at least reducing its salience, is an important task for the new reformers. This might prove difficult. The minimalists, for example, have al-

ways relied on some variation of the bureaucrat myth in their analysis of what is wrong with government administration. In contrast, Osborne and Gaebler make clear that reinventing government is not another form of bureaucrat-bashing rhetoric: "our intention is to bash *bureaucracies*, not bureaucrats."¹¹² As for the deregulators, they see their objective as restoring the public's trust in public administration, and thereby "restoring a sense of pride in public service."¹¹³

Conclusion

Growing numbers of people are joining the chorus for administrative reform, and a new movement is emerging with considerable political support. Succeeding at reform is not merely a matter of articulating a program and developing the necessary political will and strength to implement it, although those are very important tasks. Displacing the dominant paradigm is crucial, and that will be no easy task.

Perhaps the most foolish thing reformers could do is believe their own rhetoric. The need to rationalize major changes and energize the political forces required to succeed is bound to result in some overstatement. Such overstatement might be expected of the minimalists, who still carry the ideological baggage of their years in power under Reagan and Bush. For the advocates of reinventing government, the power of anecdotes and catchy labels will only take them so far. The more analytical deregulators, in contrast, may find it difficult to sustain their enthusiasm and support for the movement in light of their awareness of the formidable challenges the coalition faces.

Will the new reformers succeed? It is hard to be very optimistic. The cultural hurdle will prove the most difficult, for the distrust of government remains strong despite the growing willingness of Americans to live with greater government involvement in their lives under the Clinton administration. So long as trust is weak, the public will not support reforms that give public administrators more discretion, even with the promise of more innovative, productive, and efficient government.

Nevertheless, if it can find leaders who can mobilize support and sustain political and cultural strategies for change, a new administrative culture might reshape government during the next decade. If

it does, it will most likely be a variation of debureaucratization with features strongly influenced by the deregulators. Although the minimalists and reinventors now get greater attention, the deregulators are more strategically positioned to meet the intellectual, political, practical, cultural, and institutional challenges facing administrative reformers.

Notes

1. Cases like these fill the files of the National Center for Public Productivity at Rutgers University, which collects them as part of its annual awards for exemplary innovations in the public sector. A similar program is run by Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government in conjunction with *Governing* magazine.

2. For example, see Rosabeth Moss Kanter, *When Giants Learn to Dance* (Simon and Schuster, 1989); Peter M. Senge, *The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization* (Doubleday, 1990); and Tom Peters and Nancy Austin, *A Passion for Excellence: The Leadership Difference* (Random House, 1985).

3. Tom Peters and Robert Waterman, *In Search of Excellence: Lessons from America's Best-Run Companies* (Harper and Row, 1982).

4. On the renewed interest in administrative reform worldwide, see Gerald E. Caiden, *Administrative Reform Comes of Age* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1991).

5. William A. Niskanen, *Bureaucracy and Representative Government* (Chicago: Aldine Atherton, 1971); Gordon Tullock, *The Politics of Bureaucracy* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1965); and James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, *The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy* (University of Michigan Press, 1962). For a critique of this legacy, see Colin Campbell and Donald Naulls, "The Consequences of a Minimalist Paradigm for Governance: A Comparative Analysis," in Patricia W. Ingraham and Donald F. Kettl, eds., *Agenda for Excellence: Public Service in America* (Chatham House, 1992), chap. 4; also Steven Kelman, "'Public Choice' and Public Spirit," *Public Interest*, no. 87 (Spring 1987), pp. 80-94.

On a more prescriptive level, advocates of privatization as a means for limiting government intrusion into daily life were also prominent in developing the theory. See E. S. Savas, *Privatization: The Key to Better Government* (Chatham House, 1987). For an overview of privatization, see John D. Donahue, *The Privatization Decision: Public Ends, Private Means* (Basic Books, 1989).

6. Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* (Basic Books, 1974), p. 26.

7. Caiden, *Administrative Reform Comes of Age*, p. 25.

8. James D. Carroll, A. Lee Fritschler, and Bruce L. R. Smith, "Supply-Side Management in the Reagan Administration," *Public Administration Review*, vol. 45 (November-December, 1985), p. 807.

