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THE PLANNER'S IMAGE: THE IMPACT OF EXPERTISE ON
DEVELOPMENT PLANNING AND POLICYMAKING

by

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B.S., Southern Colorado State College, 1968

M.A., University of Colorado, 1969

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate
School of the University of Colorado in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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1974

This Thesis for the Doctor of Philosophy Degree by


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
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The Planner's Image: The Impact of Expertise on Development

Planning and Policymaking

Thesis directed by Professor James R. Scarritt

The purpose of this work is to develop a concept that would be useful in analyzing the impact of a planner's perception upon Third World development planning successes. Borrowing extensively from Kenneth Boulding's work, the Image concept is developed and used as a basis for the analysis.

In Chapter I the failure of Third World development planning is discussed along with some of the causes to which such failure has been attributed. One such cause is found in the perceptions and orientations of the planning expert. That this causal factor has not been frequently and systematically investigated probably results from the lack of a sufficient framework with which one may conceptualize the subject matter. It is for this purpose that the Image concept is used.

In the first section of Chapter II the Image concept is presented to the reader as a control apparatus within the general system that can be analyzed in terms of its content, structure and strength. The research design used for analyzing these aspects of the planner's Image is offered in section two of Chapter II.

The specific application of this design is made in Chapters III, IV, and V. The planner's Image content is explored in Chapter III through the use of a thematic content analysis of portions of national development plans, a secondary analysis of a study involving interviews with 30 professional planners, and a brief review of the literature on development planning which is relevant in this regard. The examination of the planner's Image structure in Chapter IV is accomplished through a literature review of the economic theories which predominate in Third World development planning. Finally, in Chapter V the Image's strength is analyzed through measures of association and speculative discussions vis-à-vis the causes of high strength measures for relevant factors.

The results of this analysis seemed to indicate (1) a strong Image content bias among planners which stressed the economic sector as a means for planning, the Gesellschaft model of society as a desired goal for development planners, and an orientation which emphasized the need to change current societal and cultural configurations rather than maintain them; (2) an Image structure based on a closed logic which does not facilitate the consideration of new and perhaps relevant environmental factors; and (3) an Image strength that gives more weight to irrelevant than to relevant variables in the planner's surroundings. All these tendencies add to the

possibility of an Image which is inflexible and therefore less likely to adapt to the needs of the subject society. Planning failure might be the result of such Image inflexibility.

The possibility of changing the planner's Image is discussed in Chapter VI. There are alternative Image configurations. The problem is to select the best agent of change for the adjustment of the current Image. The profession as a change agent is examined using various propositions of culture change to describe what must be done to orient the profession in this direction.

This abstract is approved as to form and content. I recommend its publication.

Signed James R. Smith
Faculty member in charge of dissertation

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

It is not until one attempts a work such as the present one that the reason for an acknowledgments section becomes clear. There are many individuals (at several institutions) who have added to the volume which the reader has before him; and while none of these "friends" can be held responsible for what follows, there can be little doubt that the product could not have been produced without each and every one of them.

At the cost of breaking the normal format for acknowledgments (and perhaps insulting several others), the greatest friend and helper on this long project has been Randi, my wife. Without her suggestions, prodding, proofreading, encouragement, and humor, the arduous process of developing a dissertation such as this would have been impossible to endure. Let there be no mistake, her criticisms were not always accepted gracefully, and at times her own heavy load as student, teacher, and mother made her a very reluctant volunteer. As a matter of fact, in hindsight her endurance in the face of my demands and moods was remarkable. My only regret in dedicating this work to her is my inability to fulfill her request to have the dedication written "in gold letters 3 inches high across the front cover."

Another who suffered from my inconsistencies and numerous non-productive phases is James R. Scarritt who chaired my doctorate committee and served as first reader for the present volume. Since 1971 when I first discussed the topic of planning images with him, Dr. Scarritt has valiantly attempted to keep me from wandering away from the subject at hand. The broadness which I continuously sought conflicted with the narrowness he and the discipline rightly demanded. The message finally got through!

Criticisms of the final draft by Beverly Springer, Roger Paget, and Lyle Sumek of Colorado University added to the present text. Three fellow graduate students (besides my wife) also helped in the analytical portions of the dissertation: Stafford Thomas suffered with me in the selection of a measure of association for Image strength; and Thaddeus Tecza and Richard Foster joined forces with Randi Dubnick in the reliability test of the content analysis described in Chapter III.

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The Lafayette Walker family (of Gaithersburg, Maryland) gave up the privacy of their home and the use of their automobile for a week while helping me do my research in the Washington, D.C. area in August of 1973. My only wish is that I might have the opportunity to return their favors ten-fold in the near future.

Access to documents used in the content analysis was facilitated through the cooperation of the University of Colorado Libraries and the staff of the Joint Library of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/International Monetary Fund in Washington, D.C. A grant-in-aid from Colorado University also helped meet expenses in this regard. In addition, a generous amount of computer time and a fellowship from the University helped speed the completion date of this volume.

The unenviable task of typing this dissertation was left to Mrs. Ann Underwood of Boulder who, among other things, had to decipher scratchings which even I could not understand. Her help in meeting the technical requirements of dissertation writing cannot be overstated.

Finally, I'd like to thank my daughter Heather Lisa (age 3 1/2 years) for being a constant distraction which gave me a sense of perspective; and my son, Philip Daniel (age 3 days)

for arriving just in time to help me celebrate the completion
of my dissertation.

Melvin Jay Dubnick

April 28, 1974

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CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM OF DEVELOPMENT PLANNING FAILURE

On an international scale since World War II there has been a consensus among political actors concerning the objective of seeking to obliterate "underdevelopment" as the life style for a great many of the earth's human population. At the same time there has not been an exercise which has led to more frustrations than the moves made to accomplish that goal. As one reviews the literature of Third World development planning, one fact becomes evident: notations of successful development are few and far between. Permeating the discussions and writings of planning experts is the conviction that national development programs have failed to accomplish their intended tasks. In the present chapter the nature of that conviction is reviewed along with some frequently imputed causes for planning failures. Thus, the reader will be given some perspective as to the type of problem which may be partly solved by the development of the Image concept central to the present work.

A. The Nature of Planning Failure Assessments

Since the present study is premised upon the fact of planning failure in the Third World, some consideration must be given to the evidence which supports this contention. Surprisingly, the verdict of failure is not an empirically based determination. Instead, it has its roots in the conviction among professional planners themselves that they generally have failed to meet the challenge of development. The criteria used in determining planner success or failure is, therefore, "social" (in the sense explicated below) rather than empirical. The validity of this assessment of planning can only be determined in terms of the criteria available for evaluative purposes.

Utilizing concepts developed in organizational theory, one may regard the process of assessment as taking three possible forms: the efficiency test, the instrumental test, and the social test. Each approach offers an alternative for evaluative purposes which must be considered as valid in its own right. In a rational world, functioning under norms of rationality, the preference among these tests will go to that which emphasizes efficiency; where this might not be possible, an instrumental test is regarded as the next in value; and finally, where the other tests are found to be inapplicable,

social tests may be considered.¹ Which of these tests best suits the evaluation of planning in the Third World?

(1) In order for the efficiency test to be utilized in the assessment of planning two factors must be present. First, the evaluator must have a "crystallized" picture of specific standards of desirability "against which actual or conceivable effects of causal actions can be evaluated." In addition, there must be a "complete" knowledge of cause/effect relationships among all relevant variables. In other words, an efficiency test assumes that the process being evaluated is taking place within a closed system of which the assessor has total knowledge. Such knowledge must go beyond that which makes the assessor aware of how the system is functioning; he must also be aware of how the system ought to operate under optimal conditions.

From the outset it seems obvious that planning cannot be submitted to this test for a number of reasons. First, the planning process--from its inception to implementation phases--is not occurring in a closed system-type of atmosphere. While the process may be structured to some extent, it relies upon an environment which is, at most, only partially organized.

¹James D. Thompson, Organizations in Action: Social Science Bases of Administration Theory (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1967), p. 87.

There are numerous factors which cannot be controlled, and it is these factors which must be confronted during the planning process.

Second, and following from the open system-nature of the planning process, is the fact that there is no complete knowledge of the cause/effect relationships with which planning programs must deal. In every circumstance, planners must deal with many unknown variables and the possibility of variations even in seemingly common behavior patterns. To seek total knowledge of all the relevant relationships is virtually impossible.

Finally, for all the rhetorical references to such goals as "development" and the "good life," a common and widely accepted definition of those conditions does not exist. In other words, there are no specific standards of desirability against which planning results can be measured. Similarly, there are no widely accepted criteria for a "good" planning process or a "bad" one.

In short, since the primary ingredients for the efficiency test are lacking in Third World planning, that form of assessment is not a viable alternative for present purposes.²

(2) The instrumental assessment seems to represent a more likely test in the evaluation of planning success or failure.

²See Thompson, pp. 84-86.

This test differs from the first in that, while it does assume a set of standards of desirability, one need not have complete knowledge of the various cause/effect relationships that might be involved. Under these conditions, the basic criterion is "whether a desired state of affairs is achieved."³

For example, to the extent that national development plans have met their stated "targets" of per capita income growth or Gross Domestic Product (G.D.P.) levels, cannot one call such efforts "successful"? Having not reached their specified objectives, cannot other plans be labeled as "failures"? In order to answer these questions we must take a closer look at what such instrumental measures are composed of.

Plan targets, in almost every case, are economic in nature and always oriented toward increases in this realm.⁴ Accepting these targets as valid criteria for the moment, what can be said about development plans in light of such measurements? Assuming, of course, some correlation between reported and actual growth rates, do Tables 1 through 2 disclose planning success or failure in most cases?

Table 1 can be analyzed from at least two points of view. Comparing planned with actual G.D.P. annual growth rates

³Thompson, pp. 84-86.

⁴Evidence in this regard will be presented in Chapters III-V.

for the selected⁵ countries, one immediately notes that only six of the sixteen definitely achieved their targeted objectives: Kenya, Korea, Pakistan, Taiwan, and Uganda. The most obvious conclusion to be derived from these figures is that a majority of the cases failed in their planning efforts since they did not achieve the desired levels of G.D.P. annual growth. From a second perspective, however, the results are not at all so dismal. For example, a quick perusal of Table 1 shows that in only one of the sixteen cases--Mauritius--was a negative G.D.P. growth rate recorded. All other states in the selected population register in the positive column.⁶ This, too, can be interpreted in terms of success or failure, but in a different way. Had not most of the sample avoided the attainment of negative growth rates? Is it not a sign of planning success that this much was accomplished?

⁵Selection was based upon the availability of data rather than a more rational criterion. This applies as well to the other tables in this section.

⁶In order to orient the reader to some of the distortions which result from the biased sample represented in Table 1, additional information is necessary. Of 42 African countries surveyed, a majority of cases recorded a positive rate of increase in G.D.P. growth from 1960 through 1966. The number of cases in which a negative rate was noted, however, is enlightening. Mauritius was not alone, for sixteen African states suffered a negative G.D.P. growth rate during those years. In light of these figures one can conclude that the distortions of the tables in this section are of major

Tables 2 through 4 can be analyzed and evaluated from similar perspectives, although signs of success and failure vary with each. In Table 2, six of the eleven cases cited show plan targets which were met or exceeded while investment was at a positive rate of increase in all cases for the periods cited. From either perspective, a sign of moderate planning "success." Tables 3 and 4 present a mixed picture similar to that given in Table 1. Planned objectives were achieved in only four and five of the eleven countries samples in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. This is suggestive of planning failure. However, the fact that no negative growth rates in either manufacturing or agricultural sectors were recorded can be taken to mean that, overall, planning has been successful in these countries.

proportions. The reader should bear this in mind as he or she reviews the relevant tables.

DISTRIBUTION OF COUNTRIES IN DEVELOPING AFRICA ACCORDING
TO RATES OF GROWTH OF REAL G.D.P. PER CAPITA, 1960-66

Rate of Growth Per Cent	No. of Countries	No. of Countries (Cumulative)
less than 0	16	16
0-1	8	24
1.1-2	6	30
2.1-3	5	35
3.1-4	3	
4.1-5	3	41
over 5	1	42

Source: United Nations, Economic Commission for Africa, A Survey of Economic Conditions in Africa, 1967 (New York: United Nations, 1969), p. vii.

TABLE 1
 PLANNED AND ACTUAL ANNUAL GROWTH RATES
 IN GDP FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES

Country	Rates: Planned/ Actual	Period	Average annual growth rates	
			GDP	GDP per capita
Ghana	Planned	1963/64-69/70	5.5	2.9
	Actual	1960-65	1.7	-1.0
		1965-69	3.2	0.5
India	Planned	1961/62-64/65	5.5	
	Actual	1961-64	4.3	
Kenya	Planned	1966-70	5.2	2.1
	Actual	1965-69	7.2	4.1
South Korea	Planned	1962-66	6.0	
	Actual	1962-65	7.6	
Mauritius	Planned	1963-66	9.2	7.9
	Actual	1960-65	7.0	4.0
		1965-66	-6.9	-9.1
Morocco	Planned	1960-64	6.0	
	Actual	1960-65	3.6	
Pakistan	Planned	1960/61-64/65	4.5	
	Actual	1960-64	5.5	
Philippines	Planned	1962/63-66/67	6.0	
	Actual	1962-65	4.6	
Sudan	Planned	1961/62-70/71	5.1	2.3
	Actual	1960-65	3.9	0.8
		1966-68	6.9	4.0
Taiwan	Planned	1960-64	8.0	
	Actual	1960-64	10.4	
Tanzania	Planned	1964-69	6.7	4.6
	Actual	1964-69	5.9	2.9
Tunisia	Planned	1965-68	6.5	4.4
	Actual	1965-69	3.6	0.3
Uganda	Planned	1961/62-65/66	3.5	
	Actual	1961-65	3.8	

TABLE 1 (Cont'd)

Country	Rates: Planned/ Actual	Period	Average annual growth rates	
			GDP	GDP per capita
UAR	Planned	1960/61-64/65	7.0	
	Actual	1960-65	6.5	
Venezuela	Planned	1963-66	8.0	
	Actual	1963-66	5.7	
Zambia	Planned	1966-70	11.0	
	Actual	1965-68	7.7	4.3

Sources: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistical Office of the United Nations, Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1970: Volume II, International Tables (New York: United Nations, 1972), pp. 74-75; United Nations, Economic Commission for Africa, A Survey of Economic Conditions in Africa, 1960-1964 (New York: United Nations, 1968), p. 216; United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Economic Survey, 1966 (New York: United Nations, 1967), p. 57.

TABLE 2

ANNUAL RATE OF INCREASE IN GROSS INVESTMENT

Country	Period	Annual rate of increase in investment	
		Planned	Actual
Morocco	1960-64	21	8.5
Pakistan	1960/61-64/65	20.5	18.1
South Korea	1962-66	15.5	15.7
Philippines	1962/63-66/67	12	4.6
Malaysia		11.5	11.6
UAR	1960/61-64/65	11.5	11.4
India	1961/62-65/66	10	7.5
Tunisia	1962-71 (1966)	9.5	12.3
Venezuela	1963-66	8.5	13.1
Taiwan	1960-64	7	11.2
Sudan	1961/62-70/71 (1966)	5	11.5

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Economic Survey, 1966 (New York: United Nations, 1967), p. 57.

TABLE 3

PLANNED AND ACTUAL RATES OF GROWTH IN
MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION IN PERCENTAGE

Country	Period	Annual rates of growth in production	
		Planned	Actual
Sudan	1961/62-70/71 (1966)	21	9.1
UAR	1960/61-64/65	15	8.4
Venezuela	1963-66	13.5	9.6
Taiwan	1960-64	12.5	16.2
South Korea	1962-66	11.5	15.6
India	1961/62-65/66	11.0	9.3
Philippines	1962/63-66/67	10	5.6
Morocco	1960-64	9	4.9
Pakistan	1960/61-64/65	8.5	10.1
Tunisia	1962-71 (1966)	8	4
Malaysia		7.5	11.1

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Economic Survey, 1966 (New York: United Nations, 1967), p. 66.

TABLE 4

PLANNED AND ACTUAL RATES OF GROWTH IN
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN PERCENTAGE

Country	Period	Annual rates of growth in production	
		Planned	Actual
Venezuela	1963-66	8	6.6
Taiwan	1960-64	5.5	6.4
Morocco	1960-64	5.5	6.4
South Korea	1962-66	5	3.7
UAR	1960/61-64/65	5	3.3
India	1961/62-65/66	4.5	2.5
Sudan	1961/62-70/71 (1966)	4	5.3
Tunisia	1962-71 (1966)	4	2.7
Malaysia		3	4
Philippines	1962/63-66/67	3	2.6
Pakistan	1960/61-64/65	2.5	3.3

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Economic Survey, 1966 (New York: United Nations, 1967), p. 58.

This rather simple evaluation through an instrumental test has three major drawbacks which offset its initial impact. The first is obvious from the manner in which it is presented; as a measure, it does not present hard and fast evaluative criteria upon which an assessment can be made. The extent to which targets are to be achieved in order for a plan to be declared successful or not is a matter for the arbitrary judgment of the evaluator. Some assessors will be absolute in their judgment and regard as successful only those plans which have met their preestablished goals. Others, perhaps being more realistic, will measure success at a lower level of achievement by noting that any positive increase (or an increase to some specific but still lesser level of growth) might be better than that which would have been accomplished without the planning effort. All in all, this arbitrariness in the setting of efficiency standards seems to partially invalidate the value of an instrumental test which should contain definite desirability standards.

A second and related problem with this test involves an assumption crucial to its validity. Even while we may grant the utility of an economic growth indicator for development, what basis do we have for assuming that the planning efforts of each country had any impact upon the final outcomes? Since the evaluator is not operating in a closed system where each

variable can be noted for its influence on the whole, it is possible that the achievement of certain levels of attainment in economic growth could be accomplished through forces outside the view of the assessor.

A third flaw in this particular test is its necessary assumption that economic growth and its various indices constitute valid measures for "development." There is no denying that economics is a fundamental aspect of social life. Nor can one refute its utility as an indicator of standards and levels of living. But the question must be raised as to whether economic growth indicators offer a sufficient measure of general development or development in its social, political, and cultural form. While much can be made of the argument that there is a high correlation between economic well-being and political-social-cultural levels of development, there is little evidence that economic growth alone is the key to the process. As a matter of fact, a rather substantial argument can be made that just the opposite is true.⁷ In short, the presence of this unquestioned assumption weakens the standards of desirability that might be used in an instrumental test such as that attempted above.

⁷Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris, Economic Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973).

With these caveats in mind, the utility value of an instrumental test must be qualified. For present purposes its utility is rather low.

(3) A third and final possible method of assessment involves the use of a social test of planning success or failure. Lacking both an unambiguous set of standards of desirability and sufficient knowledge of cause/effect relationships, an assessor must turn from empirical to social criteria. According to Thompson, there are many instances where social referents must be called upon for this task of supplying some standards for evaluative purposes.⁸

An essential ingredient for the social test is a social reference to which the assessment must be anchored. For the planning profession in the Third World a number of alternatives are possible in this regard. First, there is the "Prince" (political leader) to whom the planner must answer. He is the conventional client for the planning expert--a "politician in search of advice," according to Guy Benveniste.⁹ The criteria for success derived from this actor will more than likely rest

⁸Thompson, pp. 86-87; he refers to the studies of Leon Festinger, Herbert Hyman and Robert Merton in this regard, especially as those investigators examined the role played by reference groups in the stabilizing of beliefs and opinions where other sources of standards were lacking.

⁹Guy Benveniste, The Politics of Expertise (Berkeley: The Glendessary Press, 1972), p. 6.

upon policies which will enhance the power of the Prince and/or the regime by which he governs. Satisfaction of the Prince's desires, however, does not present the assessor with any useful clue as to how well development planning is meeting its primary task--the achievement of development. As with the assumption noted previously which tended to equate development with economic growth, the premise that political development of a Prince's accumulation of power means development in general is a weak one upon which to build evaluative criteria.

A second relevant social group to which planners might look for evaluative criteria are those Benveniste refers to as the "implementors." These "lieutenants" to the Prince are the "men of administration who surround the Prince and control the machinery of implementation." Their importance lies in the power of policy execution which they control.

They are the members of the bureaucracies who sometimes succeed and sometimes fail to bring about the policies the [planning] experts help elaborate.¹⁰

The criteria derivable from this group differ somewhat from those which develop out of Prince-planner relationships. On a very general level and utilizing the literature of administrative theory, the implementor-bureaucrat can be regarded as one who seeks out policies which are implemented with the

¹⁰ Benveniste, p. 7.

least damage to current bureaucratic patterns. The type of behavior they find optimal seems to follow a rather "simplified" model which, according to Charles Perrow, calls for

satisficing behavior [that is, action which is "good enough" in the sense of satisfying immediate needs]; sequential and limited search processes that are only mildly innovative; specialization of activities and roles so that attention is directed to "a particular restricted set of values"; "attention-directors that channelize behavior"; rules, programs, and repertoires of action that limit choice in recurring situations and prevent an agonizing [for the organization] process of optimal decision making at each turn; a restricted range of stimuli and situations that narrow perception; training and indoctrination enabling the individual to "make decisions, by himself, as the organization would like him to decide"; and the factoring of goals and tasks into programs that are semi-independent of each other so as to reduce interdependencies. Most organizational activity takes most of the conditions as given; "only a few elements of the system are adaptive at any one time."¹¹

Once again, the criteria given lack any reference to the task of development. It is not an assessment of how much the planner's efforts have improved the social system's chances of achieving some degree of development, but instead concentrates on how well the planning policy fits into the framework of the implementors vis-a-vis their execution of the policy.

While development policies should be constructed with the

¹¹Charles Perrow, Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1972), pp. 151-152. The "satisficing" concept was first noted in James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1958). For an excellent summary and example of the organizational theory paradigm see Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971), especially Chapters 3 and 4.

implementation process in mind, the primary evaluative concern must be with what the policy will achieve in regard to the primary task of development.

Benveniste uses the term "beneficiaries" to denote that social group "whose lives and purposes are affected by [planning] expert designs."

These are the people for whom the plans are made in the first place, the people who may support or fight planners and who may be peaceful or violent depending on the way the play unfolds. [We] call them beneficiaries. At times they are victims.¹²

As the group which receives the eventual impact of development planning, it might seem logical and fair that planners should orient themselves toward meeting the criteria that beneficiaries set forth. However, two problems must be overcome before such standards can be accepted and applied. First there is the problem of determining what those standards are. This is a two-sided problem for not only may the planners be unable to communicate with all relevant beneficiaries, there is also the problem of the beneficiaries communicating as a whole with the planners. In most contemporary societies--developed or developing--societal fragmentation is seemingly more common than the unity which might facilitate the setting of clearly defined standards.

¹² Benveniste, p. 7.

A second problem arises should the first be overcome and the planner finds himself faced with a definite set of standards. Are such criteria to be accepted on the basis of their source rather than upon some more objective grounds? Only as one is able to accept the ultimate "wisdom of the masses" can this problem be put aside. While the beneficiaries might be able to supply valid criteria under some circumstances, the present situation in most developing societies does not seem to recommend their use for evaluative purposes.

A final social reference group whose standards might be used for assessment purposes are the planning experts themselves. This reference group may be regarded as the "professional planner's social system." Its membership includes (1) those individuals trained for and practicing in development planning organizations found in the Third World and relevant international and "developed" world organizations; (2) those institutions in the international social system which employ trained and practicing planning experts; and (3) those individuals and institutions in the academic community which take part in the training and evaluative processes of development planning. The criteria derivable from this group will have to meet the same criticisms aimed at the previously discussed referents. For instance, there does not seem to be any definition of development which is consensually accepted among

planners that can be used to measure success or failure. Nevertheless, their goal is to achieve a better state of affairs for the beneficiaries; that is, political power, implementation efficiency, etc., are secondary conditions to be met. The primary task is development, even though that term is ambiguously defined by the experts. Yet, despite the weaknesses they share with other social referents, planners are perhaps the best source of evaluative standards presently available. Where one is told by politicians or bureaucrats or beneficiaries that a plan has failed, the source and bases of that determination should be carefully weighed in light of the special interest held by that assessor. Those who have the most to gain through a positive evaluation are, of course, the planners; therefore, one must beware of narcissism in their self-evaluation. The fact is, however, that planners have been their own most demanding assessors; and the resulting evaluations offer the casual observer a rather critical view of Third World planning since World War II. In short, the judgment of failure seems to permeate the evaluation of development planning among the works of planning experts themselves.

The evidence from which this conclusion is drawn is found in a variety of articles and books concerning Third World plans. In a sense these works reflect a "feeling" which penetrates the

entire profession, but which is not empirically measurable.¹³

One well-known work on development planning is Albert Waterston's

Development Planning: Lessons of Experience. After examining the results of Third World planning efforts, he notes that it is obvious

that they are falling short of what is reasonable to expect. The record is so poor--it has been worsening in fact--that it has sometimes led to disillusionment with planning and the abandonment of plans. Even in India, a citadel of planning, planning has been under unprecedented attack. Indeed, participants in the United Nations Meeting of Experts on Administrative Aspects of National Development Planning, held in Paris in June 1964, went so far as to suggest that national development planning was in crisis.¹⁴

Since then the situation has not seemed to improve. The literature of planning has become more and more a literature of discouragement and failure. While most development planning "textbooks" tend to avoid evaluation of actual plan performance,¹⁵ those books and articles which attempt to assess planning attempts continue to present a dismal picture of the results. United Nations documents are most revealing in this respect. One well-known planner, Jozef Pajestka of Poland, notes that

¹³The only empirical research in regard to the beliefs and attitudes of planners will be discussed later in this paper.

¹⁴Albert Waterston, Development Planning: Lessons of Experience (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), p. 4.

¹⁵See for instance, W. Arthur Lewis, Development Planning: The Essentials of Economic Policy (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1966) and Jan Tinbergen, Development Planning, trans. N. D. Smith (New York: World University Library, 1967).

the "experience of developing nations that have resorted to planning in recent years revealed that there is a great discrepancy between plans and achievement."¹⁶ The 1970 Report on the World Situation (published by the U.N.) is highly critical of Third World development plans and planners for their inability to obtain desired objectives.¹⁷ In addition, at a September, 1969, meeting of experts at Stockholm, top planning authorities from around the world accused themselves and their colleagues of narrowness in approaching the problems of development and of relying too heavily upon rather "simplistic" models.¹⁸

Still another organ of the United Nations states the problem as follows:

. . . there is a great deal of dissatisfaction with the results of the planning process. In some quarters

¹⁶Jozef Pajestka, "Planning Methods and Procedures and Plan Implementation," in United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Planning and Plan Implementation (New York: United Nations, 1967), p. 2.

¹⁷United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1970 Report on the World Situation (New York: United Nations, 1971).

¹⁸Meeting of Experts on Social Policy and Planning, "Social Policy and Planning in National Development," in United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, International Social Development Review, No. 3: Unified Socio-economic Development and Planning; Some New Horizons (New York: United Nations, 1971), p. 4.

the dissatisfaction has even reached the point where the value of planning as an instrument of development has been questioned.¹⁹

This attitude of failure seems to have been magnified by the results of the U.N.'s First Development Decade which tended to reduce any optimism which remained in the late 1950's. Not only is failure admitted in several official documents, but it is also present in the records of major conferences on development planning. The results of one gathering are published in a volume edited by Colin Legum²⁰ and reflect the feeling of failure that has permeated other sources. Another conference at the University of Sussex in June, 1969, was attended by a World Bank official whose comments are relevant in this regard. Having noted that since World War II "more than 1200 development plans have been prepared, over 125 central planning offices have been established, about 100 training centers giving courses in planning have been created," and so on, C. J. Martin expressed the expectation that "planning should have gained in stature and have received a secure place of importance in the development

¹⁹Centre for Development Planning, Projections and Policies of the United Nations Secretariat, "Employment Strategies and Poverty-Reduction Policies of Developing Countries: Problems and Issues in the Light of Experience in Development Planning," Journal of Development Planning, 5 (1972), 3-4.

²⁰The First U.N. Development Decade and Its Lessons for the 1970's (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970).

sphere." To his dismay, however, development planners were being called to Sussex for a conference on "The Crisis in Planning."²¹ Paraphrasing Martin's lament, Benveniste noted that, "with twenty-five years of experience behind them, national planners talk more about failures than about successes."²²

While the reader may feel uncomfortable with the scope of this assessment and the social test upon which it is based, there is little doubt in the minds of most professional planning evaluators that--on a general level of discussion--Third World planning has failed to achieve its primary tasks. In his study of various planning efforts, Aaron Wildavsky found sufficient evidence for this fact to warrant the following conclusion:

Planners begin by attempting to transform their environment and end by being absorbed into it. This pattern of failure is most evident in the poor countries of the world where glittering promise has been replaced by discouraging performance. Nor, despite the high economic growth, are the results different in rich countries; brief examination of two critical cases--France and Japan--will show they also do not follow their plans or make good on them when they do. Planning fails everywhere it has been tried.²³

B. The Causes of Planning Failure: Some Hypotheses

The question which logically results is one that asks why planning failure seems to have been the result of development

²¹C. J. Martin, "A Conference Note: Crisis in Planning," International Development Review, XI (1969), 40-41.

²²Benveniste, p. 14.

²³Aaron Wildavsky, "If Planning is Everything, Maybe It's Nothing," Policy Sciences, IV (1973), 128.

efforts during the post-World War II period. To what causes can one attribute the apparent inability of plans and planners to fulfill the needs of Third World societies? In answer to that query, one can turn to a number of explanations which range along a continuum from factors inherent in the subject society to the psychological make-up of the planners themselves. In the following paragraphs three specific categories along that continuum will be examined so as to give the reader some perspective in regard to the problem eventually focused upon in the present work. Any number of factors can be blamed for the failure of planning, and this paper will eventually concentrate upon one. Such a narrowness in analysis should not be regarded as an indication on this writer's part that the planner's Image or any other particular factor is the cause of policy failures. Rather, the Image is one among many possible causes, but one which has been disregarded while social scientists concentrated on societal factors and planning experts regarded procedural variables as the core problems of development plans. In order to bring more attention to the Image as a barrier to planning success, some note must be made of these other important elements along the causal continuum.

Societal Factors

As noted previously, the continuum of possible causes for planning failure begins, at one extreme, with those

explanations which regard conditions within the subject societies as primary barriers. For instance, it is not difficult to find references in social science literature to the obstacles for development programs posed by the social values and norms adhered to by the client system. This argument contends that the value system of the subject society is incompatible with those values deemed necessary for the success of planning attempts.²⁴ One prominent advocate of this hypothesis is David Apter.

In The Politics of Modernization, Apter touches upon the subjects of "professionalism" and the "ideology of science" as these are associated with the modernizing process. There are, he notes, four ideological tendencies which are relevant for that process: socialism, nationalism, national socialism, and science. The last, science,

is not merely a style of thinking about problems, nor is it solely a derivation from the functional significance of science in an industrialized world, although this is clearly the origin of its power. Rather, it is the application of rational methods and experimentalism to social affairs.²⁵

The role of the ideology of science is manifested in "professional roles and norms" usually associated with manpower experts,

²⁴Fred G. Burke, "The Cultural Context," in Bertram Gross, ed., Action Under Planning: The Guidance of Economic Development (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1967), pp. 68-83.

²⁵David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 343.

social survey teams, management experts, and planners among others.²⁶ While these professionals might exist within a modernizing social system, there are limits in regard to their respective utility in the development process. It is Apter's contention that the professional's ideology of science "functions only in a period of practical realism, and is ultimately antagonistic to any other ideology. . . ." For him the alternative ideologies of nationalism, socialism and national socialism are more likely to predominate in the early stages of modernization. The overall result is a societal context which, at least ideologically, works against professional efforts such as development planning. The early stages of development call for an emphasis on identity and solidarity functions which act as foundations for future collective action. "For these purposes the ideologies of nationalism, socialism, and possibly, national socialism are more satisfactory than the ideology of science."²⁷

If this is the case, what is the role played by planners and other professionals found within the political and administrative systems during those early stages of modernization? Which functions do they perform which make them valuable enough to

²⁶ Apter, Politics of Modernization, p. 317.

²⁷ Apter, Politics of Modernization, pp. 328, 343.

keep? For Apter they are "a kind of exhibit; they are formally consulted, but their advice is not followed."²⁸ For Benveniste, who regards the planner's primary task as the "reduction of uncertainty,"²⁹ a number of secondary functions are also attributable to their roles: that is, legitimization of the regime; acting as a private staff for the political leaders; and supplying the political leader with a means of obtaining secrecy in policy formulation, thereby enhancing the leader's political power.³⁰ In other words, the ability of professional planners to perform functions external to their primary task may give them a role within the political and/or administrative structures of a developing social system. This role, however, is not of a nature that will lead to planning success. This could only occur, according to the Apter hypothesis, when societal conditions are of the quality which permits the dominance of the ideology of science.

At what point in the modernization sequence does the ideology of science become possible? When can planners and other professionals expect to have some impact relevant to their main task of aiding in development? Apter's implied answer is that this will occur only when societal conditions warrant it--

²⁸Apter, Politics of Modernization, p. 318.

²⁹Benveniste, Chapter Two.

³⁰Benveniste, Chapter Three.

that is, only when the modernizing nation "develops" sufficiently to permit the exercise of the science ideology. Three conditions are defined as necessary in this respect: first, there must be "a general acceptance of common membership in the society, with the result that nationalism has become internalized and implicit"; second, "sufficient development has already occurred so that societal dislocations require fine adjustments rather than gross 'solutions'"; and, third, "a consensus prevails about the roles that are functional to the continuous process of development." In other words, for development planners to have any impact (that is, for them to play an effective role in development processes), development must already have taken place to a considerable extent.³¹

When regarded as the primary cause of planning failure, this hypothesis may suggest, first, that the planner accept as a "fact of life" that the conditions necessary for the fulfillment of his primary task are absent and, second, that he also realize that no professionally sanctioned (i.e., planning) action he or his colleagues might take or suggest will change the situation until the facilitating circumstances are present. Being personally and procedurally exempt from blame, the planner is also personally and procedural impotent to render the situation any better vis-à-vis his goals.

³¹Apter, Politics of Modernization, p. 344.

This same argument can be made on the structural as well as normative level. Not only can the value environment of planning lead to failure, but the stratification and role systems can impose themselves as barriers as well. In a later work Apter accomplishes such a transition between normative and structural levels. Figure 1 graphically summarizes his view of the relationship between stages in development and the social roles relevant to each step in the process. In his theory, Apter posits a correlation between the degree of development and the needed and present degree of functionality within the population. As development passes from one stage to the next (always becoming progressively more and more "modern" at each successive stage), so the complexity of the stratification system passes from a rather simple to a complicated structure. At various stages new classes appear and new stratification relationships are formed, the most recently developed class tending to dominate and grow as time goes on.

The normative and structural characteristics of these classes vary as illustrated in Figure 2. As in his exposition of the ideological barriers to professionalism, Apter's argument vis-à-vis stratification is that, until the correct circumstances arise--that is, until "functional status elites" (professionals) are dominant--there will be little possibility




Fig. 1. Development and Stratification

Source: David E. Apter, Choice and the Politics of Allocation: A Developmental Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 60.

Stratification type	Characteristics	
	Structural	Normative
Segmentary	Set boundaries Fixed membership No mobility	Primordial attachments (e.g., race, tribe)
Fused	Well-defined boundaries Limited mobility Solidarity	Ideologies
Differentiated	Weakly articulated boundaries Lack of solidarity	Interests
Functional	Well-defined boundaries Ease of mobility for those with germane attribute Solidarity within social unit	Professional expertise

Fig. 2. Normative and structural characteristics of stratification

Source: David E. Apter, Choice and the Politics of Allocation: A Developmental Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 54.

for the effective utilization of professional expertise. In summary, where the society is sufficiently developed the planner will have the opportunity to aid in the development process. Until then, it is implied, the planner must fulfill other functions while awaiting his moment of truth.³²

While not oriented toward the specific consideration of the role of planners and/or other professionals in developing countries, numerous analysts besides Apter have commented about the societal prerequisites for facilitating development and modernization efforts. Dankwart Rustow, among others, has contended that "only societies transformed into nations have shown themselves capable of attaining the more advanced forms of modernity. . . ."³³ Using this perspective it is seen that the absence of "nationhood" and "national identity" can be regarded as crucial barriers to planning effectiveness. Alternative structures and attachments such as tribes, villages, and the like are not deemed acceptable as units within which development and modernization can be facilitated.

As a type of conventional wisdom within the social and political sciences, this attitude is praised by W. W. Rostow

³²David E. Apter, Choice and the Politics of Allocation: A Developmental Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971).

³³Dankwart A. Rustow, A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernization (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 31.

who notes that there is "a good deal of sense in the contemporary political scientist's emphasis on the achievement of an effective sense of nationhood. . . ." Economic progress, he contends, "tends to be relatively slow" in those legally defined entities which lack a binding nationalism. Under such circumstances the leaders and those who aid them "are denied the benefits of popular exhilaration, the sense of momentum, and the enlarged flow of tax resources" that seem to follow the presence of a greater unity in society.³⁴

Edward Banfield takes note of still another prerequisite for development efforts of a societal nature. Modernization, he argues, occurs within the context of corporate organization and corporate forms of collective action. Without these frameworks the development process--and, supposedly, those involved in that process--are fighting a losing war against "backwardness." What is lacking in the "backward" Italian community which Banfield and his wife investigate is an "ethos" which permits such corporate forms of activity and action to develop. This "ethos" barrier would have to be overcome before any effective development policies could be put to use or even seriously considered. Nor was Banfield's outlook for changing the "ethos" very optimistic. "Changing

³⁴W. W. Rostow, Politics and the Stages of Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 283.

the ethos, if it could be done deliberately, would entail . . . dangers."³⁵

At a more general level, there is that school of thought which sees the prime deficiency as a society's lack of "institutionalization." Defined in various ways--as change absorbing,³⁶ conflict managing,³⁷ or valued and stabilizing³⁸--institutions are regarded by many analysts to be a key variable which will determine the success or failure of development policies. A lack of such institutions means, according to these writers, that a necessary prerequisite for the use of planning expertise is missing.

The political environment within which planners must work also seems to have an impact on whether attempts at planning are even worthwhile. Besides the contention that weak or nonexistent political institutions might render planning a fruitless and frustrating exercise, there is also the idea that certain types of institutions might develop into barriers with which the planner cannot contend. For example,

³⁵Edward C. Banfield, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (New York: The Free Press, 1958), Chapter 9.

³⁶S. N. Eisenstadt, Modernization: Protest and Change (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966).

³⁷John P. Powelson, Institutions of Economic Growth: A Theory of Conflict Management (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972).

³⁸Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

what if the role of the political opposition is too powerful? Planning, by its very nature, involves collective choices which will benefit some sectors and inevitably present costs to others. To be effective, planners must not only attract the attention and commitment of important policymakers; they must also take account of those whose opposition they will arouse. According to some authorities, this might not even involve specific program suggestions.

As the planning organization gains in prestige, it can less readily insulate itself from the needs of the group in power: dissident groups are always ready to seize any stick to attack the ruling party and the planning group itself.³⁹

Planning attempts will more than likely provoke opposition and political controversy from non-governing elites. Summarizing the literature of sociocultural change, James R. Scarritt notes the following widely held proposition relevant to this situation: "The mobilization of collectivities to exercise power and influence in support of change is likely to result in countermobilization to resist change."⁴⁰ This condition of change can, and in many circumstances has, placed a

³⁹ Andrew Watson and Joel B. Dirlam, "Planning Problems," in Economic Development: Challenge and Promise, eds. Stephan Spiegelglas and Charles J. Walsh (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), p. 51.

