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**Blaming the Planner:  
An Alternative Explanation of  
Development Program Failure**

by

**Melvin J. Dubnick**

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# **Blaming the Planner: An Alternative Explanation of Development Program Failure**

by

Melvin J. Dubnick \*

## **I. THIRD WORLD PLANNING FAILURE**

Since World War Two, much attention has been given to the problems of Third World countries and their efforts at reducing the impoverishment and starvation which result from their social situation. For most international and Third World policymakers there has been an increasing need for coordinated efforts to facilitate development processes. Whether for selfish or altruistic reasons, political actors the world over have aided these policymakers in their battle against "backwardness" and the move toward "modernity." The resulting policies have been overtly manifested in national development plans and international programs for development (e.g., the United Nations' First and Second Development Decades, various World Bank-financed projects, etc.). The resources assigned to these policies – in mental as well as physical and financial terms – have been, to say the least, substantial.

Despite the impressiveness of such efforts, one must take note of the overall fruitlessness of these undertakings. Attempts to reduce underdevelopment have been consistently frustrated in almost every instance. Reviewing the judgments of world leaders and planning experts on the matter of development policies, one fact becomes evident: development policy successes are few and far between. Permeating the evaluations is a conviction that international and national development programs have failed to accomplish their intended tasks. Planning, the core methodology of most development programs, has been found to be ineffective where it was most needed.

The comments of planning authority Albert Waterston are typical. For Waterston it is obvious that Third World development programs in general

are falling short of what is reasonable to expect. The record is so poor – it has been worsening in fact – that it has sometimes led to

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disillusionment with planning and the abandonment of plans. . . . Indeed, participants in the United Nations Meeting of Experts on Administrative Aspects of National Development Planning [in 1964] . . . went so far as to suggest that national development planning was in crisis.<sup>1</sup>

Since then the situation did not improve. The literature of planning recorded ever more discouragement and failure. While most development planning "textbooks" avoided evaluations of actual plan performance,<sup>2</sup> those monographs assessing planning programs offered dismal pictures of the results. United Nations documents were most revealing in this respect. One well-known UN advisor on planning, Jozef Pajestka of Poland, noted that the "experience of developing nations that have resorted to planning in recent years revealed that there is a great discrepancy between plans and achievement."<sup>3</sup> The U.N. 1970 *Report on the World Situation* was highly critical of Third World development plans and planners for their inability to obtain desired objectives.<sup>4</sup> At a September 1969 U.N.-sponsored meeting of experts at Stockholm, top planning authorities from around the world accused themselves and their colleagues of narrowness in approaching the problems of development and of relying too heavily upon rather "simplistic" models.<sup>5</sup> Still another organ of the United Nations stated the problem as follows:

. . . there is a great deal of dissatisfaction with the results of the planning process. In some quarters the dissatisfaction has even reached the point where the value of planning as an instrument of development has been questioned.<sup>6</sup>

This attitude of failure was promoted by the results of the U.N.'s First Development Decade which reduced any remaining optimism in the late 1950's.

<sup>1</sup> Albert Waterston, *Development Planning: Lessons of Experience* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), p. 4.

<sup>2</sup> See for instance, W. Arthur Lewis, *Development Planning: The Essentials of Economic Policy* (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1966) and Jan Tinbergen, *Development Planning*, trans. N. D. Smith (New York: World University Library, 1967).

<sup>3</sup> Jozef Pajestka, "Planning Methods and Procedures and Plan Implementation," in United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *Planning and Plan Implementation* (New York: United Nations, 1967), p. 2.

<sup>4</sup> United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1970 *Report on the World Situation* (New York: United Nations, 1971).

<sup>5</sup> Meeting of Experts on Social Policy and Planning, "Social Policy and Planning in National Development," in United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *International Social Development Review*, No. 3: *Unified Socio-economic Development and Planning; Some New Horizons* (New York: United Nations, 1971), p. 4.

<sup>6</sup> Centre for Development Planning, *Projections and Policies of the United Nations Secretariat, "Employment Strategies and Poverty-Reduction Policies of Developing Countries: Problems and Issues in the Light of Experience in Development Planning," Journal of Development Planning*, 5 (1972), 3-4.

Failure was admitted not only in official U.N. documents, but also in the records of major conferences on development planning. The results of one gathering, published in a volume edited by Colin Legum,<sup>7</sup> reflected the feeling of failure that has marked other sources. A World Bank official, attending a conference at the University of Sussex in June 1969, commented that since World War II "more than 1200 development plans have been prepared, over 125 central planning offices have been established, about 100 training centers giving courses in planning have been created," and expressed the expectation that "planning should have gained in stature and have received a secure place of importance in the development sphere." Yet, to his dismay, development planners were being called to Sussex for a conference on "The Crisis in Planning."<sup>8</sup> Paraphrasing that writer's lament, sociologist and former planner Guy Benveniste noted that "with twenty-five years of experience behind them, national planners talk more about failures than about successes."<sup>9</sup>

## II. BLAMING THE VICTIM

Among development planners there would be little disagreement with the conclusion that planning in the Third World has been a dismal failure. Equally common is the verdict that the primary responsibility for these failures rests with the societies for which the plans were developed. What one finds, in fact, is an international version of a phenomenon William Ryan described for welfare policies in the United States: a strong tendency on the part of analysts to "blame the victim."

Ryan's work focuses on what he calls "the ideology of Blaming the Victim." Adhering to this ideology, the well intentioned analyst and the reformer, seeking to correct obvious maldistributions and injustices, are misled to develop policies which further aggravate the situation.

Good intentions and vigorous actions to improve social conditions are constantly being crippled, sabotaged, and deflected by insidious forces that have already pre-shaped the channels of thought. Because those who intend good and act with vigor also believe certain things to be true about the poor, the black, and the victimized. And, so believing, they are easily tempted into accepting the mythology of Blaming the Victim.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>7</sup> *The First U.N. Development Decade and Its Lessons for the 1970's* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970).

<sup>8</sup> C. J. Martin, "A Conference Note: Crisis in Planning," *International Development Review*, XI (1969), 40-41.

<sup>9</sup> Guy Benveniste, *The Politics of Expertise* (Berkeley: Glendessary Press, 1972), p. 6.

<sup>10</sup> William Ryan, *Blaming the Victim* (New York: Vintage Books, 1971); also see Nathan Caplan and Stephen D. Nelson, "Who's to Blame?" *Psychology Today*, November 1974, pp. 99-104.

Such an ideology seems characteristic of those who are concerned with the problems of development policy for the Third World. This becomes evident as one peruses the appropriate literature.

