

THE INFLEXIBLE "PLANNING IMAGE": A
STUDY IN THE IMPACT OF PROFESSIONAL BIAS ON
DEVELOPMENT POLICY

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INTRODUCTION

In The Politics of Modernization, David Apter touched upon the subjects of "professionalism" and the "ideology of science" as these are associated with the modernizing process. There are, he notes, four ideological tendencies which are relevant in that process: those are socialism, nationalism, national socialism, and science. The last, science,

is not merely a style of thinking about problems, nor is it solely a derivation from the functional significance of science in an industrialized world, although this is clearly the origin of its power. Rather, it is the application of¹ rational methods and experimentalism to social affairs.

The role of the ideology of science is manifested in "professional roles and norms" associated with planners, manpower experts, social survey teams, management experts, and the like.² As a "link between their countries and the various technical-professional functionaries of industrialized societies, the importance of these professionals cannot be overestimated. In short, professionals in the Third World constitute "a special group of people whose . . . careers are essential to modernization."³

Apter continues, however, by noting the existence of limits on the utility of a professional's role in the modernizing process. It is his contention that the professional's ideology of science "functions only in a period of practical realism, and is ultimately antagonistic to any other ideology . . . " For Apter, the alternative ideologies of nationalism, socialism, and

national socialism are more likely to dominate the early stages of modernization than the ideology of science.

Nationalism and socialism are linked to periods in which the needs of a developing society are that of identity and solidarity. The goals of reducing anxiety, increasing self-confidence, displacing fears, giving individuals a sense of worth and significance, etc. are salient during this early period. A basis for shared feelings and a "universal language of understanding" are needed in order to facilitate future collective action. "For these purposes," states Apter, "the ideologies of nationalism, socialism, and possibly, national socialism are more satisfactory than the ideology of science."⁴ Professions are to be found within the context of these ideological periods, but mostly as "a kind of exhibit; they are formally consulted, but their advice is not followed."⁵

Often the reasons for this are very sound. It is sometimes the case, for example, that the expert who trained in the universities of the industrial countries is, in effect, overtrained for the conditions of his own country, with the result that his suggestions lack realism. Isolated from the actual problems to be solved, he feels helpless and annoyed. In the past, this has been the situation in medicine. Today it characterizes planning, fiscal, and management experts who, complete with their Harvard Business School diplomas, are unable to cope with the practical world.

When does the ideology of science become functionally dominant? When can professionals hope to have an impact equal with their supposed capacity? Apter's answer seems to be that this will occur when the practical world of the modernizing nation becomes "developed" to the point of being susceptible to the means available to the professional. Involved are three general

conditions: first, "a general acceptance of common membership in the society, with the result that nationalism has become internalized and implicit"; second, "sufficient development has already occurred so that social dislocations require fine adjustments rather than gross 'solutions'"; and third, "a consensus prevails about the roles that are functional to the continuous process of development."⁷ In short, in order for professionals to take part in the modernization process, modernization must have already occurred to some extent.

It will be contended in the following pages that the role of at least one set of professionals need not be dependent upon the three conditions noted by Apter. Planners can take more than just an "exhibit" role in the early phases of development policy if an adjustment in their particular ideology and training is accomplished. The argument of this paper is that the ideology or "image" of reality peculiar to planners -- the planning image -- can take a variety of forms. Some of those forms will be more advantageous to development policy than others. In a sense, the profession of planning can be made practical! The goal of planning "experts" and those who dominate the professional culture of planning should be to examine the various forms of the planning image and seek that one which will best suit a specific circumstance. A flexibility of the planning image can and should be developed. The difficulties involved in accomplishing this task center in the nature of professionalism and the quality of the current planning images prevalent in the Third World. Understanding those obstacles is

is a first step toward a solution to the problem. Such is the purpose of the following work.

I

The Nature of Professionalism

Positing the "nature of professionalism" as a major determinant of the low utility of planners in the early phases of development policymaking processes, we are in a very direct sense stating that the professional's socialization is at the source of the problem.

A profession can and has been defined in a number of ways, the most common version relating it to the general occupation structure. "A profession may perhaps be defined," states A.M. Carr-Saunders, "as an occupation based upon specialized intellectual study and training, the purpose of which is to supply skilled service or advice to others for a definite fee or salary."⁸ Wilbert Moore, finding it necessary to declare a definition of profession for analytic purposes, also turned to the "occupational" standard: a profession is "an occupation whose incumbents create and explicitly utilize systematically accumulated general knowledge in the solution of problems posed by a clientele . . ."⁹ Besides noting that professions are that part of the occupational structure which involves service to clients by "knowledgable" persons, little else can be concluded.

Several others who have examined professions take a different course of action. Rather than seek out an occupational definition of professions, sociologists such as Ernest Greenwood have sought

to characterize -- that is, state the attributes of -- professions in general. Greenwood's list of a profession's attributes include, first, that there exist "a fund of knowledge that has been organized into an internally consistent system, called a body of theory." Second, professions are marked by a recognized sphere of competence by the community which compose their clientele. This attribute is necessary in that it allows the professional to render decisions and diagnoses which go relatively unchallenged.

Next, a profession was considered to have the sanction of the community as a whole within that sphere of competence so that it would be allowed to judge the standards of entrance to and work in the profession. Finally, a profession had the attribute of a professional culture which continually seeks to replenish the supply of talent for their ranks as well as expand the available fund of knowledge. While not a definition per se, Greenwood's attributes do offer an idea of the context of professional life and thereby shed some light as to the forces working on professional behavior and flexibility.¹⁰

Wilbert Moore's analysis takes a further step, however, and the result was a perspective on professions which defined the situation of the professional and the factors that influence his or her behavior. Moore began by looking for the characteristics of professionals rather than of professions. (As noted above, when he found it necessary to define a "profession," he adhered to the traditional approach). Yet these characteristics were not to be considered in terms of "a cluster of attributes."

Rather, professional characteristics were perceived along a set of scales which, when clustered, compose a "scale of professionalism."¹¹

There were six scales considered by Moore, each having its own impact upon the professional's behavior pattern. The first was the scale of occupation. While it may be taken for granted that people work at their jobs "full-time," in modern societies, the difference this makes for the practitioner in a profession must still be noted. There are forms of amateur and part-time competition with which professionals must contend; but their claim to "full-time" practice and the idea that it is in this practice that they earn most of their income seems to render the professional more competent and committed -- at least in the eyes of the clientele.¹² The impact of this characteristic of professionalism can be noted as both positive and negative in form. The professional seeks more than just admission to a career. He or she also seeks success, and for that "one needs the good opinion of clients, even if that opinion is not very well informed, and the good opinion of professional peers." Under this pressure, the professional will avoid obsolescence; instead, he will attempt to grow "in proficiency, wisdom, and recognition." The idea that he or she works "full-time" and "makes a living" in the profession will enhance the perception of clientele and colleagues as to the individual's "goodness" or "poorness" vis-a-vis his or her work.¹³ On the negative side, Moore notes the "charming French phrase "deformation professionnelle" which "refers to the possible distor-

tions in character that derive from participation in the world of work -- in any occupation."¹⁴ One can see this as a process of alienation in the Marxian sense of that term. The worker, states Marx "puts" himself into the object of his labor. "Whatever the product of his labor is, he is not. Therefore the greater this product, the less he is himself."¹⁵ Accepting Marx's idea of man as a "species-being" (that is, man as an animal conscious of himself as a member of the human species and capable of apprehending a "human essence" within himself and others), one can extrapolate the negative conceptualization of alienated man to the situation of the professional man who is so occupied with his specialty that he limits his own scope.

The plight of the professional is that extreme specialization radically narrows those significant others with whom he can carry on job-centered social discourse. And the attention required by his specialty may reduce his other social involvements. Here, once more, the importance of identification with a broader calling is apparent.¹⁶

A second scale noted by Moore is that of calling. This scale denotes a commitment to and acceptance of "the appropriate norms and standards" of the profession as well as "identification with professional peers and the profession as a collectivity." In a sense, the strong role that calling plays in professionalism is one major point of distinction between the professions and other occupations. The stronger the commitment of an individual to his occupational calling, the greater the danger that effective service to the client will be jeopardized should a conflict arise between clientele needs and professional peer group norms. One can view this from either a positive or negative perspective.

The point is, nevertheless, that professionalism does foster a situation wherein the client and his or her circumstances would be ignored in favor of upholding the norms and standards of the profession.¹⁷ This is a result not only of an urge on the part of the professional to relate to "significant others," but also a socialization (or professionalization) process which applies "punishment" for certain deviant types of behavior.¹⁸

A third scale of professionalism is that of organization. The role of organizations within professions differ from other occupational groups (i.e., labor unions, etc.) in regard to their emphasis on identification of distinct occupational interests beyond the "terms and conditions of employment." Access to the profession, protection of the "honorable" monopoly, and maintenance of performance standards among practitioners are three main functions Moore attributes to such professional organizations; and while these can be justified in light of the excesses that might otherwise occur without them, there is a cost to be paid. The implicit and explicit discipline exercised by such groups can lead toward stagnation as well as toward effective and necessary control.¹⁹ Positive benefits entail negative costs.

The scale of education has become increasingly salient in the modern age. The completion of formal educational qualifications is accepted almost without question today (although some exceptions can be cited²⁰) among professionals of all categories. While the length of formal education required varies from profession to profession, the impact of education seems to be the same --

that is, it tends toward conservatism. "The curricula of professional schools, whether at collegiate or postgraduate level, always entail an irrational mixture of several components:" first, what the professors had learned in their education; second, what the qualifying and certifying authorities think should be known; and, finally, what the "new revolutionaries" on the faculty feel is appropriate for future professionals. There is certainly much to be said for instruction based upon a sound tradition and past experiences of the teachers. But there is also the fact that the professors -- even the "new revolutionaries" -- are using information and approaches learned in a prior generation. "It should surprise no one," declares Moore, "that conservatism is the norm and innovation the exception in professional education."²¹ Once again one is faced with the fact that negative implications might be derived from a very necessary function.

The fifth scale of professionalism is that of service orientation. The key to the more traditional definitions of a profession involved the professional in the supplying of a service to a client. Talcott Parsons states (in a now classic article) that the professional concept of service is not one based upon "altruistic" motivation as opposed to the businessman's "self-interest" orientation. Rather, the objectives for both occupations were the same: "objective achievement and recognition." The difference between professions and business occupations was to be found in the "different paths" to these goals. For professionals, the path involved service to his or her clientele.