⁴⁰ James R. Scarritt, "Political Development and Culture Change Theory: A Propositional Synthesis with Application to Africa," Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics, 3 (1972), 21.

considerable restraint upon the effectiveness of planning and planners. With a weak political consensus or a low level of legitimacy for governmental decisions, the value of an official policy is decreased. Situations such as this cannot be overcome by the planners. Therefore, only in a "correct" political atmosphere can planning and other development policies succeed.⁴¹

A final relevant example of societal factors which tend to negate the impact of planning efforts is that found in the administrative sector of the environment. Administrators, as part of the policymaking context of planning and as key actors in the process in their roles as implementors, can and do make a difference between planning success and failure. In most instances these bureaucrats have been pictured as "creatures" of their societal milieu. Fred Riggs, for instance, sees the administrator in the transitional or "prismatic"

⁴¹This "political system" cause for planning failure is not unique to the Third World. Political conflict over planning in France and Yugoslavia and Italy has somewhat modified the effectiveness of planning in both the West and Communist blocs. The importance of the political variable has been taken into account in these countries and the atmosphere of conflict is built into the system. The "correct" political environment, therefore, is not necessarily devoid of political opposition. See Stephan S. Cohen, Modern Capitalist Planning: The French Model (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969); and Beverly Tanner Springer, "Italy and Yugoslavia: A Comparative Analysis of Policy-Making in Economic Planning," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Colorado, 1971.

society as a breeder of gross administrative inefficiency who reflects the "pathological" condition of his society. Lucian W. Pye, on the other hand, regards the problem as being rooted in the administrator's attempts to perform in a manner which will keep him above the corruptions of politics. As part of the nation's new elite, bureaucrats are among the first to be exposed to the acculturation processes imposed upon them by the international environment. While their induction into the "modern" world might seem to warrant an open-mindedness and a willingness to accept changes, the fact is that, according to Pye, "the manner in which the administrators are acculturated has left them primarily sensitive to questions of personal conduct and not to matters of public policy." For Pye, it is not the corruption problem which is salient; rather it is the administrators' "compulsive need to seek security and reassurance in their command over small details."⁴²

In either case, the efforts of administrative experts to correct this particular source of inefficiency and policy failure seems only to have proven the point that planners and

⁴² See Fred W. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1964), especially Part Three; and Lucian W. Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), Chapters 15-16.

others can do little else than wait for the necessary conditions to develop with the passing of time.⁴³

While each of these arguments rests on widely accepted theoretical foundations regarding various "prerequisites" for Third World development, the conclusions reached--both explicitly and implicitly--in terms of the value of planning are open to one broad criticism: they assume too limited a definition of the capabilities of Third World development planning and planners. The "appropriate" conditions which will facilitate successful planning attempts are so narrowly perceived as to render a planner impotent in most situations where his or her services are called for.

One must remain open to the idea that current and/or past behavior patterns and beliefs may not represent all possibilities for the future. These "societal" arguments seem to preclude any discussion of the potential capacity of planners to adjust either procedurally or psychologically to the various societal conditions which currently seem to overwhelm them. The basis of this last hope lies in those explanations of planning failure which regard procedural and psychological factors as salient.

⁴³Milton J. Esman, "CAG and the Study of Public Administration," in Frontiers of Development Administration, ed. Fred W. Riggs (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1971), p. 58.

The theme found in these and other social science analyses of the development process is as follows: intentional and calculated effort at facilitating Third World development can be fruitful only if certain prerequisites are met. The specific form of these requirements for development varies from writer to writer. Nevertheless, they seem to find their roots in a common and somewhat ethnocentric point of view which posits the prerequisites to be those qualities perceived as essential in "advanced" or "developed" but seemingly absent in most or all Third World societies.

Procedural/Organizational Factors

Assuming a "perfect" societal environment for planning and given that the planner himself is not a hindrance to plan formulation and implementation, there are still several obstacles which may be regarded as determinative of planning success or failure. From the critiques of planning by "experts" in the field comes one major variation which puts the primary blame for failures upon the insufficiencies within the planning process itself. From the problems inherent in the very nature of policy-making to those which plague planning specifically, one can find numerous constraints on Third World planners. It is to a brief perusal of those sources that we now turn.

One may begin by taking note of the fact that planning is one form of the general decision-making process.

Decision-making is a process by which "choice-making situations" are met and resolved in a conscious and deliberate fashion.⁴⁴

The numerous behavioral activities which we classify as "decision-making" vary in content and form; yet all have a common essence which allows the analyst to generalize in regard to several shared problems. For example, all policymakers must contend with similar constraints on policy formulation and implementation. This is as true for planners as it is for politicians. In this respect the work of Charles Lindblom and his colleagues is enlightening. According to Lindblom and associates, any policymaking exercise is qualified by obstacles which are natural to the process. Five specific barriers are noted as common and salient in this area.⁴⁵

First, policy problems are not given--they are defined into existence. Who defines the problem and how this is accomplished will have a determinative impact upon the decision analysis to be undertaken. That which is included in such a definition is as important as that which is excluded. The result is a biased presentation of the questions and choices

⁴⁴Fremont A. Shull, Jr., Andre L. Delbecq, and L. L. Cummings, Organizational Decision Making (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1970), pp. 29-31.

⁴⁵Charles E. Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), Chapter 3; and David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision (New York: The Free Press, 1963), Part I.

to be analyzed and the scope of the problem to be approached. This impact can be both positive and negative for the policy-maker; but in either situation the decision-making process is constrained by such inescapable limitations.

Second, where any degree of complexity marks the subject being scrutinized, the possibility of clarifying and organizing "all relevant" variables is extremely limited. According to Lindblom, it is "beyond the capacity of the human mind" to acquire a complete knowledge of all factors that influence a particular problem. As noted in the previous section, such a condition can only be met in a closed system--something rarely characteristic of public policy issue areas. The inevitable result is inadequate information. Considering the time and cost limits imposed on decision-makers which further hinder the gathering of even available information, one begins to comprehend the impact of this particular constraint.

Third, a decision-maker is bound to run into a conflict between his values and those of his fellow decision-makers in regard to the priorities and methods by which policy should be guided. A hypothetical example of such competition can best summarize this constraint. In foreign policymaking in the United States, even at the mundane level of determining foreign aid allocations, differing values can and have led to very

different policies. Should aid be given on the basis of the national interest, or should the criterion be more altruistic? Then again, should U.S. foreign aid be determined on the basis of both criteria? The choice made from among these alternatives will depend upon the interaction of values and power relationships of the relevant decision-makers. These choices are seemingly limited to what will be acceptable to those interacting values and the various power holders. Within that range of acceptable policies, a number of solutions and proposals may be available. Each decision-maker, depending upon his own values, the values of his client (the donor or receiver of aid, for example), and his perception of the distribution of political and social power, will select from among the alternatives as will each actor in the process. These selections will inevitably conflict--the result being policy recommendations from "experts" which seem to vary as much as they would had such knowledgeable individuals been left out of the process. Thus, foreign policy expert "A" may seek to have surplus grain given to a Third World nation on the basis of the starvation levels in that country; while analyst "B," using the same basic information, regards the criterion for such aid as being the ability of the receiving country to repay the aid with economic and political concessions to the United States. Such a situation is not as uncommon as some might think, and according to

Lindblom it results from a natural limitation within policy-making processes.

Fourth, note must be taken of that human resistance factor which is beyond "societal" in nature and, instead, reflects a usual or predictable (although somewhat uncontrollable) response to the policymaker's attempts. Resistance due to human irrationality, political assaults on the mind, dogmatic adherence to an ideology, and even reasoned objections are familiar ones to policy analysts. In short, there are always those in the environment who will seek more traditional or more rational or more radical answers to given problems. These objections will always be raised so long as decision-making is carried on in an open system. This limitation performs the positive function of reminding the policymaker that he is a social being dealing with other social beings; that there are alternative patterns of behavior and rationality; and that analytic answers are not the only ones available. However, these functions are performed at the cost of eliminating some optimal conditions for policymaking.

Finally, the policymaking process is limited by one of the tools utilized in the process of overcoming the previously mentioned constraints--organization. While efforts at decision-making are organized in order to facilitate the process, the organization itself poses numerous problems which might render

the cure more bitter than the disease. Harold Wilensky has summarized these problems in terms of structural, doctrinal, and procedural obstacles which tend to "maximize distortions and blockage" in effective policy analysis.⁴⁶

As specifically manifested in the planning process, these problems are noted throughout the literature. In fact, one begins to wonder whether planning is at all feasible after considering the many procedural barriers which inflict such efforts. In regard to the first problem, for instance, Albert Waterston has observed that, while a clearly defined set of objectives is necessary as a sound foundation for planning, in most cases this is not supplied. It seems to be a case of the client's inability or unwillingness to specifically state and identify the problems at hand and the goals sought.⁴⁷

Incongruous mixing of primary and secondary, long- and short-term, and qualitative and quantitative objectives with aims which are not really objectives, but are essentially means for obtaining the basic objectives of a development plan, is generally an indication about what they expect from their plan.⁴⁸ In lieu of facing up to difficult decisions, political authorities frequently prefer to list objectives which, although mutually inconsistent, will include something for everybody.⁴⁹

⁴⁶Harold L. Wilensky, Organizational Intelligence: Knowledge and Policy in Government and Industry (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1967), pp. 175-178.

⁴⁷Waterston, p. 146.

⁴⁸Waterston, pp. 146-147.

⁴⁹Waterston, 149.

Thus, even the basic prerequisite for planning of unambiguously defined problems and objectives is not clearly (nor frequently) fulfilled. While this obstacle is partially rooted in societal conditions (that is, in the instability of political institutions, etc.), it is also a problem inherent to the policymaking process of contemporary societies. Definitions are not objective, but rather reflect the biases and unique qualities of the definer and the subject society. There are no processes which could eliminate this problem; as a matter of fact, changes in procedure may only modify the inherent biases, and not necessarily in a positive direction. Planning processes themselves, in many cases, are regarded as the reason for poor definitions. As this is seen to be the case, more blame is placed on the process than on the society.

Limitations imposed by a lack of information (or the inadequacy of that knowledge which is already possessed) are as pervasive in the developing world as in the developed. The only difference is that, in the Third World, the problem is somewhat magnified by societal conditions. "Even the most advanced countries may lack many of the statistical series which planners require," note Watson and Dirlam; "but the shortage is much more serious in an underdeveloped nation: some countries attempt comprehensive plans without even tolerably reliable estimates of population or national income and no information on their past

rates of growth."⁵⁰ According to the procedural/organizational hypothesis, even these societal magnifications of the information-gathering inabilities of the Third World can be overcome by procedural adjustments. Information-gathering facilities are regarded as inadequate or totally lacking in developing societies; and the time and cost resources necessary for correcting this situation seem out of reach for those who wish to do so.⁵¹ Therefore, while no society's planning organizations can hope for complete or perfect awareness of all relevant variables, Third World planners will have more difficulty in attempting to overcome the information-gathering problem. However, perceiving the problem from a procedural perspective, one can be more hopeful concerning solutions than can those analysts who see the society's condition as the primary obstacle.

The third process problem involves competition among the values which guide planning formulation and implementation. Once again, explanation by example will be the most useful approach. In country "X," a hypothetical Third World nation, three actors are involved in the process of planning--each regarded as an "expert" in the planning field. Planner "A" is the director of the planning organization; in order to help him

⁵⁰Watson and Dirlam, p. 52.

⁵¹See Waterston; also Pajestka.

in his efforts, the government has contracted with planner "B" who is from Eastern Europe; and, in order to protect their investment in the program, the World Bank has sent planner "C" to aid these gentlemen. "C" is a planning expert educated in the United States. "A"'s education was accomplished in England during the early 1950's, while "B" was trained in Yugoslavia.

"A" feels that an aggregate model of development best suits his country's situation. This means that problems must be considered on a macroeconomic level where factors such as production, investment, etc., take primacy. Expert "B," however, feels that development is a matter of sector manipulation using varying strategies in order to create a balanced situation in the economy. Planner "C," on the other hand, counters with an emphasis on inter-industrial planning which is concerned with the relationships among productive, i.e., industrial, sectors. These men--all planners by profession and all hypothetically well trained and highly qualified--have a basic dispute among themselves in regard to those factors which are crucial in making the plan work. Each perspective is theoretically correct in its own right and, perhaps, can be used in similar circumstances.⁵² The mutual exclusiveness of each approach, however,

⁵²United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, "Use of Models in Programming," Industrialization and Productivity Bulletin, 4 (April, 1961), 7-15; reprinted in Gerald M. Meier, Leading Issues in Development Economics:

breeds a conflict among those involved in the formulation process. That this is not an infrequent occurrence can be seen in the notes of planning conferences and the literature on development which seems marked by a continuous competition among various schools of thought.⁵³ The obstacles posed by such competition, therefore, plague numerous planning attempts in the Third World.

Fourth, the barriers imposed by human resistance to the planning process are described in almost every work on the subject. The irrational responses of beneficiaries, the reluctance of implementors, the reasoned objections of some economists and politicians, the ideological and dogmatic demands of political leaders--each of these hinders the planner's attempt to analyze, formulate, and implement development policies. Again, one is dealing with a situation which borders on both the societal and the procedural/organizational hypotheses of planning failure. From one point of view, human resistance is societal in nature and cannot be overcome through the efforts of planners. But from a procedural perspective, an adjustment of the process will offset some of this resistance by either coopting the resister or responding to a perceived objection. The failure to procedurally adjust will result in planning failure.

Selected Materials and Commentary (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 465-476; see also Michael P. Todaro, Development Planning: Models and Methods (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1971).

⁵³ These competing schools of thought will be discussed below in Chapter IV.

A final category of obstacles inherent to the planning process involves organizational barriers. Organizational form is given to planning efforts for a number of reasons, the primary one being that many of the previously mentioned procedural obstacles can be overcome only through a coordination of resources and roles. This is especially true as most plans are concerned with the implementation as well as the formulation of plans. In both processes the role of organizations is crucial. Formulation, for example, is a task given to planning organizations because political leaders believe that development policies are needed in order to meet economic and social objectives. By structuring a distinct plan organization, government leaders feel they are decreasing the usual waste of more decentralized policy formulation procedures. While a plan organization may not meet its established objectives for the subject society, it can ease the path toward these goals. In this light, leaders expect the planners to conduct themselves in an efficient manner which will not only reduce waste in the policymaking process, but also offer the rest of society an example to be followed. The result of such efficiency is an increased "trust" which the leader, implementor, and beneficiary give the planner. And for many, trust is half of the battle! Richard Meier has argued that the planner, through his or her organized efforts, must make

others "believe" in his attempts to develop the society.⁵⁴
This is an essential part of the planning task which organization promotes.

So far as implementation is concerned, one need only peruse recent planning literature to see how important an efficient and effective organization is held to be. For some, planning failure has become synonymous with "non-implementation."⁵⁵ For Albert Waterston, the lessons of development planning experience seem to indicate that planning failure is rooted in the failure of planning implementation, and this is considered by many to reflect the poverty of implementation organizations.⁵⁶

Thus, in the case of plan formulation and implementation, organization is deemed crucial. This has been reflected in an increasing emphasis among planning experts with organizational reform. As far as they are concerned, improving the organization means eliminating more procedural inefficiencies

⁵⁴Richard L. Meier, Development Planning (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1965), pp. 114-117.

⁵⁵Marshall Wolfe, "Between the Idea and the Reality: Notes on Plan Implementation," in United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, International Social Development Review, No. 3, 1971, pp. 32-40.

⁵⁶Waterston, Chapter IX; see also Bertram M. Gross, "Activating National Plans" in Action Under Planning, ed. Gross, pp. 186-232.

which, in turn, will produce more successful planning attempts.⁵⁷

In summary, the planning process itself can be regarded as a primary cause for planning failure. It is interesting to note that this hypothesis does not deny the relevance of societal factors. As a matter of fact, the procedural hypothesis assumes that societal obstacles are present; however, it regards those as vulnerable barriers which may be overcome through adjustments in the processes and organization arrangements. As social scientists concentrate on the societal hypothesis, many of the foremost planners focus upon these procedural/organizational factors with the hope that the lessons of past failures will lead to future successes.

The Planner

The qualities of the planner and his fellow professionals represent the heart of the third hypothesis explaining the causes of planning failure. Planner qualities can be examined from two points of view, one regarding process and another concerned with substance. Procedurally, planners have been accused of being both too political or not political enough.

⁵⁷See Waterston, Chapter X; also Pajestka, and Zdeneka Vergener, "On the Relationship between Objective Conditions and Adopted Forms of Planning: The Problem of Adequate Planning," in United Nation, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Planning and Plan Implementation, 1967, pp. 10-18.

The apolitical urge for planners finds its roots in both the professionalism developed among planners⁵⁸ and the systems analysis approach which currently permeates planning in both developed and developing countries.⁵⁹ From the perspective of the more traditional schools of planning and those oriented toward a strict systems approach based on cost/benefit analysis and the like (P.P.B.S., for instance), planning failure is due to too much politics in the planning process and among the planners themselves.

The recent literature in this field tends to argue just the opposite position. According to this argument, the planners of today have yet to orient themselves to their political roles which, if handled well, can guarantee planning success. Discussions of the need for increased political activism among planners deal mainly with the problem of plan implementation⁶⁰ and the expert's role as a high echelon decision-maker for whom politics is a necessary evil.⁶¹ Benveniste takes the argument a bit further by advocating the planner's political activism as a beneficial role, desirable within

⁵⁸See Chapter V below.

⁵⁹See Benveniste, Chapter 4.

⁶⁰See Gross, "Activating National Plans," pp. 186-232.

⁶¹Richard L. Meier, pp. 114, 117.

the planning process.⁶² In this latter view, the more politically adept a planner, the better his chance at succeeding.

The contention that the substance of a planner's orientation can have an impact on planning outcomes is not a new or recent one. Ruth Glass, for example, in a 1959 article, noted the importance of the views of planners on British town and country programs during the post-World War II period. The narrowness of their outlook, she stated, was as important in its impact as were the techniques available and utilized.⁶³ In terms of U.S. urban planning, David Ranney has taken note of the fact that the "nature of the recommendations made by planners in any given city will be partially a reflection of their attitudes."⁶⁴ Despite these signs of awareness among analysts of the role played by the planner's ideology and perceptions, little has been accomplished in the exploration of this factor.

The disregard for this factor may rest more in the analyst's inability to deal with the role of ideas than its

⁶² Benveniste.

⁶³ Ruth Glass, "The Evaluation of Planning: Some Sociological Considerations," International Social Science Journal, 11 (1959): 402-405.

⁶⁴ David C. Ranney, Planning and Politics in the Metropolis (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1969), especially Chapter 2.

relative unimportance. When one examines the relevant literature, the planner's attitudes, ideology, and beliefs are frequently mentioned, but never sufficiently examined. Unlike societal and procedural factors, the planner's substantive orientation has not been subjected to a systematic examination for there has never been an appropriate framework within which it could be analyzed. Published judgments which declare a planner's attitude to be "conservative," "radical," or "unrealistic" do not explain enough. They do not permit one to see the attitude or belief as an obstacle which can be observed, described, and then manipulated to correct for various situations where those attitudes have had adverse effects.

In the balance of this work an attempt will be made to conceptualize this substantive factor in such a way as to permit more concern for it in future analyses. The first step in such an attempt is to present a term which may be adopted in this conceptualization--the Image.

CHAPTER II

THE PLANNER'S IMAGE: A CONSTRUCTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN

There are numerous alternative approaches available to the analyst who wishes to determine the impact of a particular actor's perceptions on policy outcomes. Different analysts, however, have different needs. Those who evaluate planning efforts usually do so not out of pure curiosity but are concerned with an assessment which will lead to corrective actions in regard to a poor planning performance. The framework within which they are to conceptualize the planner, the planning organization and the entire planning program must (1) facilitate the collection, description and classification of appropriate data; (2) be of use both within and without a more general theoretical framework which takes all or most relevant variables into account; (3) allow for the empirical examination of the core variables as they interrelate with each other and with the environment; (4) act as an orienting framework which will guide the assessor in his or her attempts to adjust the core variables as such corrections are deemed necessary. In attempting to develop a concept that can meet these challenges, one must take care not to meet one

or another of these standards at the cost of the "reality" from which the problems are derived. During the process of abstracting a situation, the meaning and intent of the entire effort is sometimes lost. The abstraction should not be allowed to overwhelm its origins. In terms of the present work, the Image concept will be put forth as meeting these criteria.

A. The Image Concept

The selection of the Image concept for this study over other terms which are admittedly more common (such as "ideologies," "culture," "belief systems," etc.) may seem arbitrary. With proper adjustments, cannot any of these more familiar terms do as well? The answer is both yes and no; yes, any of these terms may be reformulated so as to serve the needs of the evaluation processes, but only at the cost of bringing with them the stigma of both odious and multiple meanings derived from their frequent use.

Certain of the alternate terms carry with them connotations which tend to negate whatever utility they might seem to have at first blush. The term "ideology," for example, is of great use in a number of ways. Yet, as Herbert Waltzer has noted, the term is accompanied by a "bad odor."

It suffers from ill-repute, and, to some, is identified with hated totalitarian beliefs and is characterized as false, delusory, and "highfalutin propaganda." . . . This negative connotation of ideology as abstract, utopian, and factitious--not derived from the human spirit or experience-- . . . has persisted as a dictionary meaning of "ideology."¹

While these implications do not render the ideology concept totally useless,² they do have an adverse effect upon the meanings attached to those perceptual configurations which might be uncovered during a research project. Where the term has been regarded as conceptually useful, its utility has been somewhat limited by the fact that it is usually defined as verbalized, overt, and "coherent system of beliefs."³ By using the term in this way, much of a perceptual scheme which is covert and incoherent is ignored. The Image, as shall be seen, covers this ambiguous territory.

¹[Herbert Waltzer], "Political Ideology: Belief and Action in the Arenas of Politics," in Reo M. Christenson, et al., Ideologies and Modern Politics (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1971), pp. 3-4.

²For a critique of how the concept of ideology has been used and a discussion of what adjustments might be needed to improve its conceptual utility, see Giovanni Sartori, "Politics, Ideology, and Belief Systems," American Political Science Review, 63 (June 1969): 398-411.

³See [Herbert Waltzer], pp. 5-6; and Kenneth M. Dolbeare and Patricia Dolbeare with Jane Hadley, American Ideologies: The Competing Political Beliefs of the 1970's, 2d ed. (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1973), p. 3.

The term "culture" presents another alternative that may be less useful than the Image, but for a different reason. For Edward T. Hall, culture represents a "screen" which mediates between man and his environment. According to Hall, man's relationship to experience goes beyond the fact that "when two human beings are subject to the same 'experience,' virtually the same data are being fed to the two central nervous systems and that the two brains record similarly." Rather, it is held that

Selective screening of sensory data admits some things while filtering out others, so that experience as it is perceived through one set of culturally patterned sensory screens is quite different from experience perceived through another.⁴

The concept of culture, however, suffers from being used for a broad set of referents. Hall takes note of this drawback when he states that culture "is a word that has so many meanings that one more can do it no harm."⁵ The proliferation of definitions for "culture" has become so great that any attempt to use the term is usually accompanied by an apology of sorts. For instance, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba offer the following introduction to their adoption of the concept:

⁴Edward T. Hall, The Hidden Dimension (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1966), p. 2, emphasis in original; see also Edward T. Hall, The Silent Language (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1959).

⁵Hall, Silent Language, p. 31.

We appreciate the fact that anthropologists use the term culture in a variety of ways, and that by bringing it into the conceptual vocabulary of political science [as "political culture"] we are in danger of importing its ambiguities as well as its advantages. Here we can only stress that we employ the concept of culture in only one of its many meanings. . . .⁶

The question arises as to whether such disclaimers are acceptable.

As one critic has noted in regard to the Almond and Verba study,

To introduce the term political culture in a literature where another term culture is bound to be interspersed is a source of confusion and hampers communications among scholars. Terminological ambiguities and confusion impede the formation of fruitful propositions. In view of the long history of development of the concept of culture in anthropology and sociology and the continued debate that emerged with that development, formidable problems confront the adoption and retouching by political scientists of the master term culture.⁷

There is no denying the similarity of the Image concept to the "culture" terminology as defined by Hall. Yet, to use the latter concept would tend to lead us into the muddle of distinguishing between one meaning of "culture" as used in different contexts. The cost in confusion might just be too great to pay.

⁶Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1965), p. 13.

⁷Young C. Kim, "The Concept of Political Culture in Comparative Politics," Journal of Politics, 26 (May 1964):336, emphasis in original. For an examination of the many uses and definitions of the culture concept, see the Kim article, pp. 313-319 and Clyde Kluckhohn and Alfred Kroeber, Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions (Cambridge, Mass.: The Museum, 1952).

The choice of the Image concept is not only based upon the negative implications of possible alternatives. There is also the positive characteristic of the Image concept in its relationship to a more general theoretical framework. "Ideology" and "culture" and "belief systems" can all be used within broad theoretical constructs, but only after a redefinition of those terms has modified them sufficiently to obtain a better "fit" between the concept and the framework in question. In the process of "fitting," each of these concepts may lose some of its utility as a useful analytic tool while not necessarily ridding itself of the bad connotations and ambiguities noted above. However, as it is presented by Kenneth E. Boulding, the Image offers the analyst a theoretically adaptable concept which is useful by itself or within a general framework which does not call for its redefinition and, in fact, leads to an increase in its utility.

The basis of the Image's viability as a concept is Boulding's use of it within the context of General Systems Theory. Defined as that "subjective knowledge" which is largely responsible for an individual's behavior, the Image has as its source "all past experience of the possessor of the image itself." Among other tasks, the Image functions as a constantly adapting filter for present and future experiences.⁸

⁸ Kenneth E. Boulding, The Image: Knowledge in Life

The image is the actual content of a particular human mind--that is, it is the subjective content of knowledge. This is what a man thinks the world is like, the sum total of his beliefs, his image of the world and himself and space and time, his ideas of causal connections, and so on. From our image of the world we constantly draw inferences about the future. . . .⁹

The utility of the Image concept within a General Systems framework is facilitated by its presentation as part of broad systems construct. The Image is located between man and his environment, and this position has its implications on two levels. First, it points to the "screening" and other functions which the Image may perform in that situation; and second, it gives some hint as to how the Image obtains its form and structure from the interactions of man and his surroundings. Such interactions occur through the medium of messages (i.e., structured information), and can be perceived within the framework of a "simple feedback scheme" (see Figure 3). As described by Professor von Bertalanffy,

and Society (Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1956), pp. 5-6.

⁹Kenneth E. Boulding, The Meaning of the 20th Century: The Great Transition (New York: Harper Colophon, 1964), p. 40. For the roots of this concept see Fred Polak, The Image of the Future, trans. and abridged by Elise Boulding with introduction by Kenneth Boulding (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc., 1973); and for work done after the publication of Boulding's work, see George A. Miller, Eugene Galanter and Karl H. Pribram, Plans and the Structure of Behavior (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1960), pp. 17-18.




Fig. 3. A simple feedback scheme.

Source: Ludwig von Bertalanffy, General System Theory: Foundations, Development, Applications (New York: George Braziller, 1968), p. 43.

The system comprises, first, a receptor or "sense organ," be it a photoelectric cell, a radar screen, a thermometer, or a sense organ in the biological meaning. The messages may be in technological devices, a weak current, or, in a living organism, represented by nerve conduction, etc. Then there is a center recombining the incoming messages and transmitting them to an effector, consisting of a machine like an electromotor, a heating coil or solenoid, or of a muscle. . . . Finally, the functioning of the effector is monitored back to the receptor, and this makes the system self-regulating, i.e., guarantees stabilization or direction of action.¹⁰

Replacing the "control apparatus" label in Figure 3 with the term "Image" will suggest the place of the latter in any individual organism.

The relationship of the Image to messages from the environment is complex. Boulding notes four general responses of the Image to information. Each of these deserves some attention since change of the Image is an important consideration in the present work.

The first type of Image response to messages can be summarized as no response at all. The message and its potential meaning for the Image may be either ignored or rejected. This is, in part, a common and necessary response since it would be impossible for the Image to handle all available information being transmitted to it by its surroundings. As Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann have noted, the price of awareness and

¹⁰ Ludwig von Bertalanffy, General System Theory: Foundations, Development, Applications (New York: George Braziller, 1968), pp. 42-43, emphasis added.

contact with the environment is a certain degree of ignorance.

. . . the reality of everyday life always appears as a zone of lucidity behind which there is a background of darkness. As some zones of reality are illuminated, others are adumbrated. I cannot know everything there is to know about this reality.¹¹

This ignorance, imposed by "natural limits," is complemented by an intentional rejection of information which the Image might find contradictory and dysfunctional for its own existence and continuity. Leon Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance is useful in explaining this for it offers an hypothesis as to what might occur to force such rejections. His basic contentions are, first, that the presence of cognitive inconsistencies (dissonance) motivates an individual to take steps to reduce the resulting discomfort and, therefore, to increase consonance; and, second, that the individual will seek to avoid "situations and information which would likely increase the dissonance" in the future.¹² The result is that the message does not get through or is immediately rejected once its negative meaning for the stability of the Image configuration is perceived.¹³

¹¹Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1966), p. 44.

¹²Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1957), p. 3.

¹³See Boulding, The Image, p. 7.

A second type of response of the Image to environmentally rooted messages is that in which the Image is affected in some "regular and well-defined" way. Information is simply added to present configurations without causing any structural derangements. For example, an individual's Image of the physical shape of the African continent is not changed when he or she learns of the exact location of Tanzania in relation to Kenya, Uganda and Zambia. "I will have added to my knowledge or my image," contends Boulding; "I will not, however, have very fundamentally revised it."¹⁴

A third response is one in which the impact of certain messages on the Image is enough to change it "in a quite radical way." In a sense, a revolution occurs as the Image configuration retreats in the face of information it can neither disregard nor disprove.¹⁵ An examination of such a response is presented in a different context by Thomas Kuhn whose work on paradigm change through "scientific revolutions" has made such occurrences seem both natural and necessary.¹⁶

A fourth and final type of Image response to information from the environment involves the acceptance of the message

¹⁴Boulding, The Image, pp. 7-8.

¹⁵Boulding, The Image, pp. 8-10.

¹⁶Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2d ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970).

which either increases or decreases the certainty level of that Image. In other words, some messages will tend to clarify the configuration, thereby increasing certainty, while others will raise doubts and increase the Image's ambiguity for its possessor.¹⁷

Every image configuration is unique in its responses to its environment. This is due to the configuration itself as well as to the environment. Within the framework of General Systems Theory, the environment and the messages it communicates to an object are entropic by definition. That is, messages tend to be naturally disorganizing in line with the Second Law of Thermodynamics which holds that organized structures (natural or artificial) tend to "become more probable, more chaotic, and for things to run down."¹⁸ The Image, an organized structure, must deal with these dissonance-creating forces. Its structure must be such as to ward off as many of these forces as is necessary in order to, at the least, guarantee its continuation. It is in the degree to which different Images meet this challenge of entropic forces that each is unique.

¹⁷Boulding, The Image, pp. 10-11. It might be noted that Boulding does not seem to attribute the status to this response that he does to the other three.

¹⁸Boulding, The Image, p. 19; see also Norbert Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society (New York: Avon Books, 1954), Chapter I.

Boulding discusses the interaction between an Image and its environment in terms of a "process of testing."

Testing is a complicated process, and there are many things about it which are still very puzzling. There can be no doubt, however, that such a process in fact goes on. It involves a number of elements. The first is an expectation of prediction, that is, an image of what we expect the "real" [as opposed to the "unreal or fantasy"] part of the image to be like at a certain date in the future. Because of the sheer passage of time, the date in the future eventually arrives, and then we are faced with either conformation or disappointment.¹⁹

The type of response to such confirmations or disappointments will depend upon the Image's internal construction. Boulding states that Images may be "roughly" categorized according to their susceptibility to the testing process--that is, according to their openness to the entropic forces of the environment. These four categories include those Images which are (1) easy to test; (2) hard to test; (3) very hard to test; and (4) impossible to test.²⁰ The differences among these four classes of Images may be narrowed down to one specific criterion: the presence and use of information. The more available the relevant information and the greater the willingness to utilize it, the easier it is to test an Image configuration.²¹

¹⁹Kenneth E. Boulding, "Verifiability of Economic Images," in The Structure of Economic Science, ed. Sherman Krupp (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), pp. 129-130.

²⁰Boulding, "Verifiability . . .," p. 132.

²¹Boulding, "Verifiability . . .," pp. 132-137.

The discussion of the testability of an Image is, in part, a discussion of the Image's flexibility vis-à-vis its environment. The greater an Image's flexibility in this regard, the easier it can be tested (assuming the availability of information). The greater its inflexibility, the less likely it is that the Image will be open to whatever information is at its disposal.

Within the General Systems Theory framework, what is the natural status of Image flexibility? As an organized structure, the Image tends to work against the disorganizing forces--regardless of the positive or negative implications of those messages. Boulding notes this tendency as he points out the rarity of "radical" responses by Images to the messages of their environments. "When it receives messages which conflict with it, its first impulse is to reject them as in some sense untrue." It is in the general nature of the Image to protect and/or substantiate itself in light of negative information; and it is only under rather unique conditions that revolutionary changes successfully impose themselves upon that structure. The degree of certainty which the possessor attaches to his Image, the strength and frequency of incoming messages, the quality of their content as opposed to that of the Image itself, the internal consistency of the Image configuration, and the arrangement of the knowledge

contained therein: all these factors enter into the calculation of the possibility of bringing about any Image change, let alone a radical or revolutionary one. Therefore, for Boulding, it is more natural for the Image to promote its present configuration rather than any substantial changes.²²

Kuhn's work on scientific revolutions follows a similar line of thought except that he regards a revolution in world-views as an inevitable result of paradigm, i.e., Image, persistence; that is, the revolution is both natural and necessary. He agrees that, as a control apparatus, the paradigm tends to resist challenges from the environment. He goes so far as to attribute a part of that resistance to the environment itself which, to some extent, is reluctant to give the scientist a problem which he cannot solve given the present paradigm.

²²See Boulding, The Image, pp. 11-13. This anti-revolutionary attitude seems to permeate the works of most cyberneticists; but it is especially evident with Boulding who, in a later work, reflected the same attitude toward social change in general. See Kenneth E. Boulding, A Primer on Social Dynamics: History as Dialectics and Development (New York: The Free Press, 1970). It should be clear, however, that Boulding does not deny the role of revolutionary change, either past or present. What he is claiming is that most changes (and the most enduring of those cases of change) take place through the slower, cumulative process of "development." There are cases of radical changes, but their overall impact upon history has been less than that which occurs through the more gradual process. In regards to the Image, this view would still consider radical Image change as possible, but not as important (over a period of time) as the more conservative, gradualist response.

. . . one of the things a scientific community acquires with a paradigm is a criterion for choosing problems that, while the paradigm is taken for granted, can be assumed to have solutions. To a great extent these are the only problems that the community will admit as scientific or encourage its members to undertake. Other problems, including many that had previously been standard, are rejected as metaphysical, as the concern of another discipline, or sometimes as just too problematic to be worth the time.²³

But for Kuhn, the paradigm and its application contains the seed of its own destruction as well as the basis for its strength and endurance. The inevitability of paradigm (and Image) change seems rooted in the very processes of the paradigm's attempts to prove or improve its utility as a sufficient apparatus.

Paradigm procedures and applications are as necessary to science as paradigm laws and theories, and they have the same effects. Inevitably they restrict the phenomenological field accessible for scientific investigation at any given time.²⁴

As the scientific community, or some segment thereof, becomes more and more proficient in its investigation of a particular field for which it is tooled, an awareness of what cannot or is not being examined also increases. Within this context, anomalies develop, and one soon finds the scientist and his colleagues faced with problems which they are unable to overcome through "normal" channels. At this point the stage is

²³Kuhn, p. 37. This point will be raised again in a discussion of the professionalism of planners in Chapter V.

²⁴Kuhn, pp. 60-61.

set for one of the "non-cumulative developmental episodes" which Kuhn identifies as a "scientific revolution" and which may be regarded as comparable to radical shifts in the Image.²⁶ However, the occurrence of such changes is not so frequent as to negate the impact of the "normal" status of the Image and its usual reactions to disorganizing messages. Under normal circumstances, the Image will tend toward an increased inflexibility in its effort to continue its fight against entropic forces.

Before the flexibility of the Image can be understood, the Image concept must be developed so as to indicate its internal construction as well as its position within a specific environment. For this purpose, a definition of the Image configuration is offered which takes into account three salient features of its internal composition: the Image's content, its structure, and its strength. It is hypothesized herein that the condition and interaction of these three factors greatly determines the Image's flexibility vis-à-vis its general environment over a given period of time. Each element of the Image represents a necessary ingredient in that the perceptual configuration would not last long if one of the three was lacking or weakened in its impact. Each plays an essential role in keeping the Image organized in the face of natural trends toward running down.

²⁵Kuhn, p. 92, see Chapters VI-IX in Kuhn's work for an outline of how such revolutions develop.




Fig. 4. The configuration of Image.

Every Image has a unique content. Image content may be regarded as that abstract and theoretical portion of the Image which relates to a specific part of the individual's environment--namely, alternative contents. Ideas and theoretical constructs are not formed in a vacuum; rather, they attain some degree of clarity in relation to other ideas and theories. Figure 4A attempts to illustrate that, content-wise, an Image may first be seen in a form which differentiates it from other forms which Images might partake of at any time.

If an Image were to function with the sole purpose of relating itself strictly to other possible contents, then the internal logic of its specific content would probably be sufficient. In terms of the present study, however, other external variables must be taken into consideration--specifically, we are interested in what has been termed the "task environment"; that is, those parts of the general surroundings which are relevant or potentially relevant for the empirical application of the Image content.²⁶ In most cases it would be difficult for a content to interact with an empirical task environment without having been modified and reformed through some appropriate medium. The product of such adjustments is termed the Image

²⁶The concept of "task environment" was first developed by William R. Dill in "Environment as an Influence on Managerial Autonomy," Administrative Science Quarterly, 2 (1958): 409-443. see also Thompson, pp. 27-28. As originally used in organizational theory, the task environment was composed of a firm's clients, suppliers, competitors, and regulators.

structure, and it is through the structure that the content of an Image becomes relevant for the empirical world. Structure, in short, gives an Image its logic in regards to "reality," a logic which goes beyond the internalized theoretical organization of the Image. The structure gives the Image content a channel through which it can relate to variations in the environment, while, by itself, the content can only effectively relate to other contents.

An analogy may be useful here in clarifying the role of Image structure and its relationship to Image content. The architecture and career of Frank Lloyd Wright offer an example for present purposes. In terms of content, Wright had an Image of the role of architectural design which differed significantly from many of his professional peers. This difference was rooted in what Lewis Mumford has termed "his respect for the soil, the sight, the climate, the environing region" and his desire "to effect a synthesis of nature, the machine, and human activities and purposes." He took this approach in an era marked by the predominance of neo-classical and neo-medievalist designs in building. By simply applying the logic of his Image's content, Wright might have been victorious in verbalizing his theoretical opponents into submission. The more important step in Wright's development, however, came as he applied his Image to specific projects-- and for this a different logic had to be developed which

considered the empirically relevant factors. As each project challenged him, Wright responded with designs relevant to the particular environment as well as appropriate to his philosophy. Different functions, variations in the landscape, etc., were all matters which Wright had to consider on the level of his Image's structure. The content of his Image was appropriate only as it took a form more relevant for his task environment, and this meant applying modifications to that content logic which gave it form in terms of its empirical tasks.²⁷ This modified logic is that of the Image structure.

Image strength is represented in Figure 4C (A'B'C') as a screen which surrounds the Image's structure (ABC). Image strength is the basic point of contact between the Image and its environment. This screen is necessitated by the entropic nature of the environment and its disorganizing impact. In light of various environmental threats to its structure and content, an Image must produce sufficient amounts of internally derived protection while at the same moment it must maintain an open line of communication with its surroundings. Obviously, an Image which is incapable of receiving and/or

²⁷See Lewis Mumford, The Culture of Cities (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 1938/1970), pp. 405-410; and H. H. Arnason, History of Modern Art: Painting, Sculpture, Architecture (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. and New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., and Harry Abrams, Inc., n.d.), pp. 50-52, 139-142, 437-440.

transmitting messages between itself and its environment is a useless one which can be important only as a remnant of the past or a hypothetical alternative for the future. At the same time, an Image which is completely open--that is, one which lacks any consistent structure or content--is no Image at all in that it fails to remain somewhat distinct from the milieu which surrounds it.