It is a simple matter to find references in that literature to the obstacles for development posed by variously described social values and norms of the subject societies. This approach contends, for instance, that the value system or social structure of the subject society is incompatible with that deemed necessary for the success of development policies.<sup>11</sup> One prominent advocate of this particular explanation is David E. Apter. In *The Politics of Modernization*, Apter discusses the subjects of "professionalism" and the "ideology of science" as these are associated with modernizing process. He notes four ideological tendencies relevant for that process: socialism, nationalism, national socialism, and science. The last, science,

is not merely a style of thinking about problems, nor is it solely a derivation from the functional significance of science in an industrialized world, although this is clearly the origin of its power. Rather, it is the application of rational methods and experimentalism to social affairs.<sup>12</sup>

The role of the ideology of science is manifest in those "professional roles and norms" associated with, among others, manpower experts, social survey teams, management experts, and planners.<sup>13</sup> While these professionals might exist within a modernizing social system, there are limits to their respective utility in the development process. Apter contends that the professional's ideology of science "functions only in a period of practical realism, and is ultimately antagonistic to any other ideology. . . ." For him the alternative ideologies (nationalism, socialism, and national socialism) are more likely to predominate in the early stages of modernization. The overall result is a societal context which, at least ideologically, works against professional efforts such as development planning. The early stages of development call for an emphasis on "identity" and "solidarity" functions which act as foundations for future collective action. "For these purposes the ideologies of nationalism, socialism, and possibly, national socialism are more satisfactory than the ideology of science."<sup>14</sup>

As this is the case, what roles are played by planners and other professionals within the political and administrative systems during those early stages of modernization? Which functions do they perform

<sup>11</sup> Fred G. Burke, "The Cultural Context," in Bertram Gross, ed., *Action Under Planning: The Guidance of Economic Development* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1967), pp. 68-83.

<sup>12</sup> David E. Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 343.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 317.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 328, 343.

which make them valuable enough to "keep"? For Apter they are "a kind of exhibit; they are formally consulted, but their advice is not followed."<sup>15</sup> For Benveniste, who regards the planner's primary task as the "reduction of uncertainty,"<sup>16</sup> a number of secondary functions are also attributable to them: legitimizing the regime; acting as a private staff for the political leaders; and supplying the political leader with a means of obtaining secrecy in policy formulation, thereby enhancing the leader's political power.<sup>17</sup> Thus, the ability of professional planners to perform functions external to their primary task may give them a "place" within the political and/or administrative structures of a developing social system. Nevertheless, the roles are not of a nature that will lead to planning success. This can only occur, according to the Apter hypothesis, when societal conditions are of the quality which permits the dominance of the ideology of science.

At what point in the modernization sequence does the ideology of science become possible? When can planners and other professionals expect to have some impact relevant to their main task of promoting and aiding development? Apter's implied response is that this will occur only when societal conditions warrant it, i.e., when the modernizing nation "develops" sufficiently to permit the exercise of the science ideology. For this to occur three conditions are deemed necessary: first, there must be "a general acceptance of common membership in the society, with the result that nationalism has become internalized and implicit"; second, "sufficient development has already occurred so that societal dislocations require fine adjustments rather than gross 'solutions'"; and third, "a consensus prevails about the roles that are functional to the continuous process of development." In short, for development planners to have any impact, that is, for them to play an *effective* and successful role in development processes, development must already have taken place to a considerable extent.<sup>18</sup>

When regarded as the primary explanation of planning failure, this hypothesis may suggest: first, the planners accept as a "fact of life" that conditions necessary for the fulfillment of their primary task are absent; and second, that they realize that no professionally sanctioned (i.e., planning) action they might take or suggest will change the situation until the *facilitating circumstances* are present. Thus personally and procedurally exempt from blame, planners are also personally and procedurally impotent to improve the situation vis-a-vis their goals.

This same argument can be made on the structural as well as normative level. Not only can the value environment of planning lead to failure, but the stratification and role systems also can impose themselves as barriers. In a later work (*Choice and the Politics of Allocation*), Apter accomplishes such a transition between normative and struc-

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 318.

<sup>16</sup> Benveniste, Chapter Two.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, Chapter Three.

<sup>18</sup> Apter, *Politics of Modernization*, p. 344.

tural levels. Apter does this by positing a correlation between the degree of development and the needed and present degree of functional utility within a population. As development passes from one stage to the next (always becoming progressively more and more "modern" at each successive stage), so the complexity of the stratification system passes from a rather simple to an increasingly complicated structure. At various stages new classes appear and new stratification relationships are formed, the most recently developed class tending to dominate and grow as time goes on. The normative and structural characteristics of these classes vary. As in his exposition of the ideological barriers to professionalism, Apter's argument vis-a-vis stratification is that, until the correct circumstances arise — that is, until "functional status elites" (e.g., professionals) are dominant — there will be little possibility for the effective utilization of professional expertise. In summary, where the society is sufficiently developed the planner will have the opportunity to aid in the development process. Until then, it is implied, the planner must fulfill other functions while awaiting his or her moment of truth.<sup>19</sup>

While not oriented to the specific consideration of the role of planners and/or other professionals in developing countries, numerous analysts besides Apter have commented on the societal prerequisites for facilitating development and modernization efforts. Dankwart Rustow, among others, has contended that "only societies transformed into nations have shown themselves capable of attaining the more advanced forms of modernity. . . ." <sup>20</sup> Using this perspective, it is seen that the absence of "nationhood" and "national identity" can be regarded as crucial barriers to planning effectiveness. Alternative structures and attachments (such as tribes, villages, and the like) are not deemed acceptable as units within which development and modernization can be facilitated. As a type of conventional wisdom within the social and political sciences, this attitude is praised by W. W. Rostow, who notes that there is "a good deal of sense in the contemporary political scientist's emphasis on the achievement of an effective sense of nationhood. . . ." Economic progress, he contends, "tends to be relatively slow" in those legally defined entities which lack a binding nationalism. Under such circumstances the leaders and those who aid them "are denied the benefits of popular exhilaration, the sense of momentum, and the enlarged flow of tax resources" that seem to follow the presence of a greater unity in society.<sup>21</sup>

Edward Banfield takes note of another prerequisite for development efforts. Modernization, he argues, occurs within the context of corporate organization and corporate forms of collective action. Without these

<sup>19</sup> David E. Apter, *Choice and the Politics of Allocation: A Developmental Theory* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971).

<sup>20</sup> Dankwart A. Rustow, *A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernization* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 31.

<sup>21</sup> W. W. Rostow, *Politics and the Stages of Growth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 283.

corporate frameworks the development process — and, supposedly, those involved in that process — are fighting a losing war against "backwardness." What is lacking in the "backward" Italian community which Banfield investigated is an "ethos" which permits such corporate forms of activity and action to develop. This "ethos" barrier would have to be overcome before any effective development policies could be put to use or even seriously considered. Banfield's outlook for changing the "ethos" was not very optimistic. "Changing the ethos, if it could be done deliberately, would entail . . . dangers."<sup>22</sup> In this light, planning efforts might seem fruitless.