9. Patricia W. Ingraham and David H. Rosenbloom, "Political Foundations of the American Federal Service: Rebuilding a Crumbling Base," *Public Administra-*

tion Review, vol. 50 (March-April 1990), p. 214. See also Richard P. Nathan, *The Administrative Presidency* (John Wiley, 1983), especially chap. 6; Chester A. Newland, "A Mid-Term Appraisal—The Reagan Presidency: Limited Government and Political Administration," *Public Administration Review*, vol. 43 (January-February 1983), pp. 1-21; and Peter M. Benda and Charles H. Levine, "Reagan and the Bureaucracy: The Bequest, the Promise, and the Legacy," in Charles O. Jones, ed., *The Reagan Legacy: Promise and Performance* (Chatham House, 1988), pp. 102-42.

10. Also see James Q. Wilson, *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It* (Basic Books, 1989), p. 369. Wilson attributes the idea of deregulation to Constance Horner, former director of the Office of Personnel Management, and also notes its use in Gary C. Bryner, *Bureaucratic Discretion* (Pergamon Press, 1987), p. 215.

11. National Commission on the Public Service, *Rebuilding the Public Service: The Report of the National Commission on the Public Service* (Washington, 1989), p. 19.

12. See Donald F. Kettl, "Micromanagement: Congressional Control and Bureaucratic Risk," in Ingraham and Kettl, *Agenda for Excellence: Public Service in America*, chap. 5. See also Jeremy Rabkin, *Judicial Compulsions: How Public Law Distorts Public Policy* (Basic Books, 1989).

13. Wilson, *Bureaucracy*, pp. 376-77.

14. E. S. Savas, a major advocate of privatization, as well as James Q. Wilson, who is a principle advocate of deregulating government, are frequently cited in David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, *Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit Is Transforming the Public Sector* (Addison-Wesley, 1992).

15. More recently, Michael Barzelay's *Breaking Through Bureaucracy: A New Vision For Managing in Government* (University of California Press, 1992), has provided additional articulation for this movement. As do Osborne and Gaebler, Barzelay seeks a postbureaucratic paradigm for government, one stressing values similar to those cited by others in this growing chorus for change.

16. Jonathan Walters, "Reinventing Government: Managing the Politics of Change," *Governing*, vol. 6 (December 1992), p. 29.

17. Tom Shoop, "Goring the Bureaucracy," *Government Executive*, vol. 25 (October 1993), p. 13.

18. William A. Niskanen, "Competition among Government Bureaus," in Carol H. Weiss and Allen H. Barton, eds., *Making Bureaucracies Work* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1980), p. 167. Niskanen's status is international. His work, for instance, was required reading for top-level officials of the Thatcher government. See Campbell and Naulls, "Consequences of a Minimalist Paradigm for Governance," p. 67.

19. For example, see Lloyd G. Nigro, "Personnel for and Personnel by Public Administrators: Bridging the Gap," in Naomi B. Lynn and Aaron Wildavsky, eds., *Public Administration: The State of the Discipline* (Chatham House, 1990), pp. 185-202.

20. Wilson, *Bureaucracy*, pp. 375-76. See also Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States*, 2d ed. (Norton, 1979).