This two-sided function for the Image's strength gives the latter its variability. The strength of an Image is dispersed in such a fashion as to render some environmental messages more communicable than others. While Image structure determines how the environment is to be perceived, Image strength determines what will be perceived. In an environment composed of messages A, B, C, and D, an Image's strength might be so dispersed as to facilitate the perception of A and D while blinding the Image holder to B and C. A different Image within the same environment might have an Image strength dispersal which allows for the perception of B and D while blocking the perceiver's consideration of A and C.

The determination of a strength's dispersal is rooted in a number of factors: the content and structure of the Image as they orient the perception toward the environment; the types of messages and information received by the Image in the past and its expectations for the future; the present state of the

environment;²⁸ and so on. The interaction of these forces results in a particular Image strength dispersal which can promote the reception of some messages and the rejection of others.

These three features of the Image should be regarded as being in a relationship of mutual dependence and interaction. This relationship, illustrated in Figure 5, reflects the dynamic aspects of the Image's internal configuration. Taking a hierarchical form,²⁹ the relationship is one in which regulation flows in one direction while the provision of facilities and energy flows in the other. Within this context it is held that content, giving the Image its uniqueness vis-à-vis other Image contents, exercises control of the other two factors. Structure means little or nothing without a content to determine its direction and substance. Similarly, structure is both prior to and a determinant of Image strength. Strength

²⁸For a discussion of variations in environmental conditions, see the typologies suggested in F. E. Emery and E. L. Trist, "The Causal Texture of Organizational Environments," Human Relations, 18 (1965):21-32 [reprinted in Jong S. Jun and William B. Storm, eds., Tomorrow's Organizations: Challenges and Strategies (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman Co., 1973), pp. 144-146]; and in Thompson, pp. 70-73.

²⁹This hierarchy of control and facilitation is adapted from Parsonian social theory. See Scarritt, pp. 9-10, and Talcott Parsons, Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), p. 9.




Fig. 5. Relationship among Image configuration factors.

is a characteristic of some structured entity which has content. But the relationship is not one-way. The structure depends upon the presence of strength for its endurance and capability vis-à-vis the task environment. The same holds true for Image content which is nothing without the structure which relates it to the relevant surroundings. In short, strength facilitates structure which, in turn, furthers the existence and application of content.

How does each of these features influence Image flexibility? First, flexibility is promoted by an Image content which is broad enough in scope to facilitate the Image-holder's adjustment to specific task environment problems. Images with too narrow a scope will limit the Image's structure and strength as each contends with that environment; in short, Image flexibility will be decreased. In general one may talk in terms of an Image content's bias. By definition, each Image has an inherent bias. It is not pure knowledge, but subjective knowledge which marks the Image content. Where the bias of the Image content is excessive, Image inflexibility results. An extremely biased Image content can result in a situation where the Image is "held with great tenacity" and is considered so important by the perceivers that it "cannot be dismissed out of hand, despite all

the protests of the logical positivists."³⁰ Thus, the greater the content bias, the less the Image flexibility.

Second, Image flexibility is intricately tied into the Image's structure. Structure gives the Image its logic vis-à-vis the task environment. It determines how a particular element in that surrounding will be perceived. This logic may be regarded as either open or closed. An open logic creates an Image structure which can respond to needs developed by the task environment. A particular element in the environment can be defined in such a way that, when conditions change, its meaning for the Image may change. Under a closed logic, however, the element is perceived in a definite way and the Image structure resists attempts to change or adjust that perception. The closure of the Image structure's logic thereby increases an Image's inflexibility.

Third, Image strength may both add to or subtract from Image flexibility. The impact it has will depend upon how the protection it offers is dispersed. Ideally, an Image should be exposed to those relevant messages which will facilitate its utility for the Image-holder. These messages come, by definition, from the task environment. There are also non-task environment messages to which the Image is exposed

³⁰Boulding, "Verifiability . . .," p. 136.

and the impact of these should be minimized so that they do not interfere to any considerable extent with the Image's utility. Image strength should therefore be dispersed so as to promote the communication and impact of relevant information while acting as a barrier to messages which might be dysfunctional for the Image's usefulness. The more Image strength allows irrelevant messages to influence the Image, the greater the chance of Image inflexibility.

With the positing of the Image concept and these three propositions regarding Image flexibility, the foundation for an evaluation of the impact of perceptions upon policy formulation and implementation has been laid. The utility of this conceptualization for an empirical examination of a specific Image is the topic of the next section.

B. The Planner's Image: A Research Design

The problem to be approached in the present study can be summarized as an attempt to determine the flexibility of the planner's Image as it is manifested in that Image's content, structure, and/or strength. As developed in the next three chapters, the planner's Image will show itself to be highly inflexible and in need of some adjustments if its utility is to be sufficient for the planning efforts of developing states. This judgment depends for its validity

upon the conclusions derived from the research undertaken in those chapters. The importance of the research techniques and the data used cannot be overstated. In this research design we shall discuss the research aspects of this study in terms of their positive and negative impacts upon the validity of the conclusions. This is done not so much to verify what was concluded, but rather to qualify the results. Admittedly, this study was carried out within the limits imposed by a lack of research resources. The methods, techniques, and data sources used in the present work were not the best; however, they were the best available under the circumstances. The results of the research must be evaluated in light of that qualification.

The Image Content

As noted earlier in this chapter, every Image has a content which distinguishes it from other possible contents. Uncovering the specific Image content for the planner's Image can perhaps best be accomplished through the use of interviewing techniques which are designed specifically for that purpose. Lacking the resources to use such techniques, this researcher was forced to turn to available secondary sources. It was decided that Image content might be researched through

the use of (1) a thematic content analysis of documents written by professional planners; (2) a secondary analysis of interviews with Third World planners conducted by other investigators; and (3) the use of information derived from a perusal of the literature of development planning.

Thematic content analysis. A first step in a thematic content analysis involves the determination and explication of those themes considered relevant for the present study. What are the salient themes of development planning and how may they be classified?

The construction of the classification scheme begins with a review of what the planner is supposed to be doing. For this study, it was necessary to adopt Benveniste's definition of the primary function of planners--to reduce uncertainty.³¹ This reduction is obtained through the planner's ability to create "images of the future" by which policymakers and private decision-makers may orient themselves. In terms of development planning in the Third World, such future images can be regarded as reflected in three important areas. First, the image of the future must be either change or maintenance oriented. That is, it must regard the future as a manifestation of adjustments in the status quo or as the perpetuation

³¹Benveniste, Chapter 2.

one of those patterns which currently dominate. The purpose of planning is not necessarily change. In a life of continual flux and challenge from the environment, it does take a conscious and "planned" effort at times to keep things the same. Thus, these two alternatives present the planner's Image with a choice from which to select a general orientation.

Second, since planners are dealing with societal changes, it seems obvious that their Images should include an orientation toward the types of social relationships which they regard as desirable for their clientele. While one might attempt to inventory the types of social relationships which each planner may see as desirable, a more feasible possibility would be the categorization of those variations into a classification of "ideal types." A useful classification in this regard is found in the Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft distinction which has its roots deep in the history of Western thought.

Since the emergence of the cities of antiquity, social philosophers have attempted to characterize and account for the contrast between tribal or rural life and the ways of city men. During the past century, the age-old contrast has been conceived in terms of pairs of societal types, such as rural-urban or primitive-civilized. The poles of such a pair are characterized by the opposite extremes of type-defining variables, such as the degree of importance of kinship or the extent of division of labor in a society. The range of variation of such

characteristics creates conceptual "continuum" between the opposed polar types.³²

Known as the "community-society" or Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft continuum, this typological scheme allows us to generalize where the planner's Image will fall within the broad domain of one of the ideal types. Where an Image is placed in regard to this classification depends on the definition given to each of the ideal types. For this we need to turn to the work of Talcott Parsons and his General Theory of Social Action.³³ Sociologically, the Gemeinschaft (community) and

³²Horace M. Miner, "Community-Society Continua," International Encyclopedia of Social Science, 3 (1968): 174.

³³For the basic writings on Parsonian social theory see Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils, eds., Toward A General Theory of Social Action (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1951), especially Parts 1 and 2; Talcott Parsons, The Social System (New York: The Free Press, 1951); and other publications by Parsons since that time. How this theoretical approach relates to a long tradition in social theory is brought out in an early work by Parsons, The Structure of Social Action: A Study in Social Theory with Special Reference to a Group of Recent European Writers, 2 vols. (New York: The Free Press, 1937 and 1968), and a later collection of readings which was intended to provide an historical perspective for sociologists interested in the Parsonian approach; see Talcott Parsons, et al., eds., Theories of Society: Foundations of Modern Sociological Theory, 2 vols. (New York: The Free Press, 1961). For a brief summary of the Parsonian approach, see William C. Mitchell, Sociological Analysis and Politics: The Theories of Talcott Parsons (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967). Among critiques of Parsons' approach, see Alvin W. Gouldner, The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology (New York: Avon Books, 1970).

Gesellschaft (society) types owe much to the writing of Ferdinand Tönnies.³⁴ Others, including Durkheim, Weber, Cooley, Redfield and Becker, have since used those concepts, each with his own modifications. But it is Parsons' elaboration of the dichotomy which is by far the most useful for present needs. In Parsonian theory, the basic unit of analysis is the "role" which gives its possessor a functional significance within the social system of which he or she is a part. In seeking to differentiate among role-types, Parsons notes that the "most crucial structural focus of differentiation" is to be found in "the cultural patterns which are institutionalized in roles."³⁵ In order to facilitate an examination of role-types, Parsons develops a categorization of cultural pattern variables which would simplify any classification of them. Adopting the Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft distinction, Parsons posits five variables as concept-pairs between which an ego must choose in its relationships with its alters (social objects). The choice process is forced upon the ego by five basic dilemmas which it faces (necessarily) vis-à-vis the alter ego.

³⁴ Ferdinand Tönnies, Community and Society: Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, trans. and ed. Charles P. Loomis (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1957).

³⁵ Parsons, The Social System, pp. 25-26, 46-48.

The first dilemma poses a choice between the immediate gratification of desires without regard for consequences and the discipline needed to obtain some desired end through the control of one's feelings. This is a choice between acting with affectivity or affective neutrality.

A second dilemma faces the individual who must select between private or collective objectives. Is the ego to be self-oriented or collectivity oriented?

The third dilemma is the ego's choice between the value standards by which a social object is to be evaluated. In this sense, should one utilize particularistic or universalistic standards? An example is when one is faced with the prospect of evaluating a physician as a licensed practitioner (universalistic standards) or as a neighbor who happens to be your friend as well as your family's doctor (particularistic standards).

In a fourth dilemma the ego must choose between giving the alter ego its value according to its status as a "composite of ascribed qualities, or conversely, as a composite of ascribed qualities, or conversely, as a composite of performances." In other words, should a social object be valued on ascriptive or achievement grounds?

Fifth, and finally, an ego must establish, to its own satisfaction, the scope of interest it is to give an alter. Some objects may be given a diffuse significance; that is, they may be given rights and powers limited only by some conflicting demands pressed by other objects. Other objects may be given specific rights and a significance which clearly delimits its influence.³⁶

Within this general framework given by Parsons one finds an in-depth definition of the Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft typology. With the major adjustment that these characteristics be regarded as continua rather than dichotomies, Parsons' summary can be made to fit into the community-society dimension. Figure 6 illustrates the result. When a planner's Image is held to be Gemeinschaft in orientation, one should interpret that to mean that the Image reflects a view of the future falling somewhere to the left of the base point (0) in Figure 6 rather than as an indication of a desire for a pure Gemeinschaft form of social community, and vice versa.³⁷

³⁶ See Parsons, The Social System, pp. 58-67; also Charles P. Loomis and John C. McKinney, "The Application of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft as Related to Other Typologies," in Tönnies, pp. 21-23.

³⁷ It should be emphasized at this point that the usual Western bias of equating Gemeinschaft conditions with traditional societies and Gesellschaft with "modern" ones is not being honored in this study. The assumption used herein is that the Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft variations are viable alternative forms for any contemporary society to take.

<u>Gemeinschaft</u>	6	5	4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	<u>Gesellschaft</u>
Affectivity	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Affective Neutrality
Collectivity Orientation	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Self- Orientation
Particular- istic	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Universal- istic
Ascription	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Achievement
Diffuseness	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Specificity

Fig. 6. Attributes of Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft social types.

Adapted from: Charles P. Loomis and John C. McKinney, "The Application of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft as Related to Other Typologies," in Ferdinand Tönnies, Community and Society: Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, translated and edited by Charles P. Loomis (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1987 and 1957), p. 27.

A third aspect of the "images of the future" relevant for Third World planners involves those functions of society and social life with which the planning expert must deal. Planning must consider which functional sector of the society is to be influenced in order to facilitate that change or maintenance which renders Gemeinschaft or Gesellschaft social relationships more attainable. Once again turning to Parsons, one may structure the alternative functional sectors into four categories.

First, a planner may imagine pattern-maintenance (i.e., cultural system) to be the primary sector of his or her concern. The principal function of this sector is to maintain and/or change the pattern of values, norms, collectivities and roles which make up the society. By socializing actors within the society, this functional sector passes the society's "culture" on from one generation to the next. In so doing, it not only promotes predominant cultural patterns, but also manages conflicts which might arise during the process. When a planner seeks to influence the acculturation and socialization process, the values held by his or her clientele ("beneficiaries"), etc., then his strategy may be regarded as oriented toward pattern-maintenance functions in the social system.

Second, a planner may wish to deal with the integrative sector (i.e., social structure) by which a society adjusts the relationships among its units. By seeking to correct what may be regarded as an unfair or ineffective distribution of prestige, wealth, governmental services, etc., the planner is seeking to adjust the integrative subsystem of society. By seeking to get the units to interact as a single and cohesive entity or to change their composition, the planner is attempting to make an adjustment in this realm.

Third, the planner may see the subject society's problem in terms of its inability to bring about "valued" ends. In light of this he or she might seek to adjust the goal-attainment sector of the social system. By attempting to increase political legitimacy, the political efficacy of a particular group of people, the efficiency and effectiveness of the civil service, etc., the planner is seeking to adjust the process and structures of goal-attainment.

Fourth, the planning expert may look to the adaptation sector for his or her target. Through the functional subsystem concerned with adaptation, a society relates to its physical-organic environment and obtains the facilities and energy by which society may endure and/or change. As a planner seeks to render a society more "industrialized" or more

agriculturally productive, he or she is dealing with adaptation; when a new technology or seed is scheduled for introduction, adaptation is involved; when vocational training is aimed at fulfilling the need for skilled labor in mining efforts, the primary concern is with adaptation.³⁸ From these three dimensions of planning themes one can derive a classification scheme similar to that given in Figure 7. Each of the 92 cells given in that chart may be regarded as a combination of the three dimensions previously described. Thus, one finds cells 1 through 6 representing Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft Images, with and without change and maintenance Images. Cells 7 through 18 reflect the Image of which sector is to be influenced, again with and without the change/maintenance variations. Cells 19 and 20 represent Images which are simply oriented toward change or maintenance. The balance of the cells illustrates combinations of these: cells 21 through 29 combining Gemeinschaft Images with that of the influencing of the adaptation sector and maintenance or change or neither; cells 30 through 38 showing an Image set which is oriented toward Gemeinschaft, and adjustment in the goal-attainment functional subsystem, and the maintenance or change or neither of the status quo; and so on.

³⁸ See Mitchell, p. 59; Scarritt, pp. 8-10, Parsons, Societies, Chapter Two; and Talcott Parsons, The System of Modern Societies (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971), pp. 11-13.

		Adaptation	Adaptation/ Maintenance	Adaptation Change	Goal-Attainment	Goal-Attainment/ Maintenance	Goal-Attainment/ Change	Integration	Integration/ Maintenance	Integration/ Change	Pattern- Maintenance	Pattern-Mainten- ance/Maintenance	Pattern-Mainten- ance/Change	Maintenance	Change
		7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
Gemeinschaft	1	21	22	23	30	31	32	39	40	41	48	49	50		
Gemeinschaft/ Maintenance	2	24	25	26	33	34	35	42	43	44	51	52	53		
Gemeinschaft/ Change	3	27	28	29	36	37	38	45	46	47	54	55	56		
Gesellschaft	4	57	58	59	66	67	68	75	76	77	84	85	86		
Gesellschaft/ Maintenance	5	60	61	62	69	70	71	78	79	80	87	88	89		
Gesellschaft Change	6	63	64	65	72	73	74	81	82	83	90	91	92		

Fig. 7. Alternative planner Image contents.

The most obvious document to explore for these themes is the national development plan itself which, one assumes, is mainly the product of a planning organization headed and directed by professional planners. However, there are dangers in selecting this document. For example, it may not be drawn up by the planners, but rather by propagandists who communicate more rhetoric than they do planning proposals. Some of the documents may also suffer from being drawn up by planners who write what they think the Prince and others (i.e., implementors, World Bank, etc.) wished to hear rather than what they held to be valid for planning purposes. Both of these dangers are somewhat magnified for this study since only one chapter from each document was examined--a chapter more susceptible to propagandizing and false statements than any other. However, this particular chapter was the only one common to the thirty plans used in this study. More importantly, it is the chapter concerned with the statement of planning priorities and objectives. These "objectives" chapters are usually found at the beginning of each document and sometimes include a brief statement about the success or failures of past policies. The typical objectives chapter then goes on to summarize the plan being proposed and the techniques being advocated. The length of those examined for this study varied from two or three pages to 50 or 60 pages.

The unit of analysis was a "plan objective" which this writer defined as a somewhat coherent and complete statement regarding the goals being sought by the statement's authors. Some of these statements were sentences, others were paragraphs. For each plan objective three questions were asked: first, toward what societal form was the objective aimed; second, was the objective oriented toward the maintenance or change of the structures of the present system; and third, what functional portion of the social system did the objective attempt to influence? The answers to these questions determined where the objective was classified in the three-dimensional scheme of Figure 7. The only addition was a category of "not ascertainable" added to each of the dimensions.

Selecting the plans to be analyzed was perhaps the most difficult problem. An analysis of this sort should be based on a sample derived randomly from an entire population of national development plans. The only other valid alternative might be a weighted sample whose composition is calculated to control for certain factors. Neither method could be used in the present study due to the limited availability of the documents and of financial resources which might have facilitated the effort. After considering what plans were available, it was decided that an attempt should be made to at least disperse the samples into five distinct regional categories

based on geographic and/or language criteria. Thus, while the discussion which follows will treat this analysis as if it were accomplished with a scientifically acceptable random or weighted sample, the reader should keep in mind that this is not the case. One should regard this study as an example of how such an analysis could be done if sufficient materials were available. All conclusions must be regarded with this warning in mind.

The countries chosen for the study include a total of thirty, six each from five geographic and/or language region areas. They are as follows:

- Anglophone and Eastern Africa (Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia);
- Francophone and Central Africa (Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Dahomey, Gabon, Togo);
- Asia/Pacific (Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Nepal, Thailand);
- Latin America (Argentina, Barbados, Brazil, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru);
- Middle East and Asia Minor (Afghanistan, Iraq, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey).

For each of these countries, a relatively recent plan document was obtained which dated from about the mid-1960's.³⁹

³⁹The bibliography of documents used for the content analysis is given in Appendix A.

Analyzing the content of the plan objectives of these plans is an extremely subjective process. Unlike content analyses where one seeks to account for the recurrence of certain words, phrases, or subjects, a thematic analysis relies to a large extent upon the meanings each individual codifier attaches to the concepts being used. It is, therefore, important to note the reliability of one's codification methods. For the present study, only the present writer accomplished the primary analysis, the results of which are given in Chapter III. However, three other individuals were asked to take part in a reliability test of that analysis. The specifics of that test are given in Appendix A. A brief discussion of the test's results will give the reader some basis for evaluating the results.

The three codifiers each had different academic backgrounds and different degrees of exposure to the arguments of this study. One, a graduate student in the humanities, had been exposed to many early versions of this dissertation and was very familiar with the reasoning behind the content analysis. A second codifier for this test was a political science graduate student whose main area of concern was comparative politics. He had been involved in several discussions about the present study, but was otherwise unfamiliar with the arguments made in this work. The third codifier was also

a political scientist. His main concern in the study of politics was political thought and American government. He was not involved in any discussions regarding the present study.

The reliability test was given in two parts. Part one tested the process used for selecting plan objectives from the objectives chapters. The coefficients of reliability⁴⁰ for these three codifiers were .730, .692, and .615 respectively--the individuals with more knowledge of the concepts being used scoring higher than those with lesser knowledge in this regard.

Part two of the reliability test consisted of giving each codifier specific sets of plan objectives which the present writer had previously classified in terms of the three theme dimensions. Each codifier was then asked to classify that plan objective. Comparing the classifications of this writer and those given by the codifiers, coefficients of reliability were calculated to be .792, .693, and .594 with the individual having the greatest knowledge vis-à-vis the present work again coming out highest and the person with the lowest familiarity scoring the lowest coefficient level.

⁴⁰The formula used for determining this coefficient was taken from Ole R. Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1969), pp. 139-140. See Appendix A for a discussion of that formula and what it measures.

A familiarity with the concepts being used in this analysis and the general argument of the study did seem to have an impact upon the validity of the codification. In light of the subjective quality of the themes being examined, this finding is not at all surprising. It is difficult to determine whether this finding has a positive or negative meaning for the analysis. This is for the reader to judge. At the least, the reader should be aware of these reliability results.

Clarification and sources of verification. The various drawbacks to the thematic content analysis make it necessary for the researcher to seek clarification and verification from other sources. Two such sources were used to complete the analysis in Chapter III.

In section B of that chapter, a secondary analysis of a previous study of Third World planners was used. The study was one undertaken by Warren and Alice Stone Ilchman and Philip Hastings in the mid-1960's. In that study 33 "middle-range" planners were surveyed through individual interviews to determine their backgrounds, ideologies, and general behavior patterns. The concern of those researchers was not as specific as it is in the present study. Rather, the Ilchmans and Hastings were exploring the characteristics of a social actor who seems to be gaining more and more prominence in the

contemporary world--the expert. The planner was an obvious example of an expert, and when the opportunity presented itself, the study was undertaken.⁴¹

Studies such as the Ilchman, Ilchman, and Hastings one are surprisingly rare in light of the interest in expertise which has been building since World War II. As early as 1940 Florian Znaniecki had established a concern in sociology for the "men of knowledge" in society whose role was gaining increased importance.⁴² His emphasis upon the sociological factors surrounding that group produced a concern among Znaniecki's colleagues for those aspects of the environment which influenced the behavior of experts. Ideological and other factors internal to the man of knowledge, however, were not sufficiently explored. The Ilchman study was a move in a more general direction. The wide range of the interview and

⁴¹The grounds for selecting the interviewees seem to give evidence as to the reasoning behind the study. The 33 subjects were planners who were in the United States for supplementary instructions in their profession. This common quality obviously places limits upon the value of the study. See Warren Ilchman, Alice Stone Ilchman, and Philip K. Hastings, The New Men of Knowledge and the Developing Nations; Planners and the Polity: A Preliminary Survey (Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California, 1968); also see Warren Ilchman, "Productivity, Administrative Reform, and Antipolitics: Dilemmas for Developing States," in Political and Administrative Development, ed. Ralph Braibanti (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1969), pp. 472-526.

⁴²Florian Znaniecki, The Social Role of the Men of Knowledge (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940).

profession of the subjects makes this particular study valuable for present purposes. Conducted over a two-year period, the study is not a "classic." As a matter of fact, it leaves itself open to some very damaging criticisms at a number of points. The composition of the sample and the basis for its selection are two points which the Ilchman group has a difficult time defending. The sample included mostly (but not exclusively) Third World planners. There were six planners from Southeast Asia, eight from South Asia, six from the Middle East, five from Africa, six from Latin America, and two from the "Communist world" (i.e., Yugoslavia). As noted previously, the grounds for selecting these subjects seemed to be proximity to the interviewers since they were all planners who were in the United States for training. While this selection is justified on the basis that these planners will be more "open" to interviews away from their working environments, one must remain aware of the fact that these individuals were guests of the United States and were perhaps unwilling to offend their hosts with critical responses to the interviewers. Despite these obvious drawbacks, the insights, both sociological and ideological, gained from the survey cannot be totally disregarded. Placed in the perspective of the preceding content analysis they do, in fact, aid in solving some problems of interpretation.

A second source of clarification and verification includes that portion of the development planning literature which discusses, directly and indirectly, the various themes of Third World planning. In Section C of Chapter III, these works are discussed as they might add to the findings of the content analysis.

The Image Structure

While a content analysis or interview techniques might be useful in regard to Image content, they were of little use in attempting to derive the logic (or structure) of an Image. Uncovering the Image's structure in a systematic way was all but impossible under the research conditions for this study. A more intuitive approach was adopted in Chapter IV which sought to find the structure within the broad literature of economic development that has been accumulating and developing over the past several decades. In a sense, the study of Image structure was carried out as one would study an intellectual history.

The basis for looking at this particular literature was found in the analysis of Chapter III. In uncovering the Image content, it was found that the planning profession had a distinct and obvious relationship with the field of economics. There seemed to be an identity between economic development and planning strategies; so much so that planning theory was to

be considered one form of economic theory. An exploration of economic theory was therefore the most logical point of departure for the search for the Image structure.

The Image Strength

Under optimal research conditions an analysis of Image strength would attempt to correlate the Image configuration with task and non-task environment factors. In that way one might measure the relationship between those factors and the Image. A high correlation between the Image and the task environment factors would mean that the dispersal of Image strength was low in that regard. A low correlation would, of course, be interpreted as a measure of high Image strength vis-à-vis the task environment. The same correlations might be made in terms of non-task environment factors. It is necessary to understand the relationship between these environments and Image strength before determining the research procedures and methods to be used under the less-than-optimal research conditions of this study.

Task environment factors are those which are most relevant to the problems planning is supposed to solve. These are the elements with which the Image should be most concerned. As the task environment changes, the Image should adjust. This is one key to the idea of "flexibility" for the Image concept. The shield of Image strength should be thin at the

points of contact between the Image and these relevant conditions. Similarly, non-relevant elements in the environment should have minimized influence; that is, Image strength should be high in regard to the non-task environment. Image inflexibility will result where an inappropriate dispersion of Image strength exists: where the shield is thin at those points of contact between the Image and the non-task environment factors, and thick where in proximity to task environment factors.

The reasoning behind this conceptualization was rather simple. If non-task environment elements were given a substantial role in determining the strategy and priorities of policies, the likely outcome would be policy failure. Policies should suit the conditions under which they must function. This, for instance, is one of the basic arguments behind the call for more policy formulation responsibility at the local level of U.S. government and less determination at the national levels. Needs and resources, as the proponents of policies such as revenue-sharing contend, differ from locale to locale. Setting general standards in Washington might seem to guarantee a consistent set of policies, but it also ignores that which is unique in each local environment. The problems of Chicago are not the same problems faced by Boulder, and to impose standards upon the latter Colorado city because of

conditions in Chicago would entail setting irrelevant criteria. In such a case, policymakers could be accused of working from an Image which generalizes the problems of Chicago as the problems of all cities. Their inability to perceive this error might be protected by an Image strength which offers more influence to those generalizations than it does to the more relevant elements in the task environment of Boulder.

While this reasoning is quite obvious, the difficulty is that there are, at present, no means or standards by which one may specifically define and distinguish between task and non-task environments. Only relative and somewhat arbitrary judgments are available. In addition, if some means and standards were to be developed, one would have a difficult time defending the criteria used since the line between task and non-task environment factors is a thin one. For example, what of the vaguely defined values of freedom and human dignity? These are values rooted in the international system of today and are not "obviously relevant to" the development of any particular country. Is the international social system, along with its values and norms, part of a country's task environment? If so, what portions of it are relevant? What portions, if any, are irrelevant? A clear distinction between task and non-task environments may be impossible to draw.

Even more important, such a clear division may be as unnecessary as it is impossible. What may be irrelevant may not be discardable. The task environment, by definition, cannot exist within a vacuum. There are and always will be pressures from non-task environment elements which must be taken into account. Therefore, when it is advocated that non-task environment factors be minimized, the intent is to limit rather than eliminate their impact. Image strength vis-à-vis irrelevant factors should not be of such a high intensity as to lead to a total disregard for what might be important variables. It is not a matter of ignoring the non-task environment so much as it is a matter of preventing it from determining the course a particular policy will take and the standards it will meet.

As a foundation for the work to be carried out in this chapter, relevant environment factors will be limited to those variables which are measurable or classifiable as characteristic of the countries under study. Irrelevant or non-task factors will be defined as the historical and social conditions of "developed" social systems with which the Third World countries must interact.

The primary chore at hand is to determine what impact task environment factors have upon the planner's Image as it is reflected in the Image content. What is the level of association between various relevant factors in the environment

of the countries used in this study and the frequency of the planning themes given in Chapter III? If Image strength is correctly dispersed. (that is, a low degree of strength in regard to task environmental factors), the levels of association should be relatively high. If not properly distributed, those levels should be low.⁴³

Used in this analysis are the absolute frequencies of the planning themes derived from the content analysis of Chapter III,⁴⁴ and data derived from Arthur S. Banks, et al.'s Cross-Polity Time Series Data for each of the thirty countries.⁴⁵

The data collected by the Banks group included, "insofar as possible," material for the time period 1815 to 1966 excluding the periods of the two world wars. The Cross-Polity Time Series Data volume is a preliminary publication which included data for 102 of the 200 variables for which information was being collected. The cases (i.e., countries) used were "all commonly recognized members of the international community . . . excluding

⁴³Much of the analysis which follows came to fruition with the help and patience of Stafford Thomas, a graduate student at the University of Colorado.

⁴⁴The reader is reminded of the quality of the data used in that content analysis.

⁴⁵Arthur S. Banks and the Staff of the Center for Comparative Political Research, SUNY at Binghamton, Cross-Polity Time Series Data (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1971).

a handful of quasi-states such as Andorra, Bhutan, Liechtenstein, Monaco, and Vatican City."⁴⁶

Most of the data assembled in the volume were scaled at interval levels of measurement, with several of the variables being ordinal- and nominal-scaled. The variables chosen in this study were interval or nominal. For purposes of the present analysis, it was necessary to collapse the interval data into discrete categories of as equal categories as possible. The resulting tables are given in Appendix C.

The data were of two types: primary and secondary. The latter were derived through various manipulations of the former. (The "population density" variable is a good example of the secondary type since it is derived by dividing total population figures by area.)

Banks notes that "most of the interval-scaled longitudinal arrays contain both original and estimated data." The original data was derived from sources such as The Statesman's Yearbook. Estimated data was taken from two sources: those of the compiling source and those which are computer-generated through the use of "averaging" methods.⁴⁷

⁴⁶Banks and the Staff of the Center, p. ix.

⁴⁷The "averaging" method, where used, consisted of taking the average between two original data points and calculating the difference that average increment would make for each intervening year. For instance, if original data points

The Banks group's statement on the reliability of the data gives nothing more specific than the following statement:

A margin of error in the vicinity of 5% must probably be allowed for even the most rigorous of aggregate statistics, while it would appear that margins of from 10-20% will not completely destroy their utility for most comparative purposes, assuming the error to be random, rather than systematic. It is our conviction that the latter range is seldom exceeded with regard to the interval data appearing in the present volume, with the possible exception of early and mid-nineteenth century entries, of some of the . . . data for the interwar period, and of the conflict data contained in Segment 10.

Of the latter exceptions noted in the statement, the only ones that concern the present study are the conflict variables taken from Segment 10. A reliability test for that data as it relates to the more recent years, however, showed that the recent information had a high coefficient of reliability (ranging well above .95 in most instances).⁴⁸

While there was no direct statement in regard to the reliability of the nominal-scaled state, mention was made of the fact that "several hundred volumes . . . were consulted" in their compilation. The reliability of those variables -- mostly political in nature (i.e., regime type, methods of

for the years 1936 and 1939 were 12 and 27 respectively, the calculated annual increment would be 5 $[(27-12)/3]$. Therefore, the level given for 1937 would be 17, for 1938, 22. See Banks and the Staff of the Center, p. x.

⁴⁸ Banks and the Staff of the Center, pp. xi-xii, xxi.

of effective executive selection, etc.) -- must be judged in light of that statement.⁴⁹

The Banks data was divided into ten segments. In numerical order these were: (1) area, population, and political data; (2) urbanization data; (3) national government and revenue data and information regarding railroad mileage; (4) communications data; (5) telephone and trade data; (6) educational data; (7) literacy and transportation data; (8) economic, energy, and radio data; (9) printed material data, G.N.P., currency and medical care data; and (10) data on domestic conflict and party competition. Of the 102 variables given by Banks, 48 were used in this study. These were presented in six categories. First were four variables classified as representative of physical and demographic factors of the task environment: area, population, population density, and population in cities of over 100,000 per capita. These were taken from segments (1) and (2) of the Banks' data collection. The second class of data involved political structure and process variables. These nine factors were taken from Banks' segments (1) and (10) and included information on regime types, head of state type, effective executive type, legislative selection process, effective executive selection process, nomination process,

⁴⁹Banks and the Staff of the Center, p. xi.

party legitimacy, parliamentary responsibility, and legislative effectiveness. Political conflict variables were derived from Banks' segments (1) and (10) and included number of coups d'etat, major constitutional changes, major cabinet changes, changes in effective executive, legislative elections, assassinations, general strikes, government crises, political purges, and anti-government demonstrations. Economic variables were taken from segments (5), (8), and (9) and included G.N.P. per capita, G.D.P. per capita, G.D.P. per capita originating in the industrial sector, energy production per capita, energy consumption per capita, imports and exports per capita, and the country's proportion of world trade. Social variables taken from segments (6), (7), and (9) were primary, secondary, university, and total school enrollment per capita, percentage of population literate, and physicians per capita. Finally, transport and communications factors were grouped together from segments (3), (4), (5), (7), (8), and (9) and included railroad mileage per square mile, railroad passenger kilometers, passenger cars, commercial vehicles, and all highway vehicles per capita, telegrams, telephones, radios and newspaper circulation per capita, book production by titles per million population, and all mail per capita.

There were any number of reasons for the selection of these 48 variables from among the 102. Many of the remaining

factors were absolute measures of the adopted variables. For instance, one of the variables left off of the list of factors was G.N.P. in its absolute form. By taking G.N.P. per capita as the basic measure a number of methodologically obvious problems are avoided for this comparative study. Other factors were eliminated due to the small number of cases for which data was available. Many of the urbanization variables fell into this category. Most redundant factors were eliminated, although some (all highway vehicles per capita, for instance) were included in order to give some perspective to other variables. Finally, several factors were eliminated because they did not seem salient for the present study. What we are concerned with are those elements in the environment which would be somewhat relevant for planning goals and strategies. For instance, the size of a government cabinet (given in the Banks data in segment (1)), currency in circulation per capita, official exchange rates, the age of currency in months (all from segment (9)), and so on would seem to be less relevant for planning orientations than those variables which were selected.

Except where noted (mainly for conflict variables), all data are from the year 1966--a year just prior to or at the beginning of most of the plan periods for the documents examined. The exceptions included those variables for which a single year's figures would mean little or nothing as a basis for comparison.

In the latter cases, the years 1964 to 1966, inclusive, were used.⁵⁰

Each of the variables was cross-tabulated with the absolute frequencies of planning themes (see Appendix C). From the resulting tables it was then possible to compute a measure of association noted as the Goodman and Kurshal's τ_b measure.⁵¹ Taking A as the independent variable and B as the dependent, Goodman and Kurshal's τ_b will give us some idea of the influence

⁵⁰There are many drawbacks to the use of a single period (1966 or 1964-1966) for a study such as this one. There are questions, for instance, concerning the relevance of 1966 or 1964-1966 figures as a task environment for planners who might have drawn up their plans much earlier or later than those dates. Some of the plans used in this study were dated in the mid-1960's but were formulated years before. Other plans used were dated in the early 1970's, indicating the possibility that they were formulated under conditions which varied from the chosen base years.

On the other hand, there are reasons for using these dates. First, and rather arbitrarily, the Banks data for 1966 was the latest date for which there was information. The research was restricted in this regard. Second, a perusal of the literature of the Third World's development efforts will not indicate any reason for perceiving 1966 or 1964-1966 as odd periods vis-à-vis developing world conditions. The decade of the 1960's did seem to show a uniqueness in the sense that development efforts showed a decreased effectiveness (by economic measures) relative to the impact of such policies in the post-World War Two decade. However, during the sixties there did not seem to be specific years where Third World conditions changed radically. The years 1966 and 1964-1966 are probably as valid in this light as any other period of time during the past decade.

⁵¹See Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Social Statistics, 2d ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1972), pp. 300-302; and E. Terrence Jones, Conducting Political Research (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1971), pp. 112-116. See Appendix C.

of A on B by showing to what extent a knowledge of A will reduce the number of errors made in the distribution of B when A is not known. The greater the τ_b , the greater the reduction of the errors, the more impact A may be said to have on B.

In the present study, the dependent variables are the planning themes uncovered in the content analysis of Chapter III. The independent variables are those derived from the Banks data collection. These τ_b scores are presented in tables in Chapter V.

If it is difficult to find a measure of Image strength as it relates to the task environment, it is all but impossible at present to develop one for the non-task environment. By definition, all that is not the task environment belongs to the non-task environment. Even the use of a poor measure seems out of the question in light of the factors encompassed by such a category.

Yet while no measure of Image strength can be taken in this regard, there seems to be sufficient evidence to suggest that the implications of section A of Chapter V--that is, that Image strength is high for the task environment and therefore low in regard to the non-task variables (due to their exclusivity)--are correct. Since the relevant or potentially relevant factors seem to lack a high degree of association with the Image's variations, one may logically speculate that non-task environment factors are determining the planner's Image.

While no "proof" can be offered for this contention at the moment, one can indicate several facts which seem to substantiate that hypothesis. These "facts" are rooted in both historical and sociological aspects of the non-task environment. Specifically, the planner's Image in the Third World today seems to owe much to its historical background in the "developed" countries and their academic communities, as well as to those sociological characteristics of the planning profession which presently gives priority to the status of professionalism rather than the more relevant aspects of the environment. These points are discussed in the final section of Chapter V.

While the research techniques and methods used in this study can be much improved, they do offer a foundation for future work in this area. The utility of the Image concept will only be as good as the methods designed to explore it. It is hoped that in the near future the utility of the Image as a tool for analysis will greatly increase.

CHAPTER III

THE IMAGE CONTENT BIAS

In the present chapter we shall be concerned with the measurement of the Image content's bias. As noted in the previous chapter, the greater the content bias, the less the Image flexibility. This inflexibility results from perceptions which are held with "great tenacity" by the Image-holder. The problem is not one concerned with whether or not there is a content bias, but rather to what degree that bias is held. We are seeking to find how strongly planners hold to certain planning themes. We are assuming that the frequency of certain themes will reflect the presence of a particular content bias, and that the greater the frequency of themes, the more the bias of the Image content.

The content analysis used in this investigation has many limits which were discussed in the previous chapter. That the reader should be aware of these caveats cannot be too frequently stated.

A. The Analysis of Plan Documents

The thematic content analysis of the objectives chapters of thirty national development used in this study showed

the frequency of certain themes to be extremely high. For example, for the 184 cases within the Anglophone and Eastern Africa region, one finds the dominant Image to contain a change orientation (77.7 per cent), while the maintenance approach was uncovered in 4.9 per cent of the cases and 17.4 per cent were not ascertainable. With regards to the Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft dimension, 93.5 per cent were not ascertainable. Of the balance, 2.7 per cent were Gemeinschaft oriented and 3.8 per cent were Gesellschaft. Of the four functional subsystems, adaptation/economic sectors were salient in 65.8 per cent of the cases, with integration/social structure being the theme for 27.7 per cent of the observations. Not only was this a regional trend, but as shown in Table 5, it also held for each country within the region.