At a more general level, there is that school of thought which sees the prime deficiency in a society's lack of "institutionalization." Defined in various ways — as change absorbing,<sup>23</sup> conflict managing,<sup>24</sup> or valued and stabilizing<sup>25</sup> — institutions are regarded by many analysts to be key variables which will determine the success or failure of development policies. A lack of such institutions means, according to these writers, that a necessary prerequisite for the use of planning expertise is missing.

The political environment within which planners must work also seems to have an impact on whether attempts at planning are even worthwhile. Besides the contention that weak or nonexistent political institutions might render planning a fruitless and frustrating exercise, there is the conceptualization that certain types of institutions might develop into barriers with which the planner cannot contend. For example, what if the role of the political opposition is too powerful? Planning, by its very nature, involves collective choices which will benefit some sectors and inevitably present costs to others. To be effective, planners must not only attract the attention and commitment of important policymakers; they must also take account of those whose opposition they will arouse. According to some authorities, this might not even involve specific program suggestions.

As the planning organization gains in prestige, it can less readily insulate itself from the needs of the group in power: dissident groups are always ready to seize any stick to attack the ruling party and the planning group itself.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>22</sup> Edward C. Banfield, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (New York: The Free Press, 1958), Chapter 9.

<sup>23</sup> S. N. Eisenstadt, *Modernization: Protest and Change* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966).

<sup>24</sup> John P. Powelson, *Institutions of Economic Growth: A Theory of Conflict Management* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972).

<sup>25</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

<sup>26</sup> Andrew Watson and Joel B. Dirlam, "Planning Problems," in *Economic Development: Challenge and Promise*, eds. Stephan Spiegelglas and Charles J. Walsh (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), p. 51.

Planning attempts will likely provoke opposition and political controversy from non-governing elites. "The mobilization of collectivities to exercise power and influence in support of change is likely to result in countermobilization to resist change."<sup>27</sup> This condition of change, in many circumstances, has placed considerable restraints upon the effectiveness of planning and planners. With a weak political consensus or a low level of legitimacy for governmental decisions, the value of an official policy is decreased. These situations cannot be overcome by the planners. Therefore, only in a "correct" political atmosphere can planning and other development policies succeed.<sup>28</sup>

Still another relevant example of societal factors which tend to negate the impact of planning efforts is found in the administrative sector of the environment. Administrators, as part of the policymaking context of planning and as key actors in the process in their roles as implementors, can and do make a difference between planning success and failure. In most instances these bureaucrats are pictured as "creatures" of their societal milieu. Fred Riggs, for instance, sees the administrator in the transitional or "prismatic" society as a breeder of gross administrative inefficiency who reflects the "pathological" condition of his society. Lucian W. Pye, on the other hand, regards the problem as rooted in the administrator's attempts to perform in a manner which will keep him above the corruptions of politics. As part of the nation's new elite, bureaucrats are among the first exposed to the acculturation processes imposed upon them by the international environment. While their induction into the "modern" world might seem to warrant an open-mindedness and a willingness to accept changes, the fact is that, according to Pye, "the manner in which the administrators are acculturated has left them primarily sensitive to questions of personal conduct and not to matters of public policy." For Pye, it is not the corruption problem which is salient; rather it is the administrators' "compulsive need to seek security and reassurance in their command over small details."<sup>29</sup> In either case, the efforts of administrative experts to correct this particular source of inefficiency and policy failure

<sup>27</sup> James R. Scarritt, "Political Development and Culture Change Theory: A Propositional Synthesis with Application to Africa," *Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics*, 3 (1972), 21.

<sup>28</sup> This "political system" cause for planning failure is not unique to the Third World. Political conflict over planning in France, Yugoslavia and Italy has somewhat modified the effectiveness of planning in both the West and Communist bloc nations. The importance of the political variable has been taken into account in these countries and the atmosphere of political conflict is built into the system. The "correct" political environment, therefore, is not necessarily devoid of political opposition. See Stephen S. Cohen, *Modern Capitalist Planning: The French Model* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969); and Beverly Tanner Springer, "Italy and Yugoslavia: A Comparative Analysis of Policy-Making in Economic Planning," unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Colorado, 1971.

<sup>29</sup> See Fred W. Riggs, *Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1964), especially Part Three; and Lucian W. Pye, *Politics, Personality and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), Chapters 15-16.

seems only to have proven the point that planners and others can do little else than wait for the necessary conditions to develop with the passing of time.<sup>30</sup>

Each of these arguments rests on widely accepted conceptualizations of cause/effect relationships in developing societies. While such wide acceptance testifies to the *logic* of "blaming the victim," questions can be raised regarding the *utility* and *validity* of these explanations. Yet the validity of "victim-centered" explanations need not even be brought into question (although they should be) in order for analysts to realize that

- (1) these interpretations of why plans fail are only partial answers which, when taken as the sole focus of analyses, will only mislead future researchers and reformer-oriented policymakers;
- (2) the logical conclusions one reaches by such explanations tend to be those that legitimize all currently dominant institutional arrangements outside the subject society, i.e., the planning profession, the funding organizations (World Bank, national economic assistance programs, etc.), the international system and its current inequities, and so forth; and
- (3) these explanations, by absolving the planning professional of any blame, reduce the incentives for planners and planner-training institutions to adapt and adjust to the needs of particular situations.

In response to these points, there are several directions which analysts have taken. Some have turned from "blaming the victim" to "blaming the beneficiary," i.e., noting the highly stratified nature of the international social system and its tendency to continually perpetuate the socioeconomic and political predominance of "advanced" world states.<sup>31</sup> Some have taken this theme and developed it within the conceptual framework of contemporary Marxist thought on imperialism.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>30</sup> Milton J. Esman, "CAG and the Study of Public Administration," in *Frontiers of Development Administration*, ed. Fred W. Riggs (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1971), p. 58.

<sup>31</sup> See Irving Louis Horowitz, *Three Worlds of Development: The Theory and Practice of International Stratification*, 2d edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972). For a unique and stimulating view based on this perspective, see Denis Goulet, *The Cruel Choice: A New Concept in the Theory of Development* (New York: Atheneum, 1973).

<sup>32</sup> Harry Magdoff, Paul Sweezy, Paul Baran and others are leading exponents of this view. Typical of this approach is the following statement by Paul A. Baran: "What is decisive is that economic development in underdeveloped countries is profoundly inimical to the dominant interests in the advanced capitalist countries . . . [T]he backward world has always represented the indispensable hinterland of the highly developed capitalist West." *The Political Economy of Growth* (New York: Modern Reader Paperbacks, 1957), pp. 11-12.