This is inherent in the occupational situation of the profession.²² As such, the service rendered follows the occupationally defined norms of competence, conscientious performance, and loyalty to the client. The client is supposed to benefit from these norms to the extent that his problem can be solved within the profession's definition of competence, conscientious performance, and loyalty. But what of the situation that is not definable within those limits? Would it be unethical or unprofessional for the professional to act in this case? Service to the client is somewhat restricted to the extent that this question is answered affirmatively. The pressures to adhere to the normative boundaries are always present, especially where altruism is not the major factor in performance. If objective achievement and recognition are the motivating forces behind professional efforts, as Parsons contends, then it is more likely that the parameters of professionally defined norms of behavior will be adhered to.²³

The sixth and final dimension of the scale of professionalism used by Moore is that of autonomy. "The specialist in his field must be supreme," contends Moore, "for who, other than another similarly qualified specialist, can challenge him?" As the technical specialization of a field increases, so does its degree of professionalism according to this scale. This is what differentiates the plumber and electrician from the lawyer and medical doctor. The knowledge necessary to fix a backed-up sewer or an electrical circuit with which one has been having difficulty is within the "grasp of the do-it-yourself householder who spends a

little time at the problem," while the same cannot be said of the ill patient or the person seeking to sue the government. In a sense, autonomy naturally follows from the situation of the professional and has a positive influence on the individual member of the profession in that it releases him from the pressures that might otherwise be forthcoming from the client's self-diagnosis or other forms of interference. On the negative side, the defense mechanisms involved in protecting this autonomy will tend to produce a "closed-mindedness" where all suggestions will be considered to have little or no substance -- save those coming from a professional's peers. The problem of déformation professionnelle again becomes a salient danger.²⁴

These scaled characteristics, in a positive perspective, are essential qualities for the controlled discipline of professional endeavors. At the same time they have restrictive implications for the innovativeness and flexibility of professionals. These professional attributes define a life-style within which the individual professional finds himself. It is a context of continuous pressures on the individual to prove himself competent to his particular reference group which marks professionalism. These pressures are manifestations of a socialization process which is continuously impinging upon professional action. And while this socialization can be deemed a necessary component of training and the maintenance of high and competent standards, it can also be considered as limiting in regard to the individual practitioner. In short, the profession seeks to mold the individual social ego

of the practitioner into as narrow a range as it deems necessary to protect itself and its position in the community.

Pitrim Sorokin has stated what might be called the commonly accepted view of this situation:

In general, each of us has as many "social egos" as there are social groups to which we belong. Personal experience and daily observation amply corroborate these generalizations.

Thus man is indeed a creature of several different empirical roles. Their difference manifests itself introspectively and behavioristically, in man's mentality as well as in his overt actions.²⁵

It is this pluralism of the personality which is likely to be defeated in the life-style of professionals, and the deformation professionnelle is a conceptual signal of that situation.

The impact of professionalism in developing social systems has not gone unnoticed. Apter, as noted previously, contends that professionals in modernizing countries relate to the training they obtained at "Harvard" and the like rather than the society in which they are functioning.²⁶ Warren Ilchman's ideal-type of the rational-productivity bureaucrat (equivalent to "professional" as used by Apter, Moore, etc.) poses a problem for developing states because of his or her orientation as a professional which is toward extra-societal, extra-organizational, "professionally" defined knowledge, expertise, and so forth. The more conventional bureaucratic type, on the other hand, is considerably more parochially rooted.²⁷ Ilchman, Ilchman and Hastings sought empirical evidence of this extra-societal orientation among economic planners from the developing countries. One conclusion they note

from their interviews with 33 "mid-career planners" from 18 low-income nations is that the national identification among the sample was low.²⁸ According to Moore the professional is likely to have less identification with his client and/or administrative co-worker than with a professional peer working in a different geographic area. For the sample used by Ilchman et alia, it was obvious that planners had more in common with their fellow planners in the industrial world than their fellow citizens at home. For example, the typical economic planner in their survey spoke two Western languages while his wife spoke 1 2/3 languages on the average. Seventy-nine per cent of the sample lived in urban areas, and most frequently read a Western periodical or newspaper at home. They usually belonged to professional organizations and overwhelmingly favored performance criteria for the granting of promotions. The agreement they shared as to the concept of economic development was also high. Modernization was considered desirable, for instance, by 94% of the sample; and 100% asserted a positive view in regard to industrialization. There was also a high degree of agreement between this sample and the anti-political orientation of planners in industrial systems.²⁹ These and other aspects of the survey will be discussed later in this paper. The main point for current purposes is that the professional in developing countries is more likely to relate to his professional peer than to those with whom and for whom he works.

How does this professionalism manifest itself? What form does the limitations and conservatism of the professional life-style take in particular circumstances? The answer to that question is

that the professional subjects "reality" to his or her own perspective. Professionalism, in this sense, takes the form of subjective knowledge in the individual's mind. This subjective knowledge, in turn, acts as a screen for information obtained from the professional's environment. In Kenneth Boulding's terms, the profession manifests its desires in the form of an image.

II: On The Planning Image

Boulding's concept of the image is not the only one which could have been selected for this paper. Any number of other forms of "subjective knowledge" might have been put to use. "Ideology," "conceptual framework," "frame of reference," and even "culture" represent some of the many and varied alternatives which might be posited. Each, however, has its problems as a concept. Ideology, for all its usefulness, still carries with it the stigma of dogmatic belief. Conceptual framework and frame of reference, on the other hand, seem to define a more specific form of subjectivity than is intended here. Culture is a problematic word that has been defined in many and varied ways. Although it includes the sense of a "screen" through which information passes, it also represents any number of other meanings. Edward Hall's definition of culture is one form that can be considered most compatible with Boulding's image. Hall states that culture "is a word that has so many meanings already that one more can do it no harm. Before this book is finished I will redefine it again . . . "30 Certainly little or no "harm" will come to the word. But what of the analyst or the student of social science? The list of definitions and/or

concepts intended by the term culture³¹ warrants careful consideration by the analyst who is seeking to convey his ideas. For present purposes the idea of image is more functional than that of culture or the other alternatives available to us.

The thesis presented by Boulding, Hall and others regarding the subjective nature of human knowledge is that man's relationship to experience goes beyond the fact that "when two human beings are subject to the same 'experience,' virtually the same data are being fed to the two central nervous systems and that the two brains record similarly." Rather, it is held that

Selective screening of sensory data admits some things while filtering out others, so that experience as it is perceived through one set of culturally patterned sensory screens is quite different from experience perceived through another.³²

That portion of the individual's behavior which acts as the "screen" through which messages from the environment must pass is the image. By definition the image is subjective knowledge, for it is formulated and structured from "all past experience of the possessor of the image itself." At the same time it functions as a filter for present and future experiences, rendering them as congruent as possible to the subjectivism of the image as structured in the past. As Boulding states, it is the image that "largely governs my behavior."³³

The impact of the image upon incoming information varies from message to message. Each message, states Boulding, consists of information which has been structured in such a manner as to create a meaning. The meaning produced by any message is relative to the image with which it interacts. Meaning, in short, is defined as

the change that a message produces in the image.³⁴

Meaning takes four forms in Boulding's analysis. First, a message can be meaningless for the image when it fails to produce any effect upon the image's structure or content. A second impact of the message can be seen in meanings which affect the image in "regular and well-defined" ways. This is analogous to the process of simply adding information to an image which will remain structurally unchanged after the meaning is absorbed. One's image of the physical shape of the African continent is not changed for example, when one learns of the exact physical relationship of Kenya to Tanzania. "I will have added to my knowledge, or my image; I will not, however, have very fundamentally revised it." A third form of meaning is that which changes the image "in a quite radical way." Here the impact of a message might be of such a quality as to force the receiving individual to reorganize his perceptions of the world. A fourth and final form of meaning, is that which increases certainty or doubt in the image. In other words, the message might strengthen or weaken the image rather than change it in either form or content.³⁵

The possibility of revolutionizing an image is, in Boulding's view, rather limited. "When it receives messages which conflict with it, its first impulse is to reject them as in some sense untrue." The tendency of the image is to substantiate itself, and success in substantiation depends on a number of factors. The strength of the image -- that is, the degree of certainty attached to it -- is a primary determinant of self-substantiation. The strength and frequency of the messages also enters into the

the picture, as does the quality of their content. The degree of internal consistency of the image is still another factor, as is the arrangement of the knowledge structure of which the image is composed. According to Boulding, most of these factors seem to favor resistance to change rather than innovation. It is the nature of the image to promote a consistent and constant perspective.³⁶

The analysis of the image can take two forms. The first, presented by Boulding and exemplified in the work of Hall, differentiates between ten "aspects of the image" which can be examined individually. These are the spatial image which concerns the view one has of his or her location in the space which surrounds one³⁷; the temporal image which involves the individual's place in the flow of time; the relational image in which a person pictures the universe around him "as a system of regularities"; the personal image which defines one's place within the universe of persons, roles, and the like; the value image which orders the parts of the whole image according to judgements of "better" or "worse"; the emotional or affective image which gives parts of the whole image an emotional value; the level of consciousness of the image which divides the whole into conscious, unconscious, and subconscious areas; the level of certainty of the image; the level of reality of the image which defines the congruence of the image with empirical facts; and, the public-private aspect of the image which distinguishes between those parts of the whole image shared with others and those which are not.³⁸ One may go further than Boulding and seek other dimensions of the image for analysis. For instance, those concerned with social functions and human behavior might

explore the political image, the economic image, etc. Another approach might be accomplished on the psychological level where one can analyze the individual's image of competence, efficacy, self-sufficiency, and so on. While the analysis of these dimensions is essential if one is to obtain a thorough understanding of the image and its impact, it becomes necessary to first consider the image as a whole.