The same overall trend can be seen in the Francophone and Central Africa region, the only difference being that in the latter group of countries the emphasis upon the more prevalent themes is even stronger. For example, of the 136 cases given in this region, all were change-oriented. As for the Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft dimension, 97.1 per cent of the cases were not ascertainable while the small remainder were Gesellschaft in nature. Meanwhile, the designation of the adaptation subsystem as the functional target was found in 78.7 per cent of the cases with integration (10.3 per cent),

TABLE 5

THEMES OF PLANNING: ANGLOPHONE AND EASTERN AFRICA

Dimensions	Botswana (N=32)	Ethiopia (N=16)	Kenya (N=46)	Nigeria (N=33)	Tanzania (N=36)	Zambia (N=21)	Region (N=181)
N=	5	0	2	0	2	0	9
%=	15.6	0.0	4.3	0.0	5.6	0.0	4.9
N=	19	15	34	26	28	21	143
%=	59.4	93.8	73.9	78.8	77.8	100.0	77.7
N=	8	1	10	7	6	0	32
%=	25.0	9.3	21.7	21.2	16.7	0.0	17.4
N=	0	0	0	0	5	0	5
%=	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	13.9	0.0	2.7
N=	3	0	1	2	0	1	7
%=	9.4	0.0	2.2	6.1	0.0	4.8	3.8

TABLE 5 (Cont'd)

Dimensions		Botswana (N=32)	Ethiopia (N=16)	Kenya (N=46)	Nigeria (N=33)	Tanzania (N=36)	Zambia (N=21)	Region (N=181)
N=	Not Ascertainable	29	16	45	31	31	20	172
%=		90.6	100.0	97.8	83.9	86.1	95.2	93.5
N=	Adaptation	22	13	30	18	23	15	121
%=		68.8	81.3	65.2	54.5	63.9	71.4	65.8
N=	Goal Attainment	1	0	1	0	5	2	9
%=		3.1	0.0	2.2	0.0	13.9	9.5	4.9
N=	Integration	9	3	15	11	8	4	50
%=		28.1	18.7	32.6	33.3	22.2	19.0	27.2
N=	Pattern Maintenance	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
%=		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

TABLE 5 (Cont'd)

Dimensions		Botswana (N=32)	Ethiopia (N=16)	Kenya (N=46)	Nigeria (N=33)	Tanzania (N=36)	Zambia (N=21)	Region (N=181)
N=	Not	0	0	0	4	0	0	4
	Ascertainable	-----						
%=		0.0	0.0	0.0	12.1	0.0	0.0	2.2

goal attainment (9.6 per cent), and pattern maintenance (1.5 per cent) far behind in relative frequency. As can be seen in Table 6, this pattern held for each country in the region.

For the Asia/Pacific region (Table 7), one finds 96.4 per cent of the 139 cases emphasizing change with 3.6 per cent showing a concern for maintaining present conditions. As for the Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft distinction, only 2.9 per cent of the observations were ascertainable, and all of those fell into the Gesellschaft category. Adaptation was dominant in 74.1 per cent of the cases while integration, goal attainment and pattern maintenance were salient in 20.9, 4.3 and .7 per cent of the cases, respectively. Once again, this trend for the region was reflected in each of the country plans sampled for that region.

Table 8 shows that, of the 179 cases taken from the plans in the Latin American region, 91.1 per cent were change-oriented, 2.8 per cent were maintenance-oriented while the remainder were not ascertainable. Gesellschaft orientations were observed in 2.2 per cent of the designated plan objectives while 97.8 per cent were unascertainable. In regard to functional subsystem targets, adaptation was prevalent in 70.9 per cent of the cases and integration was prominent in 20.1 per cent. Goal attainment was projected in 5.0 per cent and pattern maintenance in 1.7 per cent of the cases; emphasis

TABLE 6

THEMES OF PLANNING: FRANCOPHONE AND CENTRAL AFRICA

Dimensions	Burundi (N=12)	Central African Republic (N=22)	Chad (N=19)	Dahomey (N=31)	Gabon (N=20)	Togo (N=32)	Region (N=136)
N=	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Maintenance	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
N=	12	22	19	31	20	32	136
Change	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N=	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Not Ascertainable	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
N=	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Gemeinschaft	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
N=	0	0	1	0	2	1	4
Gesellschaft	0.0	0.0	5.3	0.0	10.0	3.1	2.9
N=	12	22	18	31	18	31	132
Not Ascertainable	100.0	100.0	94.7	100.0	90.0	96.9	97.1

TABLE 6 (Cont'd)

Dimensions		Burundi (N=12)	Central African Republic (N=22)	Chad (N=19)	Dahomey (N=31)	Gabon (N=20)	Togo (N=32)	Region (N=136)
N=		11	15	14	26	19	22	107
	Adaptation	91.7	68.2	73.7	83.9	95.0	68.8	78.7
N=		1	3	0	3	0	6	13
	Goal Attainment	8.3	13.6	0.0	9.7	0.0	18.7	9.6
N=		0	3	5	2	1	3	14
	Integration	0.0	13.6	26.3	6.5	5.0	9.4	10.3
N=		0	1	0	0	0	1	2
	Pattern Maintenance	0.0	4.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.1	1.5
N=		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Not Ascertainable	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
N=		0	0	0	0	0	0	0

TABLE 7
THEMES OF PLANNING: ASIA/PACIFIC

Dimensions	Ceylon (N=37)	India (N=34)	Indonesia (N=21)	Republic of Korea (N=14)	Nepal (N=18)	Thailand (N=15)	Region (N=139)
N=	0	2	0	0	0	3	5
Maintenance	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
%=	0.0	5.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	20.0	3.6
N=	37	32	21	14	18	12	134
Change	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
%=	100.0	94.1	100.0	100.0	100.0	80.0	96.4
N=	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Not Ascertainable	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
%=	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
N=	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Gemeinschaft	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
%=	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
N=	2	2	0	0	0	0	4
Gesellschaft	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
%=	5.4	5.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.9
N=	35	32	21	14	18	15	135
Not Ascertainable	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
%=	94.6	94.1	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	97.1

TABLE 7 (Cont'd)

Dimensions	Ceylon (N=37)	India (N=34)	Indonesia (N=21)	Republic of Korea (N=14)	Nepal (N=18)	Thailand (N=15)	Region (N=139)
N=	28	21	19	11	15	9	103
Adaptation							
%=	75.7	61.8	90.5	78.6	83.3	60.0	74.1
N=	1	2	1	0	0	2	6
Goal Attainment							
%=	2.7	5.9	4.8	0.0	0.0	13.3	4.3
N=	8	11	0	3	3	4	29
Integration							
%=	21.6	32.4	0.0	21.4	16.7	26.7	20.9
N=	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Pattern Maintenance							
%=	0.0	0.0	4.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.7
N=	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Not Ascertainable							
%=	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

TABLE 8

THEMES OF PLANNING: LATIN AMERICA

Dimensions	Argentina (N=28)	Barbados (N=19)	Brazil (N=14)	Guatemala (N=45)	Paraguay (N=32)	Peru (N=41)	Region (N=179)
N=	0	1	2	2		0	5
Maintenance	0.0	5.3	14.3	4.4	0.0	0.0	2.8
N=	20	17	11	43	32	40	163
Change	71.4	89.5	78.6	95.6	100.0	97.6	91.1
N=	8	1	1	0	0	1	11
Not Ascertainable	28.6	5.3	7.1	0.0	0.0	2.4	6.1
N=	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Gemeinschaft	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
N=	0	0	3	1	0	0	4
Gesellschaft	0.0	0.0	21.4	2.2	0.0	0.0	2.2
N=	28	19	11	44	32	41	175
Not Ascertainable	100.0	100.0	78.6	97.8	100.0	100.0	97.8

TABLE 8 (Cont'd)

Dimensions	Argentina (N=28)	Barbados (N=19)	Brazil (N=14)	Guatemala (N=45)	Paraguay (N=32)	Peru (N=41)	Region (N=179)
N=	15	16	6	32	29	29	127
Adaptation	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
%=	53.6	84.2	42.9	71.1	90.6	70.7	70.9
N=	3	0	3	0	0	3	9
Goal Attainment	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
%=	10.7	0.0	21.4	0.0	0.0	7.3	5.0
N=	7	3	2	12	3	9	36
Integration	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
%=	25.0	15.8	14.3	26.7	9.4	22.0	20.1
N=	2	0	0	1	0	0	3
Pattern Maintenance	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
%=	7.1	0.0	0.0	2.2	0.0	0.0	1.7
N=	1	0	3	0	0	0	4
Not Ascertainable	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
%=	3.6	0.0	21.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.2

on functional subsystems was not ascertainable in 2.2 per cent of the observations. In terms of individual countries, the predominant factors of the region were also prevailing for each of the six entities.

The region noted as the Middle East and Asia Minor held to the same trend for the maintenance-change dimension. Of the 188 observations, only 1.1 per cent could be regarded as maintenance oriented. Some 98.6 per cent were change-seeking. A similar occurrence can be noted in terms of the Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft dimension wherein only one case (0.5 per cent) was ascertainable and it was Gesellschaft in nature. In the final dimension, this region also had a strong adaptation predominance, but to a lesser extent (66.0 per cent) than the other four regions. This was due to the relatively high emphasis on integration found in Iraq and Tunisia which resulted in an overall regional occurrence of 22.3 per cent for that functional subsystem. Goal attainment and pattern maintenance orientations were noted for 6.9 per cent and 4.8 per cent of the plan objectives, respectively, as shown in Table 9. On a country-by-country analysis, this general pattern is further substantiated within the Middle East and Asia Minor region.

The high consistency of these region-by-region results is reflected in the summary presented in Table 10. Of 826 total observations, 762 or 92.3 per cent showed a

TABLE 9

THEMES OF PLANNING: MIDDLE EAST AND ASIA MINOR

Dimensions	Afghanistan (N=63)	Iraq (N=8)	Morocco (N=32)	Sudan (N=34)	Tunisia (N=39)	Turkey (N=12)	Region (N=188)
N=	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
Maintenance	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
%=	3.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1
N=	61	8	32	34	39	12	186
Change	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
%=	96.8	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	98.9
N=	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Not Ascertainable	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
%=	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
N=	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Gemeinschaft	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
%=	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
N=	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Gesellschaft	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
%=	0.0	0.0	3.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5
N=	63	8	31	34	39	12	187
Not Ascertainable	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
%=	100.0	100.0	96.9	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.5

TABLE 9 (Cont'd)

Dimensions	Afghanistan (N=63)	Iraq (N=8)	Morocco (N=32)	Sudan (N=34)	Tunisia (N=39)	Turkey (N=12)	Region (N=188)
N=	44	4	23	28	17	8	124
Adaptation	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
%	69.8	50.0	71.9	82.4	43.6	66.7	66.0
N=	7	0	2	0	4	0	13
Goal Attainment	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
%	11.1	0.0	6.3	0.0	10.3	0.0	6.9
N=	12	4	6	4	12	4	42
Integration	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
%	19.0	50.0	18.7	11.8	30.8	33.3	22.3
N=	0	0	1	2	6	0	9
Pattern Maintenance	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
%	0.0	0.0	3.1	5.9	15.4	0.0	4.8
N=	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Not Ascertainable	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
%	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

TABLE 10
THEMES OF PLANNING: ALL REGIONS (N=826)

Dimensions		All Regions
N=		21
	Maintenance	----
%=		2.5
N=		762
	Change	----
%=		92.3
N=		43
	Not Ascertainable	----
%=		5.2
N=		5
	Gemeinschaft	----
%=		0.6
N=		20
	Gesellschaft	----
%=		2.4
N=		801
	Not Ascertainable	----
%=		97.0
N=		582
	Adaptation	----
%=		70.5
N=		50
	Goal Attainment	----
%=		6.1
N=		171
	Integration	----
%=		20.7
N=		15
	Pattern Maintenance	----
%=		1.8
N=		8
	Not Ascertainable	----
%=		1.0

change-orientation while 21 (2.5 per cent) sought maintenance and 43 (5.2 per cent) were not ascertainable. The implications of this finding can be regarded not only as a judgment of the status quo, but also as an indication of the value given by planners to present procedural and structural arrangements vis-à-vis the overall goal of development. In either case, the utility of current conditions is deemed very low by those who draw up the planning documents. This pattern, if further substantiated by the Image's structure and strength factors, will seemingly limit the planner's ability to perceive and make use of those aspects of the status quo which might aid in the development process. Instead, the present situation is regarded as an obstacle to overcome, not as a means toward the end of development.

The inability of the thematic analysis to ascertain an explicit Gemeinschaft or Gesellschaft orientation for Third World planning in 97 per cent of the cases can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, one may regard this as a sign of indifference on the part of planners as to the type of society which is being aimed for development plan documents. Secondly, the lack of such explicitness might be seen as a sign that the aim of plans vis-à-vis development and future social relationships is taken for granted by those who design the official national development strategies. While either of

TABLE 11
CROSS-TABULATION OF PLANNING THEMES

	Gemeinschaft	Gesellschaft	Not Ascertainable	
<u>Functional Subsystem: Adaptation</u>				
Maintenance	0	0	12	=N
	0.0	0.0	1.45	=%
Change	2	12	537	=N
	0.24	1.45	65.01	=%
Not	0	2	17	=N
Ascertainable	0.0	0.24	2.05	=%
<u>Functional Subsystem: Goal Attainment</u>				
Maintenance	0	0	5	=N
	0.0	0.0	0.60	=%
Change	1	0	37	=N
	0.12	0.0	4.47	=%
Not	1	0	6	=N
Ascertainable	0.12	0.0	0.72	=%
<u>Functional Subsystem: Integration</u>				
Maintenance	0	0	4	=N
	0.0	0.0	0.48	=%
Change	0	2	150	=N
	0.0	0.24	18.07	=%
Not	1	0	14	=N
Ascertainable	0.12	0.0	1.69	=%
<u>Functional Subsystem: Pattern Maintenance</u>				
Maintenance	0	0	0	=N
	0.0	0.0	0.0	=%
Change	0	0	14	=N
	0.0	0.0	1.69	=%
Not	0	0	1	=N
Ascertainable	0.0	0.0	0.12	=%
<u>Functional Subsystem: Not Ascertainable</u>				
Maintenance	0	0	0	=N
	0.0	0.0	0.0	=%
Change	0	0	3	=N
	0.0	0.0	0.36	=%
Not	0	4	1	=N
Ascertainable	0.0	0.48	0.12	=%

these views can be deduced from the analysis, it is from other indirect means (discussed in the next section) that the more certain alternative becomes obvious as an explanation of the Image's content.

In regard to the functional subsystem deemed most relevant for development in the planner's Image, the analysis points to adaptation first (70.5 per cent) with integration running a poor second (20.7 per cent). Interpreted in more common terms, these findings imply that development planners in the Third World regard the economic realm as the signal one. The condition of underdevelopment seems to be defined economically since actions to facilitate development are obviously economic in nature. The secondary emphasis on integrative (i.e., distributive) functions implies that adjustments in social structures and interrelationships are also sought by development planners. The low incidence of cases involving political (goal attainment) and culture/value-system (pattern maintenance) orientations reflects as much about the planner's Image as the more frequent occurrence of the other subsystem concentrations. Interpretations of these results will be discussed below after other indirect sources are explored.

Table 11 gives still another perspective on the results of this content analysis. Through a cross-tabulation of the

findings, it becomes evident how frequent the dominant themes occur together. In 65 per cent of the observations the orientation was "change/not ascertainable/adaptation" in structure. The second highest relative frequency proved to be "change/not ascertainable/integration" in nature (18 per cent). All other combinations of the three dimensions occurred in less than 3 per cent of the observations each. Again, comment as to the meaning of these findings must await further consideration of other indirect evidence pertaining to the planner's Image content.

B. The Development Planners: An Analysis of Interviews

While plagued by as many research technique problems as the content analysis, the Ilchman, Ilchman, and Hastings study does complement the study summarized in section A. The belief patterns of the sample, for instance, showed a distinct "common ideology of economic development." For those middle-range planners, modernization and industrialization were the major components of their ideology with 94 per cent of the sample finding modernization to be desirable and 100 per cent regarding industrialization with favor. Few among those interviewed felt that the cost of obtaining such goals was high enough to warrant any reduction of efforts in those directions.¹

¹Ilchman, Ilchman, and Hastings, p. 13.

What did "modernization" mean to the sample? The Ilchman group found that the emphasis was upon materialistic attributes of modernity, not the characteristics of "self-realization" or "self-determination" to which some analysts adhere.² Only eighteen per cent of the sample seemed to equate modernization with "Westernization," while 61 per cent did overtly reject the association. That finding was somewhat qualified as the interviewees associated modernization with the attributes of individualism, materialism, capitalism, etc.--attributes which the Ilchman group perceived as "Western" in nature.³ As for "industrialization," the planners considered it to be an aspect of modernization which entailed specific changes in skills, values, and the rural-urban distribution of population.⁴

Analyzing these results in terms of the three-dimensional Image outlined previously, the following interpretations may be made. First, the stress on materialistic ends correlates positively with the adaptation-oriented content uncovered during

²The self-realization and self-determination perspectives on modernization are exemplified by Henry S. Kariel, "Goals for Administrative Reform in Developing States: An Open-Ended Design," ed. Braibanti, pp. 141-165; and Denis Goulet, The Cruel Choice: A New Concept in the Theory of Development (New York: Atheneum, 1973). See Ilchman, Ilchman, and Hastings, pp. 15-17.

³Ilchman, Ilchman, and Hastings, pp. 16-17.

⁴Ilchman, Ilchman, and Hastings, p. 17.

the thematic analysis. Both findings describe an Image content that places much emphasis upon economic growth. Second, the Ilchman study reveals some societal characteristics which the planners deem desirable. While somewhat reluctant to admit to the objective of "Westernization," the sampled planners did show a strong desire for social relationships which are closely associated with the Gesellschaft ideal. Third, the high desirability of industrialization and the adjustments it called for indicate support for Gesellschaft society and the changes necessary in order to bring it about. For these experts industrialization meant a process of change--a process which would eliminate present obstacles to modernization. Other responses in the survey seemed to further substantiate this conclusion.

For example, when inquiring into the perception of "impediments" to development, the Ilchman group found that 82 per cent of the sample regarded internal factors as constraining while 18 per cent noted external obstacles. Of the internal impediments, traditional values (especially ascriptive familial attitudes--a basic characteristic of Gemeinschaft structures) were considered as the most prominent. Structural economic constraints and political/administrative obstacles were noted as impediments by 36 and 39 percent, respectively;

yet 57 per cent of the surveyed planners felt that they must content with an unsympathetic population whose cultural qualities were the greatest barriers of all. Therefore, the primary goal of planning was seen as the "revolutionary transformation" of those cultural variables which tended to cripple development efforts.⁵

The implications of these findings are twofold. First, these planners did have an image of the type of society which they were not desirous of--a society wherein Gemeinschaft relationships tended to dominate. The salience of "traditional values" and "ascriptive" attitudes was not regarded as the raw material from which a future must be formed. Rather, those attributes were viewed as constraints to efforts at development. The basic task was, seemingly, to eliminate the impact of those constraining factors by changing societal conditions from the Gemeinschaft-type to those more characteristic of "modern" Gesellschaft-types.

The second implication of these latter results is that the change toward Gesellschaft was to be accomplished through value-system, i.e., pattern maintenance subsystem. This conclusion was a misleading one, however, in light of the answers

⁵ Ilchman, Ilchman, and Hastings, pp. 18-22.

given by the sample to questions concerning more "practical matters." In the first place, the planners' desires for "revolutionary" transformations seemed more rhetorical than real as only 57 per cent favored "programmatic" action on the part of government. Even more surprising was the fact that only 23 per cent of the sample backed "comprehensive" efforts at development planning--something that would seem essential if one desired to accomplish a revolutionary transformation through planning. A second point was the fact that while the desired transformation seemed centered on the pattern maintenance subsystem, the specific strategies given primacy by the planners centered on the economic (adaptation) sectors. It was as if the Image, in its practical manifestations, was governed by an economic determinism which regarded the key to cultural change to be economic in nature.⁶ Perhaps this approach and its inherent contradiction can be rationalized in terms of long- versus short-range goals whereby the planners justify an immediate concern with economic growth and economic infrastructures as the first steps on the road to value and attitude change. This explanation, however, does little more than attempt to justify the adaptation emphasis of the planner's Image.

⁶See Ilchman, Ilchman, and Hastings, pp. 31-32.

Still further evidence in terms of the Gesellschaft and adaptation biases of the planner's Image may be uncovered in the Ilchman study. For instance, the interviewees were asked to name those countries which they look to as "models" of development.⁷ Some 30 per cent regarded Japan as a good example while 27 per cent took Western Europe as their ideal. An additional 27 per cent looked to the United States as a model to copy. Other developing societies such as Yugoslavia, Israel and Egypt were the source of inspiration for 18 per cent of the sample while an equivalent per cent considered "no country" as worthy of their designation. Six percent noted that the Communist World offered them a good example to follow. Finally, 12 per cent stated that their model for development consisted of the "best" from all nations. When asked as to why they selected models in the manner they did, over half of the sample failed to respond. Of the balance, most felt that the level of industrialization reached by the model they named made them worthy of designation. Historical reasons and the cultural/economic similarity of the model to their own country was noted as well.⁸

⁷Once again, it must be emphasized that those surveyed were guests of the United States at the time of the interviews. One should therefore exercise caution in interpreting the results.

⁸See Ilchman, Ilchman, and Hastings, pp. 40-41; and Ilchman, p. 504.

From previous evidence, interpretations of the models selected are made somewhat easier. The adoption of Japan can hardly be considered as based on historical or cultural/economic similarities. Rather, Japan offers a model which reflects a rapid and successful attempt at catching-up with the West. Even more important, the modernization of Japan represents an economic and cultural change which most planners seem to see as necessary for the goal of development. Japan can be used to show that what planners attempt can be accomplished. The idea that unique historical, cultural and economic conditions led to that modernization does not seem to have influenced at least 30 per cent of the sample. The same seems to hold true for the selection of the United States and Western Europe as models for development planning. More important than the process and means of their modernization is the fact that all three of the primary choices involved models that can be classified as Gesellschaft societies characterized by a high degree of economic development. What the Japanese, the U.S. and Western Europe have accomplished is more important for these planners than how!

All things considered in regard to the Ilchman study, the results do tend to substantiate the findings of the content analysis in terms of at least two dimensions while clarifying

the meaning of the third. The emphasis upon change and adaptation seems to hold, even in light of some seemingly contrary evidence. The ambiguity of the Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft dimension was clarified to the extent that the Ilchman study shows the planners to be desirous of a Gesellschaft-type of society. What goes unstated within planning documents is a pro-Gesellschaft orientation which is, in a sense, taken for granted.

C. The Literature of Development: A Search for Themes

A familiarity with the writings of development planning experts has the impact of both clarification and confusion for a person seeking to uncover the Image content of planners. The clarity results from the strong emphasis upon the general themes which have already been established in the present chapter. The confusion results from the multitude of forms which each of those themes tends to take.

The adaptation/economic bias of development planning is perhaps most obvious in the literature. For many, it is evident that planning professionals are economists by definition: planning journals are economic journals; planning conferences are attended by economists; university programs in development planning are programs in economics, etc. The fields of development planning and economics are as one. For example, C. J. Martin remarked that all who attended the conference on the

crisis of planning at the University of Sussex in England were economists.⁹ The end result was bound to be an emphasis upon adaptation goals and how the conferees could better facilitate their achievement. If a concern with politics, social welfare or culture developed, it would more than likely have been in terms of how adjustments in the latter three areas could aid in building a more efficient economic infrastructure or increasing the rate of economic growth.

As will be shown in the next two chapters, economics permeates the literature of planning from top to bottom--from the past to the present. Not only is it present in every plan in its many varied forms,¹⁰ but it also is primary in every text on the subject from the most proselytizing to the most critical.¹¹

⁹See Martin.

¹⁰Not only was this evidenced in the content analysis in the present chapter, but also in one of the more important works on development planning by Albert Waterston. Having accomplished a comparative survey of over 100 plans for the World Bank, Waterston concluded that development planning has the expressed or implied aims of "accelerated economic growth and structural change." He then proceeds to qualify that statement by noting that the concern for structural change, while varying from society to society, is in most instances little more than of the "lip service" variety intended to fulfill constitutional and political demands. See Waterston, pp. 17-20, 145.

¹¹See the summary of the theory of contemporary development in Chapter IV. What is even more curious is the fact that the critical texts on development planning do not break with the concentration upon economic objectives. See Paul Streeten, The Frontiers of Development Studies (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1972); and P. T. Bauer, Dissent on Development: Studies and Debates in Development Economics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972).

The Gesellschaft bias is inherent in these same works, but even more so in the work of those who deal with the social prerequisites to the development. A number of these have already been exemplified in Chapter I. Typical of this group--and perhaps most used--is the work of David C. McClelland whose The Achieving Society has gained reknown for its insights into the development process. Assumed by McClelland and others is the objective of development which can be seen only in Gesellschaft terms. This is clearest where he recommends actions that must be taken in order to promote development. First, he suggests that a respect for the "impersonal other" must be fostered. How? "The very first step is to recognize that traditional norms must give way to new ones. . . ."

The point is that if the people want the benefits of the advanced material culture of modern civilization--which they do whenever they come in contact with it, and such contact is inevitable--then they must accept many of the values and other culture patterns which support such a civilization.¹²

Increasing achievement, decreasing father-dominance, etc., are also added to the list of things to do, the end result being the same: a Gesellschaft-type of society.

¹²David C. McClelland, The Achieving Society (New York: The Free Press, 1961), pp. 394-403; emphasis in original.

The change-orientation is implied in the same writings as the assumption is made that underdevelopment is a manifestation of traditionalism, i.e., Gemeinschaft society. Not being "modern" is equated with not having the type of society which "advanced" cultures do--it means "backwardness" rather than "progressiveness." Development means change from the backward state to a "developed" one. Things must change in order for this to occur. In the literature of development planning there is little arguing on this point.

With all this agreement, where would the confusion enter? The literature of planning shows a trend over the years--a trend leading to more and more critical debate over some extremely important issues. The number of approaches to the problem of developmental proliferation as increasingly more obstacles were met on the planning path.¹³ The result was (and is) the blossoming of several schools of thought on development, each with its own variation of the same basic theme: change-Gesellschaft-adaptation. One might expect such confusion to lead to what Kuhn might call a "paradigm revolution." This was not the case as the planner's Image structure kept the intent intact. That, however, is the subject of the next chapter.

¹³See Chapter IV.

D. Conclusion

It is not surprising that any specific Image is biased in terms of its content. The very concept of Image content is defined in a negative way which points to the importance of what the content is not. In that sense, the bias is necessary. In accord with the first hypothesis discussed in Chapter II, however, there are limits to how biased the Image content may be before it adversely affects the Image's usefulness. This is not to say that a high degree of bias in the content will be the sufficient cause of planning ineffectiveness. Rather, it is to note that a bias as frequent in its occurrence as that discussed in the present chapter can only favor the inflexibility of an Image. Other factors, such as Image structure and strength, the messages from the environment, and so on, will determine the impact of the Image content--just as the content will influence the impact of those other factors.

CHAPTER IV

THE STRUCTURE OF THE PLANNER'S IMAGE

As noted in Chapter II, "any Image which is to make itself felt in the task environment must structure itself in a fashion that will permit the content to interact with salient circumstances. Lacking such a structure, the Image will prove to be useless in aiding the Image-holder in his or her relationships with that environment." In addition, and perhaps more relevant to the present work, is the fact that inappropriate structures will not survive in the long run. An Image structure which fails to perceive or respond to the conditions of its surroundings will eventually be discarded for one which facilitates suitable conceptualization and fitting actions. Having taken note of the dominant planner's Image in terms of content, the next concern is with the structure of that Image. While the narrowness of scope in that Image content is obvious, one might argue that this drawback can be offset by an openness in Image structure which tends to increase the Image's flexibility vis-à-vis environmental changes, variations in developmental problems, etc. In light of that contention, the primary questions of the present

chapter are: What is the structure of the dominant planner's Image of today? Does this structure add to or subtract from the flexibility of that Image?

A. The Logic of Economic Growth and Social Change

What is being sought here is the structure of the planner's Image in terms of its "logic." The terms "structure" and "logic" are used synonymously in this regard because Image structure, rather than being a static configuration, is a way of reasoning vis-à-vis the ever-fluctuating task environment. Besides giving the analyst a clearer perspective on the Image structure, this equating of structure with logic also permits one to uncover the Image structure through historical analyses.

Having noted the "change-Gesellschaft-economics" bias of Image content, one may instigate an examination of the reasoning behind that bias. Where to look? The indications of the planning literature are that planning expertise is economic in nature; that is, the development planner is an economist by training and orientation. The reasoning used in planning has manifested itself over the years in economic literature as well as various governmental documents. By reviewing the trends of the reasoning found in such sources over a number of years, one may obtain a picture of the logic

being used by planning experts. It is in this manner that we will attempt to uncover the Image structure dominant among Third World planners since World War II.

The point of departure for this analysis will be decades of the 1930's and 1940's.¹ The key event during this period was, of course, the Great Depression. This crisis, perceived in almost purely economic terms, caused what J. P. Nettl and Roland Robertson have termed an "international trauma." Among the groups most influenced by this event were social analysts and political leaders. The harshness of the Depression was not so much financial as psychological for these groups. Both found themselves helpless--the social analyst because of his lack of a relevant theory upon which to base policy suggestions and the political leader because of the lack of advice from those analysts. In response to this situation there occurred what might be termed a "scientific revolution." That is, the dominant paradigm among social scientists (especially economists) gave way to a newer paradigm which, it was felt, would suffice to meet the needs of a society plagued by Depression and in need of political and expert guidance. This paradigm change brought about the acceptance of planning and similar

¹This "point of departure" should not be mistaken as a judgment on the part of the present writer that planning did not occur prior to those dates. See Chapter V, below, for a brief statement on planning prior to the Depression

policies as tools to be used on a national level. Nettl and Robertson summarize the situation as follows:

The failure of economics to explain--and still less to cope with--the period of depression . . . led not to the dislodging of economics as the most useful social science . . . but rather to a reorientation of economics itself, a search for a new theory. Keynes and post-Keynesians offered practical solutions which would prevent a recurrence of the disaster of the early nineteen-thirties. Probably one of the major points of significance about the Keynesian revolution . . . was that it brought an interventionist meta-economic principle to the forefront of economic analysis, so pushing the previously dominant necessitarian principle to the background.²

The Keynesian revolution involved the replacement of the more pessimistic "dismal" outlook of economics with a new, more optimistic regard for man's capacity to manipulate the economy and other aspects of society for his own ends. In short, it was the Keynesian challenge to classical and neo-classical economics which seemed to turn the tide for advocates of planning.

One commonly associates the phrase "dismal science" with the discipline of economics because of the heritage of that social science in the "classical" school of thought. In its varying forms from the classical period of Smith, Ricardo and Malthus through to the first decades of the twentieth

²J. P. Nettl and Roland Robertson, International Systems and the Modernization of Societies: The Formation of National Goals and Attitudes (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1968), p. 28, emphasis in original.

century, economics perceived social life from the perspective of the infamous "S-curve." In the S-curve paradigm, social life was dominated by two developmental trends. The first of those trends was "optimistic" in that underdeveloped societies were regarded as having a relatively bright economic future given sufficient or optimal conditions. The second trend manifested a pessimistic preview for those societies which have developed to their respective capacities and were about to contend with such problems as "diminishing returns," and the like. Hans Singer has summarized these trends as "U-optimism" and "D-pessimism" respectively.³

The Keynesian school of economic thought seemed to reverse this "dismal" outlook for the future--at least so far as developed societies were concerned. In the more traditional schools of thought, capitalist societies seemed destined for "secular stagnation." Keynes (and those who modified his theory during the 1930's and 1940's) did not bother to argue with that gloomy forecast. However, within the economic theory which he outlined there was some degree of hope for mankind's cultivation of steady and continuous economic growth. Seemingly all that was necessary was for men to develop the will and capability to deviate from the traditional market situation.

³H[ans] Singer, International Development: Growth and Change (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1964), pp. 3-6.

The [Keynesian] formula shrugged off the burden of traditional assumptions. When inventions, discoveries and improvements in transport open up new sources of raw materials sufficiently fast, there are no diminishing returns. . . . Taking off traditional blinders, we have wider fields to survey.⁴

From this Keynesian perspective planners obtained acceptable foundations upon which to base their claims that man is capable of manipulating and changing social conditions. It was no longer "utopian" to manipulate variables for the purpose of helping a society grow, or expand, or otherwise improve.⁵ It was not surprising, in this sense, to find that variations of the Keynesian model formed the basis of national development planning theories

One variant of the Keynesian model which was held to be of particular importance in this respect was the Harrod-Domar model. Its name is derived from the names of two economists whose similar approaches were explicated at about the same time during the early 1940's. While the work of M.I.T.'s E. F. Domar overlapped with that of Oxford's R. F. Harrod, it is the latter's work which will be used in the following discussion. (Not only is Harrod's version noted

⁴ Joan Robinson, Economic Philosophy (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1962), pp. 106-107.

⁵ For an example of how this attitude influenced social analysts other than economists, see Robert S. Lynd, Knowledge for What? The Place of Social Science in American Culture (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1939 and 1964).

by most sources as more relevant to the problems of Third World development, but it also has proven easier to use for heuristic purposes.) Both versions, however, are similar enough to suffer from the same problem in regard to their utility for development planning; that is, while both have shown themselves to be valuable as descriptions and explanations (on an abstract level), each fails to present planners and policymakers with those concrete causal relationships which are essential ingredients in the decision-making process. Successful policymaking to effect some change in society necessarily demands that the decision-maker be conscious of the causal relationships which surround and compose the task environment. Social models which guide social policy should be as clear as possible in this respect even though it is assumed that total knowledge is impossible.

Harrod's model can be explained in terms of three sets of growth rates, each a possible basis for economic expansion and growth.⁶ First, there is the actual rate of growth which reflects an empirically derivable fact. Second, each economy has a natural or potential growth rate. This rate is determined by the objective conditions present in a society at any

⁶ Most of the following discussion is taken from Benjamin Higgins, Economic Development: Problems, Principles, and Policies, revised edition (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1968), chapter 6.

particular time. Finally, there is a warranted rate of growth which Harrod defined as that change in income which barely satisfies entrepreneurs, i.e., investors. This growth rate is, in simple terms, subjective in nature and, as such, is determined by a number of factors in the environment. Of the three growth rates, it is the "warranted" rate which holds the key to obtaining a steady rate of actual growth, the only limitations being those imposed by natural bounds. The complexity of the interrelationships among the three growth rates is notable, however, in the fact that the warranted rate of growth is determined, in part, by the actual and potential rates. But all in all, the primary concern of planners and policymakers must be on those factors which are held to determine the warranted growth rate.⁷

Having shown this to be the case, the next question--and a critical one for the logic of the planner's Image--is: what are those concrete determinants of the warranted rate of growth? This has been the problem for planners; and none of the answers that have been offered in this regard have been held as sufficient by all planning experts. According to Joan Robinson,

To understand the motives for investment, we have to understand human nature and the manner in which it reacts

⁷See Appendix B for a brief summary of the Harrod-Domar model in more detail.

to the various kinds of social and economic systems on which it has to operate. We have not got far enough yet to put it into algebra.⁸

The logic of the planner's Image since World War II is manifested in the numerous attempts on the part of planners and planning advisors to "understand" human nature and develop an algebraic capacity so as to facilitate manipulation. In a sense, all the Harrod-Domar model did was create a vast vacuum within which specific "formulae" were to be debated.

This debate became more and more relevant for the Third World as the Keynesian school turned its attention to the problems of developing societies. Albert Hirschman, noting the irony of this occurrence, pointed out that the Harrod-Domar model was created primarily

to illuminate a condition which had been thought to be threatening the advanced industrial countries--secular stagnation--but which during the postwar period has been one of the few worries from which we have been entirely free. Being thus relatively under-utilized the newly perfected models were employed in a setting quite different from the one for which they were designed.⁹

The result of this application to the Third World situation of a model intended for the developed World's advancement was a truly "dismal" picture. Using Hans Singer's categories, what

⁸Joan Robinson, p. 109.

⁹Albert O. Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1958), p. 31.

had previously been a situation of U-optimism and D-pessimism now became D-optimism and U-pessimism. Under the Harrod-Domar model, for example, any path the underdeveloped world would take in regard to the warranted rate of growth results in insufficient growth and/or an overabundance of inflationary pressures.¹⁰ In short, planners, given some foundation for action in the developed world, were faced with an overwhelming challenge in regard to their work among developing nations. The result was a proliferation of variants to the economic growth model during the 1950's as many planning experts attempted to fill the Harrod-Domar vacuum.

It was those discussions and debates of the 1950's which formed the core of the planner's *Image vis-à-vis* structure. Working off the Harrod-Domar model, the assumed concern at the outset was development through a process of economic growth at levels sufficient enough to eventually enable "beneficiaries" to live a "good life"--that is, a life style equivalent to that of the "advanced" or "developed" world. Gesellschaft social relationships were the implicit goals, while the explicit desire was for an accelerated economic growth through a modern (i.e., industrialized) economic infrastructure.

¹⁰ See Higgins, pp. 113-117; Singer, pp. 6-14.

Development thereby became a complex problem involving the manipulation of production rather than social, cultural, or political variables. What was made important in this manipulation was the search for what Hirschman has termed the primum mobile--the primary cause. What, in a concrete rather than theoretical sense, must be present in order for the necessary economic growth to take place? That was the question inherent in this search.

The basic formula for economic output sufficed to offer a number of candidates for the primum mobile. In that formula, in its simplest form, output was a function of labor force, capital stock, the supply of known resources, and level of technology factors [$O=(L,K,Q,T)$]. Such factors, either individually or clustered into various aggregate forms, presented planners with a number of alternative "causes," each reflected in a particular policy suggestion.

The first and simplest type of problem statement concerned the lack or oversupply of some specific production factor. Suggested policy solutions amounted to calls for the increase or decrease in the volume of the factor in question. For example, in some early plans development policy became a matter of controlling population growth and movement; or there were those plans which regarded an increase in the capacity for capital formation as the key to economic growth and development.

A second form of the problem was defined at a more complex level. Taking their cues from the classical and neo-classical schools of economics, many planners sought the optimalization of two or more production factors. The dilemma of developing societies was regarded not so much as a result of a lack or oversupply of a certain factor; rather, it was the imperfection of factor interrelationships which was continually feeding underdevelopment. Determining the "optimal" combination of production factors was regarded as the primary step for policy-making in the Third World. Increasing the supply of capital or the size of the potential or present labor force means little unless the new combination of factors was correct.

To the extent that resources have remained undeveloped because of underutilization or misutilization of resources, it follows that fuller utilization and a more efficient allocation of resources might allow a poor country to approach its productive potential more closely. A different combination of factors could increase real income.¹¹

By increasing resource and factor mobility as well as market "perfection," underdevelopment could be overcome. How was this best accomplished? Mainly this was done through the use of a relatively free market economy under the conditions of relatively

¹¹Gerald M. Meier and Robert E. Baldwin, Economic Development: Theory, History, Policy (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1957), p. 317.

perfect competition. How does planning fit into this strategy? Hla Myint, one of the leading spokesman for this "neo-classical" approach, notes that this attack on underdevelopment is not necessarily laissez-faire; nor is it an advocacy of Western-type capitalism. Instead it regards the market mechanism as a basic tool for attaining economic growth--a tool which can be extended and adapted to relevant circumstances through planning and other government policies.¹²

A third approach to the problem is that known as the "vicious circle" thesis. While not denying the validity of the previous arguments, those who advocate this third definition of the dilemma of underdevelopment are quick to note that moves to overcome the lack (or oversupply) of a particular factor or the imperfection of the market involve "not only initial results but also both favorable and unfavorable secondary repercussions." It was all too often recorded how policies created negative as well as positive results. Furthermore, such records also contained many examples of how the unfavorable "swamped" the favorable results. The frequency of this occurrence led one United Nations agency to remark on the problem as it manifested itself in one specific area.

¹² Hla Myint, Economic Theory and the Underdeveloped Countries (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 20-21.