As a welcome modification of the tendency to blame the victims, this view offers a fresh perspective that can be of considerable use in developing new strategies for increasing development plan success in the Third World. Nevertheless, even this explanation falls prey to the third point given above; that is, in focussing on the beneficiary of planning failures, this explanation absolves the planner expert of any blame for the failures. In the balance of this monograph I will present a second alternative to blaming the victim, one which considers the source and quality of planner perceptions as a possible cause of development planning failure in the Third World.

### III. BLAMING THE PLANNER: THE EXPERT'S IMAGE

Development plans are human creations, and as such they are guided by the "social values, visions and interests" of those who compose them. In almost all cases the "composers" are planner experts — professional "policy-recommenders" <sup>33</sup> commissioned to draw up development plans by those who represent a country's legitimate political rulers. In contracting for these experts, Third World leaders are getting more than functional expertise; they are also purchasing sets of assumptions and notions about what constitutes desirable social conditions for a "modern" society and how these are to be attained in a reasonable amount of time (if not sooner). These assumptions and notions — values and commitments, if you will — are purchased for the subject society as a whole and the development policymaking system in particular. Should these values and commitments be relevant and demonstrate a high utility for the subject society, plans will likely tend to be successful; if not, then we have pinpointed one other possible source of planning failure.

The relationship between plan failure and planner expert values is neither often discussed nor well researched. Several comments can be found in the general literature of planning related to this topic, <sup>34</sup> but generally these are little more than brief commentaries with no substantial empirical evidence to support them. In this section we will attempt to indicate how planner expert values influence planning policy by demonstrating the inflexible nature of their value systems in the face of conditions which demand open and malleable assumptions.

We begin by developing a framework through which we can analyze the expert's value system. For this purpose the concept of the "image" (extrapolated from Kenneth Boulding's 1956 work) will be

<sup>33</sup> See Raymond Apthorpe, "Development Studies and Social Planning," *The Journal of Development Studies*, 6 (1970), 4.

<sup>34</sup> See Ruth Glass, "The Evaluation of Planning: Some Sociological Considerations," *International Social Science Journal*, 11 (1959), 393-409; also see David C. Ranney, *Planning and Politics in the Metropolis* (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1969), especially chapter 2; Apthorpe, 4; and Gunner Myrdal, *Asian Drama: An Enquiry into the Poverty of Nations* (London: Penguin Books, 1968).

used. <sup>35</sup> Defined as "subjective knowledge" which is largely responsible for an individual's behavior, the image has as its source "all past experience of the possessor of the image itself." The image has several functions, two of which are relevant at this point. First, it is the repository of an individual's values and commitments. Talcott Parsons defines a value as an "element of a shared symbolic system which serves as a criterion or standard for selection among the alternatives of orientation which are intrinsically open in a situation. . . ." <sup>36</sup> Thus, a value is a code or standard which "organizes a system of action."

Value, conveniently and in accordance with received usage, places things, acts, ways of behaving, goals of action on [an] approval-disapproval continuum. . . . A value is a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means, and ends of action. <sup>37</sup>

Functioning as a repository of values, the image takes on a second task by acting as a constantly adapting filter for present and future actions and experiences. <sup>38</sup> Viewed within the context of a general systems framework, the image is situated between the individual and his/her environment. In this location, the image acts as a screen or control apparatus through which incoming information is processed (or not processed) in accordance with the image's form at the time of contact. In its role as a filter, the image can respond to incoming messages in three ways: (1) not at all, i.e., by rejecting or ignoring the input; <sup>39</sup> (2) by accepting the input in some "regular and well-defined" way which can lead to a gradual modification of the image itself; <sup>40</sup> and (3) by accepting certain messages which will change the image "in a quite radical way" thus causing an intellectual revolution of sorts. <sup>41</sup>

Every image configuration is unique in its response to inputs from the environment. The particular form of an image depends on several factors, and these manifest themselves in what Boulding calls the "process of testing." This process exposes the image in its current form to

<sup>35</sup> Kenneth E. Boulding, *The Image: Knowledge in Life and Society* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1956).

<sup>36</sup> Talcott Parsons, *The Social System* (New York: The Free Press, 1951), p. 12.

<sup>37</sup> Clyde Kluckhohn and others, "Values and Value-Orientations in the Theory of Action," in Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils (editors), *Toward a General Theory of Action* (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1951), p. 395 (emphasis in original).

<sup>38</sup> Boulding, *The Image*, pp. 5-6.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7; see also Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1966), p. 44; and Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957), p. 3.

<sup>40</sup> Boulding, *The Image*, pp. 7-8.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 8-10; see also Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2d ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970).

"reality" (i.e., incoming messages) which tests the image's ability to give its holder relevant and useful data. Having delivered relevant and useful information, an image verifies itself. If it fails to deal with reality, the image is open to challenge and change.<sup>42</sup> In this sense, much depends on the image's ability to be tested. An easily tested image will be a *flexible* one, open to challenge and change as "reality" warrants such adjustments. But as Boulding notes, not all images are easily tested and some might even be impossible to verify.<sup>43</sup> In such cases we can talk of *inflexible images*.

We can expect some degree of inflexibility in all images. A completely flexible image would, in fact, be no image at all. Similarly, some degree of flexibility would be necessary if an image were to be of any use to its holder. There remains a wide range between the poles of this flexibility-inflexibility continuum within which any particular image can be located. That location constitutes an important factor in determining an image's utility for its holder or those who depend on that holder. It is in light of that contention that we will examine the planner's image.

In order to further facilitate this analysis, we will view the image itself as characterized by four basic qualities. First, images have *content*; that is, an abstract and theoretical portion which negatively relates to alternative abstractions and theories. Each image contains values which reflect a choice among various value alternatives. Planner experts have a considerable number of views about desirable societal forms to choose from, and in making their choice and assigning it as their selected value they have given content to their image, i.e., they have adopted a particular bias which is then used by the planning system. The question of image flexibility in regard to its content should be viewed in terms of the extent to which a particular bias is held. The greater the bias toward one particular view of a "desirable" societal form for the subject society, the more inflexible the image.

A second quality of an image is its internal consistency — its *structural logic*. We can attribute to images the same tendency Leon Festinger attributes to their holders, i.e., the drive for consonancy and congruity in the cognitive realm.<sup>44</sup> Images are organized entities that are continually exposed through the testing process to entropic forces which seek to disorganize structured patterns.<sup>45</sup> To ward off such forces, images continually strive for an internal logic which can withstand dissonance-creating pressures. This logic, to be effective for the image, must be "open" enough to permit the empirical realities of the

<sup>42</sup> See Kenneth E. Boulding, "Verifiability of Economic Images," in *The Structure of Economic Science*, ed. Sherman Krupp (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), pp. 129-130.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 132.