Thus, the second analytic approach to the image is that of defining the "whole" image with which the more particular analyses must deal. This approach is not uncommon on the societal level where one finds studies of the American, German, English, French, etc. cultures. Nor is it uncommon to find the analysis of "whole" images of sub-cultures, whether these are defined in tribal, racial, class, or situational terms. While these studies do not use the term image, each is in its own way analyzing the subjective knowledge of a particular social entity or grouping. Therefore, one can posit a German image, a Japanese image, etc. for study. Or, on a different level one might deal with a middle-class image, or the image common to Blacks in the United States. Or still another level one might discuss the occupational group images in modern society, among which are the "professional" images; and within that categorization we might consider the physician's image, the lawyer's image, etc. and, finally, the planner's image. It is the structure and content of the planner's image -- that is, the planning image -- which composes a second factor determining the professional planner's capacity to render effective service to countries of the Third World. The determining factor of the planning

image in regard to its flexibility is to be found in the quality of its content and structure. Much of this, in turn, depends upon the profession. Where the applicability of the image content is narrow and the structure of the image is such as to blind the planner from alternatives or contradictory information what would otherwise be available, then efforts should be made to correct the situation. The salient question is how one might influence the professional planner's image. The primary step, however is to discover the content of the image and its structure.

III: Methods of Examining the Planning Image

Two methods may be used in examinations of the planning image. First, a survey might be made of development planners in order to discover salient factors of their thought. As noted previously, such a survey was attempted by Ilchman, Ilchman and Hastings on a rather small scale. Thirty-three "middle-range" economic planners, in the United States for supplementary instruction in their profession, were surveyed through individual interviews to determine their backgrounds, ideologies, and behavior patterns.³⁹ In regard to their ideologies, the sample interviewed shared a "common ideology of economic development." Modernization and industrialization were the major components of that ideology with 94% finding modernization to be desirable and 100% considering industrialization in a favorable light. Few among those interviewed felt the costs of development were high enough to offset the gains that were possible. For instance, 24% felt modernization had high human costs while 32% saw high human costs deriving from industrialization.⁴⁰

In determining what modernization meant to the sample, Ilchman, et alia found that the emphasis was upon materialistic attributes of modern society rather than the idea of "self-realization" to which some analyses have held.⁴¹ Yet, only 18% of the sample equated modernization with Westernization while 61% rejected that definition. As a matter of fact, 83% agreed that Western social attributes should be avoided. The irony of this study was that when the "Western attributes" of individualism, materialism, capitalism and the like were associated with modernization rather than Westernization, they were found acceptable.⁴² Industrialization was considered as an aspect of modernization which entailed changes in skills, a specific value change, and movement to the city.⁴³

The Ilchman study went on to inquire about "impediments" to economic development as perceived by planners. It was found that 82% mentioned only internal factors as restraining while 18% mentioned some external factors. Of the internal factors, traditional values, especially ascriptive familial attitudes, were seen as major obstacles. Structural economic problems and political/administrative conditions were listed as impediments by 36% and 39% respectively, but 57% felt they must deal with an unsympathetic population whose cultural qualities were the greatest impediment of all. A "revolutionary transformation" of the cultural factors which were the greatest impediments was generally held to as a basic goal.⁴⁴ These attitudes of planners were further substantiated when the Ilchman study turned to questions regarding which sectors were contributing the most to modernization and industrialization. The government and private business sectors were at

the top of the list, while the bottom was brought up by the "people" and "agriculturalists."⁴⁵ In short, the problem of development was believed to be more "cultural" than economic or political.

The "ideology" of planners vis-a-vis "methods" of planning, criteria of decisions, time horizons, etc. was also examined. Some 57% of the sample advocated "programmatic" action by the government; but only 23% backed comprehensive efforts. Overall the answers to these inquiries contradicted the perception that the same planners had of the problem. While the basic obstacles to economic development were considered to be rooted in the cultural factors of their societies, the strategies given in response to interview questions had a marked bias in the direction of "economic solutions." Strategy was based on the idea of economic/technological determinism while the planners believed the problem was caused by cultural factors.⁴⁶ In addition, these economic solutions favored maximization of growth rather than policies of redistribution, politically determined allocations or other forms of social restructuring. Those policy criteria were considered "irrational" regardless of the fact that they might bring about some short-run benefits. Such "wasteful" criteria as politics and equality were generally held in low esteem. This was further reflected in the planners' attitudes toward foreign aid. Those interviewed overwhelmingly held to the position that aid should be given and accepted or refused on "technical" rather than "political" grounds.⁴⁷ In regard to time horizons, the Ilchman study sought answers to questions about the length of time foreign aid had to be depended upon. With 35% stating "indefinitely" and 29% looking for aid for more than two decades, there seemed to be

some consensus as to the long-run orientation.⁴⁸

A further point of interest here is that part of the interview which inquired about the "model" countries to which the planners looked for examples. (Since those surveyed were in the United States at the time, caution should be given to any attempt at "over"-interpreting some of the findings.) Thirty per cent looked to Japan, while 27% looked to Western Europe, a similar per cent of the sample (27) considered the United States as their prime model. Other developing states, such as Israel, were the source of inspiration for 18% while the same portion of the sample considered "no country" to be a "good" model. Twelve per cent sought the "best" from all nations, while only 6% looked to the Communist bloc for a model of development. Why did they select the model countries which they did? "Historical reasons" were noted by 12% and similarity of cultural conditions was given as the reason by 12%. While over half of the sample was unable to state the reasons for their selection, 27% did admit to selecting their model on the basis of the level of material life reached by the selected model nation.⁴⁹

Much criticism can be levelled at the Ilchman study in terms of the sample used, the basis for their selection (in the sense that they were conveniently located in the United States), and so forth. Yet, for all the drawbacks involved, Ilchman, Ilchman and Hastings have produced some empirical evidence as to the nature of the planning image. As a first step, their study faced the limitations of time and facilities. Perhaps future studies with more sophisticated techniques could be made; but for the present this type of "convenient" examination of the planning image will have

to be relied upon heavily.

A second approach for determining the content of the planning image is through a survey of the literature associated with it on the professional and academic levels. The most appropriate source is, of course, the plans themselves. Albert Waterston's comparative analysis of over 100 development plans is perhaps the most extensive study of plan content undertaken in the last decade. In terms of the empirical evidence found by the Ilchman survey, the conclusions reached by Waterston should not be surprising. Development planning, he notes, has the expressed or implied aims of "accelerated economic growth and structural change." Two comments, however, should be noted as to the actuality of planning efforts. First of all, concern for structural change varies from country to country. In most nations with "mixed economies," states Waterston, "the degree of structural change is generally less pronounced and more gradual." Many countries -- developed and developing -- are constitutionally and politically committed to structural reform and change; but in most instances little more than "lip service" is given to this aspect of planning.⁵⁰ Instead, one finds a general agreement as to the aim of accelerated economic growth.

Although there may be a variety of other basic objectives, the ultimate objective of national development in most countries is to raise the level of living of all the people in the country through expanded output and use of consumer goods and services for education, health and cultural activities. For almost all less developed countries, this requires an acceleration in the rate of economic growth to provide higher per capita incomes. It is no surprise, therefore, to find this requirement emphasized as a prime objective in almost every national development plan.⁵¹

Examples of this statement's validity are as easy to come by

as is almost any development plan since World War Two. For instance, India's First Five Year Plan notes the central objective of planning in India to be to raise

the standard of living of the people and to open to them opportunities for a richer and more varied life. Planning must, therefore, aim both at utilizing more effectively the resources, human and material, available to the community so as to obtain from them a larger output of goods and services, and also at reducing inequalities of income, wealth, and opportunity.⁵²

Specifically, the goal of the plan was to "at least . . . double the per capita national income within the space of about a generation."⁵³ The second and third five-year plans in India, although more rhetorical in regard to structural change, followed suit in making economic growth acceleration the primary goal.⁵⁴

Uganda, Zambia and Tanzania all offer examples of plans in which more than just economic growth was mentioned. The first five-year plan in Uganda sought to end economic dependence of that country on the international system of economics; the second added that its goals included an increase in "social and economic justice."⁵⁵ In Zambia, the First National Development Plan contained a long list of social objectives; but, as was the case with Uganda's plans, the emphasis was still on the economic growth goals common to all developing nation plans.⁵⁶ Tanzania's First Five-Year Plan gave much space to structural reform, but in the end it was more specific as to its economic growth goals than the social transformations which it advocated. Although much space is devoted to economic factors in the Second Five-Year Plan, the document has a decided deemphasis on the growth goals and much more concern with policies of developing ujamaa villages based on the objective of

the Arusha declaration.⁵⁷ Nevertheless one still finds a decidedly economic growth bias. Doubling the per capita income of Tanzanians is stated not only in the plan, but also in President Nyerere's Introduction to the document.⁵⁸ The same primacy of economic growth is to be found in the plans of South Korea, Mao's China, Pakistan, Iran, etc.⁵⁹

There seems little doubt from the evidence given by Ilchman, et alia and Waterston that a basic ingredient of the planning image is that of economic growth objectives. Yet, while this information gives us some hint as to the content of the planning image, it does little to point out the structural implications for the planner's outlook. Ilchman and Waterston both point out something similar in the content of the planning image in their evidence, but they do little to help us to determine the flexibility of the image. What is the logic of the economic growth model of planning used in the Third World? Is it structured so as to facilitate acceptance of messages from the environment which contradict the image's basic assumptions? Or does the image ignore the practical implications of its own use by being "overly" structured for the sake of inner consistency and self-justification?

Perhaps the ideal way to determine answers to these questions is through empirical observation of planning efforts and interviews of planners in the manner of Ilchman, et alia. A less effective but somewhat more feasible approach to investigating the structure of the planning image is through an historical sketch of how the economic growth model has taken form since World War Two. By examining the roots and internal strengths or weaknesses of the economic

growth model over the post-war period, one can find out which questions planning experts asked, those which they did not ask, the various answers they found for those questions and the alternatives which they tended to overlook. From this information the impact of the planning image, in its economic growth form, can be derived. Through knowledge of what the impact entailed, some perspective is obtained through which we may cautiously draw conclusions regarding the structure of the planning image. Is the contemporary planning image structured so as to render itself flexible to the practical situations of the Third World?

IV: The Roots of the Contemporary Planning Image

The "strength" of an image is determined, to a great extent by the forces by which it was formed. The forces at work upon the planning image of development in the pre- and post-World War Two periods were of such a quality as to have considerable influence on the image structure as well as its content. Three historical circumstances can be noted as salient factors in the determination of planning image content and structure which eventually dominated in the subsequent era -- the economic growth model of development. These three "roots" were: first, the "economic point of view" which marks the modern age; second, the success of the economic growth model during the depression, the war, and European reconstruction; and, third, the picture of the Third World as economically "impoverished" with the implication that underdevelopment is equated with material poverty by definition.