Expenditures to improve standards of health and thus to increase life span can have quite major benefits in terms of increased efficiency of the working force as well as greatly improving the quality of life of the individual. . . . Unfortunately, this favorable effect is often "swamped" by the rise in population which occurs when death rates fall. Similarly, decreases in infant mortality have a favorable effect on the social fabric of the society but are likely to add to the load of dependency which the family and the society must carry in the developing country.¹³

The theoretical rationalization for this argument was a causal hypothesis that regarded the obstacles to development as so interrelated that any effort in a positive direction will be offset by forces working in the opposite direction. Gerald Meier and Robert Baldwin summarized this "vicious circle" argument in its three basic forms in a diagram reproduced in Figure 8.

Each number in that illustration represents the starting point for each of three widely accepted versions of the vicious circle theory. Argument (1), for example, emphasizes the fact that the total productive output of the system is low at the outset. The resulting low productivity brings about low real income for the labor force which, in turn, produces low levels of savings and demand. This leads to low investment due to a deficiency of capital--a market imperfection which is

¹³United Nations, Freedom from Hunger Campaign (F.A.O.), Basic Study No. 13: National Development Efforts (n.p., United Nations Office of Public Information, n.d.), p. 21.




Fig. 8. The vicious circles of underdevelopment.

Source: Gerald M. Meier and Robert E. Baldwin, Economic Development: Theory, History, Policy (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1957), p. 30.

magnified by the lack of other production factors. The overall result: low productivity which forms the first step in the continuing circular path.

Arguments (2) and (3) rely on the same or similar factors as found in (1), the difference being that each emphasizes a different point of departure--that is, a different primum mobile. The root of vicious circle (2) was the low level of demand real income; while the source of path (3) was to be found in underdeveloped resources and/or the backwardness of the populace.¹⁴

The policies advocated as a result of this third approach supplied the planning debate with its most controversial topic. How does one go about breaking the vicious circle? Myint has remarked that the policy recommendations which followed were "all-or-nothing" solutions to development, and these took two general forms. First, there was the "critical minimum effort" strategy which sought to break through the low level equilibrium of the productive factors. Second, and more widely accepted among planning experts, was the "balanced growth" strategy that took a number of forms itself.¹⁵

Two problems with this latter approach need to be mentioned in regard to those policies and their theoretical foundations. In the first place, the vicious circle approach

¹⁴Meier and Baldwin, pp. 319-320.

¹⁵See Hla Myint, The Economics of Developing Countries (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1964), chapters 7-8.

offered too many answers for the question of primum mobile. Selecting one version over others would mean that one is taking a greater risk than might be reasonable in light of the facts supporting opposing approaches. Secondly, the resulting strategies are marked for failure in light of the assumptions made about the subject society. Warren Ilchman and Ravindra Bhargava, for instance, have noted that policies advocated to break the vicious circle such as those of balanced growth assume (a) some authority capable of planning and implementation, (b) a ruling political elite with considerable unanimity of purpose and a basic agreement on means, (c) a supportive political system, and (d) a capable administrative system. Certainly the number of developing societies which can meet these prerequisites are very limited. Where one or several of these conditions were absent one is again faced with the vacuum of the Harrod-Domar model.¹⁶

A fourth causal relationship hypothesized by a number of planning experts as the primum mobile in development finds its basis in the international context of which Third World societies themselves are a part. According to this group of experts, underdevelopment is perpetuated by international forces

¹⁶ See Warren F. Ilchman and Ravindra C. Bhargava, "Balanced Thought and Economic Growth," Economic Development and Cultural Change, 14 (July 1966): 385-399.

which overwhelm any advance made by national planners toward internally oriented development. For example, dual economies were determined to be a product of the pressure for economic relations brought on by colonialism and neo-colonialism in the Third World. As colonies were forced into the world market, an export sector was created within their economy where no sector existed before. They were structured above and separated from non-exporting sectors which were allowed to stagnate or deteriorate without much regard from the ruling elite. Moreover, the exporting sector was developed through foreign investment for the purpose of benefiting investors in the colonizing country rather than the domestic populace. Adding to this condition of exploitation was the "world market" itself which, in recent decades, has tended to function to the detriment of the developing world's economies. In light of this hypothesis, certain analysts have advocated policies aimed at limiting the role and impact of international forces in the Third World while expanding the influence of indigenous forces.¹⁷

¹⁷See Meier and Baldwin, pp. 324-333; Myint, 1964, chapters 2-5, 9; and Susanne J. Bodenheimer, "The Ideology of Developmentalism: The American Paradigm-Surrogate for Latin American Studies," Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics, 2 (1971), especially pp. 36-40; also various articles and books by A. G. Frank, such as Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), especially pp. 3-78; and Paul A. Baran, The Political Economy of Growth (New York: Modern Reader Paperbacks, 1957), especially chapters 6-7.

As the debate continued, a crisis developed within the planning profession which seemed to create a major change in the planner's Image. Perhaps the first hint of change came from the increased acceptance of development theories which were not solely economic in nature, but also showed the increased awareness of the role played by sociological and psychological factors in the development process. By the second half of the 1960's, development planners seemed convinced that societal factors were the major obstacles to their efforts. Out of this growing awareness there developed a fifth hypothesis which, while giving the impression that the planner's Image had changed in both content and structure, really indicated that the Image structure had carried the logic of the Image through its next step.

As late as 1962 the United Nations program for the Development Decade was emphasizing that a "true development plan" was a document which presented an "action programme for the public and private sectors of the economy. . . ." The objective of national development planning was to

. . . accelerate progress towards self-sustaining growth of the economy of the individual nations and their social advancement so as to attain in each underdeveloped country a substantial increase in the rate of growth, with each country setting its own target, taking as the objective

a minimum rate of growth of aggregate national income of 5 per cent at the end of the Decade.¹⁸

Yet several years later, as the debate over the Second Development Decade took form, a different tone was heard.

Early confidence that economic growth would, of its own accord, lead more or less automatically to social progress (at least in terms of better material living conditions for the majority of the population) has been widely belied by events in the developing areas. Even in low income countries that have achieved rapid rates of economic growth, there has been a tendency for levels of living to remain static or, in some respects, actually to decline so far as the bulk of the population is concerned.¹⁹

An exaggeration of the economic factors seemed to give way to a greater concern for non-economic factors. "After 1964 the thinking became less confident," notes Ronald Robinson. "Focus shifted from the economic means of growth to the non-economic obstacles encountered by them."²⁰

The quality of that change, however, was not as massive as might have been perceived at first blush. Rather than manifesting a break with the economically oriented Harrod-Domar

¹⁸United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, The United Nations Development Decade, Proposals for Action: Report of the Secretary-General (New York: United Nations, 1962), p. 7.

¹⁹United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, International Social Development Review, No. 3, p. 2.

²⁰Ronald Robinson, "Practical Politics of Economic Development," Developing the Third World: The Experience of the Nineteen-Sixties (Cambridge: The University Press, 1971), p. 5.

model, this new concern for non-economic factors was a logical extension of the search for the primum mobile. As one U.N. research team has noted, development theory today "is much preoccupied with the role of 'social factors' as inputs or prerequisites for economic growth. It is widely believed that neglect of these factors has been a reason for disappointing rates of economic growth."²¹ What seems at first to be a fresh approach is, in the end, only an extension of the dominant Image. Changing social conditions--shifting from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft relationships--is not a goal in itself; it is rather the means to the ultimate end of economic growth. This is evident in the program for the Second Development Decade which was issued by the U.N. General Assembly at the end of the sixties. For all the concentrated effort given to adjusting social conditions, the primary purpose for that program was the attainment of an "annual rate of growth in the gross product of the developing countries as a whole . . . [of] at least 6 per cent. . . ."²² It seemed to be a matter of

²¹Nancy Baster and Wolf Scott, Levels of Living and Economic Growth: A Comparative Study of Six Countries, 1950-1968 (Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, June 1969), p. xi; emphasis added.

²²United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, International Development Strategy: Action Programme of the General Assembly for the Second Development Decade (New York: United Nations, 1970), pp. 3-5.

determining which of the non-economic variables are actually production factors that function to influence and/or control economic output and growth.²³ Thus, the search for the primum mobile is currently focusing upon the social conditions which may lead to economic growth. It is a step which further reflects the history of the dominant Image's structure, a structure that proceeds in one direction and with a single purpose to fulfill prior to and above all others.

B. Conclusions

What conclusions may one derive from this analysis about the structure of the planner's Image?

First, it is obvious that the Image's content has taken a form wherein the adaptation theme of the Image is the primary concern of the planner. An economic determinism seems to permeate the theory of development in Third World planning today while the Gesellschaft and "change" themes are regarded as obvious "givens" which planners consider to be "understood" by all concerned. Economic growth is seen as the

²³One must take care not to misinterpret this consideration of social factors as something recent for economists. Any perusal of economic theory--from Adam Smith to the present--will show how prominent a factor non-economic features were since the eighteenth century. For instance, see Irma Adelman, Theories of Economic Growth and Development (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961). What is being examined here is a particular form of economic theory which is used by development planners in the contemporary Third World. Their concern for the social factors is a relatively recent event.

key to achieving "modernity." It is also the main factor in the process which will convert the subject society from its current "backwardness" to a more "progressive" form. The layman may dream of how things will be in the future and what must change for that better future to be reached. In the "real world" of the planner's task environment, one takes those goals and methods for granted while emphasizing the necessary adjustments in the adaptation/economic subsystem. For the planner, there is no discussion of what the future holds in store for a "developed" society; nor is it necessary to challenge that orientation which totally devalues attempts to maintain current structures and processes. The only controversy allowed within the current Image's structure is that which argues various alternatives for the primum mobile. This is the implication of the planner's Image structure as traced in the previous section.

Second, and somewhat less obvious, is the nature of the formulae used as a foundation for the Image's structure. The internal nature of an Image structure determines, to a large degree, how the task environment will or will not be perceived. One important characteristic to consider is the Image's openness in its structure to messages which would do more than just substantiate its predominant features. An open and flexible Image is one which receives contradictory and varying messages

and accepts their implications without being destroyed. A closed Image rejects such message variations or adjusts their meanings to a form which will not endanger current perceptions. The question becomes: How open is the dominant planner's Image? The answer lies in the field of economics as well as in the formulae themselves.

The fundamental equation used as a basis for the planner's Image structure is as old as classical economics itself. As such, it obtains its justification (in terms of form) from the scientific perspectives which greatly influenced its creators, i.e., Adam Smith, David Ricardo, etc. The scientific ideal of that period was set by Newtonian mechanics. A prime characteristic of that paradigm was its claim to completeness. In terms of the mechanical world, this meant that the

motions of matter are predictable, with arbitrary accuracy, in terms of the generic laws of motion and the particular state of affairs to which the laws apply. The forces that link the motions of one part of a system to those of another are, in turn, completely determined by those parts and their motions. Thus there is a closed logical circuit, open to no extraneous influence.²⁴

According to David Hawkins, the foundation of this completeness was in the "logical structure" of the laws themselves.

²⁴David Hawkins, The Language of Nature: An Essay in the Philosophy of Science (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1964), p. 141; emphasis added.

If we want to make room for other ways of explaining the processes of nature, we must modify the laws so that they no longer exhibit completeness. Until that is done, we may say that the laws of motion are not the whole truth, but we cannot bring them into fruitful relation with other modes of thought.²⁵

By logically isolating certain mechanical bodies and the environment in which they act, the Newtonian system accomplishes the attainment of completeness so necessary for its utilization.

As transposed into the social science of economics, completeness is brought about through the use of the ceteris paribus clause--that is, all factors external to the formula are regarded as remaining constant.²⁶ This is exemplified by the

separation of economic theory from the complexities of psychology, of non-economic group behavior, of the details of technology on the one hand or of politics on the other. In each case the economist first takes account of these things mainly by rather rudimentary assumptions concerning them.²⁷

The status of the economic science gained by using this approach in a world dominated by the Newtonian paradigm was certainly great. The cost was a logical closure which would function only to minimize the economist-as-planner's perception of what was needed in a specific task environment in order for

²⁵Hawkins, p. 142.

²⁶See Eugene J. Meehan, Explanation in Social Science: A System Paradigm (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1968), p. 93.

²⁷Hawkins, p. 408.

"development" to occur. So long as the desire for logical completeness is prevalent among planners, the "closed logical circuit" of the dominant Image will continue to restrict the goal of development to those attempts which concentrate upon increasing the productive output of the economic sectors. Only a radical shift in the current logic of the Image structure will suffice should one feel that some factor currently "given" (that is, taken for granted) should become more central for the planner's task.

A third conclusion which might be derived from this analysis is closely related to the last. Kuhn's work on scientific revolutions seems to offer some hope vis-à-vis "closed" paradigms. It is possible that the many anomalies created in the use of the current Image structure in the Third World could inevitably result in a massive, non-cumulative paradigm adjustment. Sooner or later, it would seem, the low utility value and inflexibility of the Image will catch up with it. How soon this "necessary" event might occur will be determined, in part, by the "internal space" of the Image structure--that is, how much logical room the Image permits itself in fulfilling its logical processes. The more limited the "space," the sooner the anomalies will become major quandaries that will have to be seen as reflecting the low value of the paradigm in question. The greater the area of

"play" for the logic, the longer one will have to wait for the "inevitable" revolution.

The concept of logical space can be exemplified in the previous analysis. From the capitalist point of view, the primum mobile of development was, of course, capital accumulation. Let us assume that the capitalist paradigm was applied to country A which has the characteristic of relatively "unlimited supplies of capital." The application of that paradigm would suggest an increased status for country A which will soon be regarded as on its way toward development. It is soon discovered, however, that all the indicators are pointing in the opposite direction--that creeping inflation has taken up most of the slack in the consumption and production; that the economy is becoming more uncertain, and therefore is a poor investment risk; that the purchase of imports has greatly hindered the development of and concern with the goal of internal economic growth; that deficit spending is increasing; etc.²⁸ The capitalist paradigm is here faced with an anomaly which it would not be able to overcome unless there was another factor within the paradigm which could explain the contradiction. These alternative factors can be regarded as the logical space which the paradigm uses to rationalize its inability to fulfill

²⁸ This example of country A is very similar to the situation described by Higgins, chapter 35 for Libya.

its earlier prediction. In the case of country A, the alternative factor may be a lack of technology or labor supplies, etc. As each alternative explanation is approached and fails, the primum mobile shifts from one factor to another. The revolutionary impact of anomalies will not be felt until the logical space is nearing its end. The greater the space, the longer the paradigm will last.²⁹

The response of the current planner's Image to its more obvious anomalies is the search for the primum mobile. As each application of the Image is undertaken, a specific factor or set of factors is given primacy. When the plan's failure seems evident, the blame is not placed on the paradigm as a whole. Rather, a different factor or set of factors is deemed responsible. A new emphasis is developed and applications follow. As failure becomes evident once again, the process is repeated.

The success of the planner's Image in maintaining its current logical closure has been dependent upon its great internal logical space. This space has ranged from the core factors of capital, labor, etc., to their interrelationships (optimalization, vicious circles, etc.), to the seemingly bottomless category of social factors. In short, the structure

²⁹ This concept is derived from the discussion on anomalies given in Kuhn, chapter IV.

of the planner's Image seems to offer the planner an almost infinite variety of possibilities for the primum mobile. The inevitable "scientific revolution," therefore, seems a long way off in the future.

All things considered, the dominant planner's Image under scrutiny here seems to gain in its inflexibility when its structure is taken into account. Thus, the highly biased content is further substantiated by a structure which gives logical primacy to a single dimension of that content through a closed system that seems internally able to perpetuate itself over an extended period of time. Yet, any judgment on the Image configuration in question must be qualified until one considers the remaining aspect of that Image--its strength. Regardless of the bias of the content or the closedness of the structure, an Image can attain much flexibility through its "strength" vis-à-vis the environment.

CHAPTER V

THE IMAGE STRENGTH

In Chapter II, the strength of an Image was conceptualized as a shield or screen which surrounds Image content and structure. The shield analogy is even more useful once the qualification is made that the protection offered by that screen is uneven; that is, Image strength varies over the points of contact between the Image and its environment. Since this is the case, some environmental factors will have a greater influence on the Image than others. Image flexibility depends upon that dispersion of Image strength vis-à-vis task and non-task environment factors.

A. The Relevance of the Task Environment

As noted in the research design given in Chapter II, a measure of Image strength is extremely difficult to accomplish. The present attempt will actually focus on one measure of Image strength, and then only as that relates to the task environment. We shall seek to determine the extent to which relevant environmental factors determine the frequency of planning themes. The measure of association

used is the Goodman and Kruskal τ_b which is explained in Chapter II and Appendix C. If the τ_b values are low, it will be assumed that the Image strength is high in regard to task environment factors, and vice versa. The reader is reminded of the various qualifications under which this study is undertaken and is once again referred to the discussion of Table 1, Chapter II.

Table 16 presents the τ_b scores of association between the themes of planning and certain physical and demographic features of the environment. The τ_b 's range possibility is from .00 which shows no level of association to a level of 1.0 which denotes a perfect association. In none of the associations given in Table 12 is there a measure over .1. The highest level (.0957) is found between the variables of area and the maintenance/change theme dimension. The second highest level is noted between the same theme dimension and the population variable. In all other association, the scores are well below .05. Among the population density factor measures and the levels of association vis-à-vis the population in cities of over 100,000 (per capita), all were below .039. These findings are surprising in light of the usual argument that population pressures--of both an urban and non-urban nature--are a primary obstacle to development planning successes.

TABLE 12

ASSOCIATION OF PHYSICAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS AND
THE THEMES OF DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN
GOODMAN AND KRUSKAL'S τ

Environment Factors 1966	<u>Theme Dimensions</u>		Adaptation/ Goal Attainment/ Integration/ Pattern Maintenance
	Maintenance/ Change	Gemeinschaft/ Gesellschaft	
Area	.0957	.0381	.0246
Population	.0631	.0320	.0338
Population Density	.0267	.0086	.0010
Population in cities of over 100,000 (per capita)	.0384	.0041	.0119

The data given in this table tends to indicate one or two possible conclusions. First, one may conclude that these themes have little or nothing to say about population density problems. Yet a perusal of the plans used will show the opposite to be the case; there is a great concern with population control in almost all the documents examined. This leads to the second conclusion which states that the planner's Image has a stereotyped ideal for the population "problem" and the solutions to be suggested. Under this stereotype the Image pays little, if any, attention to the unique population

characteristics of each country. For instance, the typical population problem is defined in terms of avoiding overpopulation and decreasing the rate of population growth over the period of the plan. There are varying degrees to which this problem holds true for each country--and there are even some societies where the promotion of population growth is warranted.¹ A flexible Image would take such potential variations into account.

In Table 13, the levels of association between planning themes and various political structure and process variables are given. In this case, all variables were scaled in nominal categories.² The extremely low τ_b values for this category are not surprising at all in light of the general

¹The usual goal is to keep the rate of population growth in line with an economic growth rate that will result, in the end, in an overall per capita income growth rate of about 3-6%. See Higgins.

²The categories for each variable were as follows:

- Regime type: civilian/military-civilian/military/others;
- Head of state: monarch/president/military/other;
- Effective executive type: monarch/president/premier/military/other;
- Legislative selection process: none/nonelective/elective;
- Effective executive selection process: direct election/indirect election/nonelective;
- Nomination process: no legislature present/largely non-competitive/partially competitive/competitive;
- Party legitimacy: no parties at all or all except dominant party and its satellites excluded/significant exclusion of parties or groups/one or more minor or extremist parties excluded/no parties excluded;
- Parliamentary responsibility: irrelevant/absent/incomplete/complete;
- Legislative effectiveness: none/ineffective/partially effective/effective

TABLE 13

ASSOCIATION OF POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND PROCESS FACTORS
AND THE THEMES OF DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN
GOODMAN AND KRUSKAL'S τ

Environment Factors 1966	<u>Theme Dimensions</u>		Adaptation/ Goal Attainment/ Integration/ Pattern Maintenance
	Maintenance Change	Gemeinschaft/ Gesellschaft	
Regime Type	.0116	.0028	.0062
Head of State	.0164	.0059	.0048
Effective Executive Type	.0168	.0055	.0041
Legislative Selection Process	.0108	.0024	.0055
Effective Executive Selection Process	.0017	.0121	.0014
Nomination Process	.0258	.0088	.0072
Party Legitimacy	.0055	.0088	.0061
Parliamentary Responsibility	.0073	.0063	.0029
Legislative Effectiveness	.0148	.0047	.0067

conclusion that Third World planners have shown themselves to be either apolitical³ or antipolitical.⁴ Yet it should seem obvious that planning is, in its most basic form, a political action which is undertaken within a political milieu that cannot be ignored, let alone eliminated. Current planning failures may be attributed, in part, to a planner's image that tends to shield the planner from those unique political factors in the environment.

Table 14 offers a view of the association between planning themes and a unique set of political variables. If planners ignore the normal political structures and processes, do they also remain oblivious to the political events which occur outside the normal everyday channels? In light of the low values for τ_b given in that table, only a positive response is warranted. Yet, as low as these values are, when compared to the τ_b measures in Table 13, they reflect a higher level of association. This was mainly the case in reference to the maintenance/change dimension where the only τ levels above the .04 measure are found. While it might be misleading to draw conclusions from such small variations within such a limited range, one may speculate that, of all the political variables covered in the two tables, the greatest impact seems to come from anti-government demonstrations, political purges,

³Benveniste.

⁴Ilchman.

TABLE 14

ASSOCIATION OF POLITICAL CONFLICT FACTORS AND THE THEMES OF
DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN GOODMAN AND KRUSKAL'S τ

Environment Factors 1964-1966	<u>Theme Dimensions</u>		Adaptation/ Goal Attainment/ Integration/ Pattern Maintenance
	Maintenance/ Change	Gemeinschaft/ Gesellschaft	
No. of Coups	.0093	.0179	.0053
No. of Major Constitutional Changes	.0212	.0280	.0038
No. of Major Cabinet Changes	.0244	.0066	.0076
No. of Changes in Effective Executive	.0084	.0250	.0131
No. of Legis- lative Elections	.0142	.0144	.0012
No. of Assassinations	.0112	.0006	.0037
No. of General Strikes	.0406	.0075	.0096
No. of Govern- ment Crises	.0278	.0006	.0065
No. of Politi- cal Purges	.0440	.0068	.0124
No. of Anti- Government Demonstrations	.0853	.0307	.0235

and general strikes. It cannot be overemphasized, however, that even these impacts are of a minor nature since the highest τ_b was a mere .0853!

With such a heavy emphasis upon economics in the various plans, one would expect economic variations in the environment to have some influence in regard to the determination of theme frequency. Table 15 disputes this hypothesis. The highest association level in that group is .0565 (maintenance/change-G.N.P.). It seems that even those environmental factors which come closest to the planner's Image are obscured by a strength which aids that Image in focusing its concerns elsewhere. The planner's Image disregards variations in the economic situation of the subject society in favor of a set of priorities and strategies which pays heed mainly to the dictates of irrelevant standards.

Tables 16 and 17 complete the picture with few changes. The social variables in Table 16 show only one significant level of association (relative to all other τ_b scores in this study). The τ_b of .1019 between primary school enrollment and the maintenance/change dimension frequency can be explained by a number of arguments, the most important of which is the link usually made by planners between their Image of development and the number of educated people in a society. Even this explanation is difficult to accept, however, in light of

TABLE 15

ASSOCIATION OF ECONOMIC FACTORS AND THE THEMES OF
DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN GOODMAN AND KRUSKAL'S τ

Environment Factors 1966	<u>Theme Dimensions</u>		Adaptation/ Goal Attainment Integration/ Pattern Maintenance
	Maintenance Change	Gemeinschaft/ Gesellschaft	
Gross National Product (GNP) per capita	.0565	.0108	.0138
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita	.0387	.0063	.0114
GDP Per Capita Originating in Industrial Sector	.0375	.0252	.0119
Energy Pro- duction Per Capita	.0285	.0080	.0072
Energy Con- sumption Per Capita	.0353	.0104	.0118
Imports Per Capita	.0154	.0100	.0163
Exports Per Capita	.0156	.0082	.0133
Proportion of World Trade	.0546	.0281	.0190

TABLE 16

ASSOCIATION OF SOCIAL FACTORS AND THE THEMES OF
DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN GOODMAN AND KRUSKAL'S τ

Environment Factors 1966	<u>Theme Dimensions</u>		Adaptation/ Goal Attainment/ Integration/ Pattern Maintenance
	Maintenance/ Change	Gemeinschaft/ Gesellschaft	
Primary School Enrollment Per Capita	.1019	.0412	.0216
Secondary School Enrollment Per Capita	.0350	.0131	.0249
University Enrollment Per Capita	.0379	.0238	.0176
Total School Enrollment Per Capita	.0739	.0207	.0192
Percentage of Popu- lation Literate	.0616	.0349	.0208
Physicians Per Capita	.0303	.0052	.0189

the lower τ_b values for other school enrollment figures. For instance, before taking the primary school enrollment association level as indicative of some trend, one must look at the association between secondary and university school

TABLE 17

ASSOCIATION OF TRANSPORT/COMMUNICATIONS FACTORS AND THE
THEMES OF DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN GOODMAN AND KRUSKAL'S τ

Environment Factors 1966	<u>Theme Dimensions</u>		Adaptation/ Goal Attainment/ Integration/ Pattern Maintenance
	Maintenance/ Change	Gemeinschaft/ Gesellschaft	
Railroad Mileage Per Square Mile	.0146	.0039	.0224
Rail Passenger- Kilometers*	.0244	.0445	.0089
Passenger Cars Per Capita	.0366	.0252	.0155
Commercial Vehicles Per Capita	.0394	.0252	.0126
All Highway Vehicle Per Capita	.0309	.0248	.0115
Telegrams Per Capita	.0419	.0063	.0091
Telephones Per Capita	.0380	.0248	.0141
Radios Per Capita	.0400	.0240	.0128
Newspaper Cir- culation Per Capita	.0422	.0270	.0299
Book Prod. By Titles Per Million Pop.	.0322	.0045	.0203
All Mail Per Capita	.0358	.0133	.0092

* Number of kilometers traveled by rail passenger in given year.

enrollments and the maintenance/change theme, both of which are very low--a fact reflected in the τ_b for that theme and the total enrollment figures. Overall, these particular variables, like those in the other tables, showed low levels of association with no notable exceptions.

Table 17 gives the levels of association for a more specialized group of social variables: the transport and communications factors in the environment. Here, too, there are no major incongruities with the general trend indicated by the other tables. All τ_b values in this category are below .05, with the highest among these being mainly in regard to the determination of the maintenance/change dimension.

In terms of the Image strength concept, the factors we have designated as the task environment elements seem to have little if any impact upon the frequency of certain planning themes in Third World countries. In a sense, what should be regarded as relevant in theory is, in fact, irrelevant for the planner's Image. If this is the case, then the general flexibility of the Image is decreased where it is most essential and increased where it is needed least; that is, vis-à-vis the non-task environment. The extent to which this is so cannot be determined since we lack, at present, a means for determining the impact of non-task environment factors upon planning themes. It is possible, however, to enter into some discussion about the

influence of one particular form of the non-task environment: the historical and sociological milieu of development and professionalism in the non-Third World societies.

B. The Relevance of Non-Task Environment Factors

There is no way at present to "prove" the contention that non-task environment factors are determinative for the planner's Image strength. We are assuming that if the task environment seems to have a low level of association with the frequency of planning themes, then the non-task environment must have a high level of association with the occurrence of such themes. Being unable to defend this in any systematic way, the present writer has decided to rely on an indirect method of "proof" which admittedly leaves much to be desired. By attempting to show how various historical and sociological factors have taken hold of the planner's Image, it is hoped that the power of non-task environment elements will be demonstrated. In this section the discussion will attempt to show the deep historical roots that have developed in planning. The result has been a planning tradition which places heavy emphasis upon the economic model with the secondary themes of Gesellschaft society and "change" strategies being given their appropriate places within the professional orientations.

This is followed by a consideration of the sociological force most responsible for the perpetuation of the present planner's Image: the professional social system.

The History of the Planner's Image

In seeking the historical roots of the contemporary planner's Image, one is attempting to explore the intellectual milieu which has given that Image form and propulsion over time. The point of departure of such a study must be the basic theme which has permeated the modern age: the economic point of view.

The economic point of view has been an important factor not only in terms of the specific planner's Image, but also in the total Image of the modern world. However one may define the term modern, there seems to be one common quality which distinguishes that era from all other previous periods. In the modern age, a severe and noticeable break with the past became the goal of those who wished to be "modern" or "progressive." Around the 17th and 18th centuries, European mankind found itself faced with new capacities for actions derived from various technological and organizational innovations. While attempting to harness these newly attained potentials, it became obvious to many European intelligentsia that a new perspective was needed in order to deal with the future.

The values and objectives of the more organic and communal Gemeinschaft society of the medieval period were perceived as overly restrictive. What was needed, so it was thought, was a New Tradition--one which would permit individuals more leeway to manipulate a world which, to that point in time, had set limits upon human endeavors. Harold Rosenberg has termed the tradition of the modern age to be the "tradition of the new." It was a tradition which, when taken to its logical conclusions, would negate all traditions. It was a tradition that demanded that the human animal take control of the future rather than allowing some eschatological force to determine it. It was a tradition which denied the value of the past while glorifying that which mankind could develop in the future.⁵

The tradition of the new manifested itself in a number of academic fields and thereby supplied us with much of the foundations of modern physical and social science. In human epistemology, for instance, mainly through the works of Descartes and Locke, the human ego became central to thought processes. As Hannah Arendt has noted, the "Archimedean point," for so long located in the universe and/or the community, moved

⁵See Harold Rosenberg, The Tradition of the New (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1960), pp. 11-12. For a more detailed analysis of the change in perception being discussed here, see Polak, especially chapters 9-13.

"into the mind of man."⁶ In political philosophy the theory of "possessive individualism," as popularized by Hobbes and Locke, took center stage.⁷ The impact was similar to a "scientific revolution" in which the paradigm that had focused upon the State and the monarchy in a feudal system shifted to a concentration upon individuals and their "natural rights."

In the field of wealth and trade, a new discipline was formulated which merged previously distinct perspectives. Israel Kirzner notes that it was not until the last half of the 18th century that "thinkers in England, France, and Italy were coming to recognize that the subject of the mass of writings and speculations dealing with commerce, industry, foreign trade, money, interest, taxation, and the like constitutes a distinct theme of inquiry."

With the recognition of the fundamental unity of the principles underlying these scattered inquiries and of their analytical independence of juristic, political, and moral systems, economics, or political economy, emerged as a distinct discipline.⁸

⁶Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor, 1958), pp. 246-262; see also John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (Chicago: The Swallow Press, 1927), chapter 3.

⁷See C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (London and N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1962/1970).

⁸Israel M. Kirzner, The Economic Point of View: An Essay in the History of Economic Thought (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1960), p. 22.

As with epistemology and political thought of the time, economics turned toward the study of individual behavior. Kirzner shows how the science of economics was founded for the purpose of explaining the "phenomena of wealth," and this was eventually narrowed to the study of individualistic avarice.⁹ To study this specific aspect of human behavior, economists turned to the analytic concept of "economic man."

While the use of this concept was initially limited, it became dominant for most social thinkers. According to Jacques Ellul,

The term economic man generally referred to a purely theoretical concept. For the liberals, economic man was an abstraction created to satisfy the demands of economic inquiry. The conception was a working hypothesis. It was framed by omitting certain human characteristics, which man undeniably possesses in order to reduce him to his economic aspect of producer and consumer.¹⁰

Through the absorption of the whole human being into an economic network and a devaluation of all activities other than the economic, mankind was narrowed analytically to an entity capable of rational behavior. For the purpose of studying social activity, economic behavior became rational behavior.

⁹Kirzner, pp. 26-27.

¹⁰Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society, trans. John Wilkinson (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), p. 218. For a brief explanation of the role of such abstractions in classical and Marxist economics, see Paul M. Sweezy, The Theory of Capitalist Development: Principles of Marxian Political Economy (New York and London: Modern Reader Publications, 1942), pp. 3-22.

There is little doubt that many professional analysts of the classical school remained aware of the fact that homo economicus was an analytic tool rather than an ideal representation of man. However, there were those who began to value this model of economic man for itself. Marx captured this occurrence when he noted that, as the world of "things" received primary attention, the world of "men" was devalued.¹¹ That which was valued in analysis soon came to be valued in actuality. Life styles and personalities began to reflect what was otherwise a purely conceptual and abstract tool for analysis. In the 18th century, contends Lewis Mumford, "a new type of personality emerged, a walking abstraction: the Economic Man."¹²

In the last part of the 18th and the first half of the 19th centuries, the "dismal" science of classical economics permeated the Image of society. A number of challenges were forthcoming, however, as the limits of rational behavior and homo economicus became more obvious. There was too much in human activity which this model of man did not explain. For

¹¹"With the increasing value of the world of things proceeds in direct proportion the devaluation of the world of men." Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, ed. Dirk J. Struik, trans. Martin Milligan (New York: International Publishers, 1964), p. 107; emphasis in original.

¹²Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1934/1963), p. 177.

example, the economic man model failed to explain the distributive order within which rational actions were to occur. In addition, it did little to explain the common use of force, fraud, and other "tendencies to break through the restrictions of the order. . . ." ¹³ With this in mind, social theorists broadened their concerns and relegated the study of economic behavior to one "system of action" among many which "in fact involves a rational process of the acquisition and allocation of scarce resources by the means delegated." ¹⁴ Sociology became the salient social science in the late 19th century and turned its attention to the irrational, nonlogical, noneconomic aspects of human behavior while retaining the implied identity of economic and rational actions.

For sociological analysts and many economists, this adjusted perspective of economic behavior meant that the study of society had become more realistic. For others, however, it sparked an urge to broaden the range of actual human behavior governed by rational and logical causes. In short, rationality remained a valued form of human action and, in this sense, soon became the goal of reform movements which developed in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. As

¹³Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, pp. 265-266.

¹⁴Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, p. 266.

various crises arose in the first three decades of this century, more and more of the blame for what had taken place was set upon mankind's irrationality. Robert S. Lynd's comments in this regard exemplify the dominant feelings of the time.

Our major institutional forms and accompanying slogans derive from an era which not only viewed men as "equal" but also as "rational." We now know man to be basically emotional in his motivations and only sporadically able to sustain the tensions involved in taking thought in order to direct his actions. . . .

. . . The chance of securing more coherent, constructive behavior from persons depends upon recognizing the large degree of irrationality that is natural to them and upon structuring the culture actively to support and encourage intelligent types of behavior. . . .¹⁵

The solution of structuring culture involved, according to Lynd, "a large and pervasive extension of planning and control to many areas now left to casual individual initiative."¹⁶ In efforts to increase the application of rational (equated with "intelligent") behavior in human activities, social scientists turned to the science of economics which had so often been associated with rational human choices. The problem of planning was assumed, from the very outset, to be a problem of increasing human "rationality." Furthermore, this assumption carried with it a particular view of "rationality"--one developed in the context of the homo.economicus model which permeated capitalist thinking to that point.

¹⁵Lynd, p. 234.

¹⁶Lynd, p. 209.

The modern Western concept of economic rationality, which includes the idea that the whole of a country's social policy ought to be built on the criterion of economic rationality, in fact emerged only with the rise of the capitalist market economy and bears strong marks of its birth. It embodies not only the idea that everything ought to be made and done for man rather than God, but also the idea that all production is for consumption. The latter principle seems so self-evident to Western man . . . of the twentieth century, who have absorbed utilitarian assumptions as part of the Western democratic ethos, that to question it appears not heretical but nonsensical.¹⁷

The desire to expand the realm of human action governed by economic rationality received a boost in the 1930's with the publication of Lionel Robbins' An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science. "Economics," contended Robbins, "is the science which studies human behavior as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses."¹⁸ With this definition, Robbins rejected the limits placed on economics as the study "of the causes of material welfare." Instead, economics is posited as the study of any behavior which is influenced by the fact of scarcity of means. "We do not say that the production of potatoes is

¹⁷C. B. Macpherson, "Reflections on the Sources of Development Theory," in Social Development: Critical Perspectives, ed. Manfred Stanley (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1972), p. 209.

¹⁸Lionel Robbins, An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1932/1952), p. 16.

economic activity and the production of philosophy is not. We say rather that, in so far as either kind of activity involves the relinquishment of other desired alternatives, it has its economic aspect."¹⁹

In light of this approach, the concept of economic behavior has been extended to include a broader range of human endeavor. Concepts such as economizing resources and maximizing gains have become important features of social study;²⁰ and both were quickly adopted as basic ingredients of a planner's Image which sought economic rationality for human behavior in all its respects: political, social and cultural as well as economic.

As manifested in the planner's Image, the economic point of view buttressed the conception of man as homo economicus. Therefore, when faced with the challenge of planning, policy-makers turned toward that discipline as a source for ideas

¹⁹Robbins, pp. 16-17.

²⁰Kirzner, chapter 6. For examples of how this approach has been used, see E. J. Mishan, Economics for Social Decisions: Elements of Cost-Benefit Analysis (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972); Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1957); Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Actions: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1965/1971); and James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press Ann Arbor Paperbacks, 1962).

vis-à-vis ends and means. The perceptions promoted by the economic point of view were put to the test, and with this we enter a second phase of the historical background of the planner's Image. The successes and failures of early attempts at economic planning can be seen as an important factor in determining the current Image--in terms of its content, structure and strength. If such attempts were regarded as failures, chances are that the planner's Image would not have the same strength as would have been attained with a tradition of successes. As it turns out, prior to post-World War II period, economic planning was successful--or so it seemed.

Planning on a national level was a rather late form of the general effort at rational policymaking. One need only mention such individuals as Plato, Sir Thomas More, Sir Francis Bacon, Robert Owen and H.G. Wells to make the point that, at least on a "utopian" level, planned communities were discussed prior to the 20th century.²¹ In addition, it is well documented that some notable experiments were performed in the establishment of small planned communities--experiments carried on throughout history from the colonies of ancient Greece to the various settlements set up in the modern United States during recent times. Nevertheless, one must

²¹See Polak, Part One; and Lewis Mumford, The Story of Utopias (New York: The Viking Press, 1922/1962).

look to World War I for the first serious attempts at contemporary national planning. It was during that conflict that several European countries first gave serious consideration to massive, wide-scale planning efforts:

Before 1914 nobody had clearly recognized that a war economy differed fundamentally from a peace economy. . . . The German military plan to invade Belgium was not extended to Holland on the ground that Rotterdam must be left neutral for the passage of German overseas trade. "Business as usual" was the slogan under which the first period of the war was conducted in Great Britain. But the course of the first world war settled for all time the question of the indispensability of a planned economy for national efficiency in the war.²²

Modern warfare entailed the mobilization of scarce resources to an extent never before contemplated by man. "Business as usual" was out of the question by World War II, and wartime planning was accepted without much discussion. The nature of these national attempts at planning may be regarded as an essential factor in the development of the planner's image. It was a planning oriented not towards changes in the social structure or the opening up of new vistas of thought and behavior. Rather, wartime planning was almost purely economic in nature. The goal was national survival and self-sufficiency in a time when individual countries had to rely on their own economic resources instead of those available through the

²² Edward Hallett Carr, The New Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1951/1957), p. 35.

international markets. The goal was "victory" and planning efforts were to serve that terminal end and nothing else. The result of this condition was the socialization of the public and the planner to an image of planning as an exercise of policymaking in the economic realm only.

The Depression cannot be overlooked in this regard for it had a similar impact. It was during the 1930's and early 1940's that most of the contemporary literature on the possibilities and potentials of planning were produced. This trend was manifested in the debates of that era between advocates of planning²³ and their challengers.²⁴ These debates, however, did not deter governments from undertaking numerous and varied efforts at solving the critical problems which arose with the economic disasters of the late 1920's and the 1930's.

The U.S.S.R. had entered into its series of Five Year Plans by 1928, even before the crash of 1929. But it was the latter event and the economic events which followed which brought other states into the realm of planning. "Since the great crisis of 1929," states Raymond Aron, "governments have

²³ Among the prominent advocates was Karl Mannheim whose Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction: Studies in Modern Social Structure (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1935/1940) is often cited as a classic justification of modern planning.