21. Osborne and Gaebler, *Reinventing Government*, p. 321.
22. Osborne and Gaebler provide a list of "factors supportive of fundamental change": crisis, leadership, and continuity of leadership, a "healthy civic infrastructure," shared vision and goals, trust, outside resources, and models to follow; *Ibid.*, pp. 326–27.
23. Caiden, *Administrative Reform Comes of Age*, chaps. 4, 5.
24. Christopher Hood and Michael Jackson, *Administrative Argument* (Brookfield, Vt.: Dartmouth, 1991), pp. 178–79; Lennart Gustafsson, "Promoting Flexibility through Pay Policy—Experience from the Swedish National Administration," and Per Laegreid, "Change In Norwegian Public Personnel Policy," in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, *Flexible Personnel Management in the Public Service* (Paris, 1990), pp. 27–46; and Roger Cohen, "On Fast Track to (Gasp!) Provinces," *New York Times*, February 13, 1993, p. 4.
25. Bruce L. R. Smith, "Changing Public-Private Sector Relations: A Look at the United States," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 466 (March 1983), p. 150.
26. See Lester M. Salamon, "The Changing Tools of Government Action: An Overview," in Lester Salamon, ed., *Beyond Privatization: The Tools of Government Action* (Washington: Urban Institute Press, 1989), pp. 3–22; Christopher Hood, *The Tools of Government* (Chatham House, 1983); and Donald F. Kettl, *Government by Proxy: (Mis?)Managing Federal Programs* (Washington: CQ Press, 1988).
27. A major exception was the work of Harvey Sherman; see his "Methodology in the Practice of Public Administration," in James C. Charlesworth, ed., *Theory and Practice of Public Administration: Scope, Objectives, and Methods* (Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1968), pp. 254–90.
28. Ingraham and Rosenbloom, "Political Foundations of the American Federal Service," p. 213.
29. Corruption has not disappeared as an issue, but it is no longer at the heart of administrative reform efforts. On the role of corruption in American government, see Suzanne Garment, *Scandal: The Culture of Mistrust in American Government* (Anchor Books, 1992); also Peter deLeon, *Thinking about Political Corruption* (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1993).
30. Dieter Grunow considers the public sector as important a force in the rise of modern society as industrialization, urbanization, and democratization. See "Development of the Public Sector: Trends and Issues," in *The Public Sector: Challenge for Coordination and Learning* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1991), pp. 89–115.
- For criticism of the bureaucracy see Henry Jacoby, *The Bureaucratization of the World*, trans. by Eveline Kanes (University of California Press, 1973); Ralph P. Hummel, *The Bureaucratic Experience*, 3d ed. (St. Martin's Press, 1987); and David Nachmias and David H. Rosenbloom, *Bureaucratic Government, USA* (St. Martin's Press, 1980). There are, of course, major exceptions to the criticisms of bureaucracy; for example, see Carl J. Friedrich, *Constitutional Government and Democracy: Theory and Practice in Europe and America*, 4th ed. (Waltham, Mass.: Blaisdell Publishing, 1968), especially chap. 2.

31. The extent to which bureaucratic operatives are victims rather than perpetrators is a controversial issue. Reflecting on the guilt of those who carried out Hitler's orders during the holocaust, for example, Albert Camus considered such actions as crimes of organizational logic rather than crimes of passion. Quoted in Robert Presthut, *The Organizational Society*, rev. ed. (St. Martin's Press, 1978), p. 40.
32. Vincent Ostrom, *The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration*, rev. ed. (University of Alabama Press, 1974), p. 19.
33. Barzelay, *Breaking through Bureaucracy*, p. 5.
34. *Ibid.*, chap. 8.
35. This list takes some liberties with Osborne and Gaebler's wording but does capture the essence of the bureaucratic paradigm.
36. Caiden, *Administrative Reform Comes of Age*, p. 124.
37. Wilson, *Bureaucracy*, p. 344.
38. The factors that have led to successes and failures of reform movements are discussed in Neil J. Smelser, *Theory of Collective Behavior* (Free Press, 1962).
39. David Osborne did have an opportunity to provide such advice as a consultant to the NPR task force and in his contribution to the Progressive Policy Institute's *Mandate for Change* [Will Marshall and Martin Schram, eds. (Berkeley Books, 1992), chap. 12], a work filled with suggestions to the new administration. For a critique of Osborne's effort, see John J. DiIulio, Jr., "Thinking in Moderation," *Washington Monthly*, March 1993, pp. 51–53.
40. See the critique of Clinton's NPR efforts offered in Ronald C. Moe, "Let's Rediscover Government, Not Reinvent It," *Government Executive*, vol. 25 (June 1993), pp. 46–48, 60.
41. This is a modification of the approach used by Hood and Jackson, *Administrative Argument*, in their study of administrative doctrines.
42. Dwight Waldo, *The Administrative State: A Study of the Political Theory of American Public Administration*, 2d ed. (Holmes and Meier, 1984), p. 106.
43. Peter Wilenski argues that efficiency stands as the primary theme in all discussions of the purpose of public administration. See *Public Power and Public Administration* (Sydney: Hale and Iremonger, 1986), chap. 8.
44. Michael Barzelay states government's purpose as simply producing "results citizens value." See *Breaking through Bureaucracy*, p. 119.
45. Osborne and Gaebler, *Reinventing Government*, p. 30.
46. Ostrom, *Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration*, chap. 3.
47. See Osborne and Gaebler, *Reinventing Government*, pp. 159–60; and Barzelay, *Breaking through Bureaucracy*, chap. 7.
48. Wilson, *Bureaucracy*, pt. 3.
49. For relevant discussions on such syntheses, see Robert B. Reich, ed., *The Power of Public Ideas* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988).
50. Charles Murray, *In Pursuit of Happiness and Good Government* (Simon and Schuster, 1988).
51. For more on entrepreneurial leadership, see Jameson W. Doig and Erwin C. Hargrove, eds., *Leadership and Innovation: Entrepreneurs in Government*,