The economic point of view was an important factor in the total

image of the modern age. However one may define the term "modern," there is one common quality which distinguishes that era from all previous periods. The distinction is that, in the modern age, a severe and noticable break with the past became the goal of those who wished to be "modern" and "progressive." At about the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, mankind found itself faced with new capacities for action derived from various technological and organizational innovations. Attempting to harness the potentials which now faced mankind, it became obvious to the European intelligentsia that a new perspective was necessary. The values and objectives of the more communal, Gemeinschaft society of the medieval period were found to be too restrictive. What was necessary was a new tradition, one which would permit individuals more room to manipulate a world which, up to that time, had set limits upon human action. Harold Rosenberg has termed the tradition of the modern age to be the "tradition of the new."⁶⁰

This tradition of the new manifested itself in a number of academic fields. In human epistemology, through the works of Descartes and Locke, the ego became central to thought processes. As Hannah Arendt has noted, the "Archimedean point," so long located in the universe or the community, was moved "into the mind of man."⁶¹ In political philosophy the theory of "possessive individualism"⁶² was popularized by Hobbes and Locke, the impact being a revolution from the paradigm of the "State" toward one which centered on individuals and their natural rights. In the field of wealth and trade a new study was formulated which merged previously separated disciplines. Israel Kirzner has noted that it was not

until the latter half of the eighteenth century that "thinkers in England, France, and Italy were coming to recognize that the subject of the mass of writings and speculations dealing with commerce, industry, foreign trade, money, interest, taxation, and the like constitutes a distinct theme of inquiry."

With the recognition of the fundamental unity of the principles underlying these scattered inquiries and of their analytical independence of juristic, political, and moral systems, economics, or political economy, emerged as a distinct discipline.

As with political thought and epistemology of the time, economics turned toward the study of individual behavior. Kirzner shows how the science of economics was founded for the purpose of explaining the "phenomena of wealth," and this, eventually, narrowed to the study of individualistic avarice.⁶⁴ To study this aspect of human behavior, economists turned to the analytic concept of "economic man."

The term economic man generally referred to a purely theoretical concept. For the liberals, economic man was an abstraction created to satisfy the demands of economic inquiry. The conception was a working hypothesis. It was framed by omitting certain human characteristics, which man undeniably possesses in order to reduce him to his economic aspect of producer and consumer.⁶⁵

Through the absorption of the whole man into an economic network and a devaluation of all activities other than the economic, mankind was narrowed to an entity capable of rational activity. In a sense, economic behavior, for analytic purposes, became rational behavior.

While many serious analysts of the "classical" school of economics remained aware of the fact that homo economicus was an analytic tool rather than an ideal representation of man, others

began to value the model of economic man. In analysis, the world of "things" received primary attention; and, as Marx noted, "With the increasing value of the world of things proceeds in direct proportion the devaluation of the world of men."⁶⁶ That which was valued in analysis soon became valued in actuality. Life styles and personalities began to reflect what was otherwise purely a tool for social science. In the eighteenth century, contends Lewis Mumford, "a new type of personality had emerged, a walking abstraction: the Economic Man."⁶⁷

In the last part of the eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth centuries, the "dismal" science of classical economics dominated. A number of challenges were forthcoming, however, as the limits of rational behavior and homo economicus were made more obvious. There was too much in human behavior which this model did not explain. For instance, the economic man model failed to explain the distributive order within which rational behavior was to occur. In addition, it did little to explain the common use of force, fraud, and other "tendencies to break through the restrictions of the order . . ."⁶⁸ With this in mind the study of economic behavior was relegated to the system of action which "in fact involves a rational process of the acquisition and allocation of scarce resources by the means delegated."⁶⁹ Sociology became the dominant social science in the late nineteenth century and turned its attention to the irrational, nonlogical, noneconomic aspects of human behavior while retaining the implied identity of economic and rational behavior.

For sociological analysts and many economists, this view of economic behavior meant that social science had become more "realistic."

For many others, however, it sparked an urge to broaden the range of behavior which was governed by rational behavior patterns. Rationality was a valued aspect of human life and it soon became the goal of reformers. As crises arose in the twentieth century's first three decades, more and more of the blame for what had taken place was set upon mankind's irrationality. Robert S. Lynd's comments in this regard exemplify the feelings of the time.

Our major institutional forms and accompanying slogans derive from an era which not only viewed men as "equal" but also as "rational." We now know man to be basically emotional in his motivations and only sporadically able to sustain the tensions involved in taking thought in order to direct his actions . . .

. . . The chance of securing more coherent, constructive behavior from persons depends upon recognizing the large degree of irrationality that is natural to them and upon structuring the culture actively to support and encourage intelligent types of behavior . . .⁷⁰

The solution of structuring culture involves, according to Lynd, "a large and pervasive extension of planning and control to many areas now left to casual individual initiative."⁷¹ In efforts to increase the application of rational behavior in human action, social scientists turned toward the science of economics which had been associated with rational choice behavior. The problem of planning was considered an economic problem from the start. Increase the realm of behavior governed by homo economicus, and the task is accomplished!

This idea was facilitated by a further development within the field of economics itself circa 1930. Lionel Robbins, in his Nature and Significance of Economic Science, rendered the science of economics more adaptable to the study of human action. Economics, he posited, "is the science which studies human

behavior as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses."⁷² The condition of scarcity was, according to Robbins, the dominant factor in human life, especially in regard to available means of accomplishing numerous and differently valued ends. In light of this fact of life, the idea of economics was expanded to include a broader range of human endeavor. Concepts such as economizing of resources and maximization of the impact of one's behavior became salient features of study.⁷³ Both economizing and maximization were to be found in the planning image which was then coming into being. To accomplish a task of policy or decision-making within the limits set by criteria of economizing and maximization was to be "rational"; and noted above, this was enough to draw planners toward an economic point of view. With the onset of Professor Robbins' work, the role economics was to play in the area of planning and in the formation of a planning image became more direct. In a sense, the adoption of an economic point of view set the stage for what was to follow in fact: planning in the Depression, World War Two, and post-war years was identical to economic planning.

It is the success of economic planning in the Western world which makes up the second "root" of the economic growth model of development planning. Development planning was a late form of the general effort in the field of rational policymaking. It is a well documented fact that small, planned communities were to be found even in laissez-faire societies such as the United States. The names of philosophers who advocated planned utopias are well-known: Plato, Sir Thomas More, Sir Francis Bacon, Robert Owen,

H.G. Wells. If one were to place a date on actual planning attempts, perhaps the colonial settlements of the ancient Greeks would be a place to begin. The concept of planning and starting anew has been with mankind throughout recorded history as have small-scale attempts at actual settlement. However, one has to look to World War One for the beginnings of contemporary national planning. It was during that conflict that European nations first gave serious consideration to massive planning efforts.

Before 1914 nobody had clearly recognized that a war economy differed fundamentally from a peace economy. . . . The German military plan to invade Belgium was extended to Holland on the ground that Rotterdam must be left neutral for the passage of German overseas trade. "Business as usual" was the slogan under which the first period of the war was conducted in Great Britain. But the course of the first world war settled for all time the question of the indispensibility⁷⁴ of a planned economy for national efficiency in the war.

Modern war entailed the mobilization of scarce resources to an extent never before contemplated by man. "Business as usual" was out of the question by World War Two, and wartime planning was accepted without much quarrel. The nature of these national attempts at planning is an essential factor in the planning image which were developed during the interwar and post-war periods. Wartime planning was almost purely economic in nature. It was not a matter of changing the social structure or opening new vistas of thought. Rather, the goal was survival and self-sufficiency in a time when countries had to rely on their own resources instead of those on the international market. The goal was "victory" and the effort of planning was toward that terminal point and nothing else. The effect of this situation on the planning profession and all

planning images formed during the post-war period was that it "socialized" the populace to the idea that planning was an exercise of policymaking in the economic realm only.

The Depression cannot be ignored for its impact upon the planning trend. It is during the 1930's and early 1940's that most of the contemporary literature on the possibilities and potentials of planning was produced. This was manifested in debates which came to be represented by two prominent authors of opposing camps: the Mannheim-Hayek debates. Karl Mannheim, the advocate of democratic planning, was one of the more prolific writers in the field of planning during the 1930's. His Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction (1940) was attacked as misleading by Friedrich Hayek in his The Road to Serfdom (1943). Hayek's book in turn brought much adverse reaction. The idea of planning, however, did not remain on the purely abstract level. With the Depression came government planning in almost every major Western country. The U.S.S.R. had entered into its Five Year Plan programs by 1928, even before the crisis of 1929. But it was the "crash" and the economic conditions which followed that brought other states into the realm of planning. "Since the great crisis of 1929," states Raymond Aron, "governments have become responsible for what is called full employment, in other words, for the level of activity."⁷⁵ In the name of "the collective body of citizens" Mussolini brought planning to Italy in the early 1930's.⁷⁶ In the name of "rearmament," Hitler solved the economic problems of Germany during the later part of the 1930's with planning efforts on a major scale.⁷⁷ In the United States such attempts were found in various New Deal

programs such as the National Recovery Administration. All were the first steps toward planning no matter how comprehensive or limited their scope. What is notable, as in wartime planning, was the fact that only economic problems were considered and only economic solutions were suggested. Planning as an activity was, again, economic planning.