²⁴ Perhaps the most famous and controversial challenge was issued by Friedrich A. Hayek in his The Road to Serfdom (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1944).

become responsible for what is called full employment, in other words, for the level of activity [sic]."²⁵ In the name of "the collective body of citizens," Mussolini brought planning to Italy in the early 1930's.²⁶ In the name of "rearmament," Hitler solved the economic problems of Germany during the latter part of the 1930's with planning efforts on a major scale.²⁷ In the United States such attempts were given a less authoritarian form in various New Deal programs such as the National Recovery Administration acts. All were the first steps toward planning--regardless of how comprehensive or limited their scope. It is notable that, as with wartime planning, only economic problems were considered and only economic solutions were suggested. Once again, planning as an activity was by definition economic planning.

The closest ancestor to the development planner's image was the post-World War II planning efforts aimed at "rebuilding" Europe and Japan. In some instances such planning was labeled "development" planning, and the goals set forth in these plans

²⁵Raymond Aron, The Century of Total War (Boston: Beacon Press, 1954), pp. 267-268.

²⁶B. Mussolini, "Speech in the Senate on the Bill Establishing the Corporations, January 13, 1934," in Twentieth Century Europe: A Documentary History, ed. Stephan Fischer-Galati (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1967), p. 171.

added much to the already obvious trends of economic sector dominance. Again, reflecting previous approaches to planning, it was rebuilding for economic growth and development of war-torn areas for economic growth. Physically and psychologically devastated by the war, facing a shortage of much-needed foreign currency, and faced with the prospect of a bleak future of increasing deficits in trade based on a rapidly expanding demand, post-war Europe quickly came to realize that the economic crises experienced during the Depression and the wars were also inherent in the period of peace--even for the victors.

France was among the first countries in Europe outside the Soviet Union to implement a multi-annual plan in an attempt to solve its problems. The major prompting toward planning came in 1947-1948 with the requirements of the Marshall Plan. Not long afterward Italy issued the Vanoni Plan which sought a balanced development of the northern and southern sectors of that country. In Sweden and Denmark the anti-cyclical planning which grew out of the demands of the Depression soon turned into major annual comprehensive plans. Eastern Europe, of course, came under the influence of the U.S.S.R. and its "five-year planning" approach. It was not long before the concept of multi-annual planning was to be found manifested in-fact in

every European country.²⁸ All one finds, however, is a continued concentration on the economic sector which marked similar planning efforts in the immediate post-war era. Economics permeated efforts at reconstruction and growth and, what is even more important for present purposes, it did so successfully as far as most analysts were concerned.²⁹

In a sense, the "stigma" of success attached itself to the economic planning efforts undertaken at that early date. This heritage of success became a major influence in determining the direction of Third World development planning, and indirectly led, in part, to the planning failures of the 1950's and 1960's. According to a group of planning experts who met in the late 1960's under the auspices of the United Nations, the success of European reconstruction plans had been a key factor in determining the course of development planning. But, with the passing of time,

it became increasingly evident that these [economic] approaches which worked well in the special circumstances of Europe a generation ago . . . were not fully relevant to the problems of low income countries with which the

²⁸Waterston, pp. 31-32; also J[an] Tinbergen, "Planning, Economic: I. Western Europe," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 12 (1968): 102.

²⁹For an analysis of those post-war planning efforts in Europe and Japan written from the perspective of the period, see Seymour E. Harris, Economic Planning: The Plans of Fourteen Countries with Analyses of the Plans (New York: Alfred E. Knopf, 1949).

United Nations economic and social activities are now principally concerned.³⁰

Success helped carry the economic growth model of development through two decades following the Marshall Plan. If the model worked in Europe and Japan, why shouldn't it work as well in Asia, Africa, or Latin America? In this way "modern" planning standards and strategies, many of which were irrelevant, were transposed to the Third World.

The degree to which Third World development planning was influenced by the European economic point of view and the successes of economic planning may be seen in the story behind the first official definition of development. All definitions of development, before and since the U.N. attempt, were characterized by the use of standards relative to the environment of the Third World. Nettl and Robertson have explained this in terms of the international environment; that is, the basis for perceiving developing countries has been the comparative economic status they have vis-à-vis the "developed" world.³¹ This was no more clearly illustrated than when the United Nations was faced with the task of defining the condition of underdevelopment.

³⁰Meeting of Experts on Social Policy and Planning, United Nations, 1971, pp. 1-4.

³¹Nettl and Robertson.

Prior to World War II, little if any attention was given over to the fact of development versus underdevelopment.³² Whenever the term "underdeveloped" was applied, it was used in the sense of "backward" and "less developed" and referred mainly to the countries of Eastern and Southeastern Europe. With the advent of the U.N., the major concern for development policy remained in the reconstruction of Europe. It was not until 1949 that a major attempt at defining the condition of underdevelopment was undertaken. In spite of the failure of these initial attempts at producing a definition upon which policies were to be formulated, the need for such a specification became more and more important. In 1950, the Secretary-General of the U.N. selected a committee of "experts" whose primary goal was to develop some measures for development and underdevelopment. "With no official definition offered to guide them in their investigation, they were forced quite arbitrarily to define the term [underdeveloped country, as one in] which per capita income is low when compared with

³² See H. W. Arndt, "Development Economics before 1945," in Development and Planning: Essays in Honour of Paul Rosenstein-Rodan (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1972); also Henry David Carlson, "A Consideration of Some Problems Associated with the Definitions of Underdevelopment Used by the United Nations and Its Associated Agencies," unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Colorado, 1969, pp. 5-12.

the per capita real incomes of the United States, Canada, Australia, and Western Europe."³³

There is, of course, no denying the poverty of the people of the Third World--even in non-relative terms. A problem arises, however, when that impoverishment is defined in comparative terms only and without reference to other factors of the social system. Hla Myint has discussed this definition of underdevelopment and its impact upon policy-making. When one compares and defines the circumstances of undeveloped societies by measures such as G.N.P. or per capita income figures, the picture is as simple as perceiving the difference between \$3000 and \$100. The obvious result is a concern "with the need to do something urgent about the problem of poverty."³⁴ Situations in the Third World have thereby been abstracted to their basic economic elements. This abstraction is not based on the facts of the task environment as much as it is founded upon an Image inherited from non-task environment sources. Therefore, the need to satisfy those sources and their demands are given more attention than the more relevant demands of the task arena. The poor dispersion of the Image's strength follows.

³³Carlson, pp. 20-21.

³⁴Myint, The Economics of Developing Countries, pp. 9-10.

The Sociology of the Planner's Image

Historical roots, by themselves cannot account for the distribution of the planner's Image. These roots must attach themselves to a rich soil in which they will flourish--soil that will act to regenerate the hold of non-task environment factors in the determination of the Image. The socialization processes among planners which accomplish this give additional evidence as to the forces which have established the distribution of the Image's strength.

The very nature of most socialization processes seems to substantiate Boulding's view of Image change--that the Image tends to react negatively to information and messages which might radically or otherwise adversely affect present Image configurations. This tendency implies that, while the perpetuation of the status quo "is not an inevitable outcome" of the socialization process, it is a "highly probable one."³⁵ It seems as if, all things remaining equal, the socialization process will further the Image of the past rather than open the planner to contrary, and, perhaps, more appropriate influences. In terms of the Image strength concept, socialization will tend to further the trends which were established earlier instead of promoting new and innovative approaches.³⁶

³⁵Richard E. Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt, Political Socialization (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1969), p. 107.

³⁶Following the argument of Dawson and Prewitt, there is no denying the fact that, just as political socialization

While such generalizations might be said to hold true for most populations, there are some groups where this trend is reinforced, specifically groups such as planners who regard themselves as "professionals." This self-perception has had a number of implications for the perpetuation of the Image and its strength in particular.

In what way may planners be regarded as "professionals"? The professionalization of that group had several roots. First, those attaining the title of "planner" were also noted as "experts." The meanings implied by that term came, in turn, to result in a demand for highly educated and well-trained advisors for political leaders. A distinction began to develop between "political" appointees, bureaucrats, and expert advisors whose credentials included an apolitical background. The term "professional" seems to be associated with such characteristics. Secondly, most planners were drawn from the academic community, especially economics, and therefore they brought their professional standards with them. Thirdly, and finally, the subject societies demanded a high degree of "professionalism" from the expert planners they hired--for obvious reasons. Denis Goulet

may transform and/or create as well as maintain the present political culture, so may the general socialization processes transform and/or create the dominant planner's Image. The maintenance function, however, tends to be the salient one in most cases. In terms of political socialization, most research seems to uphold this conclusion. See for instance any of the numerous studies of the American voter.

reflects this demand when he states that

"Recipients" of technical aid must be protected. They must have the guarantee of receiving experts of proven competence who meet professional standards, men who are not in the service of other nations or business firms but formally committed to universal development objectives.³⁷

For these reasons, among others, planners began to regard themselves as professionals, which led to their taking on the characteristics of the professions. What has been the result? This can be answered only through an examination of the literature on "professionalism."

A profession can and has been defined in a number of ways, the most common version relating it to the general occupational structure. "A profession may perhaps be defined," declares A. M. Carr-Saunders, "as an occupation based upon specialized intellectual study and training, the purpose of which is to supply skilled service or advice to others for a definite fee or salary."³⁸ Wilbert Moore, finding it necessary to find a definition of "profession" for analytic purposes, also turned to the occupational standard: a profession is "an occupation whose incumbents create and explicitly utilize systematically accumulated general knowledge in the solution

³⁷Goulet, p. 179.

³⁸Quoted in Howard M. Vollmer and Donald L. Mills, eds., Professionalization (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), p. 4.

of problems posed by a clientele. . . ."³⁹ Besides noting that professions are that part of the occupational structure which involves services to clients by "knowledgeable" persons, little else may be concluded from these definitions.

A different approach was pioneered by Ernest Greenwood who sought to list the characteristics of a profession rather than attempting to render a single sentence definition. Greenwood's list of a profession's attributes included, first, that there existed "a fund of knowledge that has been organized into an internally consistent system, called a body of theory." Second, professions were marked by a recognized sphere of competence given them by the community which composes their clientele. This attribute was deemed necessary in that it permitted the professional to render decisions and diagnoses which remain relatively unchallenged. Next, a profession was considered to have the sanction of the community as a whole within that sphere of competence so that it would be permitted to judge the standards of entrance to and work accomplished in the profession. Finally, the profession was seen to have the characteristic of a professional culture which continually sought to replenish the supply of talent for the profession's ranks while expanding the available fund of knowledge. While

³⁹Wilbert E. Moore, The Professions: Roles and Rules (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970), pp. 53-54.

not a definition of professions per se, Greenwood's attributes do offer an idea of the context within which a professional life is carried on.⁴⁰

Wilbert Moore's analysis, however, takes an additional step, the result being a perspective on professions which defines the situation of the professional and the factors that influence his or her decisions. The primary difference is Moore's abandonment of the cluster of professional attributes for a set of professional characteristics which were to be perceived along a set of six scales that, when clustered together, compose a single "scale of professionalism."⁴¹

An examination of the six scales--both individually and collectively--shows how the professionalization of any group will strengthen the maintenance implications of socialization processes. For example, along the scale of occupation, the profession demands that the practicing member view his or her job as full time and dependent upon the good opinion of both peers and clients. This tends to keep one in line because more time is spent on the practices than on extra-professional concerns which might mislead the expert. "Keeping-up" and "avoiding obsolescence" also become primary goals. The result

⁴⁰Ernest Greenwood, "Attributes of a Profession," Social Forces, 2 (July 1957): 44-55.

⁴¹Moore, pp. 5-6.

is a phenomenon which Moore terms the "deformation professionelle"; that is, the attention paid to the practice distorts the individual's Image of the world outside that realm.⁴²

As a calling, a profession seeks a high degree of commitment to and acceptance of "the appropriate forms and standards" of the profession by the practitioner.⁴³ In terms of organizations, professions demand membership in sanctioned and sanctioning groups and these, in turn, do more than just represent a distinct occupational interest. Professional organizations seek, as well, control of access to the profession, protection of their "honorable" monopoly in their particular field of expertise, and the maintenance of performance standards among the accepted practitioners.⁴⁴

In any socialization process, the role of education is important as a formal means for passing on past experience to future generations. Among professionals, the import of education is greatly magnified due to the amount and type of knowledge involved. As one looks at history, there is an obvious trend to more and more educational requirements for one to meet the standards set for entrance to a profession. While this may render the practitioner a much more knowledgeable

⁴²Moore, pp. 79-82.

⁴³Moore, pp. 7-9, 76-79.

⁴⁴Moore, pp. 9-10, 113-120.

professional, it also tends to promote the cultivation of past knowledge rather than a search for new material. The innovator is usually outside the mainstream of his or her profession.⁴⁵

In terms of service orientation, Moore's fifth scale for professionalism, the professional should rank high. One measure of a profession is the extent to which it serves its clients; yet even this is based upon the requirements of the profession. The degree to which any client is to be served is a reflection of occupationally defined norms more than it is attributable to some altruistic drive. As Parsons has noted, it is the objective achievement and peer group recognition which drives the professional to attain a certain level of proficiency. Accomplishing one's task for a client is secondary to meeting the demands of the profession. Where the client or the situation challenges the standards of the profession, the implied response of the practitioner should be to refer to the definitions of "service" as set forth by the profession. It is the latter which must be followed.⁴⁶

The final scale entails the characteristic of autonomy. A professional desires a high degree of autonomy on the grounds

⁴⁵ Moore, pp. 10-12, 74, 120-124.

⁴⁶ Moore, pp. 13-15; Talcott Parsons, "The Professions and Social Structure," Social Forces, 17 (May 1939: 457-467; also Parsons, The Social System, pp. 433-439.

that he or she must remain a specialist who goes unchallenged by others who lack the professional sanction. Attaining such autonomy necessitates the partaking of high professional standards and norms. It involves the acceptance of the idea that the only acceptable challenges are those deriving from one's peers, especially those who are prominent in the field.⁴⁷

Each of these six scales represents attributes of professions which, while necessary for the protection of both the public and the practitioner, do tend to block the innovative and perpetuate the traditions of the past. If those traditions were sufficient for the tasks at hand, then the profession might have been given credit for keeping up the standards and norms which were in fact as useful and prevalent as they were perceived to be. However, where the efforts of the professional are meeting with failure after failure, some of the blame must be placed at the profession's door. In the case of the planner's Image, professionalization seems to be acting as a restriction upon consideration of the task environment while promoting a regard for the biases and logic of non-task environment-rooted factors. Empirical evidence in this regard is extremely limited, but what there is of it seems to substantiate this conclusion.

⁴⁷Moore, pp. 15-16.

For instance, in his observations on the role of professionals in the Third World, Apter characterizes them (planners included) as being able to relate more to their training environment at Harvard than the society within which they are hired to function.⁴⁸ Ilchman, working with the evidence he and his colleagues gathered on middle-range planners,⁴⁹ discussed the planner as a rational-productivity bureaucrat who was the equivalent of Apter's professional. He noted that such bureaucrats pose problems for their employers because of their "professional" orientation which is extra-societal and extra-organizational in nature.⁵⁰ The evidence upon which that conclusion was based included the fact that of the 33 planners interviewed, all seemed to show a rather low level of national identification.⁵¹ This follows a point made by Moore that professionals are more likely to have a higher identification with their peer group than with clients or administrative co-workers. The pressure of professionalism is strong--strong enough even to lead to a disregard for relevant factors that might be the key to planning success.

⁴⁸Apter, Politics of Modernization, pp. 317-318.

⁴⁹See Ilchman, Ilchman, and Hastings.

⁵⁰Ilchman, pp. 474-479.

⁵¹Ilchman, Ilchman, and Hastings, pp. 68-70.

C. Conclusions

Through its determination of what messages the Image receives from the environment, the Image's strength can either facilitate or constrain the flexibility of the Image as a whole. Image flexibility is, in this regard, dependent upon a strength which permits as many relevant environment factors as possible to influence the Image's structure and content. The current planner's Image seems to fail in this regard since what should be relevant for development planning (that is, the condition of the various Third World societies at the time the various plans were drawn up) does not have a high degree of association with what we have determined to be the current Image configuration of planning Images. If our research results are valid in terms of Image strength, and if the subsequent conclusion that non-task environment factors take up the slack (of the task elements) can be adopted, then a key factor in the planner's Image and its role in determining planning success or failure has been uncovered.

The importance of this finding cannot be overemphasized. Image strength (as that portion of the Image which is in closest proximity to the environment) is perhaps the most malleable factor of the total Image configuration. Both Image content and structure validate themselves by standards which, to a large extent, they determine to be crucial. The measure of an Image's

strength, however, is centered on forces which the Image cannot control: the hard facts of the environment. Where the environmental factors do not challenge the Image with adverse messages, the Image will survive and perhaps take even deeper roots. Where there is a challenge the Image structure and content face a test of verification from the environment--assuming the message gets through the strength's protective screen. From this perspective, the importance of allowing information from the relevant environment to get through to the Image configuration becomes more obvious.

What is one to do if it is found that an Image (such as the planner's Image) suffers from an inflexibility which hinders the planning process and outcome? What if, as discussed in the last three chapters, the inflexibility is prompted by the very conditions of the Image's features? That is the next question to approach.

CHAPTER VI

CHANGING THE PLANNER'S IMAGE

The evidence presented in the preceding chapters seems to indicate that the dominant planner's Image in the contemporary Third World is inflexible, thereby adding to the trend of planning failures discussed in Chapter I. This conclusion raises a number of important questions. The first one is just how much does Image's inflexibility contribute to the failure of development planning as compared to societal, procedural/organizational, and other attitudinal factors? Second, are there feasible alternatives to the present Image configuration which will offer a greater degree of flexibility for the planners? If so, what does the Image concept as presented in this study tell us about changing the planner's Image?

The first question of how much blame for planning failure may be attributed to the planner's Image seeks an answer that is outside the scope of the present study. The task of this work has been to develop the Image concept so as to explore its potential. However, it would take another volume, many times the size of this one, to fully develop a clear picture of the causes of planning failure as well as to

examine the relevant data in this regard. For the present, one can only note that there are several factors leading to such policymaking failures, each of which must be carefully scrutinized before definitive statements may be made.

The second and third questions can be discussed in a limited fashion in these pages. In the first section of this chapter, the possibility of a replacement configuration for the current Image pattern is reviewed with specific attention given to the broadly based Parsonian theory of social action. The final two sections focus on how a change in the Image can be brought about given the conceptualization of the Image presented in Chapter II and several propositions developed from the literature of sociocultural change.

A. An Alternative Image Configuration?

While it might seem possible that Image flexibility can be increased utilizing the present configuration with some careful adjustments, consideration must be given to the argument that the act of increasing Image flexibility may involve replacing the current pattern with one which is less open to the bias, closedness and irrelevance noted in previous chapters. Within the social sciences there does exist a number of alternatives. One in particular seems to show promise in this regard: the Parsonian theory of social action.

The present Image is based upon the assumption that man lives by economic growth and wealth alone! The dominant planner's Image of today regards human desires as reducible to a need for an increased per capita G.N.P. with two cars in every garage as the human ultimate aim. The planning profession seems to have been appointed the proselytes of a culture which thrives on such values. They are employed to aid in the development of the Third World--a development which has become synonymous with achievement of material conditions prevailing in the United States, Western Europe, and so on.

The term development should not be defined in as limited a perspective as is prescribed by the material status of the so-called "advanced" world. This perception may prove to be extremely dangerous in light of several recent trends in the "developed" world. After having reviewed several major problem areas in "modern" societies, Edward J. Woodhouse comments that

the highly populated, urban-industrial society with a continuously growing economy is not the most "developed" collectivity ever organized, but it is one of the most dangerous to the perpetuation of the species. . . .

The poor nations, rather than seeking to emulate the rich, need to redefine development so that it does not involve great affluence which can probably never be

achieved. . . . Nations would of course adapt different paths, depending on current socioeconomic composition and available alternatives. . . .¹

Such discussions of the redefinition of development must become more specific--to the extent that the planner's Image will be one which will facilitate policymaking while releasing the planner from the conceptual traps of the inflexible Image pattern. A new "model" is needed. The economic-Gesellschaft-change Image, with its closed, circular logic and its disregard for relevant environmental factors, must be replaced by one which will be specific enough to permit the decision-maker to function effectively while remaining broad enough in his or her perceptions to allow a flexibility vis-à-vis the needs of the subject society.

The beauty of the Parsonian scheme is the attention it gives to all the major sectors of the life system, not just the economic. Basic to understanding the social system is a comprehension of and consideration for the biological, cultural, social, political, economic and psychological aspects of human action and its environment. Most of the emphasis of the theory is upon the total system of social activity. Mankind is more than homo economicus or homo politicus, etc.

¹Edward J. Woodhouse, "Re-Visioning the Future of the Third World: An Ecological Perspective on Development," World Politics, 25 (Oct. 1972): 29-30.

It is a combination of several interrelated subsystems. This part of the Parsonian model can be extremely useful for the planner's Image because it gives more weight to the total being and action of the species.

In addition to taking this total picture into account, Parsons' model also gives each sector or subsystem a position in relation to the other subsystems. Through the use of a "hierarchy of control and facilitation," the planner may be able to perceive the interactions among the several sectors. The utility of this scheme for recommending social policies can be immense.²

However, while the Parsonian model offers some of the ingredients for a more flexible planner's Image, it also has some major drawbacks which reduce the chances for its total and immediate adoption. For one thing, it has a definite Gesellschaft bias. The "modern" society in its urban, mass-consumption form is regarded as the ultimate and benign conclusion to evolutionary historical development. The value of Gemeinschaft structures, values and procedures for the developed societies or as a goal for the developing world is taken as very low. This is nowhere evidenced more clearly than

²See Parsons, The Social System; Parsons and Shils, eds., 1951; Parsons, Societies; Mitchell, 1967; and Scarritt, 1972.

in Parsons' positive view of those pattern variables which characterize the *Gesellschaft* part of his typology³ and the frequent association made by Parsons and his colleagues between Gemeinschaft-ness and the "primitive"-"rural"-"folk culture" existence of non-modern man. The potentials of non-Gesellschaft social forms and values are not considered possibilities for the future--they are considered just remnants of the past which we must suffer. The revised planner's Image must avoid such assumptions.

Perhaps by combining the useful portions of the Parsonian model with the better and more useful parts of several other social theories, a model for development might be derived which can aid in increasing Image flexibility and, therefore, planning success. There is only one definite requirement for the new Image, no matter what form it might take: it must be held by planners who remain continuously aware of the fact that their perceptions may have as much to do with their failures as societal, procedural/organization, or other factors. While the Parsonian scheme may offer a conceptual framework that is perhaps less subject to the biasedness, closedness and irrelevance of economic-Gesellschaft-change model, it too can become as inflexible as its predecessor. When such a situation arises,

³See Chapter II.

the willingness to change the planner's Image must be increased. This brings us to the next question about changing the planner's Image.

B. The Sources of Image Change

In the development of the Image concept through the use of the three aspects of content, structure, and strength, some foundation has been given for a discussion of changing that Image. Each of these aspects contains a distinct key to the manipulation of the entire configuration. Working on this very theoretical level, what insights might be obtained vis-à-vis the increasing of Image flexibility?

First, in terms of Image strength, it has been noted that the dispersal of the protective shield is such as to promote variations in the relationships between that Image and points in the environment. For instance, inflexibility was determined to be a result of an Image strength which renders the impact of irrelevant environmental factors more salient than that of relevant elements. The obvious goal for any change agent seeking to increase Image flexibility is to increase the planner's regard for his or her task environment while minimizing the concern for the non-task environment.⁴

⁴This is, of course, based upon the assumption that both Image content and structure are sufficiently flexible so as not to warrant any adjustments.

How may Image strength be manipulated? The primary strategy should involve some means by which the irrelevance of the non-task environment can be emphasized or at least clarified. The agent of the change should have such a means at its disposal; that is, it should be capable of communicating with the planner and convincing him or her that what is important for policy success is not the meeting of some standards totally extraneous to the subject society's situation, but rather the meeting of the needs of that society.

Such a tool may be available to a number of actors who are in contact with the planner. Using Benveniste's terminology, we may look to the Prince as such a change agent. He or she is, after all, the person who employs the planning expert and, therefore, the one who can impose certain demands upon the planner. The implementors, through their tasks of gathering information for and administering of the plans, might also have a means available for directing the planner toward the relevant aspects of the environment. Or the beneficiaries, by making their demands known and through the manipulation of their support for planning efforts, may be capable of bringing the planning expert to his or her senses in this regard.

However, the likelihood of these actors taking on the role of agent change is slight and the chances of the planner

adjusting to the demands of "politicians," "bureaucrats," or the "uninformed masses" are even slighter. One other group of actors seem to have the means available for bringing about the needed change in flexibility: the profession itself. The sanctions of a profession can be as great a tool for innovation and change as they can be for the forces of status quo orientations. For instance, planners might be advised through a retraining program that any conflict between task and non-task environment elements must be resolved in favor of the former. Using cases of planning failure in the past, an inventory can be made of the factors which have proven themselves useful in development planning as well as those that have shown themselves to have the opposite impact. Such a project, conducted under the auspices of the profession, would have an influence upon the individual planner many times greater than any other agent.

The inflexibility resulting from an Image structure's closedness seems to pose a different problem. Here it is not a matter of simply pointing out to the planner what is relevant or irrelevant, for the cause of the inflexibility runs deeper. It is the internal logic of the Image which must be manipulated in this case, and specifically it is the search for the primum mobile which must be interrupted. The change agent in this situation must be able to (1) make the planner aware of the

possibility that his or her perception of the problems of the Third World may be a key factor in planning failure, and (2) break the circular reasoning which characterizes the logical closure of the Image structure. Again, as one surveys the possible agents of change, one stands out: the profession and those who are sanctioned by it.⁵ By using some of the methods currently employed in substantiating the present Image structure, the profession can widen the perceptual scope of the planner and prompt theoretical exploration beyond the present search for the primum mobile with its emphasis upon the primacy of economic and material wealth.

Third, the degree to which an Image content causes the inflexibility can also be adjusted with the aid of a proper change agent. In this case, however, the range of possible strategies is extremely broad. Changing the Image content may involve manipulations ranging from a total replacement of the dominant configuration (a paradigm adjustment similar to Kuhn's "scientific revolution") to a minor adjustment in some selected portion of the Image pattern. In each case the goal is to reduce the bias of the Image content in order to increase Image flexibility. At the one extreme,

⁵For example, well-respected economists and other social scientists are currently regarded with favor by the Third World planner, i.e., Albert Hirschman, David C. McClelland, etc.

one would be faced with the task of re-socializing (not simply re-orienting or re-training) the practicing planners and revising some of the basic professional traditions that have built up over the years. The other extreme strategy is based upon a slow and pragmatic modification of the bias to the extent that the Image is not constrained by a warped content configuration. Whether the change agent selects one of these approaches or some middle course, one thing is certain: the adjustment on the Image content, being an assault upon the core of the Image itself, will be difficult to bring to fruition. In light of this, the choice of a change agent becomes even more difficult; and once again the only actor with the capacity to create such changes at the lowest cost seems to be the profession.

Finally, there is the situation where Image inflexibility is caused by more than one aspect of the Image. As a matter of fact, this situation would be the one most likely to occur due to the interrelationships between the three Image aspects of strength, structure and content. As illustrated in Figure 5, there exists a hierarchy of control and facilitation among these Image characteristics. Therefore, the inflexibility on one level is bound to have some impact on the next level and probably on the entire Image configuration. This was the situation in regard to the planner's Image. The extreme bias

of the Image content was complemented by the closure of the Image structure which was, in turn, protected and furthered by the relevance given to the non-task environment through the Image's strength. For the analyst, the question of uncovering the cause of Image inflexibility becomes a rather complicated one. Any attempt at manipulating one aspect of the Image may backfire due to the conditions of the other two. Under these circumstances, the task of increasing Image flexibility becomes one which calls for a change agent capable of dealing with an Image at numerous access points. Once again the obvious candidate for the job of inducing changes in the Image is the profession. The Prince, the implementors and the beneficiaries each have limited tools of persuasion vis-à-vis the planning expert. The profession can be seen to have the facilities to contend with the problems of Image flexibility at each point of access.

C. Creating the Change Agent

In Chapter V the profession was presented as an agent of the status quo, not as an agent of change. As it currently functions, the planning profession is not a channel for change, but one which perpetuates the predominance of the current planner's Image. The problem becomes one of converting the profession to an agent of change!

(Having thus reduced the problem, one must not lose sight of the fact that the ultimate goal is to overcome the trend of planning failures which have plagued development efforts in the Third World. What is to be discussed here is not the solution to that broad challenge, but rather one among many steps along the path toward conquering one possible cause for the failures, i.e., Image inflexibility.)

Beginning with the assumption that the profession is a social system,⁶ the possibility of reorienting the system's role toward that of a change agent may be analyzed through the use of several propositions found in the literature of socio-cultural change.⁷ It should be noted that the purpose of this change is not to destroy the professional social system, but rather to adjust the system so that it facilitates innovativeness as much as it controls it. Prior to suggesting any specific strategies in this regard, an inventory of sorts should be made of the system as it currently exists. For example, it is necessary to ascertain the professional social system's

⁶As noted in Chapter I, the professional social system includes institutions of planning and planning aid as well as individual planners. In short, those organizations such as the World Bank, the U.N., and the "developed" nations' foreign ministries which employ development planners are to be regarded as parts of the system under examination here.

⁷The following discussion relies heavily upon the propositional synthesis presented in Scarritt, 1972, pp. 14-23.

values vis-à-vis "innovativeness" within its ranks, the extent to which the system is internally consistent (i.e., integrated), the dispersion of power within the system and among its actors, and the extent to which the system is adapted to its environment.

According to the literature of sociocultural change, the "stronger the values and norms of innovativeness in a social . . . system, or a subsystem thereof, the more likely it is that change will take place." In order to act as a change agent, the profession must be capable and willing to introduce new devices and methods into their activities. The greater this capacity and willingness, the more likely it is that change will occur.⁸ From the information gathered in this study, it can be noted that the planning profession does not lack innovativeness; rather, it is the form of that innovativeness which limits the profession's ability to be a change agent. For instance, the profession sanctions Images which seek the primum mobile. Those who develop theories acceptable within this framework are well regarded. Development theorists such as W. Arthur Lewis are seen as leaders in the profession and are frequently invited to participate in major conferences and sit on prestigious commissions. Although

⁸ Scarritt, p. 15.

academicians by their background, such men are soon drafted by the planning "Establishment" into a variety of posts. Lewis, for example, has been the Director of the Colonial Development Corporation, the Deputy Managing Director of the U.N. Special Fund, a leader in the Jamaican planning program, a member of the highly respected Pearson Commission, and so on.⁹ His accomplishments have even brought him a title--a peer of the British realm.

On the other side of the coin are those academicians who have gone beyond the search for the primum mobile in their writings. The development programs they advocate are incongruent with those prescribed by the dominant planner's Image of today. Non-economists concerned with development or those economists who are regarded as "radicals" by the moderates who lead the profession are seldom approached to be practitioners, commissioners, directors, or advisors. Their positions in academia are guaranteed so long as planning practitioners consider their theories to be "unrealistic" and too far out of line to be allowed to take part in actual policymaking situations. The innovativeness which these individuals might bring to the planner's professional perceptions is blocked by an

⁹See Lester B. Pearson, et al., Partners in Development: Report of the Commission on International Development (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969), pp. 397-398.

emphasis upon values which currently dominate the development planning field.

The second part of the inventory of the professional social system involves an analysis of the integration of that system. Again relying on the evidence gathered for the present study, the indication is that the profession is well integrated--so much so that planners are more closely associated with each other across national lines than they are with members of the subject society. "The more completely integrated a social . . . system," notes Scarritt,¹⁰ "the less likely it is that change will take place." If Apter and those involved in the Ilchman, Ilchman, and Hastings study are correct, the likelihood of the professional social system changing is not very high. If there are any actors that are less integrated into the action system than others, they are not an obvious group. Perhaps a more in-depth study will uncover such a collectivity.

A third part of the inventory deals with the dispersion and/or concentration of power within the system. According to the propositions of sociocultural change theories, the "number of proposals for innovation tends to increase with the dispersion of power, the more crucial variable of the acceptance

¹⁰Scarritt, p. 15.

of proposals tends to increase with the concentration of power, up to quite high levels of concentration."¹¹ The implications of this proposition are two-fold. First, it suggests the need for decentralization within the professional social system while innovativeness is promoted. Second, it admits to the necessity for some concentration of the system's power in order to facilitate the acceptance of an adopted change. The current situation of the planning profession seems to be characterized by (1) a centralization of power in the World Bank, the U.N., and the ministries of the "developed" nations that seem to work against the innovativeness that might accompany a more dispersed power structure; and (2) enough of a dispersion of power to limit the power any actor or group of actors within the profession has vis-à-vis the acceptance or rejection of any particular proposal.

The centralization of power that does exist becomes obvious as one analyzes the manner in which development projects are financed. The resources of the World Bank, the United Nations, and the various "developed" countries known for their granting of massive aid manifest themselves in a power base which permits such organizations to greatly influence the programs structured in specific countries. Add to this the

¹¹Scarritt, p. 16.

facts of political life in most Third World countries (i.e., political instability and "strenuous competition for pathetically limited public funds") and one finds an environment more susceptible to a concentration of power than decentralization. The power in this situation is the ability of one unit in the profession to impose formal or informal sanctions upon the behavior of other units within the system. Albert O. Hirschman's report on various World Bank-financed projects offers numerous examples of how such an organization limited and directed the formulation and implementation processes of Third World planning efforts.¹²

In contrast to this situation is the picture one gets from such documents as the Pearson Commission Report which claims that current efforts by international agencies such as the World Bank, the U.N., and so forth "lacks direction and coherence."¹³ Instead of an optimal balance between that power centralization needed to facilitate the adoption or rejection of change and the decentralization of power necessary to produce alternative methods and goals, the planning profession seems to be plagued with a distribution of power which promotes the continuation of the present relationships within the system.

¹²Albert O. Hirschman, Development Projects Observed (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967).

¹³Pearson, et al., p. 22.

The adaptation of a social system to its environment is the final aspect of the social system which should be accounted for in this preliminary inventory. In the literature of socio-cultural change, the relevant proposition notes that the greater the degree of a system's adaptability to its environment, the less the likelihood for change.¹⁴ In regard to the planning profession, it is a system which is well adapted to an environment, but not the one which is relevant to its task. Just as the non-task environment is seen as primary for the planner's environment, so it is the most salient reference point for the professional. What is important for the planner is his or her reception among other professional planners and his or her ability to "correctly" use the tools at the disposal of experts. The evaluation of policy efforts is a matter for those who use standards that are "accepted" among the established authorities in the field. It is not the judgment of the Prince, the implementor, or the beneficiaries which matters; rather, it is the verdict of fellow planners which counts. As long as professional planners feel secure in the use of those standards--that is, so long as they perceive themselves to be well adapted to the "right" criteria--the chance for successful change policies is severely limited.

¹⁴ Scarritt, p. 10.

Yet the inventory cannot ignore the fact that planners do criticize themselves for having failed in their attempts at Third World "development." The standards of the Prince and other actors do seem to have some impact. Relevant elements in the environment eventually make themselves felt. It is at this adaptative level that the weak link in the professional social system exposes itself; and it is at this point of access that the innovators have their best chance of facilitating change.

Having analyzed the system as it exists at present, the next logical step would be a preliminary examination of the sources and means for bringing about the desired changes. In attempting to make the professional system an agent of change, there are four access points open to us: the system's values and norms; its integration; its power structure; or its adaptation to its environment. The source of such changes can be either external or internal.¹⁵ External sources include the Prince, the implementors, the beneficiaries, or other actors outside the professional social system. The principal sources internal to the system are the various disagreements and conflicts between collectivities and among the members of any group within the profession. From the evidence uncovered

¹⁵Scarritt, p. 16.

in this writer's examination of the planner's image it can be hypothesized that the more likely choice for a change source would be the internal type. Two competing theories within the profession will attract more attention, it seems, than any suggestion that an external source might make. Recommendations or commands from Princes or implementors or beneficiaries will be heard but disregarded on the basis that these other actors lack the expertise needed to produce any profound ideas.

Besides the question of external or internal sources, one must consider the type of messages to be used in facilitating the change process. Should the message be communicated in terms of roles (money), collectivities (power), norms (influence), or values (commitments)?¹⁶ According to the propositional synthesis given by Scarritt, the more materialistic the message content, the easier it will be to communicate it between and among systems and subsystems. Roles are more communicable than collectivities which are more easily transmitted than norms, and so forth.¹⁷ Messages aimed at facilitating change will therefore have less obstacles to contend with if they are attempted at the materialistic levels. Professional planners will be more likely to adjust themselves to the demands of the financial agent in the planning process than they would

¹⁶ See Scarritt, pp. 8-11.

¹⁷ Scarritt, pp. 10-17.

to some agent of system change which communicates only in terms of theories and other forms of values. This, in a sense, is the key to the power which is presently held by the World Bank and other such units. The basis of their influence and power is their ability to finance much of a planner's projects. They demand certain commitments in exchange for their aid--a practice which has been perceived as an evil as much as a good. If one were looking for the easiest access to the professional social system, the financing units in the planning process offer the best possibilities.

This last suggestion presents the first of several ironies in this suggested process for changing the profession into an innovative organization. The financing units, currently a foundation for the present system's lack of innovativeness, are being put forth here as some of the best tools to use in changing that system. It is not a matter of eliminating the basis for the present system, but rather a matter of using that foundation in its current role so as to create the change in the system. This strategy is further supported by another proposition of sociocultural change which holds that, except "in conditions of extreme systemic breakdown, a social . . . system is more likely to accept new elements which are compatible with preexisting elements than those which are not compatible." A change process will have a greater likelihood for success

where the changes are perceived to be of a form which is similar to or complementary with the present system.¹⁸ Here is a second irony, for what is being advocated is the use of the present values and norms of the system--that is, the dominant planner's Image--in a process aimed at changing those values and norms. By giving the professional planners messages of change which they understand and perceive as useful, many of the constraints on system change are overcome--or at least eased.¹⁹ Through the use of the dominant Image within the profession, the change message can be given the compatibility and perceived utility that will open the system to its own change.²⁰

Throughout this process of selecting the means and sources of system change, the innovator must remain aware of his

¹⁸ Scarritt, p. 17.

¹⁹ Scarritt, p. 18.

²⁰ The reader is reminded of the goal of the change process being recommended here. The change being sought is not a total one; rather, we are seeking to adjust the orientation of the profession. If the total professional social system were to be changed, then the use of the dominant planner's Image or agents such as the World Bank in the process might be questioned. However, we are seeking a limited change which will minimize the impact of changes so far as the beneficial aspects of the professional systems are concerned.

In light of this qualification, the change process being suggested here might be regarded as incremental rather than revolutionary. There is no denying the potential or value of revolutionary changes in many cases, but for present purposes such radical adjustments are not called for.

or her role. This awareness will help to bring about the desired change because it will work against the innovator becoming one of the system's defenders. By suggesting strategies which are to adopt the basic parts of the system as tools for change, one faces the danger of promoting no change at all. So long as the planner's Image and the institutions used are regarded by the innovator as tools and not as ends-in-themselves, the chance for facilitating change is increased. The basic Image theme of economic-Gesellschaft-change oriented planning must be regarded as a means toward opening the professional social system. The U.N. and the World Bank should be regarded as tools for change rather than authoritative organizations toward which one looks for suggestions. This awareness is an essential ingredient in the attempt to change the professional social system. It will allow the innovator to increase his or her capacity to facilitate and control the process being undertaken.

There are a number of sociocultural change propositions that are relevant to the innovator's ability to facilitate and control the desired changes. For instance, it is noted that any new element coming into the system "is likely to be re-interpreted or modified in such a way that it will be more compatible with the existing structure of the system."²¹

²¹Scarritt, p. 20.

Taking this and similar propositions into account,²² the fruitfulness of the suggested change processes is brought into doubt. Unless care is taken in the formulation and implementation of change messages, the result may be a translation of the innovator's words into meanings which support the status quo rather than promote change. For example, many social analysts have tried to point out the importance of social development for the Third World. Their intention has been to correct the idea that development entails only an increase in per capita income growth. The response of planning experts has been to convert such recommendations into strategies which consider social development as an important prerequisite for economic growth. The original message was adjusted to fit the value system of the profession. The profession, so deeply involved in its restricted conceptualizations, can only perceive what it wishes to perceive--and then only in its own terms.