<sup>44</sup> See Festinger.

<sup>45</sup> Boulding, *The Image*, p. 19; see also Norbert Wiener, *The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society* (New York: Avon Books, 1954), Chapter I.

environment some role in determining the image's form. Here again we see the need for a mixture of flexibility and inflexibility. The image of planner experts must contain a structural logic "closed" enough to give it a relatively persistent form and internal consistency while at the same time being sufficiently "open" to allow for adjustments of the structural logic to variations in environmental conditions.

A third quality of an image is its *strategical logic*. This characteristic reflects an image's perception of the means by which it is to be applied in given situations. As with structural logic, strategical logic can be either open or closed. A "closed" strategical logic is necessary to the extent that it instructs the holder in definitive terms about what must be done and how. Yet, such specificity also breeds excessive inflexibility. Strategies must also be "open" and flexible in light of the realities of environmental variations. Thus, planner experts must have a strategical logic which helps them direct the application of their expertise while leaving the door open to adjustments in methods mandated by unique or changing circumstances.

Finally, an image is characterized by its *adaptability*, i.e., its capacity to relate to specific environmental conditions that are relevant for the image holder's purposes. An image which relates to one set of conditions is useful only when faced with that set or a closely related set. This is a sign of an unhealthy inflexibility which should be avoided, especially in a changing environment. On the other hand, one finds images which are so adaptable that they lose all value for their holders. Completely adaptable images will lack the capacity to select certain features of the environment as keys to bring about specific changes. Such images, in a sense, would *lack* any guiding logic — structural or strategic.


It is in this last reference that we can perceive the interrelatedness of all four qualities of the image.<sup>46</sup> The planner expert's image will be relevant and useful where its content is adaptable to the environmental conditions of the subject society. This adaptability *facilitates* the application of the image which, in turn, is *controlled* by its content and structural logic. This system of mutual determinism, based on a "hierarchy of control and facilitation"<sup>47</sup> (see Figure 1), indicates several points at which the planner experts and their value system can cause planning failure.

The empirical evidence useful for an analysis of planner expert images is so little as to be almost non-existent. The present writer recently undertook a limited analysis of planner images based on this model, and the results of that study will be used here where applicable.

*Content bias.* A thematic content analysis of introductory chapters to thirty national development plans (including six each from five

<sup>46</sup> This view of the interrelatedness of four components of the image was developed with the help of James R. Scarritt.

<sup>47</sup> See Talcott Parsons, *Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), p. 9.



THE PLANNER'S IMAGE

regions)<sup>48</sup> revealed very little in terms of the type of society advocated by planner experts. The analysis sought to determine the number of references these documents made to atomistic *Gesellschaft* social systems as desirable objectives, as opposed to the more organicistic *Gemeinschaft*

TABLE 1

## THEMES OF PLANNING: CONTENT BIASES

	Anglophone/ Eastern Africa	Francophone/ Central Africa	Asia/ Pacific	Latin America	Middle East/ Asia Minor	All Regions
Gemeinschaft	5	0	0	0	0	5
	2.7	0	0	0	0	0.6
Gesellschaft	7	4	4	4	1	20
	3.8	2.9	2.9	2.2	0.5	2.4
Not Ascertainable	172	132	135	175	187	801
	93.5	97.1	97.1	97.8	99.5	97.0

<sup>48</sup> For a listing of the sources used for this analysis, see Appendix A.

societal forms. The results of this attempt, as shown in Table 1, indicate only a minor preference for *Gesellschaft* forms out of a total of 826 cases,<sup>49</sup> with the content being "not ascertainable" in almost all cases. The same pattern held true for all cases even when considered on a regional basis.

The lack of any indication of preference in this area can be interpreted in two ways. First, we can hold that there was no preference. Such a conclusion cannot stand, however, in light of the fact that development planners deal constantly with the question of changing societies. They are commissioned for the purpose of converting one societal condition into another; thus, it would seem absurd for them to disavow any preference in societal form.

A second interpretation would hold that the lack of a stated preference for societal form is actually an indication that such a preference is widely held and perhaps taken for granted. If clarification of the content analysis is sought in other studies, this interpretation seems to stand up. For instance, a study by Warren Ilchman and others involving interviews with 33 "middle range planners" indicated a strong desire for social relationships closely associated with *Gesellschaft*-type society: individualism, materialism, capitalism, and other attributes common to modern Western society. The interviewees reacted negatively to "traditional values" and "ascriptive" attitudes which they perceived as constraints to development planning—another indication of a pro-*Gesellschaft* view. When asked to cite countries they see as "models" of development, their choices were basically oriented toward modern, Westernized examples like Japan, the United States, and Western Europe. The *Gesellschaft* bias was clearly evident.<sup>50</sup> Any perusal of the general literature of planning will indicate the same strong bias.

*Structural logic.* The same thematic content analysis attempted to uncover the orientation of planners toward development by determining which functional social subsystem was held to be most crucial for purposes of attaining desired ends. Using a Parsonian framework, we can attempt to determine which functional component among four primary social subsystems acts as the focus of the image's structural logic: the cultural or pattern maintenance subsystem; the social stratification or integrative subsystem; the political or goal attainment subsystem; the economic or adaptative subsystem. By determining which of these components is the dominant theme among the 826 "plan objectives," we can accomplish a dual task: first, it would indicate the operational direction of the content bias; and second, it would offer the analyst

<sup>49</sup> A "case" in the study was defined as a "plan objective" which was "a somewhat coherent and complete statement regarding the goals being sought by the statement's authors."

<sup>50</sup> See Warren Ilchman, Alice Stone Ilchman, and Philip K. Hastings, *The New Men of Knowledge and the Developing Nations: Planners and the Polity; A Preliminary Survey* (Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California, 1968).

some insight into the specific form of the structural logic. It would follow that if development planners would concentrate on economic policies (which they obviously do), then the planner expert's image is based on economic theories and models. An in-depth review of the literature of development planning supports this finding and also gives us some insight into the structural logic of the image itself. An economic determinism seems to permeate the image with considerable weight given to economic growth as the key to attaining "modernity." Among planner experts there exists a substantive controversy relating to which specific economic factor is the *primum mobile* for development, but overall there is little debate regarding the primacy of economic variables themselves. In fact, the structural logic involved in these theories is basically a closed and inflexible one which tends to deny the relevance of variables which do not "fit" into its general economic framework.<sup>51</sup> The

TABLE 2

## THEMES OF PLANNING: STRUCTURAL LOGIC

	Anglophone/ Eastern Africa	Francophone/ Central Africa	Asia/ Pacific	Latin America	Middle East/ Asia Minor	All Regions
=						
Adaptation	121	107	103	127	124	582
=	65.8	78.7	74.1	70.9	66.0	70.5
=						
Goal Attainment	9	13	6	9	13	50
=	4.9	9.6	4.3	5.0	6.9	6.1
=						
Integration	50	14	29	36	42	171
=	27.2	10.3	20.9	20.1	22.3	20.7
=						
Pattern Maintenance	0	2	1	3	9	15
=	0	1.5	0.7	1.7	4.8	1.8
=						
Not Ascertainable	4	0	0	4	0	8
=	2.2	0	0	2.2	0	1.0

<sup>51</sup> For a discussion specifically related to the closed nature of economic development logic, see Melvin Jay Dubnick, "The Planner's Image: The Impact of Expertise on Development Planning and Policymaking," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Colorado, 1974.

results are reflected in development studies that fail to take advantage of alternative models and approaches,<sup>52</sup> thus limiting the applicability of such studies and the official plans which build upon them.