Post-World War Two planning was aimed at "rebuilding" Europe and Japan and, in some instances, at development in war-torn areas. Those attempts were noteworthy, for the goals set forth in each and every effort. It was rebuilding for economic growth and development for economic growth which policy makers sought in Europe and, Japan. Physically and psychologically devastated by the war, short of needed foreign currency, and faced with the bleak future of increasing deficits in trade based on a rapidly increasing demand, post-war Europe quickly came to realize that the economic crises experienced during the Depression and World War Two were also inherent in the period of peace -- even for the victors. France was the first nation in Europe outside the Soviet Union to use a multi-annual plan in attempting to solve its problems. However, the major prompting toward planning came in 1947-1948 with the requirements of the Marshall Plan. Not long afterward Italy issued the Vanoni Plan which sought a balanced development of the north and south of that country. In Sweden and Denmark, anticyclical planning -- an outgrowth of the Depression more than a characteristic of the post-war period -- soon turned into massive annual planning efforts. Eastern Europe, of course, came under the influence of the U.S.S.R. and its approach of "five-year plans." It

was not long before the idea of multi-annual plans was to be found manifest in fact in every European state.⁷⁸ Once more, however, one finds that planning -- even "development" planning as in Italy -- was economic in nature. Economics permeated efforts at reconstruction and, what is even more important, it did so quite successfully. Crises came and went, but the economic plans seemed to function satisfactorily.⁷⁹ In a sense, the "stigma" of success attached itself to these attempts at economic growth planning, thereby further substantiating the capacity of economic growth as a model to be followed. This heritage of success came to be mentioned in a 1969 meeting of "planning experts" sponsored by the United Nations at Stockholm. A key to their efforts in developing countries in the post-war years was the success of European reconstruction. But, with the passing of time

it became increasingly evident that these economic approaches which worked well in the special circumstances of Europe a generation ago -- were not fully relevant to the problems of the low income countries, with which United Nations economic and social activities are now principally concerned.

Success carried the economic growth model through the two decades which followed the Marshall Plan up until the time of the meeting of experts which issued that statement in 1969. Nothing seemed more difficult to overcome than success.

The final contextual ingredient which determined the economic growth planning image was the definition of underdevelopment which was dominant during most of the early efforts at development planning. Terms such as "underdeveloped" are usually defined in terms of the relative situation in "advanced" countries. In the case of

the Third World in the post-war period, the most salient feature of their underdevelopment became their impoverishment in light of the material affluence of the rest of the world.⁸¹

Of course, there is no denying the poverty of the people of the Third World even in non-relative terms. A problem arises, however, when that impoverishment is defined in comparative quantitative terms only. Hla Myint has discussed this definition of underdevelopment and its impact upon policy. When one decides to compare and define the circumstances of underdeveloped societies by means of G.N.P. or per capita income figures, the picture is as simple as perceiving the difference between \$3000 and \$100. The result is a concern "with the need to do something urgently about the problem of poverty."⁸² Situations of social existence in the Third World are abstracted to their basic economic impact, and the economic growth model -- seeking the increase in per capita income as the primary operationalized goal of planning policy -- becomes the development model in all planning efforts.⁸³ Economic man was given value once again as planners sought to create a situation wherein material poverty did not exist.

To this point only the roots of the dominant planning image have been considered. These roots show that the planning image was subject to much reinforcement from external conditions. In a sense, the development planning image was itself the product of an "image" -- that is, the economic point of view which dominated the social and academic worlds during the modern age and especially during the 1930's. The success which planning had in Europe through the Depression, World War Two, and post-war reconstruction also did

much to externally substantiate the economic solutions which would later dominate development planning efforts. Finally, the very definition of "underdevelopment" as a condition of economic impoverishment did much to promote the economic perspective. But what of the internal strength of the planning image? What was the logic of the economic growth model and how did it influence the planning image?

V: The Logic of Economic Growth

Perceiving the logic of the economic growth planning image as it was manifested in its application since World War Two seems to be a matter for which historical analysis is well suited. The chronological point of departure for this examination might be debatable, for, as noted in the previous section, planning efforts were matters of historical record before the 1930's and 1940's. The general acceptability of planning, however, was not obvious until the Depression and World War Two crises took their toll. But more was involved than the circumstances of poverty and war to facilitate the wide acceptance that planning received during and after this period. There was also an important change in attitude among those in the major policy-making positions of the time. In the "advanced" industrial states of the 1930's and 1940's what had previously been considered "pessimistically" became something within the realm of possibility. That was the idea that mankind was capable of purposefully controlling its economic circumstances despite the "laws" of classical and neo-classical economic theory which considered the "planned" situation as one which could only lead to frustrations. It is at the point

of departure marked by the writings of John Maynard Keynes that one finds the new optimism which planning advocates needed in order to gain a legitimacy among those who were responsible for public policymaking.

One commonly associates the phrase "dismal science" with the study of economics -- at least when considering that discipline into historical developments. In varying forms from the "classical" period of Smith, Ricardo and Malthus through to first decades of the twentieth century, economics was a discipline which examined life from the perspective of the infamous "S-curve." In the S-curve perspective, social life was dominated by two developmental trends. The first of those trends was "optimistic" in the sense that underdeveloped societies were seen to have a relatively bright future given sufficient or optimal conditions. The second trend manifested a pessimistic preview for those societies which have developed to their respective capacities and were about to contend with diminishing returns and other such "laws." Hans Singer has summarized these conditions as "U-optimism" and "D-pessimism."⁸⁴

The Keynesian school of economic thought seemed to reverse the dismalness of the future -- at least as far as developed societies were concerned. In the more traditional school of thought, capitalist societies were destined for "secular stagnation." Keynes, and those who modified his argument during the 1930's and 1940's, did not argue with the pessimistic forecast. However, within the economics which they outlined there was some degree of hope for mankind's cultivation of steady and continuous economic growth. Seemingly all that was necessary was for men to develop the will and

capability to deviate from the traditional market situation.

The Keynesian formula shrugged off the burden of traditional assumptions. When inventions, discoveries and improvements in transport open up new sources of raw materials sufficiently fast, there are no diminishing returns . . . Taking off traditional blinders, we have wider fields to survey.

From the Keynesian perspective planners obtained acceptable foundations upon which to base their claims that they were capable of manipulating and changing social conditions. It was no longer "utopian" to manipulate variables for the purpose of helping society "grow" and "expand." Therefore it is not surprising to find as the primary model of the planners the economic growth perspective developed by "Keynesians."

One variant of the Keynesian model which received most of the attention of planners in the post-World War Two period was the Harrod-Domar model, its name being derived from two economists who published their similar approaches in professional journals in the early 1940's. While the work of M.I.T.'s E.V. Domar overlapped that of Oxford's R.F. Harrod, it is the work of the latter which will be used in the following discussion. Not only is Harrod's version noted by most sources as more relevant to the problem of development, but it is also much easier to summarize. Both versions share one problem so far as development planning is concerned: that is, while both were quite valuable as descriptions and explanations (on an abstract level), they failed to offer policymakers and planners the concrete relationships so necessary to the decision-making process. Before one is able to effect a conscious change, he must be able to construct some type of causality through which that change can occur.

Harrod's model⁸⁶ involves three sets of growth rates vis-a-vis the economy, each based upon different factors of social life: the actual rate of growth; the natural or potential rate of growth; and the warranted growth rate. The first rate was an empirically derivable fact, while the potential growth rate was determined from objective factors such as the potential size and growth rate of the labor force, the potential increase of output per head (which, in turn, was a function of invention and its impact upon capital-output ratios) etc. Actual and potential rates of growth are founded upon objective factors in the environment which are difficult to manipulate. Therefore other, more flexible factors had to be found if policymaking was to be facilitated. The warranted rate of growth was such a factor. Defined as that change in income which barely satisfies entrepreneurs (i.e. investors), it was a factor rooted in human subjectivity -- that is, it was a function of human feelings and attitudes. It was felt that, in the short run, the warranted rate of growth, being of such a subjective nature, was more malleable than the objective factors. Tampering with motives and other facets of this factor meant, for the Keynesian analysts, modifying the fluctuations of economies which might otherwise lead to stagnation.

The major problem with this model for policymakers and planners is its inability to offer some concrete foundation upon which a solution to specific economic problems can rest. How does one go about controlling the warranted rate of growth in actual circumstances? According to Joan Robinson,

To understand the motives for investment, we have to

understand human nature and the manner in which it reacts to the various kinds of social and economic systems in which it has to operate. We have not got far enough yet to put it into algebra.⁸⁷

The absence of this knowledge of human nature could be especially harmful to the planning efforts of the Third World.

Albert Hirschman has summarized another aspect of the situation created for Third World policymakers as follows. The Harrod-Domar model, he stated, was created primarily

to illuminate a condition which had been thought to be threatening the advanced industrial countries -- secular stagnation -- but which during the postwar period has been one of the few worries from which we have been entirely free. Being thus relatively under-utilized the newly perfected models were employed in a setting quite different from the one for which they were designed.⁸⁸

When the "newly perfected" models were applied to "underdeveloped" societies it was found that the Third World's future situation was more dismal than was previously forecast under the classical models. As Singer summarizes the situation, what had been U-optimism and D-pessimism under the pre-Keynesian models soon turned into a D-optimism and U-pessimism. It was found that, no matter the course of action taken in the economy in regard to the warranted rate of growth, underdeveloped societies were destined to produce insufficient growth and an overabundance of inflation.⁸⁹ Planners, given some foundation by the Harrod-Domar model in the "developed" countries, were faced with the challenge of overcoming what seemed to be a fundamental contradiction to the very basis of their work. During the 1950's a proliferation of variants to the economic growth model resulted, all aimed at the solving of the problem of underdevelopment.

It was the discussions and debates of the 1950's regarding development planning policies which gives the first clues to the logic of the planning image which dominated within the profession. No matter which direction the debate took there was one underlying assumption: development was assumed to be a problem of achieving economic growth at sufficient levels.⁹⁰ Rarely does one come across criticisms of that accepted goal, especially during the 1950's. Instead, on both the academic and professional levels one finds the debate over development taking a single logical direction.

Development, viewed in purely economic terms, becomes a complex problem involving factors of production rather than social or cultural factors. What occurred was a search for what Hirschman termed the primum mobile -- the primary cause. Specifically, it was the search for the cause of economic growth -- for it was within the increase of economic well-being (in the sense of greater material wealth) that planners were convinced was the goal of their efforts.

Simply stated, the formula for economic output was:
 $O = (L, K, Q, T)$ or Output is a function of the Labor force, the available Q (capital stock), the supply of Known resources, and the level of Technology. These factors, either individually or clustered in aggregates or sectors of the economy, composed the total population of possibilities for the primum mobile. This was reflected in a number of policies. The first and simplest type of the problem concerned the lack or oversupply of any of the production factors. The solutions amounted to suggestions for limiting or

decreasing the particular problematic factor. For example, development became a matter of decreasing population growth in order to facilitate a more compatible labor force in both quality and size; or of a policy of capital formation through various government policies such as raising saving and taxation.