Taking this behavior into consideration, the innovator must be able to adjust for its impact. The change message

²²For instance, the "mobilization of collectivities to exercise power and influence in support of change is likely to result in countermobilization to resist change"; and "resistance to new elements introduced by invention is likely to come soon after the initial adoption, while elements introduced by diffusion are more likely to be given a longer trial"; etc. See Scarritt, pp. 20-22.

must be given a form calculated to overcome the impact of re-interpretation. This might mean relying more upon subverting the professional consensus than declaring an opposing theoretical stance. Raising questions about current roles, power relationships, norms and values would create an instability within the system which would open the profession to messages with greater content. Pointing out the inconsistencies in the economic theory of development will accomplish more in the beginning than the positing of a broader social theory; questioning the value of the Gesellschaft society might do more than declaring the value of Gemeinschaft structures; and pointing out the dangers of an unquestioning orientation toward "change" strategies in planning would probably be more useful than noting that this or that institution or social condition should be retained as an aid in development. These questions will be reinterpreted, but it is more than likely that they will become doubts instead of substantiations of the present system.

In a similar vein, the proposition that any mobilization of support for change will result in a countermobilization can also be used to further change. An innovator with a knowledge of the various behavior patterns of groups within the profession can calculate what would occur if certain groups were mobilized in favor of one variation of planning strategies. Setting

group A in favor of strategy a, for instance, might bring it into conflict with groups B and C which each holds to its own strategy. Even though the innovator may wish to promote a strategy advocated by neither A nor B nor C, the circumstances for obtaining a hearing of his or her strategy might develop. The messages which bring about these conditions are therefore not necessarily of the type which directly communicates the change to the system.

The social change process is obviously complex. Attempts to change the profession to increase Image flexibility can be frustrating unless numerous calculations based upon an enormous amount of information are utilized. If we were to determine that Image inflexibility is due to only one of the three aspects of the planner's Image, the adjustments needed in order to reorient the professional planners' social system might be reduced. For example, where Image strength is determined to be the cause of the inflexibility, the profession need only be changed to the extent that it sanctions the consideration of task environment factors over non-task elements. But the causes of Image inflexibility among planners seem to involve all three aspects of the Image, thus bringing about the need for a more complicated set of changes in the professional social system. Again, further consideration of this topic must be deferred to a distinct study which could do more than just speculate on the basis of the limited information here.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

As described in Chapters II and III, the content analysis used in this study was based on a search for specific themes in "plan objective" statements found in specific "objectives" chapters for thirty national development plans of recent origin. In this appendix we will (1) give the sources of the data; (2) describe the procedure and reliability of the content analysis; and (3) present a read-out of the raw data obtained in the study.

Data Sources

The thirty countries used were noted in Chapter II, and the reasoning behind their selection was briefly discussed. To recapitulate, this study is not based on the analysis of a scientifically selected sample from an entire population. There were a number of determining factors, including the availability of the necessary material. It was decided that, at minimum, the sample should be dispersed to as many geographic and linguistic areas as possible. Five regions were therefore structured and six countries within each region were chosen for the analysis. These regions were each given a code number as follows:

- 1 - Anglophone and Eastern Africa
- 2 - Francophone and Central Africa
- 3 - Asia/Pacific
- 4 - Latin America
- 5 - Middle East and Asia Minor

Each country within those regions was designated by a second number ranging from one through six. Thus, each country had a designation which noted its region and specific country title. These numbers are given below with a specific description of the "objectives" chapter used for the analysis and the plans from which they were drawn.

- 11: Republic of Botswana. National Development Plan 1968-73. Gaberones, 19y8, Chapter II.
- 12: Imperial Ethiopian Government, The Planning Commission. Third Five-Year Development Plan 1961-1965 E.C. (1968-1973). Addis Ababa, 1961 (1968), Chapter I.
- 13: Republic of Kenya, Ministry for Economic Planning and Development. Development Plan 1970-1972. n.p., n.d., Chapter 1.
- 14: Federal Republic of Nigeria. Second National Development Plan 1970-74. Lagos, 1970, Chapter 4.
- 15: Tanzania. Second Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development 1st July 1969 - 30th June 1974. Dar Es Salaam, 1970, Volume I, Chapter 1.
- 16: Republic of Zambia, Ministry of Development Planning and National Guidance. Second National Development Plan January 1972 - December 1976. Lusaka, 1971, pp. 33-36.

- 21: Republique du Burundi. Plan Quinquennal de Développement Économique et Social du Burundi 1968-1972. n.p., n.d., pp. 9-22.
- 22: Republique Centrafricaine. Plan de Développement Économique et Social 1967-1970. n.p., n.d., Titre II.
- 23: Republique du Tchad, Ministère du Plan et de la Coopération. Premier Plan Quinquennal de Développement Économique et Social 1966-1970. n.p., n.d., pp. 5-8.
- 24: Republic du Dahomey. Plan de Développement Économique et Social 1966-1970. n.p., n.d., Chapitre III.
- 25: Republique Gabonaise. Plan de Développement Économique et Social 1966-1970. n.p., n.d., Chapter II.
- 26: Republique Togolaise, Ministère des Finances, de l'Économie et du Plan. Plan de Développement Économique et Social 1971-1975. Lomé, n.d., Section II.
- 31: Government of Ceylon, Ministry of Planning and Employment. The Five Year Plan 1972-1976. Colombo, 1971, Chapter 1.
- 32: Government of India, Planning Commission. Fourth Five Year Plan 1969-1974, Draft. n.p., n.d., Chapter 1.
- 33: Republic of Indonesia. The First Five-Year Development Plan (1969/70 - 1973/74). n.p., n.d., Chapter I.
- 34: Government of the Republic of Korea, Economic Planning Board. The Third Five-Year Economic Development Plan 1972-1976. n.p., 1971, Chapter I.
- 35: Nepal, National Planning Commission. Fourth Plan (1970-1975). Singha Durbar, Kathmandu, 1972, Chapter I.
- 36: Government of Thailand, National Economic Development Board. The Second National Economic and Social Development Plan (1967-1971). Bangkok, n.d., Chapter III.
- 41: República Argentina, Presidencia de la Nación, Secretarios del Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo y Del Consejo Nacional de Seguridad. Plan Nacional de Desarrollo y Seguridad 1971-1975. n.p., 1971, pp. 17-19.

- 42: Barbados. Development Plan 1969-1972. n.p., n.d., Chapter III.
- 43: Federative Republic of Brazil. First National Development Plan 1972/74. n.p., 1971, Chapter I.
- 44: Guatemala, Secretaria General del Consejo Nacional de Planificacion Economica. Plan de Desarrollo 1971-1975. n.p., 1970, Tomo I, Seccion Primera, Capitulo I.
- 45: Paraguay, Presidencia de la República, Secretaría Técnica de Planificacion. Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Economic y Social 1971-1985: Sintesis del Plan General y Sectorial. n.p., 1970, pp. 10-17.
- 46: República Peruiana, Presidencia de la República. Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Para 1971-1975: Volume I, Plan Global. n.p., 1971, Capitulo I.
- 51: Royal Government of Afghanistan, Ministry of Planning. An English Translation of the Third Five Year Economic and Social Plan of Afghanistan 1967-1971. n.p., 1967; pp. 25-39.
- 52: Iraq. Law No. 70 of 1970: The National Development Plan for the Fiscal Years 1970-1974. n.p., n.d., pp. 149-151.
- 53: Kingdom of Morocco, Prime Minister, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Planning and the Training of Senior Grades. Five Year Plan 1968-1972. n.p., n.d., Volume I, Section II, Chapter I.
- 54: Democratic Republic of the Sudan, Ministry of Planning. The Five Year Plan of Social and Economic Development of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan for the Period 1970/71-1974/75, Volume I: Major Trends of Development. Khartoum, 1970, Chapter II.
- 55: République Tunisienne, Secretariat d'État au Plan et l'Économie Nationale. Plan Quadriennal 1965-1968. Tunis, n.d., pp. 11-21.
- 56: Republic of Turkey, Prime Ministry, State Planning Organization. Second Five-Year Development Plan 1968-1972. Ankara, 1969, pp. 3-5.

Process and Reliability of the Analysis

In order to present the reader with a brief explanation of how the thematic content analysis was carried out, I have included the following instructions for the reliability tests which were undertaken in order to obtain some measure of how reliable my coding of the data was.

Reliability test - Part One:

The reliability of my content analysis will be tested in two parts. This first test seeks to determine the reliability of my selection of PLAN OBJECTIVES, the particular units which I analyze in my dissertation. Attached to this sheet of instructions are two chapters from different national development plans in the Third World. You will note that each and every line in these chapters has been given a number. These are the only markings relevant to your testing of the reliability. All other markings should be ignored. They mean absolutely nothing in terms of the present concern.

Briefly, your task will be to designate those parts of each chapter which are classifiable as PLAN OBJECTIVES. A PLAN OBJECTIVE is a coherent and complete statement within each chapter that gives the reader an idea as to the goals being sought by the plan's authors. Such goals may be of a primary or ultimate nature ("the purpose of this plan is to promote the good life in this country") or of a secondary type ("a political infrastructure must be built on a sound foundation before economic stabilization policies can be put to use"). At the same time, there are goals which are trivial and of no concern for this study ("we must build a bridge over the river near the town of Ossollo so as to keep the peanut trade high") and these must be ignored. In addition, these plans sometimes state the goals of planning itself ("to make decision-making more rational") and these too must be passed over. I am only interested in how the planners who authored these plans perceive the ends they must reach through policymaking. It is their view of the future and the goals to be met in order to attain that future that concerns me. These are the statements you must pick out for me.

PLAN OBJECTIVES will take forms which vary in size from total paragraphs (P); to portions of paragraphs, being more than one sentence but less than a paragraph (F); to a simple sentence (S); or to a sentence fragment (E). Whenever possible, the larger units should be used. A paragraph is to be favored as a unit over a paragraph fragment which is to be looked for before a sentence, etc. See the examples on the next page.

After finding the PLAN OBJECTIVE, note this fact on a piece of paper which is headed by the country's name at the top. Designate the objective by the line number upon which the unit begins, the type of unit being used (P,F,S, or E), and the first word in that unit.

Examples:

- 1 a. At the end of the Five Year Plan, population growth
- 2 should be at a level commensurate with the promotion
- 3 of economic growth at a level of 4.8% per annum.
- 4 This means establishing programs of birth control
- 5 which will keep the population growth rate below
- 6 the normal 3% per year level. Such a program should
- 7 be financed through the public treasury.

(In this first example, the only notation would be 1P At showing that the entire paragraph is a goal for the plan. The presence of a goal in "establishing programs of birth control" is really a modification of the real and primary ends of population growth for the purpose of aiding economic growth.)

- 1 b. Action in the tourism sector has produced more rapid
- 2 and concrete results than the agricultural sector.
- 3 Still, there is much more potential to be unlocked in
- 4 this area. In view of this, one of the priorities of
- 5 the next plan will be the continued development of the
- tourist trade.

(In example b, the notation would be 4S In since no goal was stated until the last sentence. Until that point the discussion centered upon the past performance of the tourist sector as opposed to the agriculture sector.)

- 1 c. The goals of this plan are:
- 2 --to attain an economic growth rate of
- 3 4.8% over the next three years;
- 4 --to establish an economic infrastructure
- 5 which will be able to sustain growth
- 6 in the future;
- 7 --to establish a democratic political and
- 8 social order as soon as possible

(In the third example, the notations would be 2F to
4F to
7F to

This is a little tricky since there are a number of goals stated within a one-sentence paragraph. This is a common format of Third World planners. Instead of regarding this as a sentence unit, look at it as a paragraph unit in which subparagraph fragments each state a particular goal. Again, try to use the largest unit size in giving your designations.)

- 1 d. In regard to industrial development, it must
- 2 be perceived in terms of a number of principles:
- 3 --development should be in accordance
- 4 with local feasibility;
- 5 --it should be coordinated with possible
- 6 market outlets; and
- 7 --it should aid in the development of
- 8 other sectors in the economy wher-
- 9 ever possible.

(There is no notation here since there is no PLAN OBJECTIVE being presented. Just because a paragraph is a discussion of industrial development or some other goal does not mean it is a goal statement. Avoid falling into the trap of relegating every mention of development or the future into the category of an objective.)

Reliability Test - Part Two

In this part of the testing for reliability you are asked to judge the content of several PLAN OBJECTIVES which have been chosen from two chapters of different national development plans. The goal of my study was to find what each designated PLAN OBJECTIVE said about (1) the type of social relationships desired by the planning statement; (2) the attitude of the planners toward the use or non-use of the present society in attaining the desired goals and (3) the role played by various function systems within a society in the process of planning for desired results.

Attached to this sheet are the two documents with which you will be working. Read each in its entirety. You will come across certain paragraphs, sentences, fragments, etc. which are marked off by green brackets. When you come to these, ask yourself three distinct questions about the bracketed statements:

(a) Does the statement reflect a desire for an individualistic/atomistic society based on the model idealized as "modernity?" If so, write down the line number where the statement begins and then note GES next to that number. On the other hand, what if the statement calls for a society based upon organic, communal relationships? In that case mark the letters GEM next to the line number. If the statement does not seem to take a stand for either type of social relationships and structure, mark the letters NA next to the line number.

(b) The next question asks whether the statements are change oriented or maintenance oriented. A plan need not, by definition, call for the change of present institutions. It might, in fact, seek to keep the present condition intact as a means of furthering development. In each statement, ask yourself whether the goal is change or maintenance oriented and then mark CH or MAI next to your previous designation in regard to (a). If you feel that the statement says nothing along this line, note by the letters NO.

(c) The last question seeks to determine what sector in the social system the objective seeks to work in. If the goal means tampering with the economic growth rate or the economic structure, mark with the letters AP after your designation for (a) and (b). If the objective seeks to adjust the distribution of wealth or prestige among classes or other social strata, mark with an IN. Where the power distribution in a system is the target, note by GA. Finally, where the cultural sector of values and ideology are to be the target of the plan objective, designate by PM. If no sector seems to be involved, use the letter NS.

Example:

- 1 [We must rebuild our society from scratch after the
- 2 current constraints have been overcome. A social
- 3 structure must be constructed which will give each
- 4 individual a share in the wealth.]

(In this example, the notation would be LNA/CH/IN since there is no statement of what the future society should look like, but there is the inherent idea that the present structure must be eliminated and a new distribution of wealth must take its place.)

1 [The primary goal of this plan is to achieve an economic
 2 growth rate well above that reached in the past. This
 3 means a basic change in infrastructure of the economy
 4 away from the tribalism of yesterday and toward the
 5 rationalism of the modern world.]
 (The obvious notation here is LGES/CH/AP).

Having carried out this coding task, each of the three individuals taking part in the reliability test was asked to comment on the clarity of the instructions and the difficulty of the coding. There were no major problems discussed, and only some minor points of clarification were brought up. The coefficient of reliability was then calculated in accordance with the following formula:

$$C.R. = \frac{2M}{N_1 + N_2}$$

where M is the number of coding decisions on which the present writer and the individual test coder agree, and N_1 and N_2 refer to the number of coding decisions made by the two coders. The resulting reliability coefficients are reported in Chapter II.¹ This coefficient formula is widely used and is regarded as quite acceptable. The one criticism of its results is that "it does not take into account the extent of inter-coder agreement which may result from chance." While there have

¹See Holsti, p. 140.

been measures developed to make up for this drawback, they were not found useful for the present study.²

The Data

On the following pages the data resulting from the content analysis is presented in coded form. There are fourteen columns used in this coding, and these are to be read as follows:

- Column 1: designates the regional category into which the analyzed unit falls. See the first section of this appendix.
- Column 2: designates the country from which the unit has been derived when used in conjunction with column 1. See the first section of this appendix.
- Columns 3 through 5: denote the plan objective being analyzed from 001 to 999. Example: "11001" means the first plan objective in the Botswana document.
- Column 6: gives the form of the plan objective being analyzed. As described in the reliability test instructions, the designations are as follows: P is for paragraphs; S is for sentences; F is for fragments of paragraph (more than a sentence, less than a full paragraph); and E denotes a sentence fragment.
- Columns 7 through 10: give the sentence or line number within the source where the plan objective begins. Thus "11001S0006" states that the first plan objective in the Botswana objective chapter is a sentence which begins on line 6. "32033P1052" points to the thirty-third plan objective in the Indian document which is a paragraph found on line 1052.
- Column 11: is blank.
- Columns 12 through 14: presents the themes found in these plan objectives. Column 12 designates whether the objective is maintenance ("1"), or change ("2") oriented or whether that theme is not ascertainable ("0"). Column 13 shows whether the plan objective is Gemeinschaft ("1") or Gesellschaft ("2") oriented or not ascertainable ("0"). Finally, column 14 reflects

²See Holsti, p. 140.

the plan objectives orientation toward the adaptation ("1"), goal attainment ("2"), integration ("3") or pattern maintenance ("4") subsystem of society, or whether this particular theme could not be ascertained within the plan objective ("0").

From this data the cross-tabulations presented in the tables in Chapter II are derived.

11001S0008	021	13003E0004	001	14007P0007	201
11002P0008	201	13004E0009	003	14008P0008	201
11003S0120	002	13005P0009	203	14009S0008	203
11004S0123	103	13006P0018	021	14010S0000	201
11005P0131	201	13007P0040	203	14011P0009	203
11006S0152	201	13008P0064	203	14012P0009	220
11007P0162	203	13009P0131	203	14013P0109	001
11008S0230	003	13010P0157	001	14014P0117	201
11009S0244	103	13011P0169	201	14015P0129	201
11010S0251	003	13012F0189	201	14016P0142	201
11011S0263	001	13013P0195	201	14017P0154	203
11012F0268	201	13014E0201	003	14018P0163	201
11013P0277	203	13015P0207	001	14019F0180	201
11014P0287	203	13016P0246	203	14020S0185	203
11015P0297	201	13017P0264	201	14021F0192	001
11016P0355	201	13018S0281	201	14022P0215	201
11017P0367	201	13019P0289	001	14023S0241	201
11018P0378	003	13020S0314	201	14024S0244	200
11019P0387	221	13021P0322	203	14025S0245	200
11020P0431	103	13022P0332	101	14026S0246	200
11021P0446	201	13023P0342	203	14027S0248	221
11022P0460	201	13024P0354	201	14028S0250	201
11023P0498	201	13025P0381	203	14029S0254	201
11024P0525	221	13026P0389	203	14030S0256	201
11025P0550	201	13027P0394	201	14031S0260	201
11026P0561	001	13028P0412	201	14032S0262	203
11027P0575	201	13029P0425	201	14033S0264	203
11028P0624	101	13030P0432	201	15001S0004	003
11029P0641	201	13031E0442	201	15002S0006	013
11030P0669	101	13032F0439	201	15003S0009	002
11031P0702	201	13033P0442	201	15004S0012	201
11032P0741	001	13034S0471	201	15005S0015	101
12001P0009	201	13035P0480	201	15006P0017	201
12002P0013	201	13036P0490	201	15007P0047	201
12003S0020	201	13037P0496	201	15008F0059	203
12004S0022	201	13038P0501	201	15009F0071	201
12005P0029	203	13039P0532	202	15010E0088	201
12006P0033	201	13040P0543	203	15011E0089	203
12007P0045	201	13041P0566	201	15012P0100	201
12008P0075	201	13042P0586	203	15013P0127	201
12009P0103	201	13043P0599	101	15014S0136	201
12010P0127	201	13044P0617	201	15015P0150	211
12011P0134	001	13045P0653	201	15016P0161	001
12012S0146	201	13046S0734	003	15017E0174	002
12013S0148	201	14001P0024	003	15018E0177	012
12014P0153	201	14002E0056	003	15019P0180	212
12015P0171	203	14003E0057	001	15020P0186	201
12016P0191	203	14004E0058	003	15021P0190	201
13001E0003	001	14005E0059	003	15022P0200	211
13002L0004	003	14006P0063	203	15023P0211	201

15024P0220	201	22005PC066	201	24C14F0070	201
15025P0227	203	22006PC091	204	24C15F0071	201
15026P0250	101	22007P0087	202	24C16F0075	201
15027P0289	201	22008EC039	201	24C17F0076	201
15028P0300	201	22009EC101	201	24C18P0078	201
15029P0307	201	22C10P0103	202	24C19F0083	201
15030P0329	201	22011EC113	201	24C20F0085	201
15031P0340	201	22012EC115	201	24C21F0087	201
15032P0366	203	22013EC117	201	24022F0089	201
15033P0376	201	22C14PC123	201	24C23F0091	201
15034P0380	203	22015PC128	201	24024F0092	201
15035P0394	203	22C16P0134	201	24C25P0099	201
15036P0400	202	22017P0143	201	24C26P0102	201
16001S0003	201	22018P0150	201	24027P0109	202
16002F0032	201	22019P0158	201	24C28P0114	201
16003F0035	221	22C20P0168	201	24C29P0134	201
16004F0042	201	22021PC176	201	24C30P0140	201
16005F0053	201	22022PC185	203	24C31P0146	201
16006F0056	201	23001E0013	221	25CC1P0064	203
16007F0064	201	23002E0015	201	25CC2P0082	201
16008F0075	203	23003EC016	201	25CC3P0091	201
16009F0082	202	23004P0023	201	25CC4P0102	201
16010P0098	201	23005F0035	203	25CC5S0107	221
16011P0120	201	23C06F0036	201	25CC6P0110	221
16012P0133	201	23007P0041	201	25CC7P0115	201
16013P0142	201	23008P0046	201	25CC8S0123	201
16014P0145	201	23009P0062	201	25CC9S0124	201
16015P0151	201	23C10P0071	201	25C10S0125	201
16016P0156	201	23011P0076	203	25C11S0128	201
16017P0176	203	23C12P0081	201	25C12S0130	201
16018P0186	203	23013S0086	203	25013S0134	201
16019PC191	203	23014S0087	201	25C14S0136	201
16020P0198	201	23015PC089	203	25C15P0139	201
16021P0204	202	23016P0098	201	25016S0144	201
21001P0159	201	23017P0103	201	25017S0146	201
21002P0175	201	23018P0107	201	25C18S0147	201
21003P0179	201	23019PC114	203	25C19S0148	201
21004P0185	201	24001P0001	201	25020P0152	201
21005P0210	201	24002P0013	201	260C1P0001	201
21006P0216	201	24003P0015	203	26CC2P0007	201
21007P0220	201	24004P0017	201	26CC3S0018	204
21008P0251	201	24005P0022	201	260C4S0022	201
21009P0263	202	24006P0025	201	260C5P0027	202
21016P0314	201	24007P0028	201	26CC6P0031	202
21011PC325	201	24008P0032	201	26CC7P0039	202
21C12P0330	201	24009PC043	201	26CC8P0047	201
22001P0023	203	24C10P0051	202	26CC9P0058	203
22002P0029	203	24011P0061	201	26C10P0070	201
22003P0037	202	24012P0065	202	26C11P0070	203
22004P0045	201	24C13F0069	203	26C12F0074	201

26013F0076	201	31031P0625	201	33010P0347	201
26014F0079	201	31032P0647	203	33011P0361	201
26015F0081	202	31033P0676	201	33012P0370	201
26016P0085	202	31034P0704	201	33013P0386	201
26017P0088	201	31035P0718	201	33014P0392	204
26018P0114	201	31036P0725	201	33015P0399	202
26019P0117	221	31037P0741	201	33016P0405	201
26020P0135	201	32001SC139	201	33017P0421	201
26021P0142	201	32002SC143	203	33018P0437	201
26022P0152	201	32003P0153	201	33019P0483	201
26023P0159	201	32004F0444	201	33020P0537	201
26024P0173	201	32005P0458	201	33021P0584	201
26025P0176	201	32006P0462	201	34001S0019	201
26026P0180	201	32007F0479	201	34002S0020	203
26027P0203	202	32008P0505	201	34003P0023	201
26028P0217	201	32009P0523	203	34004P0026	201
26029P0227	203	32010F0558	201	34005P0035	201
26030P0227	201	32011P0566	201	34006F0038	201
26031P0247	201	32012P0569	203	34007F0040	201
26032P0255	201	32013F0613	221	34008F0044	203
31001S0039	203	32014F0620	223	34009F0047	201
31002S0042	203	32015P0632	201	34010F0049	201
31003P0052	201	32016P0710	201	34011F0051	201
31004P0079	203	32017S0725	203	34012F0054	201
31005PC092	203	32018F0730	203	34013F0056	201
31006PC102	201	32019P0745	201	34014F0059	203
31007P0119	201	32020P0760	201	35001S0003	201
31008P0172	201	32021P0781	201	35002S0006	203
31009P0197	201	32022PC804	203	35003S0007	201
31010P0310	201	32023P0842	203	35004P0035	201
31011P0338	201	32024P0853	201	35005P0055	201
31012F0371	201	32025P0895	202	35006P0067	201
31013F0383	201	32026PC931	201	35007P0077	201
31014F0387	203	32027EC956	102	35008P0092	201
31015F0389	203	32028EC957	103	35009P0112	203
31016F0395	221	32029P0966	203	35010P0129	201
31017F0472	201	32030P0974	201	35011P0142	201
31018F0474	201	32031P1008	201	35012P0147	201
31019F0476	201	32032F1034	201	35013P0172	201
31020F0478	201	32033P1052	203	35014P0190	201
31021F0481	201	32034P1059	201	35015P0206	201
31022F0482	202	33001P0071	201	35016P0217	201
31023P0527	201	33002S0144	201	35017P0260	201
31024P0541	221	33003P0228	201	35018P0275	203
31025F0557	201	33004PC233	201	36001P0003	201
31026S0561	201	33005P0244	201	36002P0006	203
31027P0566	201	33006P0255	201	36003P0009	101
31028P0575	201	33007P0272	201	36004P0010	102
31029P0579	201	33008P0298	201	36005F0015	201
31030P0617	203	33009P0303	201	36006E0016	203

36007P0022	201	42014F0293	201	44031S0277	201
36008P0033	201	42015F0296	201	44032F0288	203
36009S0042	203	42016F0298	201	44033F0295	203
36010P0044	201	42017E0300	201	44034F0303	203
36011P0051	201	42018E0301	203	44035F0312	203
36012P0056	203	42019F0303	201	44036E0337	201
36013P0065	101	43001P0063	220	44037F0337	203
36014PC076	202	43002F0067	201	44038F0368	203
36015P0083	201	43003F0069	202	44039F0379	203
41001P0001	002	43004P0081	220	44040P0404	201
41002P0004	001	43005P0083	201	44041P0412	201
41003F0006	003	43006F0090	201	44042P0452	203
41004F0007	204	43007F0092	201	44043F0474	201
41005P0009	203	43008F0095	201	44044F0480	201
41006P0013	201	43009P0100	003	44045F0486	203
41007P0020	000	43010E0102	220	45001P0028	201
41008P0053	202	43011E0103	201	45002P0028	203
41009P0080	201	43012E0103	203	45003P0031	201
41010P0098	203	43013P0105	102	45004P0031	203
41011P0107	203	43014P0107	102	45005P0034	201
41012P0111	203	44001S0022	201	45006P0037	201
41013P0112	203	44002S0024	201	45007P0039	201
41014P0130	001	44003S0028	201	45008P0045	201
41015P0133	201	44004S0029	203	45009P0049	201
41016P0139	201	44005S0030	201	45010P0052	201
41017E0171	004	44006S0032	201	45011P0057	201
41018E0173	002	44007P0033	201	45012P0072	201
41019E0173	001	44008F0048	201	45013P0092	201
41020P0310	201	44009F0049	203	45014P0104	201
41021P0312	201	44010F0050	204	45015P0120	201
41022P0314	201	44011F0056	201	45016P0128	201
41023P0317	201	44012P0059	201	45017P0141	201
41024P0320	201	44013P0067	201	45018P0160	201
41025F0323	201	44014P0075	201	45019P0178	201
41026F0324	203	44015P0078	201	45020P0187	201
41027P0326	201	44016P0122	201	45021P0195	201
41028P0328	201	44017P0137	201	45022P0200	201
42001P0107	201	44018F0171	201	45023P0205	201
42002P0116	201	44019F0177	201	45024P0219	201
42003P0136	201	44020F0179	201	45025P0226	201
42004P0170	101	44021F0181	201	45026P0234	201
42005P0189	001	44022F0187	201	45027P0241	201
42006P0211	201	44023F0188	203	45028P0249	201
42007F0222	201	44024F0189	221	45029P0257	201
42008P0236	201	44025S0208	201	45030P0261	201
42009F0249	201	44026P0212	101	45031P0277	203
42010P0255	201	44027P0226	201	45032P0287	201
42011P0265	203	44028P0238	201	46001P0032	203
42012P0275	203	44029P0242	201	46002P0036	201
42013F0291	201	44030P0261	101	46003P0041	201

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46006P0055	203	51015P0084	201	52002P0027	201
46007P0057	203	51016P0088	201	52003P0041	201
46008P0059	203	51017P0090	201	52004P0044	203
46009P0061	201	51018P0092	201	52005P0051	201
46010P0062	201	51019P0095	203	52006P0062	203
46011P0067	201	51020S0097	203	52007P0070	203
46012P0072	201	51021S0098	201	52008P0078	203
46013P0075	201	51022P0101	203	53001P0009	201
46014P0077	201	51023P0102	201	53002P0027	201
46015P0079	201	51024P0109	202	53003P0033	202
46016P0080	201	51025P0114	201	53004P0039	201
46017P0084	201	51026P0122	201	53005P0052	201
46018P0087	201	51027P0131	201	53006P0064	201
46019P0090	201	51028P0139	201	53007P0131	203
46020P0101	201	51029P0157	201	53008P0203	201
46021P0115	201	51030P0166	201	53009P0231	201
46022P0137	201	51031P0177	201	53010P0247	201
46023P0163	201	51032P0191	201	53011P0258	201
46024P0185	201	51033P0197	201	53012P0273	201
46025P0192	201	51034P0223	201	53013P0277	203
46026F0211	201	51035P0227	201	53014P0300	201
46027F0214	201	51036P0231	201	53015P0331	201
46028F0217	201	51037P0245	201	53016P0336	201
46029F0220	202	51038P0271	201	53017P0342	201
46030P0230	203	51039P0294	201	53018P0351	201
46031P0244	201	51040P0303	202	53019P0359	201
46032F0257	203	51041P0308	201	53020P0365	201
46033F0258	201	51042P0315	201	53021P0399	201
46034P0265	201	51043P0319	201	53022P0404	201
46035P0278	203	51044P0342	101	53023P0409	201
46036P0338	201	51045P0348	201	53024P0425	201
46037P0366	201	51046P0364	201	53025P0441	203
46038P0379	201	51047P0370	201	53026P0441	201
46039F0385	201	51048P0380	201	53027P0474	201
46040F0388	203	51049P0389	201	53028S0516	203
46041F0389	202	51050P0405	201	53029S0520	204
51001P0003	203	51051P0413	201	53030S0525	223
51002P0005	201	51052P0423	201	53031P0535	203
51003P0009	201	51053P0445	202	53032P0544	202
51004P0011	201	51054P0450	102	54001E0007	201
51005P0023	201	51055P0457	202	54002E0008	203
51006P0031	203	51056P0461	202	54003E0009	204
51007P0033	203	51057P0469	202	54004E0010	203
51008P0040	201	51058P0482	201	54005F0014	201
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51011S0055	203	51061P0542	201	54008F0028	201
51012P0062	203	51062P0552	203	54009F0029	201

54010F0031	201	55026P0321	203
54011F0032	201	55027P0324	201
54012F0033	201	55028P0332	201
54013F0041	203	55029P0333	204
54014F0041	204	55030P0334	203
54015F0041	201	55031P0335	203
54016F0045	201	55032P0335	204
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54033P0188	201	56010P0058	203
54034P0201	201	56011P0083	201
55001P0020	204	56012P0092	201
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55008E0107	201		
55009E0109	203		
55010E0109	204		
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55012P0129	204		
55013P0139	203		
55014P0200	201		
55015P0227	201		
55016P0232	202		
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55021P0271	201		
55022P0275	201		
55023P0277	203		
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55025P0319	201		

APPENDIX B

The role played by the Harrod-Domar model (a variant in the Keynesian school of economic thought) in the planner's Image of the Third World is such as to warrant a more detailed presentation. It is widely accepted among planners that this model and its logic are at the heart of most contemporary analyses of the underdeveloped world.

As noted in the body of this work, development planners have become a category of professional economists and the process of planning has demanded an Image from the expert which focuses upon the economic sector of social life. As with any social science, economics is plagued by variations in perspectives. From time to time old and new "schools of thought" come to the surface and tend to dominate this social study in its several forms. Classical economics, for example, provided the analytic framework for economists from the late eighteenth century through the nineteenth and, in the modified neoclassical form, into the twentieth. During the periods of its predominance, classical economic thought had a great impact upon the conclusions reached by those in the sub-fields of economics. It is little wonder that planning was not a substantial sub-field while the laissez-faire attitude permeated the Image of the era. At the same time, it is not surprising to find

planning as a major ingredient in more recent schools of economic thought which promote an active rôle for societal organizations.

The coincidence of the concern with planning in the Third World and the predominance of Keynesian economic thought may not have been at all accidental. The end result, however, was that the process of development has been perceived in Keynesian terms. For this the Harrod-Domar variant became primary. It gave the Third World problem of underdevelopment a semblance of explanation which could be utilized in attempts at a conscious solution. Even more, it placed development in the Third World within the view of the "accepted" school of economic thought of the period.

In Toward a Dynamic Economics (1948), Harrod posited his version of the variant which will be used in this brief summary. His system was composed of three basic elements: (1) manpower; (2) output per head (itself a function of the level of technology and the supplies of known resources); and (3) the quantity of available resources. Changes in the system were credited solely to inventions which can have an impact on the ratio of resource supplies (capital) to output, that is the "capital coefficient." This impact may take one of three different forms. First, it can leave the capital coefficient unchanged, thereby having a "neutral" effect.

Second, it can be "capital saving" by decreasing the ratio.

Last, it can be "labor saving" by increasing the ratio.¹

A key factor in this system change process is that of "capital requirements," i.e., that portion of income that must be saved and invested (rather than consumed) in order for the economy to maintain a given rate of increase in income within a given rate and type of technological progress and a given rate of population growth. Symbolically, where p is the capital coefficient, C_r the capital requirements, Y the national income, and I_r the required net savings and investment, then

$$(B.1) \quad I_r = \frac{\Delta Y}{Y} \cdot P$$

and

$$(B.2) \quad C_r = \frac{I_r}{\Delta Y}$$

For instance, where there is a situation involving no technological changes, the capital requirements of a system need only increase at a rate proportional to the rate increase in population growth.

However, this is a relatively simple solution to a relatively non-existent set of circumstances. In reality, the

¹Higgins (p. 103) raises the question as to whether Harrod might not have been assuming too much in his considering an increase in the capital coefficient as automatically resulting in a saving in labor costs. While this and other questions about the Harrod-Domar model could and should be raised, the present task is to offer the reader a brief explanation of the model, not a critique.

relationships involved are much too complex to state that the problem of economic growth is affected only by technological progress or population increases, or that growth amounts to nothing more than a continuous game of cat and mouse among these several factors. What this model does supply is a description of an equilibrium condition. It explains, in part, how such a state of equilibrium among several factors is to be maintained. Through such a model the conditions of change and growth may be perceived and partially explained.²

The key to the Keynesian equilibrium state was the condition of investment equals savings ($I=S$), wherein the portion of non-consumed income appropriated to investments was identified with that given over to the accumulation of capital. From that starting point, Harrod made a number of assumptions regarding the determination of the investment and savings allocation. Investment was considered a function of the rate of growth, G , multiplied by the net capital accumulation during a given period of time, C ; therefore,

$$(B.3) \qquad I=GC$$

On the other hand, savings are determined by the average propensity to save its income ($\underline{Y}$) among the population over a given

²The use of equilibrium models among economists is something the field owes to Marx. See Sweezy, especially chapter V.

period of time, or,

$$(B.4) \quad S = sY$$

where $\underline{s}$ symbolizes the propensity to save. The Keynesian formula for the equilibrium condition is thereby changed in Harrod's model to

$$(B.5) \quad GC = sY$$

From this condition, the Harrod model turns its attention to the problem of "steady" growth--a condition which involves a constant and even break in the equilibrium condition. The key to such a discontinuity may be found in another factor in the analytic system: the warranted rate of growth. Represented as $\underline{G}_w$, this growth rate is defined as that increment of income change which barely satisfies entrepreneurs (i.e., investors) in their appropriation of non-consumed funds so as to promote their investment propensity to a certain extent under particular conditions at any given point in time. Unlike $\underline{G}$ which is an empirically given value that is defined within the parameters of the equilibrium condition, the warranted rate of growth is a flexible and constantly fluctuating value that is determined by factors both subjective and objective as well as exogenous and endogenous to the system. As such, $\underline{G}_w$ does not relate to the actual net capital accumulation during

a given period of time, but rather to those capital requirements ($\underline{C}_r$) which would be necessary to meet the demands of the warranted growth rate.

Obviously, where $\underline{G}_w = \underline{G}$ and $\underline{C}_r = \underline{C}$, then the equilibrium condition remains intact:

$$(B.6) \quad \underline{G}_w \underline{C}_r = sY = \underline{G}\underline{C}$$

Steady growth will result where this condition is broken in an even and constant manner. That is, despite the fact that all empirical and objective conditions remain the same, growth may occur within any system. For instance, a disequilibrium is produced where some exogenous force brings about a situation wherein $\underline{G}_w > \underline{G}$. By definition ($\underline{G}_w \underline{C}_r = \underline{G}\underline{C}$), this decreases the value of $\underline{C}_r$ as it relates to the new $\underline{G}_w$ level resulting in a condition of $\underline{C}_r < \underline{C}$ (all this assuming that the equilibrium in B.6 remains in effect). The tension created thus brings about a demand for a solution by a system which desires to maintain its balance. This may be accomplished through a return to the prior equilibrium situation (by reducing $\underline{G}_w$ to its prior level), or by injecting the system with more funds which will raise the equilibrium to a new level from which future growth may occur. Within the latter situation, deficit financing takes a primary role. This new source of capital will raise the equilibrium level by increasing the total amount of

income in the system rather than just funding increased investments through the capital already within the system. (Harrod shows, in fact, that the financing of investments through current savings will have an opposite effect; that is, over a long period of time the system's capacity will decrease and the equilibrium level decreases. His reasoning is based upon the assumption of consumption stability over time. For Harrod and other Keynesians, the consumption function is stable and does not drift on its own.)

This process is illustrated in Figure B.1. The horizontal axis in that illustration represents income ($\underline{Y}$) at particular periods over time. The vertical axis shows, above point O, the level of consumption ($\underline{T}$), and, below point O, investment levels ($\underline{I}$) over time. The consumption function is assumed to relate to income in a constant and stable manner, represented by the straight line $\underline{TT'}$. With the level of investment at $\underline{I_1}$ and income at level $\underline{Y_1}$, an equilibrium condition exists which is represented by intersection $\underline{E_1}$. Let us assume that some force creates an increase in the value of $\underline{G_w}$, thereby making the potential entrepreneur realize that the system has an increased capacity. There is a perception that follows which views current capital stocks as insufficient in light of perceived capital requirements. More funding is necessary, and one source of financing is through an increase




Fig. B.1.

($I_1 I_2$) in investments without injecting new funds into the system. A new investment level is reached at I_2 , but only at a cost since the new equilibrium level (E_2) is lower than the beginning one. In a sense, this response to a perceived increase in system capacity has in fact lowered that capacity in the future.

Increasing investments by means such as deficit financing has an opposite impact. Let us assume that investments are increased in this way in an amount equal to $I_1 I_3$. This created capital raises the level of income in the system and, proportionately, the corresponding level of consumption. A new equilibrium level (E_3) is achieved which is higher than the previous one. The perceived capacity of the system has been met. Even more important is the fact that this new level may also be viewed in terms of a higher system capacity, thereby promoting more investments through injecting funds into the system ($I_3 I_4$), which in turn facilitates an increased level of income (Y_3) for the system and a higher level of equilibrium, and so on.