abridged ed. (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), especially pp. 7–8. See note 24 for references on alternative tools.

52. See Robert Maranto and David Schultz, *A Short History of the United States Civil Service* (University Press of America, 1991), chap. 4.

53. David H. Rosenbloom provides an overview of these cultures and argues that a third is emerging. "Thus far, however, [the new culture] has not been accompanied by a coherent political movement. Rather it has been composed of several diverse elements that have evolved somewhat separately. These elements can be joined together, but it may be up to the public administration community to make them cohere." See his "Democratic Constitutionalism and the Evolution of Bureaucratic Government: Freedom and Accountability in the Administrative State," in Peter F. Nardulli, ed., *The Constitution and American Political Development: An Institutional Perspective* (University of Illinois Press, 1992), pp. 132–34.

54. Smelser, *Theory of Collective Behavior*, p. 296.

55. *Ibid.*, p. 297.

56. Tom Shoop, "The Reinvention Rage," *Government Executive*, vol. 25 (March 1993), p. 10.

57. Smelser, *Theory of Collective Behavior*, pp. 298–301.

58. *Ibid.*, p. 302.

59. The release of the National Performance Review report in September 1993 was accompanied by public relations efforts that initially drew bipartisan support to the proposed reforms as well as considerable attention from the media. See Shoop, "Goring the Bureaucracy," pp. 12–16. It is too early to judge whether such efforts will generate the needed momentum and support to create a full-fledged movement.

60. Robert T. Golembiewski, *Organizing Men and Power: Patterns of Behavior and Line-Staff Models* (Rand McNally, 1967), p. 2.

61. See Woodrow Wilson, "The Study of Administration," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 1 (June 1887), pp. 197–222, reprinted in *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 56 (December 1941), pp. 481–506. There is, of course, some question of the influence of the essay in the founding of the field; see Paul P. Van Riper, "The American Administrative State: Wilson and the Founders—An Unorthodox View," *Public Administration Review*, vol. 43 (November–December 1983), pp. 478–79.

62. Wilson, "Study of Administration," p. 500.

63. Dwight Waldo, *The Study of Public Administration* (Random House, 1955), pp. 40–42.

64. The model of bureaucracy that most intrigued Wilson was that found in the administration of European governments, especially Germany and France. See Daniel W. Martin, "Deja Vu: French Antecedents of American Public Administration," *Public Administration Review*, vol. 47 (July–August 1987), pp. 297–303. Among the emerging middle class, the highly centralized, single-product corporation provided a model that many believed appropriate for government; see Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., *The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1977). On the movement of American social values toward bureaucratism between 1900 and 1920, see Robert H. Wiebe, *The Search for Order, 1877–1920* (Hill and Wang, 1967), pp. 145–63.

65. Ostrom, *Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration*, pp. 34–35.

66. Waldo, *Study of Public Administration*, pp. 42ff. For a brief historical overview, see Jonathan B. Bendor, *Parallel Systems: Redundancy in Government* (University of California Press, 1985), pp. 33–39.

67. Alan A. Altshuler, "The Study of American Public Administration," in Alan A. Altshuler and Norman C. Thomas, eds., *The Politics of the Federal Bureaucracy*, 2d ed. (Harper and Row, 1977), p. 6.