A second form of the problem was defined at a more complex level of the optimalization of the factors of production. The dilemma was considered not so much as a lack or oversupply of specific factors; rather, it was the imperfection of factor interrelations that was causing continued underdevelopment. Finding the "optimal" combination of the production factors was deemed the solution to the situation of "market imperfections." Increasing the supply of capital or utilizing a population policy to modify the labor force to a more feasible size means little unless the new combination of factors can be used correctly.

To the extent that resources have remained undeveloped because of underutilization or misutilization of resources, it follows that fuller utilization and a more efficient allocation of resources might allow a poor country to approach its productive potential more closely. A different combination of factors could increase real income.

Increasing the mobility of resources and the perfection of the market are the primary goals of policy, and these can be accomplished best under a free market economy and perfect competition conditions. The neo-classical approach to development from which this approach is derived is not necessarily laissez-faire or purely an advocacy of Western capitalism. As Hla Myint, one of its foremost spokesmen during the past decade, has noted, the market mechanism can be a basic tool for development if it is

extended and adapted to the relevant circumstances defined by a particular country.⁹²

The third manifestation of economic growth model's difficulty of "no known primum mobile" took the form of the "vicious circle" hypotheses. Programs to solve the lack or oversupply of production factors and/or to overcome market imperfections involved "not only initial results but also both favorable and unfavorable secondary repercussions." It was all too often, however, that the favorable outcome was "swamped" by the unfavorable one.⁹³ A study of such an occurrence was noted in a document prepared for the United Nations' Freedom From Hunger Campaign:


Expenditures to improve standards of health and thus to increase life span can have quite major benefits in terms of increased efficiency of the working force as well as greatly improving the quality of life of the individual. . . . Unfortunately, this favorable effect is often "swamped" by the rise in population which occurs when death rates fall. Similarly, decreases in infant mortality have a favorable effect on the social fabric of the society but are likely to add to the load of dependency which the family and the society must carry in the developing country.⁹⁴

This view of policy impact is the foundation of a causal theory for underdevelopment which determines "obstacles" to development to be so interrelated that any effort in a positive direction will tend to be offset by forces working in the opposite direction. Meier and Baldwin have summarized this "vicious circle" argument in its three forms in the diagram reproduced in figure 1. Each number in the diagram represents the starting point for each of three widely accepted versions of this perspective. Argument (1) emphasizes the fact that total output of the system is low. The resulting low productivity results in low real income for the labor

force which, in turn, produces low levels of savings and demand. Low investment results which lead to capital deficiency -- which is in itself a market imperfection which is bolstered by a lack of other production factors. The outcome is, once again, low productivity and the "vicious circle" is again the path of the underdeveloped society. Arguments (2) and (3) rely on the same or similar factors, the differences among the approaches being the factor which is emphasized as the primum mobile of the "vicious circle." Argument (2), for instance, considers low levels of demand and real income to be at the root of the vicious circle problem. Argument (3), on the other hand, seeks the causal factors in the underdeveloped resources and/or backwardness of the population in the area.⁹⁵ The policy for such situations seemed obvious enough: break the vicious circle! The problem was how.

Myint has remarked that the resulting policies are "all-or-nothing approaches" to development. These in turn are considered in two general forms: the critical minimum effort strategy which seeks to break through the low level equilibrium of the productive and other factors; and the balanced growth strategies which seek to bring about a minimum but sufficient investment program that will start economic development.⁹⁶ The varieties of balanced growth theories, however, show that even this approach was not held consistently among all planners. The vicious circle hypothesis had too many possible causes from which planners might chose; and in that sense it failed to solve the problem created by the Harrod-Domar model. The planning professional's task seemed to remain: to determine the primum mobile which would allow him to direct

FIGURE 1. THE VICIOUS
CIRCLES OF UNDER-
DEVELOPMENT^a



^aFrom Gerald M. Meier and Robert E. Baldwin, Economic Development: Theory, History, Policy (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1957), p. 320.

policies with greater effectiveness.

A fourth causal relationship is hypothesized by a number of planners within the context of the situation of the Third World since the Second World War. According to one group of analysts, underdevelopment is perpetuated by international forces which overcome any advance made through internal planning. Dual economies, considered a basic obstacle to effective development, were determined to be a result of the pressure for economic relations brought by colonialism and neo-colonialism in the Third World. As colonies were forced into the world market, an export sector of their economy was created where it did not exist previously. Meanwhile the non-exporting sectors were allowed to stagnate or deteriorate without much concern. The export sector, moreover, was developed through foreign investment for the purpose of benefiting the foreign investors rather than the domestic population. In addition, the world market itself has been subject to a general trend in which the terms of trade have deteriorated for the developing states. This is different from what might have been expected as international trade as well as the demand for natural resources increased. Development policies, in light of this hypothesis, aimed at limiting the role of international forces in the markets of the Third World while expanding the impact of indigenous forces.⁹⁷

Prior to this point the role of social factors had been peripheral to the perceptions of planners in regard to their tasks. The obvious bias that only economic factors are relevant determinants of development was reflected in a statement of proposals for the United Nations Development Decade issued in 1962. A "true

development plan" was defined in that document as "an action programme for the public and private sectors of the economy"98

Furthermore, the General Assembly resolution upon which the Decade of Development program was formulated had an equally strong economic definition of the "development" which professional planners must seek. The objectives of national development plans were to

. . . accelerate progress towards self-sustaining growth of the economy of the individual nations and their social advancement so as to attain in each under-developed country a substantial increase in the rate of growth, with each country setting its own target, taking as the objective a minimum rate of growth of aggregate national income of 5 per cent at the end of the Decade.99

In that statement, not only were previous strategies and hypotheses accepted, but a new form of the economic growth argument was brought to the fore in official terms. A fifth version of the economic growth planning image developed as the social context of the plan itself was recognized as a major determinant of the success or failure of plans aimed at increased economic growth rates. It was seen that, in terms of the planning image which prevailed at the time, the problem of development was the quality of the social, cultural and political institutions in each particular country. An exaggeration of economic factors gave way to that of non-economic factors. "After 1964 the thinking became less confident," states Ronald Robinson. "Focus shifted from the economic means of growth to the non-economic obstacles encountered by them."¹⁰⁰ Previously these social factors of production were "hidden" within the abstracted economic factors such as labor force sizes and quality and the like. Even that version of the vicious circle argument which laid "blame" upon the "backward population" (see figure 1 page 46) and similar

factors considered these to be definable in terms of "unskilled" labor, etc. This fifth argument of the economic growth approach was unique in its view that the traditional theories of economic development and the capacity of the social systems involved were incongruent. This was, for example, in debates among economists regarding the low capital absorption rate of Third World countries. In part this was the fault of the economic system -- but the primary causes were closer to factors in the social realm which qualified the capacity of the economic system. Planners became aware of the fact that, in order for them to accomplish their projected task of economic growth, it would be necessary to deal with the cultural and social aspects of the population. As the first Development Decade failed to reach its minimum goals, more and more effort was put into reorienting the targets of plans. "Development theory today," noted one United Nations source, "is much preoccupied with the role of 'social factors' as inputs or prerequisites for economic growth. It is widely believed that neglect of these factors has been a reason for disappointing rates of economic growth."¹⁰¹ As the second Development Decade program was being debated by "planning experts," greater emphasis was directed to the fact that economic growth can only come about within the context of a social environment favorable to it.

Early confidence that economic growth would, or its own accord, lead more or less automatically to social progress (at least in terms of better material living conditions for the majority of the population) has been widely belied by events in the developing areas. Even in low-income countries that have achieved rapid rates of economic growth, there has been a tendency for levels of living to remain static or, in some respects, actually to decline so far as the bulk of the population is concerned.¹⁰²

The U.N. "planning experts" go on to argue that there is a pressing need to identify new and more realistic conceptual and methodological approaches to the problems of development and planning in low-income countries, taking prominently into account the fact that economic growth and social progress are not only mutually interdependent, but are also organically related parts of a single process of development.¹⁰³

The resulting policy was termed a "unified socio-economic" approach to planning and development. As transformed into specific policy goals, however, it is still a socio-economic approach oriented toward economic growth -- for ultimately underdevelopment is defined in purely economic terms. As the objectives of the second Development Decade stated by the General Assembly are considered, it is difficult to see where non-economic goals fit into the total effort. Whatever social planning is advocated, it is for the purpose of facilitating the primary ends of obtaining an "annual rate of growth in the gross product of the developing countries as a whole . . . [of] at least 6 per cent . . ."¹⁰⁴ Modernization of social factors has entered into planning strategies in the sense that modernizing is deemed a prerequisite to economic growth which, in turn, was defined relative to the international society within which Third World societies were located.¹⁰⁵ Planning was and still is based upon a fundamental assumption of economic growth as the key to development. It was in order to facilitate that goal that planners had to reorient themselves to the social factors of Third World life.

The planning image of development as a matter of facilitating economic growth has never been overcome. The logic of that image functioned to keep the debate on development limited to finding

the causes of economic growth.

CONCLUSIONS AND A PROPOSAL FOR RESEARCH

According to Guy Benveniste, the primary function of development planners and other "experts" is to reduce uncertainty in complex social circumstances.¹⁰⁶ A number of "secondary" functions, however, can also be noted as the expert offers the politician (1) secrecy in policy research and planning. (2) a private staff to aid in decision-making, and (3) legitimacy in conditions which demand the presence of planning organizations.¹⁰⁷ Apter's argument regarding professionals can be described from this functional perspective. In brief, Apter sees professionalism as a means which can be utilized only within the "correct" environment. That is, planners and their related colleagues can fulfill their primary function only in a context dominated by the "ideology of science"; and until that circumstance exists, it is only the "secondary" functions which can be fulfilled by planners and other professionals.

In a sense, the Apter argument has been both challenged and substantiated in the preceding pages. His observations regarding professionalism and its inability to fulfill its primary functions in the developing world seems obvious from the fact that, in the literature of planning experts, there is "talk more about failures than about successes."¹⁰⁸ According to Apter, the cause of this situation may be found in the incongruity of the professional's ideological framework with the social conditions of the subject cultures.¹⁰⁹ However in regard to his conclusion that a congruency

between the professional ideology and societal conditions can only occur as the latter adjusts to the former. Apter's presentation can be challenged. Planners and other professionals again according to Apter, can perform their primary function of reducing uncertainty only as societal conditions facilitate the utility of the ideology of science. This ideology of science is deemed a necessary condition of professionalism -- a necessity which manifests itself in seemingly extreme inflexibility so far as planners and other professionals are concerned. If there is some degree of optimism to be found using such a perspective, it is rooted in the malleability of the social system and not the flexibility of the planner or his ideological determinants. In the previous sections the planner's ideology has been considered from a different point of view -- one which emphasizes that the problem is not inherent in the planner's professionalism per se, but rather in an inflexibility prompted and promoted by both the nature of professionalism and those forces, both internal and external, which define the planning image.