*Strategical logic.* The strategy orientation of planner experts is an extension of the structural logic with an added emphasis on eliminating perceived constraints. Strategy in development plans heavily emphasizing the adaptation subsystem will, of course, concern itself primarily with the manipulation of economic factors. Planning documents are, in many cases, little more than statements about the adjustment of key production factors (land, labor, capital, technology, etc.). As shown in Table 2, rarely does one come across strategies related to the political subsystem or the stratification (integrative) subsystem of the subject society. Even less frequent are references to the need for modifying the cultural subsystem as a means for bringing about development objectives. Such tendencies are continually reinforced by the historical traditions of the development planners which seem to equate all planning with economic planning,<sup>53</sup> and the pressures of a professionalism which define theories and models that planners *should* follow if they are to be accepted by their professional peers.<sup>54</sup> These determinants of strategy are thus related more to factors outside the truly relevant environment (that is, the subject society) than they are to those in that environment. The result is a high degree of strategical logic inflexibility in the image of planner experts.

An indication of this inflexibility was uncovered in the thematic content analysis. For each of the 826 plan objectives found in the thirty plans, this writer sought to determine the strategic orientation advocated vis-a-vis current conditions in the subject society. The point of such an investigation was to find some measure of the extent to which planning images promote strategic flexibility. Such flexibility would be indicated by strategies which oriented to specific conditions on the basis of their individual utility for achieving given plan objectives. Inflexibility would manifest itself as strategies which failed to consider individual utilities and instead perceived *all* current conditions as either useful or not solely on the basis of their identification with the present state of "underdevelopment." The strategic choices involved either the *maintenance* of current conditions, thereby implying their possible use in the development plan; or the *change* of such conditions, implying that their elimination would best facilitate development efforts.

The results, shown in Table 3, point to the overwhelming concentration on *eliminating rather than utilizing* given subject society conditions; on imposing a new social system rather than modifying the old one to contemporary conditions. The most desirable stance in

<sup>52</sup> Apthorpe, 4-5.

<sup>53</sup> See Dubnick, pp. 188-205.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 206-214.

TABLE 3

## THEMES OF PLANNING: STRATEGIC LOGIC

	Anglophone/ Eastern Africa	Francophone/ Central Africa	Asia/ Pacific	Latin America	Middle East/ Asia Minor	All Regions
=	9	0	5	5	2	21
Maintenance	4.9	0	3.6	2.8	1.1	2.5
=	143	136	134	163	186	762
Change	77.7	100.0	96.4	91.1	98.9	92.3
=	32	0	0	11	0	43
Not Ascertainable	17.4	0	0	6.1	0	5.2

reference to this particular strategic question would be one which calls for the evaluation of current subject society conditions in terms of their potential utility for development planning efforts. The evidence, however, indicates a tendency for planner experts to *assume* condition-change to be of greater value. This reflects a considerable inflexibility in the image of planner experts.

*Adaptability.* The adaptability of planner expert images is very difficult to analyze. Some indication was obtained in the previously mentioned study when this writer attempted to uncover what relationship there was, if any, between the frequency of the planning themes found during the content analysis and the environmental conditions of the 30 countries whose development plans were used.<sup>55</sup> That analysis, involving six categories of environmentally relevant factors (physical and demographic factors, political structure and process factors, political conflict factors, economic variables, social factors, and transport/communications variables), indicated little if any association between environmental conditions and planning themes. Using Goodman and Kruskal's *tau beta* as a measure, associations were determined between the frequency of planning themes and variables derived from Arthur S. Banks' *Cross Polity Time Series Data*.<sup>56</sup> The results, displayed in Tables 4 through 9, reflect low levels of association between the frequency of planning themes and the forty-eight variables used to represent environmental variations among the thirty countries examined.<sup>57</sup> While it is impossible to draw general conclusions from such limited evidence, the implication of the study is obvious: planner expert images tend not to adapt to given environmental conditions.

<sup>55</sup> For a discussion of the methods and measures used, *ibid.*, pp. 102-114.

<sup>56</sup> Arthur S. Banks, *Cross-Polity Time Series Data* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1971).

<sup>57</sup> See Dubnick, pp. 175-187 and Appendix C (pp. 289-332).

TABLE 4

## ASSOCIATION OF PHYSICAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS AND THE THEMES OF DEVELOPMENT PLANNING

Environment Factors 1966	Theme Dimensions		
	Maintenance/ Change	Gemeinschaft/ Gesellschaft	Adaptation/ Goal Attainment/ Integration/ Pattern Maintenance
Area	0.957	.0381	.0246
Population	.0631	.0320	.0338
Population Density	.0267	.0086	.0010
Population in Cities of 100,000 (Per Capita)	.0384	.0041	.0119

TABLE 5

## ASSOCIATION OF POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND PROCESS FACTORS AND THE THEMES OF DEVELOPMENT PLANNING

Environment Factors 1966	Theme Dimensions		
	Maintenance/ Change	Gemeinschaft/ Gesellschaft	Adaptation/ Goal Attainment/ Integration/ Pattern Maintenance
Regime Type	.0116	.0028	.0062
Head of State	.0164	.0059	.0048
Effective Executive Type	.0168	.0055	.0041
Legislative Selection Process	.0108	.0024	.0055
Effective Executive Selection Process	.0017	.0121	.0014
Nomination Process	.0258	.0088	.0072
Party Legitimacy	.0055	.0088	.0061
Parliamentary Responsibility	.0073	.0063	.0029
Legislative Effectiveness	.0148	.0047	.0067