68. See Avery Leiserson and Fritz Morstein Marx, "The Study of Public Administration," in Fritz Morstein Marx, ed., *Elements of Public Administration*, 2d ed. (Prentice-Hall, 1959), pp. 27–34, 39–48. Also James W. Fesler, "Public Administration and the Social Sciences: 1946–1960," in Frederick C. Mosher, ed., *American Public Administration: Past, Present, Future* (University of Alabama Press, 1975), pp. 97–141.

69. Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, ed. by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (University of California Press, 1978), p. 973.

70. Osborne and Gaebler, *Reinventing Government*, pp. 14–16.

71. Elliott Jaques, "In Praise of Hierarchy," *Harvard Business Review*, vol. 68 (January–February 1990), p. 127.

72. There have been attempts to study the variations or to approach such a study. See Christopher Hood and Andrew Dunsire, *Bureaumerics: The Quantitative Comparison of British Central Government Agencies* (University of Alabama Press, 1981); also see Hal G. Rainey, *Understanding and Managing Public Organizations* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1991), especially chap. 5.

73. Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., *Managing Public Policy* (Little, Brown, 1987), p. 79.

74. For institutional contexts, see Rainey, *Understanding and Managing Public Organizations*, pp. 115–17; and Louis C. Gawthrop, *Bureaucratic Behavior in the Executive Branch: An Analysis of Organizational Change* (Free Press, 1969), especially chap. 3. For reflections of politics see Harold Seidman and Robert Gilmour, *Politics, Position, and Power: From The Positive To The Regulatory State*, 4th ed. (Oxford University Press, 1986). For adaptations see Herbert Kaufman, *Time, Chance, and Organizations: Natural Selection in a Perilous Environment*, 2d ed. (Chatham House, 1991). Also see Louis C. Gawthrop, *Administrative Politics and Social Change* (St. Martin's Press, 1971), chaps. 5, 6.

75. See Grunow, "Development of the Public Sector," pp. 101–02.

76. See Victor A. Thompson, *Bureaucracy and the Modern World* (Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1976).

77. See Bendor, *Parallel Systems: Redundancy in Government*; Donald Chisholm, *Coordination without Hierarchy: Informal Structures in Multiorganizational Systems* (University of California Press, 1989); and Charles Perrow, *Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies* (Basic Books, 1984).

78. Weber, *Economy and Society*, p. 987.

79. Louis C. Gawthrop, *Public Sector Management, Systems, and Ethics* (Indiana University Press, 1984), chap. 3.

80. Wilson, *Bureaucracy*, p. 331.

81. Michel Crozier, *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon* (University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 195; and Donald A. Schon, *Beyond the Stable State* (Random House, 1971), chap. 2.
82. *Ibid.*, p. 49; also see Victor A. Thompson, *Bureaucracy and Innovation* (University of Alabama Press, 1969), chap. 4.
83. Wilson, *Bureaucracy*, p. 375. Also see Guy Benveniste, *Bureaucracy* (San Francisco: Boyd and Fraser, 1977).
84. Walters, "Reinventing Government," p. 34.
85. David N. Ammons, "Productivity Barriers in the Public Sector," in Marc Holzer, ed., *Public Productivity Handbook* (Marcel Dekker, 1992), pp. 117–36.
86. See Michael Beer, R. A. Eisenstat, and Bert Spector, "Why Change Programs Don't Produce Change," *Harvard Business Review*, vol. 68 (November–December 1990), pp. 158–66.
87. Osborne and Gaebler, *Reinventing Government*, p. 309.
88. *Ibid.*, pp. 290–98.
89. See Chris Argyris and Donald A. Schon, *Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective* (Addison-Wesley, 1978); Paul W. Waldo, Jr., "A Learning Model of Organization," in Christopher Bellavita, ed., *How Public Organizations Work: Learning From Experience* (Praeger, 1990), chap. 9; and Peter M. Senge, *The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization* (Doubleday, 1990).
90. See, for example, Philip Selznick, *TVA and the Grass Roots: A Study of Politics and Organization* (University of California Press, 1949).
91. See Richard Beckhard, *Organizational Development: Strategies and Models* (Addison Wesley, 1969); and Edgar Schein, *Process Consultation: Its Role in Organization Development* (Addison Wesley, 1969).
92. The classic expression of this attitude toward change is found in Harvey Sherman, *It All Depends: A Pragmatic Approach to Organization* (University of Alabama Press, 1966).
93. See, for example, Ralph H. Kilmann, *Beyond The Quick Fix: Managing Five Tracks to Organizational Success* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1984); and Dave Ulrich, Robert E. Quinn, and Kim S. Cameron, "Designing Effective Organizational Systems," in James L. Perry, ed., *Handbook of Public Administration* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1989), pp. 148–61.
94. See Terry M. Moe, "The New Economics of Organization," *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 28 (November 1984), pp. 739–77.
95. On the concept of reengineering, see Michael Hammer, "Reengineering Work: Don't Automate, Obliterate," *Harvard Business Review*, vol. 68 (July–August 1990), pp. 104–12. On its use see John Martin, "Reengineering Government," *Governing*, vol. 6 (March 1993), pp. 26–30.
96. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, translated by George Lawrence (Anchor Books, 1969), p. 207.
97. Wiebe, *Search for Order*, chap. 6.
98. Stephen Skowronek, *Building A New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877–1920* (Cambridge University Press, 1982); and Chandler, *Visible Hand*.