The basis for presenting the concept of the planning image is not to deny the problem which Apter defines. Rather, from the perspective of the planning image framework the possibility of facilitating the use of planners as "reducers of uncertainty" in the early stages of development is increased. Assuming that planners and the planning image are malleable to the particular social conditions which define the type of development strategy to be utilized, one can help to overcome some basic obstacles to development policymaking. In short, we must seek a cause upon which we may have an impact. The problem is to create a concept such as

the planning image which can be used as both explanation and a practical point of policymaking.

The idea of "practicality" carries with it the connotation of "utility" in the simple sense of tools, etc. The usual declarations of practicality advocate a movement away from theory, idealism, and the like. However, put forth here is a call for practical criteria for theories and ideas as such theories are manifested in planning images. Theory, to be useful, must relate to the circumstances to which it is intended to apply. In a similar vein, planning images must relate to the relevant factors in the environment for which change and control is sought. Too often it is advocated that the subject social system change so as to facilitate the utilization of the image. Instead of forcing the situation to relate to a particular image form, the planning image must be made to relate to the situation, if the planning image is to be considered "practical." The problem posited is how to produce a practical planning image.

In lieu of the current planning image, what must be sought is a flexible image which will be malleable in regard to the circumstances with which planners must deal while allowing for the theoretical nature of human knowledge. Although much remains to be done in order to specify how that task might be accomplished, a number of suggestions come to mind from the very nature of the problem itself. For instance, a primary avenue to creating image flexibility that might be considered is the manipulation of the image holder -- that is, the planner. Personality theories in psychology abound with typologies which contrast the open and

closed mind.¹¹⁰ Using this background one may posit that the key to flexible planning images are to be found in flexible planners who avoid the dogmatisms usually associated with the "closed-minded" individual. Seeking to reorient planners -- seeking, in short, to open their minds -- might produce the desired results; but other methods might accomplish that task while relying less upon the difficult if not impossible chore of changing personalities. For instance, changing the structure of the decision-making process might be the alternative in the "openness" could be built into or near the organization. This would involve improving the "feedback-evaluation loops" of policy-making processes to the extent that the planning image would be challenged in regards to its "practicality." Yet as simple as that solution might sound, the problems which arise in attempting to create a truly evaluative feedback are massive. Some may deem it possible to have an effective feedback channel built into the system; others have considered it necessary to construct a system of external evaluation;¹¹¹ while still others have advocated the subordination of planning efforts to certain more general criteria which might be used in the evaluation of planning efforts.¹¹²

An entirely different approach might concern itself with the quality of the model used by planners rather than the planners or planning processes. However, the impossibility of discovering a model suitable to all circumstances, while implied strongly in contemporary social theories such as the Parsonian scheme seems unlikely.¹¹³ An opposite approach can be derived from an extreme incrementalist outlook which, while advocated by many analysts in

the developed world, has many critics among those who see the end of development in terms of some specific form of society. The incrementalist would regard the factor of "ends" entirely in a secondary light.¹¹⁴ Those who consider it feasible to posit a particular goal for development planners regard such incrementalism as inhumane and unethical. Denis Goulet's goal of a decrease in societal "vulnerability,"¹¹⁵ Manfred Halpern's desire that societies have "an intrinsic capacity to generate and absorb continuing transformation,"¹¹⁶ Henry Kariel's claim that the product of development should be "open-ended," political beings¹¹⁷; all three are examples of definitions of development which go beyond the economic realm and present planners with alternatives upon which future planning images may rest.

To Apter and others, such recommendations as these amount to little more than wishful speculation. Using the planning image concept, however, such proposals for creating a more functional planning effort would only be considered premature. Changing planners, their organizations, or the criteria used to guide planning attempts in the Third World are all feasible alternatives to the present dilemma of development policymaking. But prior to consideration of which alternatives may be used, it is necessary for more research and theory construction efforts to be applied to the idea of the planning images. The image has been posited as the target. Obtaining an image of that image will be necessary before aim can be taken at its flexibility. Relevant questions must be asked of the researcher, such as:

—What is the impact of professionalism upon the planning image at this time;

- What are the sources of planning image content;
- What is the content of the planning image
- What is the structure of the content of the planning image;
- How resistant (in other words, how internally consistent) is the particular planning image in relation to contradicting information from the environment; and
- At which structural or logical point is the planning image most susceptible to change rendering messages?

We have put forth the economic growth model as a manifestation of the dominant planning image by which development policymakers seem to orient themselves. What brief perspectives have been derived are a beginning to a more thorough analysis which, if at all fruitful, might open the door to efforts at more practical planning in the Third World.

FOOTNOTES

1. David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 343.
2. Apter, The Politics of Modernization, p. 317.
3. Apter, The Politics of Modernization, 317.
4. Apter, The Politics of Modernization, pp. 328, 343.
5. Apter, The Politics of Modernization, p. 318.
6. Apter, The Politics of Modernization, p. 318; emphasis added.
7. Apter, The Politics of Modernization, p. 344.
8. See Professionalization, eds Howard M. Vollmer and Donald L. Mills (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Incorporated, 1966), p. 4.
9. Wilbert E. Moore, The Professions: Roles and Rules (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970), pp. 53-54.
10. Ernest Greenwood, "Attributes of a Profession," Social Work, 2 (July 1957) 44-55.
11. Moore, The Professions, pp. 5-6.
12. Moore, The Professions, pp. 6-7.
13. Moore, The Professions, pp. 79-82.
14. Moore, The Professions, p. 82.
15. Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, ed Dirk J. Stulik (New York: International Publishers, 1964), p. 108.
16. Moore, The Professions, p. 83.
17. Moore, The Professions, pp. 7-9.
18. Moore, The Professions, pp. 76-79.
19. Moore, The Professions, pp. 9-10; 113-120.

20. For example, Moore cites a census of educational levels attributed to members of various occupations in the United States for 1960. These figures show that 95.3% of college administrators and faculty have 4 years or more of college education. The figure for physicians and surgeons is 98%; for lawyers and judges, 89.7%; and so on. See Moore, The Professions, p. 12.

21. Moore, The Professions, pp. 10-12; 74; 120-124.

22. See Talcott Parsons, "The Professions and Social Structure," Social Forces, 17 (May 1939), 457-467.

23. Moore, The Professions, pp. 13-15.

24. Moore, The Professions, pp. 15-16.

25. Pitirim A. Sorokin, Society, Culture, and Personality: Their Structure and Dynamics (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, Inc., 1969), pp. 348-349; emphasis in original.

26. Apter, The Politics of Modernization, pp. 317-318.

27. Warren F. Ilchman, "Productivity, Administrative Reform, and Antipolitics: Dilemmas for Developing States," in Political and Administrative Development, ed. Ralph Braibanti (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1969), pp. 474-479.

28. Warren F. Ilchman, Alice Stone Ilchman, and Philip K. Hastings, The New Men of Knowledge and the Developing Nations: Planners and the Polity, A Preliminary Survey (Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California, 1968), especially pp. 68-70.

29. Ilchman, Ilchman, and Hastings, pp. 68-70.

30. Edward T. Hall, The Silent Language (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1959), p. 31.

31. See Clyde Kluckhohn and Alfred L. Kroeber, Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions (Cambridge, Mass.: The Museum, 1952).

32. Edward T. Hall, The Hidden Dimension (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1966), p. 2; emphasis in original.

33. Kenneth E. Boulding, The Image: Knowledge in Life and Society (Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1956), pp. 5-6.

34. Boulding, The Image, p. 7.

35. Boulding, The Image, pp. 7-11.

36. Boulding, The Image, pp. 11-13. Boulding views the nature of social change in the same light as he does image change. In later works he posits a view of history which considers change to be "developmental" rather than "dialectic" /see A Primer on Social Dynamics: History as Dialectics and Development (New York: The Free Press, 1970)7. Such a perspective seems to mark his observations of image change as well in that he considers the tendency of the image to be cumulative in its process of change rather than revolutionary. While not a denial of revolutionary or dialectic change, the tendency toward developmental adjustments is dominant.

37. For an example of an in-depth study of this aspect of the image, see Hall, The Hidden Dimension.

38. Boulding, The Image, chapter 4.

39. Ilchman, Ilchman, and Hastings, The New Men of Knowledge. . ., and Ilchman, "Productivity . . . ," pp. 474-479.

40. Ilchman, Ilchman, and Hastings, The New Men of Knowledge, p. 13.

41. The "self-realization" developmentalists are represented in a number of works including Henry S. Kariel, "Goals for Administrative Reform in Developing States: An Open-Ended Design," in Political and Administrative Development, ed Braibanti, pp. 141-165; and Denis Goulet, The Cruel Choice: A New Concept in the Theory of Development (New York: Atheneum, 1971/1973). For the particular survey results noted here, see Ilchman, Ilchman, and Hastings, The New Men of Knowledge, pp. 15-17.

42. Ilchman, Ilchman, and Hastings, The New Men of Knowledge, pp. 16-17.

43. Ilchman, Ilchman, and Hastings, The New Men of Knowledge, p. 17.

44. Ilchman, Ilchman, and Hastings, The New Men of Knowledge, pp. 18-22.

45. Ilchman, Ilchman, and Hastings, The New Men of Knowledge, pp. 23-24;30-31.

46. Ilchman, Ilchman, and Hastings, The New Men of Knowledge, pp. 31-32.

47. Ilchman, Ilchman, and Hastings, The New Men of Knowledge, pp. 34-39.

48. Ilchman, Ilchman, and Hastings, The New Men of Knowledge, p. 39.

49. Ilchman, Ilchman, and Hastings, The New Men of Knowledge, pp. 40-41.

50. Albert Waterston, Development Planning: Lessons of Experience (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), pp. 17-20.

51. Waterston, Development Planning, p. 145.

52. Government of India, Planning Commission, First Five Year Plan (Dehli: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, January 1953), p. 11.