TABLE 6

ASSOCIATION OF POLITICAL CONFLICT FACTORS  
AND THE THEMES OF DEVELOPMENT PLANNING

Environment Factors 1964-1966	<i>Theme Dimensions</i>		
	Maintenance/ Change	Gemeinschaft/ Gesellschaft	Adaptation/ Goal Attainment/ Integration/ Pattern Maintenance
No. of Coups	.0093	.0179	.0053
No. of Major Constitutional Changes	.0212	.0280	.0038
No. of Major Cabinet Changes	.0244	.0066	.0076
No. of Changes in Effective Executive	.0084	.0250	.0131
No. of Legislative Elections	.0142	.0144	.0012
No. of Assassinations	.0112	.0006	.0037
No. of General Strikes	.0406	.0075	.0096
No. of Government Crises	.0278	.0006	.0065
No. of Political Purges	.0440	.0068	.0124
No. of Anti-Government Demonstrations	.0853	.0307	.0235

TABLE 7

ASSOCIATION OF ECONOMIC FACTORS AND  
THE THEMES OF DEVELOPMENT PLANNING

Environment Factors 1966	<i>Theme Dimensions</i>		
	Maintenance/ Change	Gemeinschaft/ Gesellschaft	Adaptation/ Goal Attainment/ Integration/ Pattern Maintenance
Gross National Product (GNP) Per Capita	.0565	.0108	.0138
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Per Capita	.0387	.0063	.0114
GDP Per Capita Originating in Industrial Sector	.0375	.0252	.0119
Energy Production Per Capita	.0285	.0080	.0072
Energy Consumption Per Capita	.0353	.0104	.0118
Imports Per Capita	.0154	.0100	.0163
Exports Per Capita	.0156	.0082	.0133
Proportion of World Trade	.0546	.0281	.0190

TABLE 8

ASSOCIATION OF SOCIAL FACTORS AND  
THE THEMES OF DEVELOPMENT PLANNING

<i>Theme Dimensions</i>			
Environment Factors 1966	Maintenance/ Change	Gemeinschaft/ Gesellschaft	Adaptation/ Goal Attainment/ Integration/ Pattern Maintenance
Primary School Enrollment Per Capita	.1019	.0412	.0216
Secondary School Enrollment Per Capita	.0350	.0131	.0249
University Enrollment Per Capita	.0379	.0238	.0176
Total School Enrollment Per Capita	.0739	.0207	.0192
Percentage of Population Literate	.0616	.0349	.0208
Physicians Per Capita	.0303	.0052	.0189

TABLE 9

ASSOCIATION OF TRANSPORT/COMMUNICATIONS FACTORS  
AND THE THEMES OF DEVELOPMENT PLANNING

<i>Theme Dimensions</i>			
Environment Factors 1966	Maintenance/ Change	Gemeinschaft/ Gesellschaft	Adaptation/ Goal Attainment/ Integration/ Pattern Maintenance
Railroad Mileage Per Square Mile	.0146	.0039	.0224
Rail Passenger- Kilometers*	.0244	.0445	.0089
Passenger Cars Per Capita	.0366	.0252	.0155
Commercial Vehicles Per Capita	.0394	.0252	.0155
All Highway Vehicles Per Capita	.0309	.0248	.0115
Telegrams Per Capita	.0419	.0063	.0091
Telephones Per Capita	.0380	.0248	.0141
Radios Per Capita	.0400	.0240	.0128
Newspaper Circulation Per Capita	.0422	.0270	.0299
Book Prod. By Titles Per Million Population	.0322	.0045	.0203
All Mail Per Capita	.0358	.0133	.0092

\* Number of kilometers traveled by rail passenger in given year.

\* \* \* \* \*

While much more investigation is needed in this area, the data presented here indicate that planners themselves may be as much to blame for development plan failure as the subject society or the international social system. Their general immunity from blame in the past derives from a number of sources including our reverence for the "professional" (the "expert" in a technical field) and an international version of that ideology which blames the victim. While *total* fault for development program failure cannot be placed on the planner experts alone, one must consider their image inflexibility a potential source of policy problems.

## APPENDIX A

Specific details concerning the selection of sources for the content analysis, the procedure used, the results of the reliability test of those procedures, and a "read-out" of the data are given in Chapters II, III, and Appendix A of Melvin Jay Dubnick, "The Planner's Image: The Impact of Expertise on Development Planning and Policymaking," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Colorado, 1974. In the present appendix some brief notes about the sources and the reason for their selection are in order.

The goal of this study was to try to uncover some of the "themes" which marked the planner's image. The most obvious document to explore for these themes is the national development plan itself which, one assumes, is mainly the product of a planning organization headed and directed by professional planners. However, there are dangers in selecting this document. For example, it may not be drawn up by the planners, but rather by propagandists who communicate more rhetoric than they do planning proposals. Some of the documents may also suffer from being drawn up by planners who write what they think their political clientele and others (i.e., administrators, World Bank, etc.) wished to hear, rather than what they held to be valid for planning purposes. Both of these dangers are somewhat magnified for this study since only one chapter from each document was examined — a chapter more susceptible to propagandizing and false statements than any other since it was a reflection of non-technical objectives intended for the general public's reading. This particular chapter, however, was the only one common to the thirty plans used in this study. More importantly, it is the chapter concerned with the statement of planning priorities and objectives. These "objectives" chapters are usually found at the beginning of each document and sometimes include a brief statement about the successes or failures of past policies. The typical objectives chapter then goes on to summarize the proposed plan and the techniques being advocated. The length of those examined for this study varied from two or three pages to 50 or 60 pages.

The unit of analysis was a "plan objective" that this writer defined as a somewhat coherent and complete statement regarding the goals sought by the statement's author. Some of these statements were sentences, others were paragraphs. For each plan objective, three questions were asked: first, toward what societal form was the objective aimed; second, was the objective oriented toward the maintenance or change of the structures of the present system; and third, what functional portion of the social system did the objective attempt to influence? The answers to these questions determined where the objective was classified in a three-dimensional scheme. The only addition was a "not ascertainable" category added to each of the dimensions. The results provided the data for the present study.

Selecting the plans for analysis was perhaps the most difficult problem. This sort of analysis should be based on a sample derived randomly from an entire population of national development plans.

The only other valid alternative might be a weighted sample whose composition is calculated to control for certain factors. Neither method could be used in the present study due to the limited availability of the documents and of financial resources which might have facilitated the effort. After considering what plans were available, it was decided that an attempt should be made to at least disperse the sample into five distinct regional categories based on geographic and/or language criteria. Thus, while the following discussion will treat this analysis as if it were accomplished with a scientifically acceptable random or weighted sample, the reader should keep in mind that this is not the case. One should consider this study as an example of how such an analysis could be done if sufficient materials were available. All conclusions must be evaluated with this caveat in mind.

Thirty countries were chosen for the study, six each from five geographic and/or language region areas. They are as follows:

- Anglophone and Eastern Africa (Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia);
- Francophone and Central Africa (Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Dahomey, Gabon, Togo);
- Asia/Pacific (Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Nepal, Thailand);
- Latin America (Argentina, Barbados, Brazil, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru);
- Middle East and Asia Minor (Afghanistan, Iraq, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey).