99. Michael Thompson, Richard Ellis, and Aaron Wildavsky, *Cultural Theory* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), p. 6; also Wiebe, *Search for Order*, p. 156.
100. Robert N. Bellah and others, *Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life* (University of California Press, 1985), chap. 2.
101. There are many ways to conceive of institutions; for example, compare James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics* (Free Press, 1989); and Robert Grafstein, *Institutional Realism: Social and Political Constraints on Rational Actors* (Yale University Press, 1992). I present a vague definition to facilitate the present discussion.
102. See Barbara S. Romzek and Melvin J. Dubnick, "Accountability in the Public Sector: Lessons from the Challenger Tragedy," *Public Administration Review*, vol. 47 (May–June 1987), pp. 227–38; also Melvin J. Dubnick and Barbara S. Romzek, *American Public Administration: Politics and the Management of Expectations* (Macmillan, 1991), chap. 3.
103. See Herbert Kaufman, "Administrative Decentralization and Political Power," *Public Administration Review*, vol. 29 (January–February 1969), pp. 3–15.
104. The constitutional doctrine of separation of powers thus fostered at least three organizational approaches to government administration—in David H. Rosenbloom's terms, the managerial (executive), political (legislative), and legal (judicial)—that cannot be synthesized "without violating values deeply ingrained in the United States political culture." See Rosenbloom, "Public Administrative Theory and the Separation of Powers," *Public Administration Review*, vol. 43 (May–June 1983), p. 219. Compare Laurence J. O'Toole, Jr., "Doctrines and Developments: Separation of Powers, the Politics-Administration Dichotomy, and the Rise of the Administrative State," *Public Administration Review*, vol. 47 (January–February 1987), pp. 17–25.
105. This division reflects a long-standing controversy usually traced back to the debate between Carl J. Friedrich, "Public Policy and the Nature of Administrative Responsibility," in C. J. Friedrich and Edward S. Mason, eds., *Public Policy, 1940* (Harvard University Press, 1940), pp. 3–24, and Herman Finer, "Administrative Responsibility in Democratic Government," *Public Administration Review*, vol. 1 (Summer 1941), pp. 335–50.
106. Wilson, *Bureaucracy*, pp. 376–78.
107. *Ibid.*, p. 302.
108. See Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky, *Cultural Theory*.
109. *Ibid.*, pp. 4–5.
110. See James Oliver Robertson, *American Myth, American Reality* (Hill and Wang, 1980), p. xv.
111. This is in contrast to the more heroic image of "Bill Bureaucrat" offered by Paul H. Appleby in *Big Democracy* (Knopf, 1945).
112. Osborne and Gaebler, *Reinventing Government*, p. xviii.
113. National Commission on the Public Service, *Rebuilding the Public Service*, p. 13.