If we were discussing an open-ended system, it would seem as if the growth potential of any economy might be infinite in nature. Economics, however, are closed systems and Harrod took note of this through a third growth concept, that of the "natural" or "potential" rate of growth, G_n . This

concept was defined as that steady rate of an economy's growth determined by the fundamental conditions of its existence. According to Higgins, what Harrod seemed to mean by $\underline{G}_n$ was "the rate of increase in output at full employment, given the rate of population increase and the rate of technological progress."³ With the introduction of this concept, Harrod is able to explain a number of phenomena, such as depressions and inflationary booms. For example, assume $\underline{G}_w > \underline{G}_n$ at some point in time. In such a case the actual rate of growth (G) resulting from increased investments will fall below that of the warranted growth rate. Assuming $\underline{GC} = \underline{G}_w \underline{C}_r$, the net capital accumulations will therefore be greater than capital requirements. The product is a depression similar to that of the 1930's. Where $\underline{G}_w < \underline{G}_n$ occurs, G will tend to be greater than $\underline{G}_w$ and capital requirements will be greater than the net capital accumulations. A chronic inflationary condition results.

The impact of $\underline{G}_n$ on the system is illustrated in Figure B.2 where $\underline{DD}'$ represents the potential growth capacity of the economy. Points $\underline{P}$ represent points in time along the horizontal axis while the vertical axis symbolizes levels of income ($\underline{Y}$). Starting at $\underline{P}_0$, let us assume a "full employment growth rate" from $\underline{P}_0$ to $\underline{P}_1$. At this rate the full utilization

³This appendix depends for much of its content upon Higgins, chapter 6. This particular concept is explained on pp. 111-112 of that work.




Fig. B.2.

Source: Kenneth E. Boulding, Economic Analysis: Volume II, Macroeconomics 4th edition (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1966), p. 224.

of resources (i.e., the system's capacity for growth at that time) is achieved in time period P_0P_1 . In order to maintain a full employment of resources at P_1 it is necessary that the same rate of growth be maintained. This is not possible, however, in light of the system's limits (as per DD'). Growth may be desired along the path of P_1 to P_2 , but such a goal cannot be reached. Instead growth must follow the curve of DD' . According to Boulding, a more likely course of growth will be the cyclical pattern of P_1 to P_3 to P_4 to P_5 and so on.⁴

As a foundation for public policymaking, Harrod's variant of Keynesian thought left much to be desired. It did offer an ideological basis for governmental intervention into the economy. It also presented Third World economists and planners with an explanation of conditions in underdeveloped societies and of why those conditions persisted over time.⁵ However, it lacked a reference to specific empirical situations. As noted in Chapter IV of the present work, this model created a vacuum in the analysis of underdevelopment which experts have been attempting to fill ever since. It was evident from Harrod's writings that G_w varied (1) inversely with capital

⁴See Kenneth E. Boulding, Economic Analysis: Volume II, Macroeconomics, 4th ed. (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1966), pp. 223-224.

⁵See Chapter IV.

requirements; (2) directly with the propensity to save; (3) inversely with the volume of public works; (4) independently of the current rate of growth; and (5) directly with the rate of interest. As Higgins has concluded, this list of relationships, by failing to specify empirical causal connections left adherents to the model in a position of trying to uncover some such causality so as to facilitate a sound policy recommendation. Thus the beginnings of the search for the primum mobile.

APPENDIX C

The measures of association used in the attempt to calculate Image strength (Chapter V) were determined through the calculation of Goodman and Kruskal's τ_b for cross-tabulations of the frequency of particular planning themes and specific "task" environment variables selected from the Banks' data collection.¹

There were a number of considerations taken into account in the selection of this measure. First, it was necessary to use a statistical tool such as τ_b because of the levels of measurement involved in the cross-tabulations. As noted in Chapter II, the data from the Banks collection was both nominal and interval in nature. However, the planning theme frequencies with which these were to be cross-tabulated were all nominal. Following a rather conservative approach, it was decided to use that technique appropriate to the lower level of measurement. If a scale was to be forced on the data, this writer felt it to be more useful if it was a lower level being forced on a higher scale.² This narrowed the selection of a measure

¹Banks and the Staff of the Center; see Chapter II of this dissertation.

²See Jones, p. 133; and Blalock, p. 24.

of association to those available at the nominal level of measurement.

The next fact to consider was the nature of the cross-tabulations themselves. There are several measures of association for nominal data³ but many of these can only be used for 2 x 2 contingency tables and are therefore of little or no use in the present study. After those are eliminated, there are two measures of association left for serious consideration: lambda and Goodman and Kruskal's τ_b .

The selection of the τ_b was determined by the fact that lambda "is insensitive to small degrees of association; unless the two variables are moderately related, lambda will tend to equal zero."⁴ The very nature of the measure this study attempted to obtain called for the use of the τ_b . It was the small degrees of association which were sought and obtained. There was therefore no question as to which measure was to be used.

In facilitating the use of the τ_b , it was necessary to adjust the form of the interval data taken from the Banks collection. The purpose of this adjustment was to scale down the data from interval to nominal. This was accomplished by reducing the interval data into nominal categories. In constructing

³See Blalock, chapter 15.

⁴Jones, p. 114; see footnote on that page.

these categories the minimum and maximum values of the data were taken into account, as was the mean of the interval distribution. The resulting categorization is reflected in tables presented at the end of this Appendix.⁵

For certain task environment variables, it was unnecessary to go through a reduction procedure. These variables were nominal in form as taken from the Banks data. These variables are designated on the data tables by an alphabetical footnote using lower case letters from a through i. The values for these nominal designations are as follows.

^aRegime Type: 1) civilian
2) military-civilian
3) military
4) other

^bHead of State: 1) monarch
2) president
3) military
4) other

^cEffective Executive Type: 1) monarch
2) president
3) premier
4) military
5) other

^dLegislative Selection Process: 0) none
1) nonelective
2) elective

⁵For purposes of presentation, these tables were further reduced through the collapsing of categories which had values of zero. The categories reduced for presentation purposes are designated by an asterisk (*).

- ^eEffective Executive Selection Process: 1) direct election
2) indirect election
3) nonelective

- ^fNomination Process: 0) no legislature present
1) largely noncompetitive
2) partially competitive
3) competitive

- ^gParty Legitimacy: 0) no parties at all or no parties but dominant one and its satellites excluded
1) significant exclusion of parties/groups
2) one or more minor or extremist parties excluded
3) no parties excluded

- ^hParliamentary Responsibility: 0) irrelevant
1) absent
2) incomplete
3) complete

- ⁱLegislative Effectiveness: 0) none
1) ineffective
2) partially effective
3) effective

The basic question answered by the r_p measure is "how much does knowledge of the independent variable help us in predicting the dependent variable?" For the present study the task environment variable is the independent factor while the frequency of planning themes is the dependent. If the association between these two factors was perfect, then knowing one will enable us to know the other or at least increase our

capacity to predict it. The τ_b measure "tells us precisely how much our predictive value has been increased" through a knowledge of the independent variable's distribution.

The first step in calculating τ_b is to determine how many mistakes would be made in predicting the dependent variable (planning themes) when nothing is known except its frequency distributions. This figure will provide a baseline against which to judge any possible predictive improvements given through a knowledge of the task environment variable. The next step is to determine how many mistakes would be made when the distribution of the independent variable (the specific task environment factor) is known. Having determined these figures, the calculation of τ_b is done by

$$\tau_b = \frac{\begin{array}{l} \text{Number of errors not} \\ \text{knowing independent} \\ \text{variable} \end{array} - \begin{array}{l} \text{Number of errors} \\ \text{knowing independent} \\ \text{variable} \end{array}}{\begin{array}{l} \text{Number of errors not knowing independent variable} \end{array}}$$

Briefly, the procedure used in this study was as follows: the total of each row (the dependent variable in this case) was taken and multiplied by the total number of cases minus that row total and divided by the total number of cases. The sum of these calculations was the expected number of errors not knowing the independent variable (x). Then for each column (the independent variable), each entry was taken,

multiplied by the column total minus the entry number, and divided by the column total. The summation of the resulting figures constituted the expected number of errors knowing the independent variable (Y).⁶ Thus,

$$\tau_b = \frac{X - Y}{X}$$

In the following tables the τ_b measures are given just below the data for which they were calculated. The column figures represent the independent variables of task environment factors. Except as previously noted, these are self-explanatory. The row figures represent the frequency distribution of planning themes which were uncovered in the content analysis. The symbols used to head these rows stand for the following themes:

Maintenance/change planning theme dimension:

- I 0 = not ascertainable
 1 = maintenance
 2 = change

Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft planning theme dimension:

- II 0 = not ascertainable
 1 = Gemeinschaft
 2 = Gesellschaft

⁶ See Jones, pp. 113-116; and Blalock, pp. 300-302.

Function subsystem planning theme dimension:

III 0 = not ascertainable
 1 = adaptation
 2 = goal attainment
 3 = integration
 4 = pattern maintenance

		AREA IN 100,000 SQUARE MILES											
Theme	Dimensions	0- 1.0	1+- 2.0	2+- 3.0	3+- 4.0	4+- 5.0	5+- 6.0	6+- 9.0*	9+- 10.0	10+- 11.0	11+- 12.0	12+- 13.0	13+- 32.9*
I	0	1	0	18	13	2	0	0	0	8	0	0	1
	1	3	3	9	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
	2	243	104	157	66	74	21	0	34	20	0	32	11
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0957092$													
II	0	243	104	179	74	75	21	0	34	28	0	32	11
	1	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2	4	3	5	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	3
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0381851$													
III	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	3
	1	178	84	126	49	56	19	0	28	15	0	21	6
	2	15	4	14	5	3	1	0	0	3	0	2	3
	3	46	18	43	23	17	0	0	4	7	0	11	2
	4	8	5	1	0	0	1	0	2	2	0	0	0
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0246149$													

		POPULATION IN THOUSANDS (x .0001)												
Theme	Dimensions	0- .5	.5+- 1.0	1+- 1.5	1.5+- 2.0	2+- 2.5	2.5+- 3.0	3+- 3.5	3.5+- 5.5*	5.5+- 6.0	6+- 7.5*	7.5+- 10.0*	10+- 25.0*	25+- 50.0*
I	0	9	10	7	0	9	0	0	0	7	0	1	0	0
	1	8	2	2	2	0	0	3	0	0	0	2	0	2
	2	307	42	189	61	35	14	24	0	26	0	11	21	32
$\tau_b = .0631132$														
II	0	315	53	190	63	44	14	27	0	31	0	11	21	32
	1	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2	9	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	3	0	2
$\tau_b = .0320262$														
III	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	4	0	3	0	0
	1	259	34	146	44	28	11	17	0	18	0	6	0	19
	2	20	1	11	7	3	0	2	0	0	0	3	1	2
	3	57	19	38	12	10	3	8	0	11	0	2	0	11
	4	9	0	3	0	2	0	4	0	0	0	0	1	0
$\tau_b = .0338806$														

		POPULATION DENISTY (x .1)											
Theme	Dimensions	0- 5	5+- 10	10+- 15	15+- 20	20+- 25	25+- 30	30+- 35	35+- 40	40+- 45	45+- 50	50+- 70*	70+- 80*
I	0	36	0	0	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	1	12	2	2	3	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0
	2	340	195	55	77	0	12	0	32	0	37	0	14
tau _b = .0267753													
II	0	372	195	56	85	0	12	0	32	0	35	0	14
	1	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2	11	2	1	2	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0
tau _b = .0086224													
III	0	4	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	1	278	132	40	61	0	11	0	21	0	28	0	11
	2	21	22	0	3	0	1	0	2	0	1	0	0
	3	80	35	16	18	0	0	0	11	0	8	0	3
	4	5	8	1	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
tau _b = .0010701													

POPULATION IN CITIES OF 100,000 OR MORE PER CAPITA							REGIME TYPE ^a					
Theme Dimensions		0- .06	.06+- .12	.12+- .18	.18+- .24	.24+- .30	Theme Dimensions		1	2	3	4
I	0	33	0	0	2	8	I	0	2	26	15	0
	1	12	5	2	2	0		1	6	15	0	0
	2	424	87	87	144	20		2	192	429	107	34
tau _b = .0384999							tau _b = .0164643					
II	0	451	90	88	144	28	II	0	197	450	120	34
	1	5	0	0	0	0		1	0	5	0	0
	2	13	2	1	4	0		2	3	15	2	0
tau _b = .0041059							tau _b = .0059536					
III	0	4	0	0	3	1	III	0	0	3	5	0
	1	344	64	69	90	15		1	148	328	78	28
	2	27	8	0	12	3		2	12	29	9	0
	3	91	18	19	36	7		3	39	101	27	4
	4	3	6	1	7	2		4	5	9	3	2
tau _b = .0119547							tau _b = .0048811					

HEAD OF STATE ^b					
Theme Dimensions		1	2	3	4
I	0	2	26	15	0
	1	6	15	0	0
	2	192	429	107	34
$\tau_b = .0164643$					
II	0	197	450	120	34
	1	0	5	0	0
	2	3	15	2	0
$\tau_b = .0059536$					
III	0	0	3	5	0
	1	148	328	78	28
	2	12	29	9	0
	3	39	101	27	4
	4	5	9	3	2
$\tau_b = .0048811$					

EFFECTIVE EXECUTIVE TYPE ^c							
Theme			1	2	3	4	5
Dimensions							
I	0		1	26	1	15	0
	1		0	13	8	0	0
	2		65	364	205	128	0
tau _b = .0168800							
II	0		65	385	210	141	0
	1		0	5	0	0	0
	2		1	13	4	2	0
tau _b = .0055430							
III	0		0	3	0	5	0
	1		51	280	154	97	0
	2		2	26	12	10	0
	3		12	86	46	27	0
	4		1	8	6	4	0
tau _b = .0041763							

LEGISLATIVE SELECTION PROCESS^d

Theme Dimensions		0	1	2
I	0	15	0	28
	1	0	3	18
	2	140	12	610
tau _b = .0108930				
II	0	153	15	633
	1	0	0	5
	2	2	0	18
tau _b = .0024635				
III	0	5	0	3
	1	108	9	465
	2	11	2	37
	3	27	4	140
	4	4	4	11
tau _b = .0055858				

EFFECTIVE EXECUTIVE SELECTION PROCESS^e

Theme Dimensions		1	2	3
I	0	17	10	16
	1	6	10	5
	2	250	234	278
tau _b = .0017462				
II	0	264	241	296
	1	5	0	0
	2	4	13	3
tau _b = .0121125				
III	0	0	3	5
	1	190	180	212
	2	13	15	22
	3	63	53	55
	4	7	3	9
tau _b = .0014878				

NOMINATION PROCESS ^f					
Theme Dimensions		0	1	2	3
I	0	15	1	2	0
	1	0	5	6	0
	2	158	298	175	0
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0258789$					
II	0	169	301	175	0
	1	0	0	0	0
	2	4	3	8	0
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0088737$					
III	0	5	0	3	0
	1	115	226	124	0
	2	11	20	9	0
	3	38	48	46	0
	4	4	14	1	0
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0072158$					

PARTY LEGITIMACY ^g					
Theme Dimensions		0	1	2	3
I	0	16	1	1	0
	1	5	4	0	2
	2	389	121	52	69
tau _b = .0055327					
II	0	403	122	53	67
	1	0	0	0	0
	2	7	4	0	4
tau _b = .0088737					
III	0	5	3	0	0
	1	282	97	37	49
	2	30	4	3	3
	3	80	20	13	19
	4	17	2	0	0
tau _b = .0061157					

PARLIAMENTARY RESPONSIBILITY^h

Theme Dimensions	0	1	2	3
I 0	33	1	0	9
1	8	3	2	8
2	483	53	75	151
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0073174$				
II 0	506	57	77	161
1	5	0	0	0
2	13	0	0	7
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0063641$				
III 0	8	0	0	0
1	363	41	55	123
2	37	2	7	4
3	103	14	15	39
4	13	4	0	2
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0029756$				

LEGISLATIVE EFFECTIVENESSⁱ

Theme Dimensions	0	1	2	3
I 0	15	2	24	2
1	0	5	13	3
2	140	226	258	138
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0148844$				
II 0	153	224	285	139
1	0	0	5	0
2	2	9	5	4
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0047218$				
III 0	5	3	0	0
1	108	176	196	102
2	11	15	18	6
3	27	37	72	35
4	4	6	9	0
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0067082$				

NUMBER OF COUPS, 1964-1966

Theme	Dimensions	0	1	2
I	0	18	9	7
	1	13	2	0
	2	563	105	58
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0093447$				
II	0	579	113	61
	1	5	0	0
	2	10	3	4
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0179227$				
III	0	0	4	4
	1	415	81	48
	2	35	13	1
	3	133	14	12
	4	15	4	0
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0053995$				

NUMBER OF MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES, 1964-1966

Theme	Dimensions	0	1	2
I	0	3	25	6
	1	7	6	2
	2	365	302	59
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0212674$				
II	0	363	328	62
	1	0	0	5
	2	12	5	0
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0280330$				
III	0	3	5	0
	1	264	231	49
	2	23	18	8
	3	77	72	10
	4	12	0	7
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0038017$				

NUMBER OF MAJOR CABINET
CHANGES, 1964-1966

Theme Dimensions	0	1	2	3	4
I 0	1	9	14	10	0
1	3	4	6	2	0
2	118	178	342	54	34
$\tau_b = .0244897$					
II 0	120	184	350	65	34
1	0	0	5	0	0
2	2	9	7	1	0
$\tau_b = .0066000$					
III 0	0	4	4	0	0
1	87	129	255	45	28
2	6	10	31	2	0
3	23	44	69	19	4
4	10	4	3	0	2
$\tau_b = .0076035$					

NUMBER OF CHANGES IN EFFECTIVE
EXECUTIVE, 1964-1966

Theme Dimensions	0	1	2	3	4
I 0	18	9	7	0	0
1	9	4	2	0	0
2	418	145	86	12	65
$\tau_b = .0084854$					
II 0	435	152	89	12	65
1	5	0	0	0	0
2	5	6	6	0	0
$\tau_b = .0250459$					
III 0	0	4	4	0	0
1	313	104	62	11	54
2	33	10	2	1	3
3	90	36	27	0	6
4	13	4	0	0	2
$\tau_b = .0131408$					

NUMBER OF LEGISLATIVE
ELECTIONS, 1964-1966

Theme Dimensions	0	1	2
I 0	1	33	0
1	5	10	0
2	260	466	0
$\tau_b = .0142857$			
II 0	261	492	0
1	0	5	0
2	5	12	0
$\tau_b = .0144761$			
III 0	0	8	0
1	196	348	0
2	16	33	0
3	51	108	0
4	7	12	0
$\tau_b = .0012948$			

NUMBER OF ASSASSINATIONS, 1964-1966

Theme Dimensions	0	1	2
I 0	11	7	0
1	9	0	2
2	518	70	43
$\tau_b = .0112439$			
II 0	526	75	44
1	0	0	0
2	12	2	1
$\tau_b = .0006825$			
III 0	4	4	0
1	378	55	32
2	40	0	0
3	102	18	12
4	18	0	1
$\tau_b = .0037535$			

NUMBER OF GENERAL STRIKES, 1964-1966

Theme	Dimensions	0	1	4
I	0	11	7	0
	1	9	0	2
	2	573	26	32
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0406924$				
II	0	582	31	32
	1	0	0	0
	2	11	2	2
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0075085$				
III	0	4	4	0
	1	426	18	21
	2	38	0	2
	3	110	11	11
	4	19	0	0
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0096751$				

NUMBER OF GOVERNMENT CRISES, 1964-1966

Theme	Dimensions	0	1	2
I	0	2	8	8
	1	9	0	2
	2	413	152	66
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0278422$				
II	0	414	157	74
	1	0	0	0
	2	10	3	2
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0006825$				
III	0	3	4	1
	1	308	110	47
	2	30	5	5
	3	73	38	21
	4	14	3	2
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0065363$				

NUMBER OF POLITICAL PURGES, 1964-1966

Theme Dimensions	0	1	2	3	5	
I	0	2	7	9	0	0
	1	5	2	2	0	2
	2	382	99	65	53	32
tau_b = .0440835						
II	0	383	105	73	52	32
	1	0	0	0	0	0
	2	6	3	3	1	2
tau_b = .0068259						
III	0	0	4	4	0	0
	1	284	69	49	42	21
	2	26	3	6	3	2
	3	72	30	13	6	11
	4	11	2	4	2	0
tau_b = .1249020						

NUMBER OF ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS, 1964-1966

Theme Dimensions	0	1	2	3	4	7	
I	0	2	0	8	8	0	0
	1	7	0	2	0	0	2
	2	455	32	37	40	21	46
tau_b = .0853114							
II	0	458	32	42	46	21	46
	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2	6	0	5	2	0	2
tau_b = .0307167							
III	0	0	0	7	1	0	0
	1	327	29	24	34	19	32
	2	31	0	3	3	1	2
	3	94	3	13	8	0	14
	4	16	0	0	2	1	0
tau_b = .0235568							

GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT PER CAPITA (x .1)

Theme		0-	5+-	10+-	15+-	20+-	25+-	30+-	35+-	70+-
Dimensions		5	10	15	20	25	30	35	70*	75
I	0	9	14	10	0	1	1	0	0	8
	1	6	6	5	0	2	0	0	0	0
	2	48	232	204	32	82	69	55	20	20
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0565441$										
II	0	60	243	214	31	82	69	56	18	28
	1	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2	3	4	5	1	3	1	2	0	0
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0108807$										
III	0	0	4	0	0	3	0	0	0	1
	1	49	179	157	23	52	48	40	19	15
	2	2	18	13	2	7	5	0	0	3
	3	12	50	45	6	17	17	16	1	7
	4	0	1	8	1	6	0	1	0	2
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0138863$										

GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT PER CAPITA IN UNITED STATES DOLLARS (x .1)

Theme Dimensions		0- 8	8+- 16	16+- 24	24+- 32	32+- 40	40+- 80*	80+- 88
I	0	15	17	0	2	1	0	8
	1	9	7	0	4	1	0	0
	2	191	276	124	114	37	0	20
$\tau_{\theta} = .0387493$								
II	0	206	292	122	116	37	0	28
	1	5	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2	4	8	2	4	2	0	0
$\tau_{\theta} = .0063641$								
III	0	0	4	0	3	0	0	1
	1	157	212	84	79	35	0	15
	2	16	17	8	6	0	0	3
	3	42	62	25	31	4	0	7
	4	0	9	7	1	0	0	2
$\tau_{\theta} = .0114848$								

GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT PER CAPITA ORIGINATING
IN INDUSTRIAL SECTOR OF ECONOMY IN UNITED STATES DOLLARS (x .1)

Theme Dimensions		0- 3	3+- 6	6+- 9	9+- 12	12+- 30	30+- 33
I	0	32	2	1	0	0	8
	1	16	3	2	0	0	0
	2	508	215	11	8	0	20
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0375852$							
II	0	536	218	11	8	0	28
	1	5	0	0	0	0	0
	2	15	2	3	0	0	0
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0252414$							
III	0	4	0	3	0	0	1
	1	403	154	6	4	0	15
	2	35	9	3	0	0	3
	3	109	49	2	4	0	7
	4	9	8	0	0	0	2
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0119808$							

ENERGY PRODUCTION IN KILOGRAMS PER CAPITA (x .01)

Theme		0-	2+-	4+-	6+-	10+-	12+-	30+-
Dimensions		2	4	6	10*	12	30*	100*
I	0	34	0	1	0	8	0	0
	1	21	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2	588	72	54	0	20	0	28
$\tau_b = .0285150$								
II	0	620	72	55	0	28	0	26
	1	5	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2	18	0	0	0	0	0	2
$\tau_b = .0080065$								
III	0	7	0	0	0	1	0	0
	1	460	44	40	0	15	0	23
	2	39	5	3	0	3	0	0
	3	131	16	12	0	7	0	5
	4	10	7	0	0	2	0	0
$\tau_b = .0072564$								

ENERGY CONSUMPTION IN KILOGRAMS PER CAPITA (x .1)

Theme		0-	15+-	30+-	45+-	60+-	75+-	135+-
Dimensions		15	30	45	60	75	135	150
I	0	33	0	1	0	1	0	8
	1	12	7	2	0	0	0	0
	2	458	178	44	22	40	0	20
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0353400$								
II	0	488	179	43	22	41	0	28
	1	5	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2	10	6	4	0	0	0	0
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0104701$								
III	0	4	0	3	0	0	0	1
	1	373	121	29	15	29	0	15
	2	29	10	5	0	3	0	3
	3	92	46	10	7	9	0	7
	4	5	12	0	0	0	0	2
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0118503$								

IMPORTS PER CAPITA IN UNITED STATES DOLLARS (x .1)

Theme		0- 2.5	2.5+ 5.	5+ 7.5	7.5+ 10	10+ 12.5	12.5+ 15	15+ 30	30+ 32.5
I	0	23	18	1	0	0	0	0	1
	1	13	7	0	0	0	0	0	1
	2	444	173	87	21	0	20	0	17
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0154664$									
II	0	462	194	88	20	0	18	0	19
	1	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2	13	4	0	1	0	2	0	0
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0100595$									
III	0	7	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
	1	351	131	50	15	0	19	0	16
	2	27	14	7	2	0	0	0	0
	3	91	47	25	4	0	1	0	3
	4	4	9	6	0	0	0	0	0
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0163138$									

EXPORTS PER CAPITA IN UNITED STATES DOLLARS (x .1)

Theme	Dimensions	0- 2.5	2.5+ 5	5+ 7.5	7.5+ 10	10+ 12.5	12.5+ 15	15+ 17.5	17.5+ 20	20+ 22.5
I	0	33	0	9	0	0	0	1	0	0
	1	18	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
	2	522	114	60	0	8	0	38	0	20
$\tau_b = .0156327$										
II	0	553	114	69	0	8	0	39	0	18
	1	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2	15	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	2
$\tau_b = .0082118$										
III	0	7	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
	1	412	72	44	0	4	0	31	0	19
	2	36	6	6	0	0	0	2	0	0
	3	113	30	16	0	4	0	7	0	1
	4	9	8	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
$\tau_b = .0133121$										

PROPORTION OF WORLD TRADE (x 10)

Theme	Dimensions	0- .01	.01+- .02	.02+- .03	.03+- .04	.04+- .05	.05+- .06	.06+- .07	.07+- .08	.08+- .09	.09+- .10	.10+- .11
I	0	10	16	0	8	0	0	8	0	1	0	0
	1	8	6	0	0	3	0	0	0	2	0	2
	2	407	139	46	95	12	0	20	0	11	0	32
tau _b = .0546316												
II	0	415	154	45	101	15	0	28	0	11	0	32
	1	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2	10	2	1	2	0	0	0	0	3	0	2
tau _b = .0281256												
III	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	1	0	3	0	0
	1	314	113	34	70	9	0	15	0	6	0	21
	2	28	6	2	4	2	0	3	0	3	0	2
	3	75	39	9	24	4	0	7	0	2	0	11
	4	8	3	1	1	4	0	2	0	0	0	0
tau _b = .0190284												

PRIMARY SCHOOL ENROLLMENT PER CAPITA (x .01)

Theme		0-	1.5+-	3+-	4.5+-	6+-	7.5+-	9+-	10.5+-	12+-	13.5+-	15+-	16.5+-	18+-
Dimensions		1.5	3	4.5	6	7.5	9	10.5	12	13.5	15	16.5	18	19.5
I	0	9	1	0	7	6	0	0	0	11	8	0	1	0
	1	6	2	0	0	2	0	4	0	7	0	0	0	0
	2	36	76	52	88	28	32	129	21	98	20	37	125	20
tau _b = .1019450														
II	0	48	79	52	92	31	31	129	20	112	28	35	126	18
	1	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2	3	0	0	3	0	1	4	1	4	0	2	0	2
tau _b = .0412646														
III	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	0	0
	1	38	57	43	69	23	23	90	15	76	15	28	86	19
	2	1	7	0	4	5	2	11	2	7	3	.1	7	0
	3	12	15	7	18	8	6	29	4	29	7	8	27	1
	4	0	0	2	0	0	1	3	0	5	2	0	6	0
tau _b = .0126334														

SECONDARY SCHOOL ENROLLMENT PER CAPITA (x .1)

Theme		0- 7.5	7.5+- 15	15 22.5	~~22.5+-~~ 30	30+- 37.5	37.5+- 45	45+- 75*	75+- 82.5
I	0	41	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
	1	12	5	2	0	0	2	0	0
	2	469	139	23	40	8	46	0	37
tau _b = .0350906									
II	0	508	140	23	41	8	46	0	35
	1	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2	9	4	3	0	0	2	0	2
tau _b = .0131389									
III	0	5	0	3	0	0	0	0	0
	1	363	112	14	29	4	32	0	28
	2	37	4	3	3	0	2	0	1
	3	104	26	6	9	4	14	0	8
	4	13	6	0	0	0	0	0	0
tau _b = .0249275									

UNIVERSITY ENROLLMENT PER CAPITA

Theme Dimensions		0 10	10+- 20	20+- 30	30+- 40	40+- 50	50+- 60	60+- 100*	100+- 110	110+- 140*	140+- 150
I	0	33	0	1	0	0	1	0	8	0	0
	1	14	3	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2	505	88	11	84	0	40	0	20	0	14
tau _b = .0378346											
II	0	534	89	11	84	0	41	0	28	0	14
	1	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2	13	2	3	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
tau _b = .0238144											
III	0	4	0	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
	1	405	54	6	62	0	29	0	15	0	11
	2	32	7	3	2	0	3	0	3	0	0
	3	104	24	2	22	0	9	0	7	0	3
	4	7	10	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
tau _b = .0176972											

TOTAL SCHOOL ENROLLMENT PER CAPITA (x .01)

Theme Dimensions		0+- 2	2+- 4	4+- 6	6+- 8	8+- 10	10+- 12	12+- 14	14+- 16	16+- 18	18+- 20	20+- 24*
I	0	9	1	7	6	0	0	10	9	0	0	1
	1	6	2	0	2	0	2	5	4	0	0	0
	2	36	110	56	78	22	107	67	83	39	52	91
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0739630$												
II	0	48	113	61	80	22	106	101	91	39	50	90
	1	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2	3	0	2	1	0	3	2	5	0	2	2
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0207349$												
III	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0
	1	38	85	44	63	15	77	73	54	17	48	68
	2	1	7	1	8	3	8	6	8	4	0	4
	3	12	19	14	15	3	21	23	28	12	4	20
	4	0	2	0	0	1	3	5	2	6	0	0
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0192894$												

PER CENTAGE OF POPULATION LITERATE

Theme		0-	10+-	20+-	30+-	40+-	50+-	60+-	70+-	80+-	90+-
Dimensions		10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100
I	0	1	13	18	0	0	1	1	0	0	9
	1	2	2	7	4	0	2	0	3	0	1
	2	192	204	75	75	12	11	61	95	0	37
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0616164$											
II	0	194	207	96	76	12	11	62	96	0	47
	1	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2	1	7	4	3	0	3	0	2	0	0
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0349004$											
III	0	0	4	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	1
	1	157	212	84	79	35	0	0	0	0	15
	2	16	17	8	6	0	0	0	0	0	3
	3	42	62	25	31	4	0	0	0	0	7
	4	0	9	7	1	0	0	0	0	0	2
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0208817$											

PHYSICIANS PER CAPITA (x .00000001)

Theme		0-	1+-	2+-	3+-	4+-	5+-	6+-	14+-
Dimensions		1	2	3	4	5	6	14*	15
I	0	22	10	0	0	3	0	0	8
	1	9	7	0	2	3	0	0	0
	2	391	174	8	69	68	32	0	20
tau _b = .0303509									
II	0	408	184	8	70	71	32	0	28
	1	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2	9	7	0	1	3	0	0	0
tau _b = .0053377									
III	0	4	0	0	0	3	0	0	1
	1	308	124	4	51	51	29	0	15
	2	31	10	0	0	6	0	0	3
	3	73	51	4	19	14	3	0	7
	4	6	10	0	1	0	0	0	2
tau _b = .0189240									

RAILROAD MILAGE PER SQUARE MILE

Theme Dimensions		0- 5	5+- 10	10+- 15	15+- 20	20+- 25	25+- 30	30+- 35	35+- 40	40+- 45	45+- 50
I	0	17	11	0	7	0	8	0	0	0	0
	1	10	4	3	2	0	2	0	0	0	0
	2	358	137	44	120	0	52	0	37	0	14
tau _b = .0146349											
II	0	373	147	46	126	0	60	0	35	0	14
	1	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2	7	5	1	3	0	2	0	2	0	0
tau _b = .0039006											
III	0	0	3	0	4	0	1	0	0	0	0
	1	293	108	31	75	0	36	0	28	0	11
	2	22	10	8	4	0	5	0	1	0	0
	3	67	29	7	39	0	18	0	8	0	3
	4	3	2	5	7	0	2	0	0	0	0
tau _b = .0224478											

RAIL PASSENGER KILOMETERS (x .001)

Theme Dimensions	5	10	15	50*	100
I 0	34	0	9	0	0
1	17	0	2	0	2
2	685	14	31	0	32
$\tau_b = .0244470$					
II 0	716	14	39	0	32
1	5	0	0	0	0
2	15	0	3	0	2
$\tau_b = .0445493$					
III 0	4	0	4	0	0
1	529	11	21	0	21
2	42	0	6	0	2
3	148	3	9	0	11
4	17	0	2	0	0
$\tau_b = .0089791$					

PASSENGER CARS PER CAPITA (x 10)

Theme Dimensions	0-.05	.05-.1	.1+.15	.15+.2	.2+.25*	.25+.3
I 0	22	10	1	1	8	1
1	14	4	0	2	0	1
2	440	142	132	11	20	17
$\tau_b = .0366705$						
II 0	462	140	131	11	28	19
1	5	0	0	0	0	0
2	9	6	2	3	0	0
$\tau_b = .0252514$						
III 0	4	0	0	3	1	0
1	348	113	84	6	15	16
2	31	2	11	3	3	0
3	88	40	31	2	7	3
4	9	1	7	0	2	0
$\tau_b = .0155046$						

COMMERCIAL VEHICLES PER CAPITA (x 10)

Theme		0-	.03+-	.06+-	.09+-	.12+-	.15+-	.18+-	.24+-
Dimensions		.03	.06	.09	.12	.15	.18	.24*	.27
I	0	32	0	1	0	1	1	0	8
	1	16	2	0	0	2	1	0	0
	2	462	153	79	0	31	17	0	20
$\tau_b = .0394146$									
II	0	495	150	80	0	29	19	0	28
	1	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2	10	5	0	0	5	0	0	0
$\tau_b = .0252514$									
III	0	4	0	0	0	3	0	0	1
	1	370	110	46	0	25	16	0	15
	2	32	5	7	0	3	0	0	3
	3	99	38	21	0	3	3	0	7
	4	9	2	6	0	0	0	0	2
$\tau_b = .0126073$									

ALL HIGHWAY VEHICLES PER CAPITA (x 10)

Theme		0-	.07+-	.14+-	.21+-	.28+-	.35+-	.70+-
Dimensions		.07	.14	.21	.28	.35	.70*	.80
I	0	22	10	0	1	1	0	9
	1	14	4	0	0	2	0	1
	2	440	122	112	40	11	0	37
tau _b = .0309329								
II	0	462	132	108	41	11	0	47
	1	5	0	0	0	0	0	.0
	2	9	4	4	0	3	0	0
tau _b = .0248408								
III	0	4	0	0	0	3	0	1
	1	348	94	74	29	6	0	31
	2	31	2	8	3	3	0	3
	3	88	39	23	9	2	0	10
	4	9	1	7	0	0	0	2
tau _b = .0115371								

TELEGRAMS PER CAPITA

Theme Dimensions		0- .05	.05+- .1	.1+- .15	.15+- .2	.2+- .25	.25+- .3	.3+- .35	.35+- .4	.4+- .45	.45+- .5	.5+- .7*
I	0	34	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	8
	1	19	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2	485	112	22	34	0	12	0	37	0	40	20
$\tau_b = .0419091$												
II	0	518	111	22	34	0	12	0	35	0	41	28
	1	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2	15	3	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
$\tau_b = .0063641$												
III	0	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
	1	372	87	15	28	0	8	0	28	0	29	15
	2	37	3	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	3
	3	113	23	3	4	0	4	0	8	0	9	7
	4	13	1	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
$\tau_b = .0091618$												

TELEPHONES PER CAPITA (x 10)

Theme		0-	~~.05-~~	.1+-	.15+-	.2+-	.65+-	.7+-
Dimensions		.05	.1	.15	.2	.65*	.7	.75
I	0	22	10	1	1	0	8	1
	1	16	2	0	2	0	0	1
	2	462	115	137	11	0	20	17
tau _b = .0380009								
II	0	483	123	137	11	0	28	19
	1	5	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2	12	4	1	3	0	0	0
tau _b = .0248408								
III	0	4	0	0	3	0	1	0
	1	360	97	88	6	0	15	16
	2	32	3	9	3	0	3	0
	3	98	27	34	2	0	7	3
	4	10	0	7	0	0	2	0
tau _b = .0141212								

RADIO PER CAPITA (x 100)

Theme		0-	5+-	10+-	15+-	20+-	25+-	30+-	35+-	50+-
Dimensions		5	10	15	20	25	30	35	50*	55
I	0	33	0	1	0	1	0	8	0	0
	1	14	5	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2	479	204	11	0	41	0	20	0	8
$\tau_b = .0400758$										
II	0	508	205	11	0	41	0	28	0	8
	1	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2	13	4	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
$\tau_b = .0240197$										
III	0	4	0	3	0	0	0	1	0	0
	1	380	148	6	0	29	0	15	0	4
	2	33	8	3	0	3	0	3	0	0
	3	104	45	2	0	9	0	7	0	4
	4	5	12	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
$\tau_b = .0128422$										

NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION PER CAPITA (x 100)

Theme		0-	1+-	2+-	3+-	4+-	5+-	6+-	7+-	13+-
Dimensions		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	13*	15*
I	0	34	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	8
	1	12	2	3	2	0	0	2	0	0
	2	470	72	51	11	37	26	75	0	20
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0422418$										
II	0	500	71	54	11	35	26	76	0	28
	1	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2	11	3	0	3	2	0	1	0	0
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0270991$										
III	0	4	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	1
	1	379	48	26	6	28	19	61	0	15
	2	33	4	6	3	1	0	0	0	3
	3	95	21	16	2	8	7	15	0	7
	4	5	1	10	0	0	0	1	0	2
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0299391$										

BOOK PRODUCTION BY TITLES PER MILLION POPULATION (x .1)

Theme Dimensions		0- 3	3+- 6	6+- 9	9+- 12	12+- 15	15+- 18	18+- 21
I	0	33	1	1	0	0	8	0
	1	17	2	2	0	0	0	0
	2	538	58	83	51	0	20	12
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0322634$								
II	0	569	58	85	49	0	28	12
	1	5	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2	14	3	1	2	0	0	0
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0045165$								
III	0	4	3	0	0	0	1	0
	1	432	27	61	39	0	15	8
	2	36	7	3	1	0	3	0
	3	110	18	21	11	0	7	4
	4	10	6	1	0	0	2	0
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0203074$								

ALL MAIL PER CAPITA

Theme Dimensions		0- 4	4+- 8	8+- 12	12+- 16	16+- 28*	28+- 32	32+- 36	36+- 40
I	0	33	1	0	1	0	8	0	0
	1	17	0	0	4	0	0	0	0
	2	528	79	29	55	0	20	37	14
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0358390$									
II	0	561	80	28	55	0	28	35	14
	1	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2	12	0	1	5	0	0	2	0
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0133442$									
III	0	4	0	0	2	0	1	0	0
	1	428	46	19	35	0	15	28	11
	2	32	7	2	5	0	3	1	0
	3	107	21	8	17	0	7	8	3
	4	11	6	0	0	0	2	0	0
$\tau_{\text{b}} = .0092923$									