For each of these countries, a relatively recent plan document was obtained dating from about the mid-1960's. The specific documents and chapters used were as follows:

- Republic of Botswana. *National Development Plan 1968-73*. Gaborone, 1968, Chapter II.
- Imperial Ethiopian Government, The Planning Commission. *Third Five-Year Development Plan 1961-1965 E. C. (1968-1973)*. Addis Ababa, 1961 (1968), Chapter I.
- Republic of Kenya, Ministry for Economic Planning and Development. *Development Plan 1970-1972*. n.p., n.d., Chapter 1.
- Federal Republic of Nigeria. *Second National Development Plan 1970-74*. Lagos, 1970, Chapter 4.
- Tanzania. *Second Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development 1st July 1969 - 30th June 1974*. Dar Es Salaam, 1970, Volume I, Chapter 1.
- Republic of Zambia, Ministry of Development Planning and National Guidance. *Second National Development Plan January 1972 - December 1976*. Lusaka, 1971, pp. 33-36.
- Republic du Burundi. *Plan Quinquennal de Développement Économique et Social du Burundi 1968-1972*. n.p., n.d., pp. 9-22.



- Republique Centrafricaine. *Plan de Développement Economique et Social 1967-1970*. n.p., n.d., Titre II.
- Republique du Tchad, Ministère du Plan et de la Coopération. *Premier Plan Quinquennal de Développement Economique et Social 1966-1970*. n.p., n.d., pp. 5-8.
- Republic du Dahomey. *Plan de Développement Economique et Social 1966-1970*. n.p., n.d., Chapter II.
- Republique Gabonaise. *Plan de Développement Economique et Social 1966-1970*. n.p., n.d., Chapter II.
- Republique Togolaise, Ministère des Finances, de l'Economie et du Plan. *Plan de Développement Economique et Social 1971-1975*. Lome, n.d., Section II.
- Government of Ceylon, Ministry of Planning and Employment. *The Five Year Plan 1972-1976*. Colombo, 1971, Chapter I.
- Government of India, Planning Commission. *Fourth Five Year Plan 1969-1974, Draft*. n.p., n.d., Chapter I.
- Republic of Indonesia. *The First Five-Year Development Plan (1969/70 - 1973-74)*. n.p., n.d., Chapter I.
- Government of the Republic of Korea, Economic Planning Board. *The Third Five-Year Economic Development Plan 1972-1976*. n.p., 1971, Chapter I.
- Nepal, National Planning Commission. *Fourth Plan (1970-1975)*. Singha Durbar, Kathmandu, 1972, Chapter I.
- Government of Thailand, National Economic Development Board. *The Second National Economic and Social Development Plan (1967-1971)*. Bangkok, n.d., Chapter III.
- República Argentina, Presidencia de la Nación, Secretarios del Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo y Del Consejo Nacional de Seguridad. *Plan Nacional de Desarrollo y Seguridad 1971-1975*. n.p., 1971, pp. 17-19.
- Barbados. *Development Plan 1969-1972*. n.p., n.d., Chapter III.
- Federative Republic of Brazil. *First National Development Plan 1972/74*. n.p., 1971, Chapter I.
- Guatemala, Secretaria General del Consejo Nacional de Planificacion Economica. *Plan de Desarrollo 1971-1975*. n.p., 1970, Tomo I, Seccion Primera, Capitulo I.
- Paraguay, Presidencia de la República, Secretaria Técnica de Planificacion. *Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Economico y Social 1971-1985: Sintesis del Plan General y Sectorial*. n.p., 1970, pp. 10-17.
- República Peruiana, Presidencia de la República. *Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Para 1971-1975: Volume I, Plan Global*. n.p., 1971, Capitulo I.
- Royal Government of Afghanistan, Ministry of Planning. *An English Translation of the Third Five Year Economic and Social Plan of Afghanistan 1967-1971*. n.p., 1967; pp. 25-39.
- Iraq. *Law No. 70 of 1970: The National Development Plan for the Fiscal Years 1970-1974*. n.p., n.d., pp. 149-151.
- Kingdom of Morocco, Prime Minister, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Planning and the Training of Senior Grades. *Five Year Plan 1968-1972*. n.p., n.d., Volume I, Section II, Chapter I.

- Democratic Republic of the Sudan, Ministry of Planning. *The Five Year Plan of Social and Economic Development of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan for the Period 1970/71 - 1974-75, Volume I: Major Trends of Development*. Khartoum, 1970, Chapter II.
- République Tunisienne, Secretariat d'Etat au Plan et l'Economie Nationale. *Plan Quadriennal 1965-1968*. Tunis, n.d., pp. 11-21.
- Republic of Turkey, Prime Ministry, State Planning Organization. *Second Five-Year Development Plan 1968-1972*. Ankara, 1969, pp. 3-5.

Analyzing the content of the plan objectives of these plans is an extremely subjective process. Unlike content analyses where one seeks to account for the recurrence of certain words, phrases, or subjects, a thematic analysis relies to a large extent upon the meanings each individual codifier attaches to the concepts being used. It is, therefore, important to note the reliability of one's codification methods. For the present study, only the writer accomplished the primary analysis; three other individuals were asked to take part in a secondary analysis as a reliability test of that first attempt. A brief discussion of the test's results will give the reader some basis for evaluating them.

The three codifiers each had different academic backgrounds and different degrees of exposure to the arguments of this study. One, a graduate student in the humanities, was familiar with earlier versions of this dissertation and the reasoning behind the content analysis. A second codifier for this test was a political science graduate student whose main area was comparative politics. He had been involved in several discussions about the present study, but was otherwise unfamiliar with the arguments in this work. The third codifier was also a political scientist. His main concern in the study of politics was political thought and American government. He was not involved in any discussions regarding the present study.

The reliability test was given in two parts. Part one tested the process used for selecting plan objectives from the objectives chapters. The coefficients of reliability for these three codifiers were .730, .692, and .615 respectively — the individuals having more knowledge of the concepts scored higher than those with lesser knowledge.

Part two of the reliability test consisted of giving each codifier specific sets of plan objectives which the present writer had previously classified in terms of the three theme dimensions. Each codifier was then asked to classify that plan objective. Comparing the classifications of this writer and those given by the codifiers, coefficients of reliability were calculated to be .792, .693, and .594 with the individual having the greatest knowledge vis-a-vis the present work again coming out highest and the person with the lowest familiarity scoring the lowest co-efficient level.

A familiarity with the concepts used in this analysis and the general argument of the study did seem to have an impact upon the validity of the codification. This finding is not at all surprising in light of the subjective quality of the themes under examination. It is difficult to determine whether this finding has a positive or negative meaning for the analysis. This is for the reader to judge.