53. India, First Five Year Plan, p. 14.

54. Government of India, Planning Commission, Second Five Year Plan (1956), pp. 6-7, 21-24; and Government of India, Planning Commission, Third Five Year Plan (Dehli and New Dehli: Government of India Press, 1961) pp. 1, 9, 48.

55. Government of Uganda, The First Five-Year Development Plan, 1961-62 to 1965-66 (Entebbe, Uganda: Government Printer, n.d.), p. 8; Government of Uganda, Work for Progress: Uganda's Second Five Year Plan, 1966-1971 (n.d.), pp. vii-viii.

56. Republic of Zambia, Office of National Development and Planning, First National Development Plan, 1966-1970 (Lusaka, Zambia: July 1966), p. 5.

57. The United Republic of Tanzania, Tanzania: Second Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, 1st July 1969 - 30th June 1974, Volume I: General Analysis (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania: The Government Printer, 1969).

58. Tanzania, Tanzania: Second Five-Year Plan . . ., p. xx.

59. Republic of Korea, Minister of Public Information, Korean Economy: About to Take-Off (Seoul, Korea: Kwang Myong Printing Co., n.d.), p. 17; People's Republic of China, First Five-Year Plan for Development of the National Economy of the People's Republic of China in 1953-1957 (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1956), pp. 21-25; Government of Pakistan, National Planning Board, The First Five year Plan, 1955-60 (Karachi, Pakistan: Government of Pakistan Press, December 1957), p. 13 and Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission, The Second Five Year Plan (1960-65) (June 1960), pp. 4-5; Plan Organization, Public Relations Bureau, Planning in Iran (n.d.), pp. 2, 6.

60. Harold Rosenberg, The Tradition of The New, 2nd edition (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1960), pp. 11-12.

61. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor, 1958), pp. 249-262; see also John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (Chicago: The Swallow Press, 1927), chapter 3.

62. See C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1962/1970).

63. Israel M. Kirzner, The Economic Point of View: An Essay in the History of Economic Thought (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1960), p. 22.

64. Kirzner, The Economic Point of View, pp. 26-27 and chapter 3.

65. Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society, trans. John Wilkinson (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), p. 218. For a brief explanation of the role of abstraction in classical and Marxian economics, see Paul M. Sweezy, The Theory of Capitalist Development: Principles of Marxian Political Economy (New York: Modern Reader Paperbacks, 1942), pp. 3-22.

66. Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, p. 107; emphasis in original.

67. Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1934/1962), p. 177.

68. Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action: A Study in Social Theory With Special Reference to a Group of Recent European Writers, Volume I: Marshall, Pareto, Durkheim (New York: The Free Press, 1937/1968), pp. 265-266.

69. Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, p. 266.

70. Robert S. Lynd, Knowledge For What? The Place of Social Science in American Culture (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1939/1964), p. 234.

71. Lynd, Knowledge For What?, p. 209.

72. Quoted in Kirzner, The Economic Point of View, p. 109.

73. See Kirzner, The Economic Point of View, chapter 6.

74. Edward Hallett Carr, The New Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1951/1957), p. 35.

75. Raymond Aron, The Century of Total War (Boston: Beacon Press, 1954), pp. 267-268.

76. See B. Mussolini, "Speech in the Senate on the Bill Establishing the Corporations, January 13, 1934," in Twentieth Century Europe: A Documentary History, ed. Stephan Fischer-Galati (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1967), p. 171.

77. Carr, The New Society, pp. 35-36.

78. See Waterston, Development Planning, pp. 31-32; also J. Tinbergen, "Planning, Economic: I. Western Europe," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ed. David L. Sills, XII (1968) 102.

79. For an analysis of European planning efforts written from the perspective of the immediate post-World War Two era, see Seymour E. Harris, Economic Planning: The Plans of Fourteen Countries with Analyses of the Plans (New York: Alfred E. Knopf, 1949), especially chapter III.

80. See the essays in International Social Development Review, No. 3: Unified Socio-Economic Development and Planning, Some New Horizons (New York: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1971), especially pp. 1-4.

81. One attempt to trace the definitions of underdevelopment used during the present century has found that, prior to World War Two, little if any concern was given over to development. When the term underdeveloped was used it was in the sense of "backward" and "less developed" and it was applied in that manner to the countries of Eastern and Southeastern Europe. With the advent of the United Nations the main concern of "development" policy was with the reconstruction of Europe. It was not until 1949 that some major attempt at defining the condition of underdevelopment was undertaken. These efforts did not produce a definition upon which policy-making could be based, and so in 1950 the Secretary-General of the U.N. selected a committee of "experts" whose purpose was to develop some measures for development and underdevelopment. "With no official definition offered to guide them in their investigation, they were forced quite arbitrarily to define the term underdeveloped country, as one in which per capita income is low when compared with the per capita real incomes of the United States, Canada, Australia, and Western Europe." See Harry David Carlson, "A Consideration of Some of the Problems Associated With the Definitions of Underdevelopment Used By the United Nations and Its Associated Agencies," (unpublished M.A. thesis, Department of Political Science, University of Colorado, 1969), pp. 5-12, 20-21.

82. Hla Myint, The Economics of the Developing Countries (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1964), pp. 9-10.

83. The reader is reminded that what is being discussed here is the general trends which determined the developmental model that predominated the planning field during most of the postwar period. There were and still are notable exceptions to the generalizations being made here, especially in the academic realm where political and other factors were seen as major points of underdevelopment. Yet even these exceptions note the salient role economics plays in defining the condition of underdevelopment. For example, see C.E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966), pp. 18-20.

84. Hans Singer, International Development: Growth and Change (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1964), pp. 3-6.

85. Joan Robinson, Economic Philosophy (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor, 1962), pp. 106-107.

86. Most of the following discussion is drawn from Benjamin Higgins, Economic Development: Problem, Principles, and Policies, rev. ed. (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1968), chapter 6.

87. Robinson, Economic Philosophy, p. 109.

88. Albert O. Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), p. 31.

89. For a summary of the "hypersensitivity" of underdeveloped countries to inflation as seen by the Harrod-Domar model, see Higgins, Economic Development, pp. 113-117; and Singer, International Development, pp. 6-14.

90. One source which gained wide acceptance and publicity during the 1960's -- the Pearson Report -- reflects this situation when it called the problem of development "a question of will." Rarely does one find development policy to be a question of ends. See Lester B. Pearson, et. al., Partners in Development: Report of the Commission on International Development (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969).

91. Gerald M. Meier and Robert E. Baldwin, Economic Development: Theory, History, Policy (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1957), p. 317.

92. Hla Myint, Economic Theory and the Underdeveloped Countries (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 20-21.

93. Freedom From Hunger Campaign (F.A.O.), Basic Study No. 13: National Development Efforts (United Nations, Office of Public Information, n.d.), p. 21.

94. Freedom From Hunger Campaign, Basic Study No. 13, p. 21.

95. Meier and Baldwin, Economic Development, pp. 319-320.

96. For explanations and distinctions between the critical minimum effort and balanced growth strategies, see Myint, The Economics of the Developing Countries, chapters 7-8.

97. See Meier and Baldwin, Economic Development, pp. 324-333; also Myint, The Economics of the Developing Countries, chapters 2-5, 9.

98. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, The United Nations Development Decade, Proposals for Action: Report of the Secretary-General (New York: United Nations, 1962).

99. From the United Nations General Assembly Resolution No. 1710 quoted in United Nations, The United Nations Development Decade, p. 7.

100. Ronald Robinson, "Practical Politics of Economic Development," in Developing the Third World: The Experience of the Nineteen Sixties, ed. Ronald Robinson (Cambridge: The University Press, 1971), p. 5.

101. Nancy Baster and Wolf Scott, Levels of Living and Economic Growth: A Comparative Study of Six Countries, 1950-1968 (Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, June 1969), p. xi.

102. International Social Development Review No. 3, p. 2.

103. International Social Development Review No. 3, p. 2.

104. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, International Development Strategy: Action Programme of the General Assembly for the Second Development Decade (New York: United Nations, 1970), pp. 3-5.

105. For an analysis of the relativeness of the term "modernization" see J. P. Nettl and Roland Robertson, "Industrialization, Development or Modernization," The British Journal of Sociology, XVII (September 1966), 274-291.

106. Guy Benveniste, The Politics of Expertise (Berkeley: The Glendessary Press, 1972), chapter 2.

107. Benveniste, The Politics of Expertise, chapter 3.

108. Benveniste cites the meeting of planning "experts" [which is the basis of the essays in the International Social Development Review No. 3 (see notes 80, 102, 103 above)] as his source for this comment regarding the attitude of "failure" that seems to permeate the planning profession. See The Politics of Expertise, p. 14.

109. Apter, The Politics of Modernization, p. 344.

110. See Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind: Investigations Into the Nature of Belief Systems and Personality Systems (New York: Basic Books, 1960); also see the work of O.J. Harvey, et alia in many articles [O.J. Harvey, "Belief Systems and Education: Some Implications for Change," in The Affective Domain, ed. Jack Crawford (Washington, D.C.: Communication Service Corp., 1970), pp. 67-96].

111. For a recent discussion of organizational evaluation, see Aaron Wildavsky, "The Self-Evaluating Organization," Public Administration Review, XXXII (September/October 1972), 509-520.

112. Goulet, The Cruel Choice, offers one example of an approach to development policymaking which seeks new criteria as a basis for decisions.

113. The debate regarding the utility of sociological theories is extensive. The central concern of those who challenge the "social systems," etc. approaches is that the uniqueness of various situations will be overlooked and there will be a tendency to declare "laws" of society and social life. A "determinism" is formed, according to the critics, which is "unsound in theory and unsuccessful in practice" thereby alienating more and more practitioners. See Black, The Dynamics of Modernization, pp. 35-46 for a discussion of this criticism.

114. Y. Dror argues against the incrementalist argument in many works, the most noted being his Public Policy-Making Re-examined (San Francisco: Chandler Press, 1968). His main target has been the work of Charles E. Lindblom, especially as his theory is summarized in "The Science of Muddling Through," Public Administration Review, XIX (1959), 79-88.

115. Goulet, The Cruel Choice.

116. Manfred Halpern, "The Revolution of Modernization in National and International Society," in Revolution -- Nomos VIII, ed. Carl J. Friedrich (New York: Atherton Press, Inc., 1966), pp. 178-214.

117. Kariel, "Goals for Administrative Reform in Developing States: An Open-Ended Design,"